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Figure 1: Errol E. Harris at Northwestern University, early 1970s. Photo recreated 
with permission by Nigel Harris.   
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Errol E. Harris devoted his life to grappling with the big questions concerning the 
relationship between nature and mind. Harris’s career was distinguished, his works were 
widely published, and yet his metaphysics has until now been excluded from mainstream 
discourse. The purpose of this work is to outline Harris’s philosophies of nature, mind, and 
science so as to provide his overarching metaphysics a rigorous and sympathetic assessment. 
This thesis begins with an examination of Harris’s biography, including key inspirations that 
led to the development of his philosophical system. In the remaining three parts I compare 
Harris’s distinctive phenomenological and interdisciplinary approach to the hard problem of 
consciousness with his closest theoretical analogues in the contemporary philosophies of 
physics, biology, and mind. I argue that Harris’s metaphysics both anticipates and provides a 
means of unifying the theories of Bohmian quantum mechanics, systems evolution, and 4E 
cognition. Specifically, I contend that when clarified by the philosophical developments of 
systems theory, Harris’s metaphysics reveals as yet unnoticed implications of autopoietic 
enactivism for a novel version of the anthropic cosmological principle. I conclude that insofar 
as the resulting metaphysics of “dialectical holism” remains consistent, it provides both 
methodological and theoretical principles towards revising neutral monism and naturalizing 
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Chapter 1 




Although he was not in the habit of keeping a journal, Harris maintained detailed records 
of all his communications, research activity, and other academic endeavors. Many of his 
hand-written notes and even his autobiography, have (until the writing of this thesis) been 
preserved by his son Nigel Harris in Nottingham England. Reflecting my research into this 
material, Chapter 1 draws from Harris’s autobiography to elucidate the central themes and 
experiences throughout his life that led to the development of his metaphysics. In chapter 2, I 
outline Harris’s metaphysics and argue that this system anticipates a number of recent 
theories including enactivism and the implicate order. Part I concludes by highlighting the 
common metaphysical tenets of these camps and sets the scene for a deeper evaluation of 
Harris’s system to be conducted in the following chapters.  
  
1.2 Education 
Characteristically modest, Harris admitted that although always prone to introspection, he 
had “aversion” to talking about himself, convinced that his was an unimpressive story. 
Indeed, if it were not for his son Nigel’s request, Harris would not have undertaken his 
autobiography at all. The autobiography was his final philosophical project, begun in his mid 
90s. It is from this work primarily that we are provided insight into the development of his 
metaphysics.1 
Harris’s father, Samuel (Jack) Harris was a businessman and his mother Dora taught music 
and dance. Jack and Dora knew each other when living in Leeds in the north of England and 
                                                
1 As the citations that follow were taken from an unpublished digital draft of Harris’s autobiography, their page 
numbers do not correspond to those of Bound in Shallows (2015), which is the edited and published version of 
the original work that I drew from for this chapter.   
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met again after each had independently moved to South Africa. The two eventually married 
and Errol Eustace Harris was born in Kimberley, on 19 February, 1908.  
Jack, an amateur gymnast and a soft-drink manufacturer had left school to work for his 
father at the age of 14 and during the second Boer war (1899-1902), he became one of the 
defenders of the town of Kimberley where he lived. Harris recalls that even though his father 
had never driven a car, he had learned to disassemble and reassemble an automobile engine 
just from watching a mechanic for a short time. When Jack took an interest in photography, 
Harris explains 
he allowed me to watch how he worked, under a red light, with the developer, how he fixed the 
pictures, and then printed them in the sunlight outside. It was not just a silent display; he 
explained every step of the process to me as he went along, so that I understood what he was 
doing (p. 15). 
Harris clearly admired his father’s skills and they likely provided the impetus for his own 
practical interests later in life. Harris dedicated one of his later books The Restitution of 
Metaphysics (2000) to Jack, and in his autobiography said he was “the most understanding 
and sympathetic of fathers” (p. 13). 
Harris’s mother ensured that his upbringing was firmly grounded in Orthodox Judaism, 
requiring that he learn Hebrew from a young age. Harris described his mother as “a little 
woman under five feet tall, who made up in vivacity and talkativeness what she lacked in 
stature” (p. 11). Dora filled their home with classical music, which gave Harris a lifelong 
respect for the arts. Harris’s upbringing was generally stable, aside from frequent changes of 
residence due to his father’s continual professional struggles and Harris’s debilitating bouts of 
asthma. In South Africa, his family, including two elder sisters, led a sociable life that 
frequently brought him into contact with adult conversation. Despite this, Harris describes 
himself as a lonely child, often finding himself in the African bush, immersed in his 
imagination and with only his dog for company.  
Harris recalls his earliest classroom experiences that foreshadowed his love of education. 
Because his mother was busy with her teaching, she sent Harris to school with his sisters, 
Enid and Gwenda, “not as a pupil but for the teacher to act as baby-sitter, allowing me to play 
with toys while the lessons were in progress. My attention, however, was captured by what 
was going on around me and the blocks and toys were neglected” (p. 15). Likewise, nature 
captured Harris’s attention from an early age. Here we find an early glimpse into his tendency 
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to recognize patterns across a range of natural phenomena. As his family commonly slept 
outdoors on hot summer nights, he remembers, 
The crickets sang incessantly in full chorus and in the black vault of the cloudless sky the stars 
twinkled with cheery brilliance. I associated the sound with the sight as the twinkling seemed to 
me to keep time with the chirping, and I imagined that the stars were making the merry noise. This 
was a new version of the music of the spheres (about which, of course, I as yet knew nothing) (p. 
17). 
Although Harris was a late starter for primary school, due to his asthma keeping him at 
home, thanks to his home schooling, he was able skip two grades. Showing great academic 
potential early in his studies at the Grey Institute of Port Elizabeth, Harris won a scholarship 
and became editor of the school’s newspaper. In his early teens Harris began taking a serious 
interest in literature. He became immersed in the myths and legends of Ancient Greece, Norse 
myths and legends, Dickens, Helen of Troy, and other classics. He claims that in these early 
years, English and Latin were his strongest subject while mathematics was his weakest. 
Though he was drawn to science since his youth, he would claim “ignorance” of mathematics 
throughout his career.2 
Harris’s hard work and early success enabled him to attend Rhodes College, 
Grahamstown, where he intended to major in English and Latin, envisioning a career in 
journalism. Following the advice of Arthur Lord however, Harris changed direction to pursue 
ancient philosophy, chemistry, and history. He was immediately captivated by Professor 
Lord’s instruction and fascinated by his new topics of study including right action, justice, 
and utopia. Harris quickly set his sights upon winning scholarships to help his father, who 
was at that time struggling financially.  
The study of natural sciences had inspired Harris to reconsider his own upbringing and 
question the values that he had previously taken for granted.  
Suddenly I experienced what seemed a revelation, that there was no such God as I had hitherto 
imagined, but simply a prevailing harmony in Nature and that most of our religious practices were 
based on false beliefs, prayer being inappropriate and futile. Of course, I did not express this 
revolution in my thinking to my parents (p. 33).  
                                                
2 Interestingly, evidence to the contrary can be found in Harris’s personal notes, which reveal dozens of hand-
drawn diagrams of early science experiments accompanied by their corresponding mathematics. 
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As his knowledge increased, it became clear that Harris had found his path. “I was enthralled, 
and decided that it was Philosophy to which I really wanted to devote myself. This experience 
set the mold for the rest of my life, although I little realized it at the time” (p. 37). 
Suffering from sciatica and an apparent chronic stress, Jack’s health had been declining for 
some years leading up to a cerebral hemorrhage. Jack died July 28th 1928, just shy of his 59th 
birthday. For a time this meant that Harris was to run his father’s share in a water purification 
company. This was a very difficult time for his whole family and Harris took on the 
responsibility but was not at all poised to succeed in business. Despite these challenges he 
was able to continue his education at Rhodes where he earned his B.A., won two 
scholarships, and continued his work toward an M.A. It was at this point that Harris’s 
understanding of scientific discoveries and political ideologies was significantly expanded. 
He began attending science lectures, including one by Sir Ernest Rutherford on his discovery 
of the structure of the atom. Through his studies of history, Harris came to more fully 
comprehend the “unreasonable” mentalities that perpetuated racial and class divisions 
exemplified in the South African climate.  
Harris’s spirituality too was at this point ignited by study of Spinoza. He recounts that 
Spinoza’s “Ethics (despite its dry geometrical method) is the only work that has ever aroused 
in me genuine religious emotion” (p. 41). Concerning immortality, Harris developed an 
argument against what he considered “the common belief in an after-life.” He approved of 
“Spinoza’s idea of the eternity of the soul as meaning that the attainment of truth in adequate 
ideas was not subject to time and so was not destroyed with the human body and the 
concomitant stream of imaginal consciousness (imaginatio) in the human mind” (p. 42). 
Indeed, Spinoza’s work provided the seed of what would later become Harris’s holist 
metaphysics: 
largely under the influence of my professor I came to see reality as a single whole in which 
everything was causally connected directly or indirectly with everything else. This, I thought, had 
to be conceded if only because one accepted the law of gravity, according to which every material 
body reciprocally attracted every other. If, then, the universe was an infinite whole, this Whole 
would answer to Descartes’s definition of God as a perfect being […] This clearly (as I 
understood it) was the position of Spinoza of whose philosophy I had become a devotee (p. 45). 
Nevertheless, his system would undergo numerous developments in the following years. 
For a time Harris describes himself as following Berkeley, convinced that “everything was 
ideal”. At this point Harris became sympathetic to the Christian Oxford Group at Rhodes, 
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who inspired him to reject aspects of Judaism in favour of a ‘more pragmatic’ and 
‘disciplined approach to spirituality.’ Harris admits, “[t]heir message caught me on the 
rebound, when I needed support, reassurance and guidance, for the conduct of life after the 
loss of my father” (p. 45). Eventually however, Harris lamented that their practice appeared to 
lead to “self-deception.” Resonating with Socrates, Harris believed that an individual’s 
religious convictions were secondary to the conduct and analysis of one’s own life. Religion, 
he concluded, could even act as a crutch, permitting individuals to avoid self-observation. 
After a time, Jack’s business was sold as per Dora’s arrangement and Harris was free to 
fully devote his efforts to his philosophical career. Laying the foundation for his later works 
by closely following Hegel and Spinoza in his M.A. thesis, Harris graduated in 1929 with the 
highest examination grades yet recorded at the college. By recommendation of professor 
Lord, at the age of 22 Harris took up his first academic position at Fort Hare College and 
immediately set about caring for his mother and sisters. Interestingly, at this time Harris 
recalls that shortly after his arrival a mathematics lecturer asked him “what is the use of 
philosophy?”, to which he replied, “it was what enabled one to decide the use of anything 
else” (p. 50).  
Although he had only a cursory knowledge of psychology from his earlier studies, at Fort 
Hare, Harris was required to teach the subject up to an advanced level. After a year of this 
work, he sought to further his career and applied to the Lovedale Christian School, where he 
aimed to continue his studies toward a second M.A., this time in psychology. During his 
interview however, the headmaster was initially unsure about giving Harris the position since 
he was not a self-professing Christian. “Mr. Shephard asked me to come for an interview, and 
he [questioned] me about my religious beliefs. In reply I said that I considered the Sermon on 
the Mount the most important thing in life. At that he terminated the interview and I was 
offered the post” (p. 53). Unfortunately, Harris found apartheid policies more evident at 
Lovedale than any of his previous institutions. This put extra pressure on him to manipulate 
the social situations toward integration and equality. Harris recalls making a point to work 
with the students during their required manual labour details on campus and intentionally 
interacting with the black staff members when the faculty was otherwise divided.  
Just as he resumed his studies, Harris received a response concerning the Queen Victoria 
Scholarship to which he applied as a shot in the dark but quickly put out of his mind. He 
discovered that the candidate ahead of him was out of the running, which meant that much to 
his surprise, he could now study at any British University. Considering the advice of A.R. 
Lord, Harris decided to study philosophy, politics and economics (PPE) at Oxford. With that 
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Lovedale, his mother and sisters gave Harris a warm parting and he set sail for his first trip to 
England. 
From my earliest childhood I had heard my parents talking of “going home to England”. They had 
done so after the Boer War and expressed hopes of doing so again after the Great War, but it was 
not feasible because my father had been out of work for most of the time and they could not afford 
it. So I had subconsciously learned to think of England as home (p. 56). 
 
1.2.1 Life at Oxford 
In the fall of 1931 Harris began research at Magdalen College Oxford. Upon arrival, his 
apartment appeared particularly lavish in comparison to his earlier residences and was 
beautifully situated just next to Deer Park. Though Harris had initially enrolled as an honours 
B.A. student, it quickly became clear to his tutor Thomas Dewar Weldon, that a D.Phil., 
would be much more appropriate. Though confessedly intimidated in the face of this 
unexpected challenge, Harris set himself to the task and quickly discovered that at Oxford he 
was in his element, able to make new friends and grow in ways never before possible.  
Initially facing the daunting task of writing his D.Phil. thesis proposal, he explains “I 
wanted to address the problem that, it seemed to me, ought to be faced by Idealists of how the 
human mind, which on their theory ought to be all-inclusive, could still be regarded as a finite 
inhabitant of an encompassing world” (p. 59). His biggest challenge in this regard was 
fending off the criticisms of his appointed supervisor, H.H. Joachim, a Bradlean scholar and 
logician who purportedly never approved of any philosophical work a student wrote. After a 
consultation J.A. Smith suggested the elaborate title “‘The Bearing of the Concept of 
Evolution on the Problem of Including the Human Mind within Reality as a Whole”. With 
that, Harris had his heading and it was one that would remain for the rest of his career.  
To meet his challenge, Harris attended Joachim’s lectures and set about writing a critique 
of Bradley’s theory of finite centres.3 As predicted, this first critique did not win him any 
                                                
3 For Bradley, the Absolute articulates itself in a plurality of lesser though unified psychical wholes (or finite 
centres) (Bradley 1969, p. 464). As has now been widely discussed, Bradley’s finite centres bear striking 
resemblance to Leibniz’s monads, for Bradley's finite centres like Leibniz's monads, cannot directly share 
content nor causal interaction; however, they are coordinated to one another in that they are all partial 
manifestations of the same overarching Reality (Candlish & Basile, 2013; Eliot, T. S., 1916). For Bradley, finite 
centres are framed within a monistic metaphysics and in this way, it is clear that they are essentially idealistic 
(that is, one-sided) versions of what Harris would later develop under the name “unifying principles.”  
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ground. Undeterred, Harris turned his attention toward a number of topics that were seldom 
discussed in the 1930’s, including a criticism of S. Alexander’s emergence and A. N. 
Whitehead’s process philosophy, as well as a reinterpretation of Hegel’s Naturphilosophie. 
Such a massive project demanded extensive preparation in many peripheral areas. For this, 
Harris was tutored in Greek, steeped in Aristotelian philosophy, and studied Cartesian 
rationalism. Additionally, during this time, Harris recalls, “Einstein visited the university: he 
spoke to the Philosophical Society on the Quantum Theory, and I was taken to the meeting as 
a guest” (p. 9). 
For his first spring vacation of 1932 he “went on a walking tour of Devon and Somerset” 
claiming to be “collecting cathedrals”, marvelling at their differing styles and beauty. He 
explains that the English countryside,  
appeared to me as the acme of peace and gentle beauty, with its green fields, greener than I had 
ever before seen, and trees with luxurious foliage so dense that one could not see the sky between 
their branches. Never before had I seen hedgerows so variegated and extensive or fields with the 
traces of Mediaeval strips still visible, the historical inheritance of centuries of culture (p. 62).  
As all was going according to plan, the following summer of 1933, Harris had hoped to travel 
abroad and continue his exploration of Europe, but his sister Gwenda, living in England 
herself, was not financially settled so Harris devoted his resources to her assistance instead. 
As a result, Harris was afforded the opportunity to meet more of his extended family who still 
lived in England.4  
According to Harris, his critique of Alexander’s theory of emergence set an original 
precedent, as his adviser actually returned praise for the work. Harris confesses that 
Whitehead’s philosophy was the most obscure work he had ever attempted to understand, but 
since there were no available authorities for him to consult, he felt it was a necessary 
ingredient in his thesis. When Harris submitted a draft of this critique, he claims Joachim was 
even more satisfied, calling him “the only person in Oxford who could understand 
                                                
4 In previous years, Harris had managed to develop himself with Jujitsu, hiking, and rugby, and while at Oxford, 
he was able to add sailing to this list. Continuing to play rugby for fun, Harris was invited to participate in 
games of increasing seriousness until one game resulted in his fibula being broken. This required him to have a 
cast up to his thigh and remain bed-ridden for three weeks, which he recalls as a miserable time dedicated to 
reading, listening to classical music and watching “a gorgeous spring” emerge that could not be experienced 
first-hand. As an almost comical lesson in phenomenology, Harris recalls that “when the plaster was removed I 
had no feeling in my leg, which I gazed upon as an appendage that did not belong to me” (p. 65). 
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Whitehead” (p. 65). Harris began a rigorous study Hegel’s Naturphilosophie for the content 
of his final chapter, but was required to do so in the original German due to a lack of English 
translations. With less than a year until the completion of his thesis, Harris’s colleagues began 
pre-emptively congratulating him on obtaining his doctorate. 
In its final draft, Harris’s thesis “had argued that the concept of evolution could build a 
bridge between traditional Idealism and Realism” (p. 176). While Alexander, Whitehead, and 
Spinoza provided a common means of going beyond reductionist and dualistic depictions of 
mind, Hegel’s system had provided a conception of nature as a whole.5 The results turned out 
so impressive that Joachim arranged for H.W.B. Joseph and Samuel Alexander to be present 
at Harris’s defence.  
Harris presented before his review board for an hour and a half, speaking as loudly as 
possible for sake of Alexander’s poor hearing. Though he had prepared an elaborate defence 
of his appeal to Hegel’s Naturphilosophie, Harris recalls:  
I was mentally exhausted, and at the very end the expected question was put to me about Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Nature. I was too disconcerted and too tired to recall the knock-down argument I 
had prepared and gave a rather feeble answer that was only my second line of defense. I was far 
from confident when I came out and feared the result, fears that proved all too well founded (p. 
68).  
Despite appeals from his adviser, when it was over Harris was only to be awarded a B.Litt., 
on account of Joseph’s stubborn belief that no student could complete work of such high 
standards so early in their career. “All my friends were incredulous when I told them I had 
failed, and I myself was devastated. What was I to do now?” (p. 68). Aside from meagre 
sympathy from his sisters and cousins, his family reflected that it was unfortunate but of his 
own doing, his own inadequacy; the B.Litt. he was awarded really held no weight at this point 
in his career.  
Despite his efforts to secure a position at a British University, or a scholarship to continue 
his education at Harvard, nothing materialized. Thanks solely to his sister’s enquiry on his 
                                                
5 After a lifetime of development, in its final form Harris’s metaphysics now bears many complex relationships 
with contemporary Whiteheadian philosophies. In his own works Harris made limited efforts to highlight the 
points at which he parted from Whiteheadian philosophy. As I am unable to address this issue in the present 
work, it is evident that a future proponent of Harris’s system must undertake this task. Toward this end, Eastman 
& Keeton’s (Eds) (2003) companion on Whiteheadian physics and Gaskill & Nocek’s (Eds) (2014) more general 
survey of Whiteheadian philosophy may provide sufficient grounds for beginning such a comparison.   
	   22	  
behalf, Harris ended up settling for a position as a private secretary to William Senior, 
Minister of Mines in Southern Rhodesia. However, due to her own challenges to make ends 
meet in England, Gwenda took the only opportunity open to her at the time, which was to fill 
a position in America, not to be seen by Harris for another 22 years. “Then Enid and I 
embarked on our return to South Africa: she to rejoin my mother, and I to take up my new 
appointment. Thus the interlude, that had begun so well and had promised so richly, ended in 
a rather dismal anti-climax” (p. 70).  
 
1.3 Academic Life Interrupted 
Harris saw England as the hub of Western civilization and so was disheartened to seek the 
only available employment in Southern Rhodesia, which appeared to lay on the outskirts of 
civilization. Despite Harris’s significant frustration with his circumstances, in retrospect he 
recalls this period with a great appreciation for all the opportunities it afforded him, the 
people he was able to meet and the new skills he acquired.  
Harris was first to be the secretary of William Senior – a purportedly racist politician with 
a distaste for academia and disregard for Harris’s efforts. As Minister for Mines, Senior 
employed black Africans to do the brunt of his house and mining work, speaking to them in 
their native language and discouraging their learning English. “Among his peers and political 
colleagues he was much admired and was very popular, but all who worked for him agreed 
that he was an intolerable employer” (pp. 73-74). After a long line of apparently irrational 
responses to Harris’s work, Senior eventually dismissed Harris for failing to produce a letter 
that was in a cabinet whose contents, he ordered, were not to be touched. After what had been 
only five months, without future prospects for employment, Harris was relieved to be done 
with that position, taking with him a newly acquired ability to type and an increasing 
abhorrence of African racism.  
Harris took the subsequent period of uncertainty as an opportunity to visit his mother and 
sister in Cape Town, where – metaphorically suited for this stage of his life – he climbed the 
Devil’s Peak:  
I diverged from the beaten track to attempt a climb up a broken rock face, though this time with 
more discretion. Half way up I suddenly and unaccountably lost my nerve and the courage to go 
further. Having rested on a ledge for a while I recovered my composure sufficiently to continue to 
the top of the ridge, only to discover that the route I had chosen would take me along a knife edge 
with a sheer thousand foot precipice on the south side. Wisely, I descended to a grove of pine trees 
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below to the north, and continued along the common path to the summit without further difficulty 
(pp. 78-79). 
Soon thereafter, Harris was fortunate enough to be invited to an Oxford conference, for which 
he was to present a more confident and carefully constructed version of his D.Phil. viva. 
Though he believed his presentation was a success, it was even better than he knew at the 
time. Among those in the audience were Geoffrey Mure and Sir Malcolm Knox, philosophers 
who would later provide great support for Harris’s work.  
As Harris had arrived in England unemployed but had no intention of either returning to 
South Africa or clinging to his uncle for support, he soon found himself employment at the 
Kingsmoor private school. This position however would not start until the next school year, 
so to fill in the time he volunteered at the local Tubby Clayton’s (Toc H) church. Here Harris 
was responsible for giving guided tours, for which he was provided a room basic necessities – 
to and from which he walked five miles per day. After only two weeks he was offered another 
‘vastly more rewarding’ position as “assistant house father” attending to the athletic and 
academic needs of children from an associated orphanage.  
 With the dream of academic prestige still lingering in his mind, Harris made regular visits 
to Oxford. During one such visit, Harris was to meet face to face with Nazi youths who had 
come to discuss the philosophical ideology of their Führer: 
The Nazis, finding their arguments in defense of Hitler’s policies strongly opposed, maintained 
that we could not understand the German spirit, because we had not been brought up on Hegel and 
Spengler. I protested that I had indeed been brought up on Hegel, whose philosophy led me to 
conclusions directly opposed to theirs and had convinced me of the error of their ways (p. 80).  
Having already been deeply influenced by the socio-political tensions in South Africa, long 
since committed to an anti-apartheid campaign, it is clear that Harris’s early life was uniquely 
disposed with regard to historical events such as these that moulded what would become his 
life-long work toward universal equality and international peace.   
At the Kingsmoor school, Harris makes first mention of a romance with a girl named 
Liselotte Rath (Lilo), a German Jew who, due to the Nazi influence, had fled to England just 
before completing her own Ph.D. in philosophy. Though the Headmaster frowned upon 
intimacy between members of the faculty, Harris recalls “I had really fallen in love for the 
first time in my life and found my endearments reciprocated, so I assured the Headmaster that 
our relationship was serious, and that he had no reason (and no right) to object, as long as we 
behaved discreetly in the presence of the pupils” (p. 81). Though he enjoyed the experiences 
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he had caring for the children, taking them hiking, etc., the uneven treatment of students by 
the other faculty proved too much for his morals and eventually compelled him to resign.  
Soon thereafter when Lilo returned to Frankfurt for the summer, Harris found himself at a 
loss for what to do. He felt the previous year had been somewhat unfruitful and so set himself 
to work studying symbolic logic and other philosophical systems in which he was not yet 
proficient; all in preparation for an unknown opportunity he felt might arise at any moment. 
His bleak outlook persisted though and was further exacerbated by the events taking place 
abroad: 
In Germany Hitler was now firmly in power, behaving tyrannically at home and provocatively 
abroad. Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia; the German-Italian Axis was being cemented, and the 
Spanish civil war had broken out. In Britain, Ramsay MacDonald’s government had pursued a 
policy of disarmament, and foreign policy was weakened and hampered in its efforts to maintain 
peace through the League of Nations, which the Fascist powers were defying or ignoring, and 
which seemed without authority or power (p. 84). 
Unsurprisingly, Lilo’s invitation for Harris to come visit her a few months later was not 
joyously received. However, he considered this a great opportunity to travel the continent, 
gain greater proficiency in German, and he hoped, impress upon Lilo’s parents that he would 
make a suitable husband. Upon arrival in Germany, Harris recalls being greeted with kindness 
by her family and richly entertained against a background of jaw dropping historical beauty 
of the Goethehaus, Rathaus, and the famous mediaeval Bruckegukel. Nevertheless, 
everywhere they went they were persistently faced with anti-Semitic propaganda. Harris 
recalls having lost his vitality, his energy, and confidence, finding himself unable to react in a 
manner befitting his character. Near the end of his visit Lilo went on to Berlin to meet her 
other male friends and Harris simply let her leave, unsure what action to take. Soon after he 
took his own leave, travelling through Neckar Valley and visiting all the historical sights he 
could along his way back to England, where Lilo was supposed to meet him.  
Once again arriving in England without employment, Harris was lucky enough to come by 
an advertisement for a temporary appointment at Uppingham School, whose administrators 
jumped at the first moment of Harris’s enquiry. Though he was offered a greater pay than 
ever before (six guineas a weak) he was in charge of teaching history and scripture to a group 
of boys, all of whom had earned a reputation of being difficult. After his previous experiences 
teaching, Harris recalls having acquired a certain finesse in dealing with his students, even 
handed but ever pressing them to reach their potential. His first semester went smoothly, 
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managing to help many students individually and keep order in the classes. Though Harris felt 
he was once again in his element, it was not to last. One after another, his temporary 
appointments came to an end and he was forced once again to look for employment 
elsewhere. 
Though he did not wish to return to Africa, one of the only opportunities he found was a 
school inspector in Basutoland. After consulting all the available opinions including family, 
friends, and his previous employers, Harris took his uncle’s advice: “not to turn down a 
secure career in the Colonial Service, with a steady income and a built in pension at the end, 
for an uncertain and rather vague promise of a post at one of the lesser public schools” (p. 
89). Lilo was to come to London to meet Harris just before his departure. Here Harris 
enthusiastically invited her to accompany him to South Africa. Lilo vehemently declined. 
Despite his arguments to the contrary, Lilo explained that she no longer saw them as a suited 
couple and that Africa was no place to raise a family. Soon thereafter, his sister Gwenda, 
responding to these unfortunate circumstances, assured Harris that Lilo certainly did not love 
him. Perhaps due to the infamous spell of first love, Harris wouldn’t hear of it, deciding that 
he would write to Lilo regularly to reassure her as to the favourable conditions in Africa.  
Quite surprisingly, and a testament to his undying sense of humour, even in the lower of 
times, Harris always took part in the ship costume parties going to or from London. On the 
previous occasion he was a lion tamer to a two man team dressed as a lion, but this time he 
was the “Mock turtle” from an apparently little known story of “Alice” that went 
unrecognized. Picturing him there dressed as a turtle, with the looming shadow of WWII on 
the horizon, there is a palatable tone of melancholy as Harris concludes this chapter of his life 
with “It was to be almost ten years before I next set foot in London” (p. 90).  
 
1.3.1 Colonial and Military Service 
Perhaps for reasons of necessity or admiration of his father’s service, for some time 
Harris’s life and work became embedded in the military. Though he never ceased to dream of 
academic success, his years spent in colonial and military service provided him invaluable 
first-hand experience dealing with diverse cultures, conflicts, and practical problem solving. 
These experiences undoubtedly provided his later philosophical work with orientation, 
inspiration, and grounding.  
Starting around 1937, Harris’s first appointment was as an education officer for the British 
Colonial Service. Having recently been rejected by his first love and finding few prospects for 
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companionship, Harris speaks of his mother and sister as having appeared in need of his care 
and attention just when he needed it. Since they were living in less than favourable 
conditions, Harris had Enid and his mother join him in his government-appointed home. 
Harris was however to be away from them for many days at a time as his position required 
that he ride on horseback, camping along the way to inspect the outlying schoolhouses of 
Basutoland.  
Harris describes the schoolhouses as mostly consisting of mud brick or stones and 
corrugated iron roofs that were thatched with reeds. Fuel for fires was limited to cow dung 
and the Boers still threatened the area with an overwhelming military force. This was indeed 
a rough land in which to work or live. During these trips Harris spoke to the faculty and 
students of the schools he inspected about the standards they were supposed to uphold. Harris 
recognized however, the many challenges for both teachers and students alike to uphold these 
standards, from the funding needed to send a child to school (e.g. clothes), to the funds 
needed to keep the schools operational. 
One of the problems for education in the territory was a corollary of the socioeconomic situation 
in South Africa as a whole. The majority of able-bodied young men were away from their villages 
most of the time working in the goldmines of the Witwatersrand. Traditionally the agricultural 
work, apart from plowing, was done by the women, and the boys herded the cattle, a task which 
kept them out all day on the field. It was consequently very difficult to get the boys to come to 
school, most of the pupils being young girls (p. 92). 
Harris was nonetheless shocked on one occasion when, speaking about the dangers of 
witchcraft in place of medical care, he encountered a defence of the practice: 
Lecturing on the teaching of elementary science, I stressed its importance in weaning children 
away from old-fashioned superstitions and witchcraft, counteracting the malpractices of 
witchdoctors. My audience [was] mission bred, brought up in Christian families and taught by 
ministers of Christian sects, so I was taken aback by the reaction of the majority, who, in the 
discussion after my talk, stoutly defended the witchdoctors and expressed firm belief in the 
efficacy of witchcraft, both beneficial and detrimental (p. 99).  
It is certainly interesting to notice Harris’s surprise in this situation, considering that his 
frustrated efforts are mirrored in the tedious work of medical anthropologists that continues to 
this day.  
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During his time off, Harris made every effort to travel, picking destinations that either 
ended or at least stopped by his previous academic acquaintances.6 On one such occasion he 
visited one of his M.A. examiners, Professor Hoernle, and discovered that he had for the 
fourth time just missed an opportunity for a university appointment. Harris recalls in any 
down-time philosophy remained heavy on his mind: “During the whole time that I was in 
Basutoland (and, in fact, throughout my time in the Colonial Service) I kept my philosophy 
books with me and tried in odd moments when other demands were not made on my time, to 
keep up my chosen subject of interest” (p. 102). 
As was an apparent theme throughout his life, it didn’t take long for Harris to feel 
increasingly discontented. Even in the case of persistent hard work, either out of his own will 
or external circumstances, he became compelled to re-focus his efforts. 
The Munich crisis occurred in 1938 […] I had for years been a convinced pacifist, until I found 
myself reacting to the news of Hitler’s excesses with the subjective exclamation: “Why doesn’t 
somebody stop him?” It then occurred to me that the only way he could be stopped was by force 
[…] I must confess that I felt decidedly apprehensive as I filled in the form and realized that I had 
had no significant military training hitherto, and no special skill to offer. To join the infantry was 
not by any means a cherished desire, but I could think of no alternative (p. 100). 
With his decision, Harris would leave to a successor the job (and cat) that he had grown to 
love; he would have to move his mother and sister to another less scenic, but more 
comfortable house in the Cape.  
After a short interlude, Harris was transferred to Zanzibar. As sea travel was not permitted 
during wartime however, his only option was to drive himself across five countries to his new 
post where he was once again to act as a school inspector. It is clear from his extensive 
explanation of the region that within just one year of his stay, Harris had learned much of the 
economy, politics, and even the language of Ki-Swahili. Harris’s reflections on the politics 
and history of Africa reveal an amazing insight and empathy for the people of the region. He 
                                                
6 Perhaps the single most comical event recounted in Harris’s autobiography (though it was likely not intended 
to be so) was his recollection of his earliest car. The first car he had purchased in Africa, a ‘Graham’ had never 
appeared to him as trustworthy given the rough condition of the local roads. One day his concerns were proven 
well founded when a fellow at his office came running to tell him that his truck, simply parked outside the 
office, was on fire! This provided him sufficient inspiration to upgrade to a trustworthier Chevrolet, in which 
Harris would have many adventures for years to come. 
	   28	  
recognized the horrors that had been committed to both man and nature were due to the greed 
of warlords and cultural ignorance of colonial policies:  
Possibly more could have been done by the imperial powers to encourage the development of 
modern democratic systems, and certainly much more effort might have been put into advancing 
education. But it would surely not have improved matters to subvert the traditional customs or to 
attempt to impose European ideas and methods in an alien environment. The professed aim was to 
prepare the colonies for independence, and the result gives scant evidence that the preparation was 
adequate (p. 115).  
While he enjoyed the relative safety of his duties during this time, Harris still eagerly 
wanted to contribute to the war effort directly and felt his potential was not at all being 
utilized. When nearly a year had passed, Harris was granted release from the Colonial Service 
and transferred to Egypt as a lieutenant. Here he passed a three-week course on the war effort 
become an information officer in the British military.7 Typical of his character, Harris recalls 
refraining from the drinking party that ensued with most of the recent graduates. Late that 
night however, in response to his abstinence two inebriated men barged into Harris’s quarters 
intent on fighting him. While his bunkmate merely watched from a distance, with what he 
calls a slight knowledge of ju-jitsu, Harris claims to have kept both men at bay without 
anyone sustaining injuries. As an ironic turn of events, during a following lull between 
assignments Harris was to gain experience as a defense representative for men who were 
charged with the possession of alcohol. Though Harris’s defendants lost, he recalls that these 
cases taught him valuable skills dealing with evidence and reason.  
Eventually Harris was transferred to Cairo, where he was to console, educate and inspire 
the troops who were meant for the front lines. For this assignment Harris went above and 
beyond his call of duties, taking it upon himself to teach the illiterate African soldiers how to 
read and write. The curriculum he created for this purpose was so successful that Harris was 
able to train other teachers at his base and the British army would eventually implement his 
                                                
7 Apparently one of Harris’s more exciting (but non-philosophical) stories occurred during this trip. As he knew 
that the rainy season was nearly upon him during one 1000 mile transfer between bases, he drove as fast as 
possible in the attempt to beat the impending storms. Nevertheless, he wound up having to face the heavy rains 
at night, rendering his visibility almost nonexistent. When Harris finally arrived at the next hotel and mentioned 
to one of the employees the route he had taken he received a look of shock, as it was widely known at this point 
that a river had flooded creating an impasse for all motorists. Apparently, driving at top speed (50 mph) in the 
attempt to get to safety, he had driven straight through the river without realizing it – a story Harris would relish 
for many years to come (p. 114).    
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curriculum as a standard. At this post, Harris was confronted with a heavy dose of politics 
that caused him to reconsider and refine his own beliefs. Particularly common were the 
debates surrounding Marxism and Socialism. Though Harris had socialist sympathies for 
some time, he concluded that the theory of “dialectical materialism” appeared contradictory 
and he was unable to “accept the implicit suppression of individual personality in favour of 
class and proletariat” (p. 125). 
For his Christmas leave Harris (quite suitably) travelled to Jerusalem.8 Harris had 
considered that the Catholic Church might accommodate his religious beliefs and consulted 
the advice of his unit’s Anglican Chaplain. Setting out his primary beliefs on paper, Harris 
recalls,  
I had honestly confessed my unbelief in the miraculous aspects of the Gospels, considering them 
irrelevant to the question of Jesus’s divinity. That, I maintained (and still do), followed from his 
teaching, his personality, conduct of life and the manner of his death, and not from any alleged 
virgin birth or miraculous resurrection (p. 125).  
Harris was informed that his denial of the miraculous character of the Gospels prevented him 
from being a full Christian. As he was not yet fully satisfied with this conclusion, questions 
regarding his religious home would occupy his reflections for years to come.  
 Upon returning to his post, Harris was raised to the rank of acting Captain. This new 
position provided him with his own truck and required that he inspect the education 
operations of other units. This assignment required him to transport soldiers from camp to 
camp, remaining ever vigilant of landmines that littered the roadways. On one fortuitous 
occasion, Harris was asked to give a last minute presentation to a “small” audience on the 
Atlantic Charter (1942), recently signed by Roosevelt and Churchill, and which was to 
become the basis for the modern United Nations. Harris agreed and promptly found himself 
in front of about 500 “unsympathetic men.” Harris was not at all pleased with this turn of 
events but made the best of it and the presentation went smoothly. Largely thanks to his 
                                                
8 While in Cairo Harris was able to take leave and visit Alexandria – one of his most enjoyable times in the 
Middle East – and to explore the temples of Luxor and Karnak. As this was a time before the tremendous influx 
of tourism, Harris had to rappel into the unlit passageways. Harris recalls, “We walked among the ruins, gaping 
with astonishment at the remnants of a civilization, the character of which, but for our biblical knowledge, we 
could scarcely imagine” (p. 124). Interestingly, he notes that the paintings within the tombs were so vibrant at 
that time that they looked as though they had been completed the week before. 
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participation in a number of similar events, Harris was offered the opportunity to have 
another promotion.  
Though he thought he would be sent to Italy – which was his motivation for accepting the 
appointment – Harris received the rank of Major in the Education Corps of the British Army 
and was sent to the Middle East Military Education College at Mt. Carmel, Palestine, where 
he was to be the Chief Education Instructor. After a short time and a lot of hard work, Harris 
had gained a strong reputation as an excellent instructor. The only female instructor recently 
transferred to the college, Junior Commander Sylvia Mundahl, had majored in history at 
Westfield College in London and understandably took a quick liking to Harris. Sylvia 
attended his lectures regularly and it became apparent that her interest was more than 
academic. Though Harris appreciated the attention, their relationship remained professional 
for some time.  
By 1945 the war in Europe had come to a close with the defeat of Hitler and so the 
education initiative changed focus from political and strategic briefs to a concern for 
reintroducing officers into civilian life. Thanks to these changes, after having been moved 
through a long chain of various duties, Harris finally found himself lecturing on subjects of 
his personal interest. He made use of the library of the British Council and was once again 
able to immerse himself in more recent publications on philosophical topics. A short time 
later Harris recalls being “overawed” when he learned that the atomic bomb was detonated:  
Human ingenuity had now released the ultimate force of nature, the power of the atom, against 
which there was no effective defense. Until Hitler’s intransigence had converted me, I had always 
been a pacifist, and now I saw that war with atomic weapons had become an intolerable and a 
self-defeating instrument of policy that it was imperative to eliminate from human affairs (p. 137). 
Harris saw that the League of Nations had failed to prevent Nazism and the Second World 
War because it effectively had no power, its members being mere sovereign states. The only 
solution, Harris concluded, was the formation of a World Federation, an initiative to which he 
would dedicate much of the rest of his life. He began by writing pamphlets on South Africa 
and presented a lecture to students and colleagues on the logic behind a World Federation, but 
had to wait to pursue the project further until after he left the army. 
Having been given the opportunity to mingle with generals in Beirut, it appears that at this 
point Harris had the option of either staying in the army with ample opportunity for 
professional development, or leave and face the unknown path of academia. Harris opted to 
go back to Britain and on his birthday, February 19th 1946 became demobilized from duty. 
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Returning to London, Harris encountered a city totally unrecognizable after the war. Though 
full of inspiration for philosophical projects, he was unable to secure a teaching position. As 
was common throughout his life, Harris reconsidered his beliefs in God and sought clarity 
from religious authority. It was C. E. Raven, from whom Harris heard what he considered a 
highly convincing reconciliation of science and religion. Apparently, Raven’s work 
convinced Harris of where his convictions lay. Having settled his concerns with an 
unwavering assurance that scientific findings were in fact complementary with religion, 
Harris was baptized and became a member of the Church of England.  
I accepted Descartes’s (and Anselm’s) proof, interpreting “that than which a greater cannot be 
conceived” to mean what Spinoza called Substance, and Hegel called Absolute Spirit. That this 
could be anything less or other than a self-conscious omniscient mind seemed to me to be 
unthinkable. Jesus, I believed, was the Son of God in the sense that in his teaching, his life, and 
the manner of his death – in his whole personality – he revealed to mankind the true nature of God 
as Love… (p. 141). 
He goes on to explain that the very apt commandment requiring a love of God was actually 
one and the same as love of one’s neighbour, and love of thyself. This was a conclusion that 
remained central to his metaphysics for the rest of his life. 
Harris had vowed never to return to South Africa because it did not seem possible to even 
live comfortably without supporting the suppression and exploitation of the black Africans. 
Harris recalls his change of heart as follows: “Suddenly, out of the blue, a telegram arrived 
from Johannesburg offering me a position as lecturer in philosophy at the Witwatersrand 
University and asking me to name the salary I would require” (p. 141). He was to return to 
Africa, but with the intention of advocating against those policies he found so barbaric.  
Having kept in correspondence with Sylvia since his departure from the College, when she 
returned to England to study for the bar, it was only a matter of time before she was able to 
visit Harris in Oxford. “I told her about the offer I had had from Johannesburg that I had 
accepted, and then I asked her the same question that I had put to Lilo nine years before: 
‘Will you come with me?’ She replied, ‘With you I will go anywhere in the world.’ We 
embraced and decided to marry at once” (p. 142). After a quiet wedding with close family 
they were immediately off to Gilsland for their honeymoon. 
 
1.4 Harris’s Academic Career  
Upon his arrival at Witwatersrand, Harris began teaching what he describes as a heavy 
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course load of four courses per semester in Ancient Philosophy, Ethics, as well as the 
histories of seventeenth and eighteenth century Rationalism and Empiricism. He also 
managed to catch up on recent works by Collingwood, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and 
Ayer, while writing his own book concerning “International Politics after the atom bomb”. 
Additionally, Harris could finally settle into married life with Sylvia in their new home (p. 
146).  
Ever (apparently) optimistic, Harris used his academic position to advocate for equal 
rights. This was an uphill battle however, as the majority of votes were held by the 
Nationalists who dominated the government and maintained Apartheid policies. Harris 
recounts that the situation was only to get worse until South African policies were made 
globally apparent through television broadcasts, resulting in international pressure from both 
the United States and Britain. Harris describes having witnessed blacks being hit by cars with 
no repercussions for the driver, knowing of physical abuse on nearby farms, and seeing a 
black man publically punched in the head for no reason. “Such a milieu of prejudice and 
injustice posed the difficult question how a well-disposed white citizen could, with a clear 
conscience, continue to live under a regime that automatically gave him or her privileges at 
the expense of the oppressed and maltreated African majority” (p. 149). These experiences 
inspired Harris to publish his first book, The Survival of Political Man (1950). Here, Harris 
drew upon Sylvia’s understanding of history and his own insights into international relations 
to outline what he thought were the principles of political order and reveal the obstacles to 
true democracy. Much to Harris’s dismay, though accepted by academics in both Africa and 
Britain, the work made no recognizable impact on the general public. 
With their home finally established, in March of 1948, their first son Jonathan was born. 
Soon thereafter, Harris concluded that he needed to advance his academic standing by 
completing a Ph.D., for which he secured a fellowship at Rhodes College. Though leaving his 
teaching position at Witwatersrand meant he would put their philosophy faculty in a difficult 
position, Harris knew it was the only way he would be able to complete a work sufficient for 
a doctorate. After some deliberation, he and his family moved to the Rhodes college campus.  
My plan was to get into draft my criticism of contemporary Empiricism, beginning by disposing 
of the current doctrine that the traditional philosophical problems were “pseudo-problems”, and 
then going on to demonstrate that the current theories were, in effect, repetitions of those of 
Locke, Berkeley and Hume, compounding their errors and shortcomings (p. 156). 
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This project was so ambitious that after a year it was only about half completed. Nevertheless, 
during this time, Harris was able to publish philosophical papers in both the Scottish 
Philosophical Quarterly and The Review of Metaphysics. At the same time, Sylvia became 
pregnant for a second time and on her birthday, the 30th of August, their second son Nigel 
was born.  
Upon completion, Harris submitted Nature, Mind and Modern Science (1954) to the 
University of Witwatersrand and in 1953 received his D. Litt in philosophy. In this work 
Harris first established his position with respect to both the historical tradition and 
contemporary scientific theories. Here, Harris proposed five central tenets by which 
philosophy may progress: 
(i) that mind is immanent in all things; (ii) that reality is a whole, self-sufficient and self-
maintaining, and that coherence is the test of truth of any theory about it; (iii) that the subject and 
object of knowledge are ultimately one – the same thing viewed from opposite (and mutually 
complementary) standpoints; (iv) that events and phenomena can adequately be explained only 
teleologically, and (v) that the ultimate principle of interpretation is, in consequence, the principle 
of value (1954, p. 206). 
This work truly ignited his career, with the full repercussions still returning to him years later. 
In just three years, Harris was to become a professor, then head of the philosophy department 
at Witwatersrand. It was during this time, just as Harris’s professional career came to fruition 
as his mother had (quite embarrassingly) assured everyone it would, she broke her hip and 
being too weak for an operation, died of pneumonia shortly thereafter at age 82. With Harris’s 
new socio-economic stability however, he was able to purchase his first house just outside of 
the city and Sylvia soon gave birth to their third child, Hermione.  
The government at this time was increasing its Apartheid campaign, uprooting entire 
communities to make designated regions exclusively for whites. These policies were then 
extended to the universities, but famously Witwatersrand resisted, fighting tooth and nail for 
equal education. Harris used his position as leverage, giving lectures and presenting motions 
to the Senate “condemning the Government’s intention” (p. 169). Though the decision of the 
Senate had been confidential, Harris leaked the results to a reporter via private 
correspondence. Harris soon discovered however, that the student body did not support his 
position. It eventually came to his attention that his liberal position – advocating for 
democratic terms of negotiation – was not radical enough. The student body that was 
opposed to Apartheid was furious and in no mood for negotiations or empathy. Seeing first 
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hand for years that blacks were not even dignified as human beings brought both Harris and 
Sylvia to understand that liberalism was insufficient to catalyze the social changes that were 
needed and as a result, they reconsidered raising their children in South African society.9 
Fortunately, the publication of Nature, Mind, and Modern Science afforded Harris 
increased attention and it didn’t take long before the first of a long chain of offers were made 
for him. Harris received simultaneous offers from both Yale University and Connecticut 
College for a lecture position. As both were equally appealing, Harris managed to strike a 
deal with the two institutions in which he would be shared. It didn’t take long for a house to 
be found and Harris was able to settle his family in the United States.  
Now with personal matters settled, Harris was able to more fully develop his philosophical 
position and extend his voice into the ongoing discourse of his time. This began with a review 
of his undergraduate intuitions regarding Bosanquet’s concept of the concrete universal as a 
system. 
It now appeared to me that Collingwood’s exposition of what he called “the philosophical 
universal” provided this development: i.e., a universal distinguished from the scientific universal 
(which Collingwood apparently identified with the abstract universal of formal logic) by the fact 
that within the genus, particular classes overlapped, constituting at one and the same time both 
distincts and opposites and degrees of adequate exemplification of the generic concept. It was 
clear to me that this description exactly fitted the Hegelian dialectic (p. 176). 
These insights brought Harris to maintain that physics, biology, and psychology had revealed 
a holistic metaphysics and a world that was “itself a manifestation of the concrete universal 
particularizing itself as a scale of forms as Collingwood and Hegel had foretold” (ibid). To 
flesh out his position Harris was invited to participate in the Terry Lectures at Yale in 1957, 
addressing the relationship between religion and science. Harris’s resulting five lectures were 
later published by Yale as Revelation through Reason (1958).  
Despite this success, Harris’s relations with Yale were increasingly dampened while 
Connecticut College continued to embrace him far more proactively, thus becoming his 
primary institution. After spending just a few years in the States, neither Harris nor Sylvia 
wished to return to South Africa, but as Harris still had obligations to Witwatersrand, he 
eventually felt obliged to resign from their ranks. At the same time, Harris’s colleague and 
friend Robert Mack at Connecticut College, died of lung cancer, thereby putting Harris in a 
                                                
9 Indeed, Sylvia was to write and eventually publish her own book on racism in South Africa: Mundahl-Harris, 
S. (1995). The View from the Cookhouse Floor. 
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position to become a tenured professor. Before he could take this position however, having 
been born in South Africa, unlike Sylvia, Harris faced unyielding visa regulations that 
required him to leave the country. After a long appeal, he was only given a one-year 
extension. Harris and his family used this time to travel to Colorado and visit his sister 
Gwenda, while Harris held a summer position at Colorado College. Upon their return, they 
purchased a house just across from the Connecticut College campus and soon thereafter 
Sylvia had their fourth child, Martin Trevor. Despite the ongoing efforts of Connecticut 
College to secure his visa, Harris was eventually forced to leave the country for at least two 
years.  
From 1959-1960 Harris held a position as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at 
Edinburgh University. To lecture at Edinburgh University was a dream-come true for Harris, 
as he had always wished to hold a prestigious position in a British institution. He recalls being 
immediately respected by the other members of the faculty and making many friends despite 
a wide range of deeply contrasting philosophical positions. Most notable of which, was the 
difference between Harris’s position and the logical positivists such as Scot McGowan. The 
scientists too, such as C. H. Waddington and James Drever, were welcoming and open to 
extensive dialogue across disciplines. These interdisciplinary conversations proved especially 
helpful for Harris to further develop his system across logic, biology, psychology, and 
metaphysics. Indeed, Harris felt that Edinburgh had become a home for him and was warmly 
welcomed whenever he visited in later years.  
When the first year came to an end, Sylvia and the children were able to travel back to 
Britain to stay with Harris for the summer, a visit that turned into a far more permanent 
arrangement than anyone had anticipated. Harris was able to send his eldest two boys to the 
Magdalen College at Oxford, and returned to Connecticut College, where he conducted 
research for a text about the metaphysical presuppositions of modern science. He explains his 
motivation for this work as follows:  
The Positivists had maintained that only empirical science was the legitimate source of factual 
knowledge, so I turned to that source intending to show that what it revealed implied a 
metaphysical world view (Collingwood’s “constellation of absolute presuppositions”). I therefore 
turned Kant’s title back to front and decided to call my book ‘The Foundations of Metaphysics in 
Science’ (p. 191).  
For this project Harris gained a greater knowledge of physics, which led to his argument that 
quantum mechanics implies a holistic world view that flies in the face of theses espoused by 
	   36	  
Wittgenstein, Ayer, and Russell. He admits that he was not trying to do anything new in 
physics (as one of his editors Michael Polanyi had pointed out), but rather, his goal was to 
reveal the implications of what science had already discovered.  
Working his way into the psychological discourse, Harris was fortunate enough to attend 
the joint meeting between the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Associations at Cambridge on 
the subject of perception. As the summer of 1961 drew to a close, Harris received an 
interview invitation from Glasgow and a simultaneous raise from Connecticut College. He 
was at odds as to which direction to go. Glasgow represented yet another British academic 
opportunity Harris had always dreamed of, but Sylvia’s quiet disdain for Glasgow combined 
with the necessity to find a new residence and school for his children was heavy in his mind. 
In the end – though he later claimed that the opposite decision would have been even better 
for everyone – his family tipped the scales and they returned to New London.  
At this stage of his research, Harris was able to pursue the biological aspects of his 
argument, taking full advantage of his position by gaining access to microscopes and 
collaboration with the Connecticut professor of Zoology Bernice Wheeler. As was common 
in Harris’s career however, it didn’t take long before another offer was made to him, this time 
from the University of Kansas. Harris explains, “I was in a quandary […] Kansas University 
was not my idea of a very prestigious institution, being more renowned for its football team 
than its scholarship. But the terms of the appointment were so favourable that they provided a 
very tempting opportunity for the progress of my research” (p. 195). After considerable 
deliberation he accepted the offer on the grounds that it provided the best means of helping 
him finish his book, which he believed, would allow him to go wherever he so chose.10  
In 1962 Harris became the Roy Roberts Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Kansas. Though he had taken sabbatical and even had an assistant help with his 
writing The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science, to his great frustration when it was 
finally published in 1965, made nearly no impact on the philosophical community. 
Nevertheless, for the rest of his career Harris believed that this was his most important work. 
Interestingly, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (1966), W. H. Thorpe’s 
                                                
10 The only objection that Harris mentions from Sylvia was that the summers would be terribly hot so they were 
to look for a summer home elsewhere. Soon after their search had begun, a call came from Britain regarding the 
High Wray House the family had once stayed in. It appears that Harris had years ago, half-candidly mentioned 
to the owner that he would buy it if it were ever for sale and now, it just so happened to be on the market. 
Though it would take a year for the matter to even come back to him, his initial offer turned out to be the best 
and he ended up owning a house built in 1728, one in which he would retire during the last years of his life. 
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review maintained that few philosophers have gained a deep understanding of the recent 
explosion of scientific discoveries across disciplines, but that if more were to do so we would 
witness “great conceptual advance”. He goes on to write: “If this happens much of the credit 
will be due to the thinking of a small band of philosophers among which Errol Harris takes a 
high place” (p. 263).11  
With Vietnam and the Cold War filling the minds of both academics and the general 
public, Harris was compelled to give a series of lectures regarding the ethics of war and 
peace. For him, he says, this was a means of updating his philosophical position originally 
established in The Survival of Political Man. The result of which became a new work titled 
Annihilation and Utopia (1966), which again made no more of a splash than his previous 
works. At this point Harris turned his attention back toward academic opportunities in the 
East, but was turned down from at least three positions. Nevertheless, in 1967 Harris became 
President of the Metaphysical Society of America and was chosen to chair the 1968 Vienna 
meeting of the World Congress of Philosophy – the very meeting that established the 
International Society of Metaphysics. Having been one of the original founders of this 
society, Harris regretfully explains, “I have always felt that the International Society was my 
baby, although I was never asked to be its president” (p. 212).  
During this time Harris published a text that he had been working on for years, which in its 
final form became an historical textbook, The Fundamentals of Philosophy (1969) – 
purportedly the only work from which he made any money. Never content with his 
accomplishments, Harris turned his attention to a study of neurophysiology. For this topic he 
met with many of the psychologists at Kansas University and was given a cubby at the library 
to conduct his research. All of these projects were for Harris, merely part of his grander goal 
of establishing and elaborating a metaphysics that could overarch the findings of empirical 
science. 
 
1.4.1 Late Bloom and Frustrated Efforts 
Despite his professional success, for some years to come, Harris was to face a string of 
challenges that in different ways, all appear to be the result of his being ahead of his time. 
                                                
11 Indeed, much of the present thesis takes a close reading of Harris’s (1965) Foundations, not merely because it 
is the fullest articulation of his thesis, but because it captures his transdisciplinary spirit to unify disparate 
theories, and may still provide a novel way of doing so today (as will be further considered in § 8.3.1). 
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For, in addition to encouraging conversation between scientific and philosophical word 
views, Harris was outspoken about human rights. While he recalls his students being 
enthralled by his work, many of his fellow instructors remained opposed to his approach to 
interdisciplinarity and political reformation.  
When Sylvia’s mother died the family saw it as an opportunity for change and moved back 
to their High Wray house in England.12 While attending a meeting of the American 
Philosophical Association, Harris was opened to a different opportunity. Having been turned 
down from positions in the North East, when he heard of a potential position opening in 
Northwestern University he jumped at the opportunity for an interview. Much to the 
disappointment of his superiors at Kansas University, after just four years he left to become 
John Evans Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy at Northwestern. Finding the 
environment particularly friendly and conducive to his research, Harris remained at 
Northwestern until his retirement.  
Despite the lack of response from the professional community, Harris continued his 
personal research, determined to reveal what he felt were the unrecognized and unjustified 
metaphysical assumptions of empiricism.  
My next task, therefore, was to examine empiricist theories of scientific method, and to 
investigate the actual practice of eminent scientists, to establish (a) whether the former were self-
consistent, and (b) what the actual method of scientific procedure had been in the past and 
remained in the present. This was to be the subject matter of ‘Hypothesis and Perception’, on 
which I had embarked when I moved to Northwestern (p. 211).  
The heart of this work was to be a focus upon scientific practice as a critique of empiricism 
and a response to Kuhn’s recent the Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), of which he 
was particularly sympathetic, but maintained that he could provide further clarification on the 
actual process of paradigm shifts. His intention had been to suggest an alternative to formal 
mathematical logic, in the form of a dialectical algorithm, one that proved itself ever elusive. 
He explains, “Only later did I realize, when I wrote ‘Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical 
Thinking,’ that dialectical logic could not be formalized in any way, because it was the logic 
of internal relations, whereas the necessary presupposition of formal logic is that all relations 
                                                
12 Sylvia was to notice this conservative perspective much more than Harris however as she was privy to 
interactions with the parents of other children in their area. The narrow minded and in some cases cold hearted 
perspectives she encountered (such as one man running over Nigel’s bicycle with his car) caused her to be very 
uncomfortable and never feel at home. 
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are external” (p. 216).  
 Since the philosophy department at Northwestern University was ever understaffed, 
maintaining an average of eight lecturers when they were supposed to have 13, the day 
eventually came when a new member had to be considered. This process is described as most 
tedious and academic politics at its best, as no candidate could be decided upon unanimously. 
However, one such candidate, Philip Grier demonstrated such impressive mastery of 
Rousseau’s philosophy that as per Harris’s recommendation, he was appointed. Harris 
explains that he “proved to be an excellent teacher – I have not known any better – and he 
became, not only a valued colleague, but a close and faithful friend of Sylvia and me – a 
friendship that has persisted to the present day” (p. 217).  
As his age was beginning to catch up with him, Harris found himself afflicted with acute 
arthritis of his back, causing him to take six months off of his normal engagements. At this 
point he took up the task of following Spinoza to an increasing degree. With knowledge of 
Dutch and Latin, Harris undertook two simultaneous projects portraying Spinoza’s 
contributions to the concepts of human immortality and Salvation from Despair (1973). 
Though his research afforded Sylvia the opportunity to visit Amsterdam while Harris attend 
conferences on Spinoza, the resulting works were to be rejected from publishers without clear 
reasons for years to come.  
Harris moved on, finding new topics of fascination and research. Having been invited by 
Clark University to take part in the Heinz Werner Lecture Series, Harris’s next subject was 
again to be perception. For this he criticized Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Husserl, among 
others, so as to further develop his own position. After his lectures were published in 1974, 
Harris had a stroke of inspiration: 
we would invite the most distinguished physiologists, psychologists and epistemologists, eight 
from each discipline, who would deliver papers that, with the recorded discussions, we would then 
publish in book form, a sequel to which I would myself write, formulating a theory of perception 
in the light of the findings of the conference. Through the Research Office at Northwestern I 
submitted an elaborate description of this proposal in application for financial support to the 
National foundations […] But it was turned down because “the committee thought it would not be 
fruitful!” Without the necessary funds no such conference could be convened, so the plan came to 
nothing and I never got round to writing my own mentally projected book on the subject (pp. 222-
23). 
Clearly Harris was among the earliest philosophers who could see the importance establishing 
a “transdisciplinary” field of consciousness studies (Zelazo, et al. 2007).  
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Harris presented a lecture series at Tulane University that was published just two years 
later titled Atheism and Theism (1977), a work he considered the long-awaited sequel to 
Revelation through Reason (1958). Nevertheless, at the age of 67, Harris was forced to retire 
from Northwestern. Feeling very much willing to continue his work, he applied to other 
institutions until he was eventually offered a position as Distinguished Professor at Marquette 
University. As this was a Catholic and Jesuit institution, Harris was encouraged to fine-tune 
his work regarding the problem of evil and the nature of God. During a meeting of the 
Metaphysical Society that year, one interaction that Harris describes appears to characterize 
his professional disposition: 
 
Richard de George (from Kansas) was also present at the meeting. He said to me, “I hear you have 
solved the problem of evil.” 
“Yes, I’ll send you a copy of my lecture and you can tell me whether I have succeeded.” 
When we next met I asked him if he thought I had indeed solved the problem. 
“Yes,” he said, “but nobody will believe you” (p. 226). 
 
To Harris’s knowledge he had attended the first official meeting of the Hegel Society in 
Boston in 1968, but official records indicate that while he had the date right, it began in South 
Carolina. Nevertheless, through some rather awkward internal policies Harris was elected – 
as what he believed to be the first – president by default and then replaced by a secondary 
vote. Eight years later however, he was elected president and held the position until 1978.13 
During this time, he wrote and lectured as much as possible about human rights in general 
and the socio-politics of South Africa in particular. Unfortunately, his audiences “were 
distressingly small, either from lack of publicity or due to excessive competition from other 
attractions, and many of these efforts to enlist support for my cause left me with a dismal 
sense of failure” (p. 228). Despite this setback and his “retirement,” Harris secured a position 
as a research Fellow at Edinburgh University where he worked on what would become 
Formal, Transcendental and Dialectical Thinking. In this work Harris followed Whitehead, 
contending that while logic and science serve as excellent tools, “exactness is a fake” and so 
there is need for synthetic, transcendental, and dialectical thought. With Hegel however, he 
claimed logic “is inseparable from the structure of the actual world, as well as from our 
understanding of it” (1987, p. 2).  
                                                
13 http://www.hegel.org/ 
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Moving back into a study of Spinoza, Harris was invited to attend a conference on the 
tercentenary of the philosopher’s death, which involved embarking upon a journey to Urbino 
Italy. After a brief return to Northwestern to assist in teaching some courses in Continental 
Philosophy, Harris made a concerted effort to learn German so as to teach the same subject in 
this language. Though the later arrangement fell through, throughout this time Sylvia was 
able to accompany him on numerous adventures through much of Europe.  
To his great frustration, after all the arrangements had been made, Harris was denied 
employment to Loyola University (among others), due to his being over 70. At the same time, 
having been invited to contribute a chapter into what was to become a volume of essays on F. 
H. Bradley, Harris’s contribution regarding Bradley’s conception of Nature was cut from the 
compilation without explanation. Though Sylvia was unable to accompany him, in 1982 
Harris was able to secure a position at Villanova University teaching Hegel’s philosophy of 
religion. His lecture notes for this course were later written into book form but once again, 
publishers would respond with what he called “empty excuses” for their rejection, or with no 
explanation at all. In most of these cases, though the works would eventually be published, it 
would take a number of years and yield little fruit. 
In the spring of 1983, Harris and Sylvia set off for Istanbul and the Ionian coast of Turkey, 
a vacation that he explains was their most beautiful and fulfilled Sylvia’s dream of seeing the 
“remains of Troy (discovered by Schliemann), Ephesus, Pergamon and Miletus” (p. 240). 
When the two finally settled down, Sylvia took up gardening with a particular passion and 
singular attention. On one occasion, she worked herself harder than usual until finally being 
forced to call it a day on account of the unusually hot weather. Upon returning indoors she 
complained of great fatigue and a pain in her arm and (uncharacteristically) requested a 
doctor. Calling one hospital after another Harris eventually reached a doctor who, after many 
hours and a consultation with their primary, finally concluded that Sylvia had had a (rather 
unusual) heart attack. After spending the night in hospital she appeared to have recovered but 
before being discharged the following day, Sylvia unexpectedly died.  
Harris explains, “as frequently occurred in times of crisis, my emotions became paralyzed 
and I had difficulty in realizing what had happened” (p. 241). To deal with his grief he 
committed himself to yet more work, first finding a position at Emory. This would however 
be his last teaching position as his age finally caught up with him and his memory began to 
decline. Nevertheless, moving ever further in the direction of physics, Harris gave a lecture at 
the Trent University called Time and the World. From this work he was inspired to consider 
the natures of time and evolution, leading to the possibility of what Teilhard de Chardin 
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(1959) has called the Omega point and in 1984 was offered to lecture at the Teilhard Center 
in London on Omega and Evolution. After significant expansions this lecture was later 
published as The Reality of Time (1988). For some time, Harris was inspired to continue 
exploring philosophical topics of physics and secured a Fellowship position at Boston 
University for this purpose.  
In a work published some years later, Scott Kim recalls two summers he spent with Harris 
when he was 76-77. Having trained as a philosopher in the Anglo-American analytic 
tradition, philosophy Kim says, was “a method, hardly a way of life.” He goes on to say that 
for Harris, as was true for Spinoza, “true reason—true philosophy—is not only intellectually 
satisfying but also demands a love of God and neighbour. True intellectual satisfaction, true 
religious belief and true community are all one” (2009, pp. 9-10). In their conversations, Kim 
says that he tried to disagree with Harris in a way that would “provoke him” but found that 
Harris would respond “without being negative, without aiming to win an argument or to 
dominate the other. Even when he criticized someone, he said it in a way that sounded more 
like a description than a condemnation” (p. 10). Despite the modern world’s expectation of 
what Kim calls “relentless self-promotion even in academia”, Harris wanted nothing to do 
with this. Instead, Kim finds that Harris’s faith was based upon the truth of his philosophy: 
Errol didn’t just write and teach philosophy. He was a philosopher. It was his way of being. I have 
never met a philosopher whose beliefs were more integrated with his life than Errol Harris. His 
beliefs, politics, relationships, and faith—they all cohered in him, and in the deepest and truest 
sense, he had integrity. Errol’s quiet confidence, unassuming and self-effacing yet dignified 
demeanor—they all arose from this remarkable center (ibid). 
Despite his continued passion for the work, at this point Harris was unmistakably 
disheartened when it occurred to him that his career had come and gone.  
If I had made any slight contribution to my chosen subject, it had gone unrecognized. Some of my 
pupils seemed to remember me with a degree of affection, but none of them had achieved much 
distinction in the profession and in no way could I claim that my ideas had “a following.” I had 
always wanted to devote my life to philosophical thinking, teaching and research, but now that I 
had done so, I wondered whether I would not have done better to remain in the Colonial Service 
trying to improve the standard of education and the conditions of life of poverty-stricken Africans 
(p. 250). 
In spite of this outlook, in 1990 the Metaphysical Society of America awarded Harris the Paul 
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Weiss Medal for his contributions to the field.14 When presented with the award, Harris’s 
impression was as follows:  
I had asked myself why I should have been chosen for the honour, because if I had made so 
outstanding a contribution to metaphysics, other writers (whether critical or in agreement) would 
be referring to my work, which was very seldom the case, and that those who wrote on kindred 
subjects generally ignored what I had written (p. 256). 
At the same time, thanks to Philip Grier, Harris was presented with a Festschrift written in his 
honor. Humble to a fault, when the project was first proposed to him, Harris claims to have 
replied with a warning to Philip, “that he would be undertaking an arduous, thankless and 
time-consuming task” (ibid).  
Upon religious reflection, Harris had settled himself in the belief that although the majority 
of Christian scripture was symbolic, the Trinity displayed a strong underlying resonance with 
Hegel and Spinoza’s articulation of God, i.e. that of “dialectic wholeness.” This led him to a 
sense of solace in the prospect of dedicating himself to others, to truth and love. Once again 
feeling compelled to the Anti-Apartheid campaign, Harris contacted the office of Defense and 
Aid for South Africa at Harvard, as well as Archbishop Tutu, offering his services in any way 
possible. Unfortunately all this amounted to was a distinguished opportunity to type up news 
bulletins and fund-raise, though it seemed he was not even trusted enough for these tasks. 
Harris explains: “Consequently I felt frustrated in my endeavor to be useful. I believed I 
could do much more and that the use being made of me was relatively trivial” (p. 252). 
Deeply concerned with world peace and the environmental crisis, Harris attended the CND 
and World Federalist meetings in England, but he explains, “nobody seemed willing to heed 
my arguments” (p. 252). Attending a meeting of the World Constitution and Parliament 
Association, Harris became convinced that it was the most effective organization of its kind 
and had great potential for working towards Federal World Government. After failing to start 
a chain letter with a book called Planethood that he had come across at this meeting, Harris 
was inspired to write his own book One World or None (1993), to help spread these ideas. 
Though he would attend other meetings, he claims to have been given little or no opportunity 
to engage the speakers, who would mostly placate him due to his age and credentials, but 
ultimately brush him aside.  
                                                
14 Interestingly, a number of years later, Philip Grier discovered that (for whatever reason) the society had 
neglected to mention Harris in their list of recipients for the award and even required convincing of this fact! 
Nevertheless, his name now appears in their records: http://www.metaphysicalsociety.org/awards.htm 
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Even at this stage in Harris’s life he committed himself to attend and on occasion present 
at physics symposia that regularly included the most famous names of the field. As will be the 
subject of chapter 4, this brought him in contact with Paul Davies’ work on the ‘anthropic 
cosmological principle’ – the very issue Harris had been implicitly concerned with for most 
of his career. At the same time Harris had found an old friend Keith Ashfield, as a new ally at 
Humanities Press, and subsequently published six texts over the next few years. From 1991-
2006, four texts were published that significantly contibute to the following discourse. Taken 
together, these works highlight the core of Harris’s metaphysics, ranging through cosmology, 
evolution, consciousness studies, and science-religious dialogue. While undertaking these 
projects, Harris was simultaneously continuing his campaign for a federalist world 
government, publishing, distributing texts out of his own pocket, and networking with 
numerous organizations. Unfortunately, these efforts proved fruitless during his lifetime. 
Uncharacteristically, Harris confesses that whenever he was idle in waiting for responses 
from contacts or reviews, he would become increasingly depressed. As a result, each time he 
completed a project he would start another, or work on multiple projects at once so as to 
never face the down-time.  
Harris’s concern was that the most recent scientific research was not making an impact on 
the general public, while at the same time philosophers seemed unable to appreciate the 
implications of what had been discovered. 
The twentieth century paradigm has been recognized and accepted only by scientists (and not all 
of them), but those in other disciplines, and the public at large, remain unaware of the revolution 
that has occurred in physics and biology. Consequently human thinking and behaviour is 
persistently at odds with global, and especially environmental, needs. My thesis was that until 
common habits of thought become more concordant with the new scientific paradigm the current 
desperate global problems are unlikely ever to be resolved (p. 259). 
Through most of his works – especially The Restitution of Metaphysics (2000) – Harris has 
attempted to provide a framework for re-visioning the relationship between philosophy and 
science towards a more fruitful future for both. As Grier recalled years later: 
Needless to say, most of Errol’s philosophical ambitions ran strongly counter to the prevailing 
philosophical Zeitgeist in the English-speaking philosophical world at the time. He was always 
perfectly willing and very able to argue for his views in any context, but of course the general 
response of all too many of those outside the orbit of German Idealist philosophy, or of 
continental philosophy more broadly construed, was simply to ignore his work, a fact that 
occasioned endless frustration for him (2009, p. 7).  
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Approaching his centenary, Harris’s efforts were dramatically dampened by numerous 
health problems, resulting in his reliance on a pacemaker and hearing aid. Nevertheless, 
Harris remained committed to developing his ideas and sharing them with others throughout 
the world. During his final years, Harris took up permanent residence at his High Wray house 
in Ambleside England, where he continued to work on various political and philosophical 
projects. Despite his professional frustrations, at the end of his autobiography Harris laments 
that the loss of his hearing was perhaps his deepest regret, but remained ever appreciative of 
what remained: 
At one time, many years ago, music (despite my lack of technical knowledge and ability with any 
instrument) was almost a religion. It aroused quasi-religious emotion. Now hymn tunes can barely 
do so. I profit from consideration, help (when needed), affection and visits from my sons and 
daughter, as well as neighbours; so I can regard myself as lucky (p. 267). 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
From his biographical details it is clear that Harris’s life was embedded in historically 
unique periods of social, political, and scientific revolution that significantly shaped his 
resulting metaphysics. Indeed, the dialectic remained so important for all his work because it 
first and foremost emphasized the very form of social interactions that he felt were so terribly 
lacking during his lifetime, e.g. the integration of differences, empathy, and discovery of 
mutual truth. Harris had essentially extended this principle to his philosophy of science, 
maintaining that development of knowledge will proceed via unity in and through diversity of 
methods, perspectives, and disciplines. In this way, he anticipated what are now the 
transdisciplinary approaches to consciousness and Nature.  
It is no wonder then that his message was partially appreciated by subjective idealists and 
ignored by analyticians, but what must be remembered is that his system was intended to 
bridge the gap between these two camps. For Harris, the historical development of philosophy 
had incidentally resulted in the mechanistic system popular during his lifetime, but was 
inevitably moving toward a dialectical logic. Hence, he remained ever optimistic throughout 
his life that the narrow-minded trends he encountered in South Africa, United States, and 
Europe would inevitably be overcome. Toward this end, according to Harris, the scientific 
discoveries of the 21st century have implied a wholeness about Nature that requires a 
corresponding metaphysics. Harris dedicated his life to detailing the epistemology, ethics, and 
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conception of Nature that follows from just such a system. The results, he maintained, 
requires a worldview that unifies cosmology with biological evolution and conscious 
experience, while avoiding the conclusions of both subjective idealism and empiricism. The 
key to this system is Harris’s conception of the “dialectic whole.” In the following chapter I 
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Chapter 2 




In this chapter the fundamental principles of Harris’s holism will be presented so as to 
permit comparison with contemporary theses from a range of differing fields. Here I aim not 
to defend Harris’s system, but to demonstrate that Bohm’s implicate order and enactivism in 
particular, rely upon the same concepts of dialectical relations and wholeness as Harris. In 
addition, I argue that each position applies these concepts to a limited extent and without 
recognizing their wider implications. In § 2.2, I begin with an introduction to Harris’s 
conceptions of internal relations, scale of forms, and the Concrete Universal. Using these 
terms, I outline Harris’s approach to the problem of consciousness, and epistemology. In § 
2.3, I introduce the theories of autopoiesis and embodiment under the enactivist paradigm, 
which is the closest contemporary position to Harris’s concerning the natures of life and 
mind. § 2.4 introduces David Bohm’s implicate order, which offers a quantum mechanical 
basis for a theory of mind. Here I show that Harris’s cosmology anticipated some of the 
metaphysical implications of Bohmian quantum mechanics. In § 2.5, I propose a synthesis of 
these three positions – Harris’s conception of the natural world, Bohm’s implicate order, and 
enactivism – a synthesis that sets the course for the following chapters.15   
 
2.2 Harris’s Holist Metaphysics  
As we have seen, Harris’s philosophical thinking certainly brought him career benefits, as 
well as appreciation and admiration from subjective idealists. Nevertheless, as his position 
was philosophically contrary to the dominant empiricist worldview of the day, his thinking 
was largely ignored during his lifetime. Although Harris’s terminology and method will 
                                                
15 In this chapter I draw primarily from works published in the later stages of Harris career because these works 
provide the clearest overview of his metaphysics. This means that insofar as Harris can be credited as having 
anticipated particular philosophical and scientific theories this will be sufficiently argued only in later chapters, 
where his earlier works are further discussed.  
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prima facie strike anyone of an analytic background as opaque, I argue that in the face of 
contemporary science, there are tremendous theoretical riches to be gained by studying his 
metaphysics. Common across most of his works, Harris begins by laying out what may be 
called a phenomenological foundation, an account of what he takes to be synthetic a priori 
first principles.  
Harris proposes that certain propositions about wholeness are fundamental for both 
scientific observation and philosophical investigation alike. For Harris, such a synthetic 
whole provides Descartes’s cogito, laws of thought, and rules for individuation. He maintains 
that without such presuppositions we would have no figure-ground distinction or object-
focused attention. Responding to Kant’s question ‘what makes a priori synthetic judgments 
possible’, Harris proposes “a priori synthetic judgments would be established by the 
demonstration of the existence of wholes with internal relations between their parts, for once 
the principle of organization is known, universal and necessary judgments about the structure 
and its parts would be possible a priori” (1987, p. 75).16 Metaphysics he says “is the 
comprehension of the whole and the exposition of the principle of structure by which it is 
pervaded” (1988, p. 11). The task of metaphysics then is to organize our experiences, both 
scientific and subjective, into a single unity, “not simply to reveal the presuppositions of 
science but also, and more significantly, to trace the process, and presumably, to detect the 
reasons, for their changes” (1988, p. 15). 
A synthetic whole of the kind Harris has in mind will be instantiated iff five criteria are 
satisfied. I first summarize these criteria before addressing each in the following sub-sections:  
 
(i) The components are interdependent with one another within their system, i.e. the thesis 
of internal or dialectical relations.  
(ii) The whole is dynamical (a view known as process ontology).  
(iii) The whole must contain different components organized within a medium, what Harris 
calls a system. 
(iv) The components interact in accordance with, and give rise to what Harris calls a 
unifying principle (what is today called dynamical feedback).  
                                                
16 At this point, Harris’s conception of “coherence” can be understood as what many have called the 
“systematicity” or interrelatedness of physical laws. This is to say that investigation of phenomena on different 
spatio-temporal levels can fit together without contradiction (Swartz 2010, 1995; Weinert 1995).  
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(v) As a result of i-iv, the whole undergoes a process of self-differentiation, what Harris 
calls a scale of increasingly complex forms.  
 
2.2.1 Internal Relations and Process Ontology 
For Harris, “dialectical logic” is the logic of system, the proper logic of science and 
metaphysics, one that both includes and surpasses transcendental and formal logics (1987, p. 
131). Formal logic, according to Harris, can only posit external relations – relations that are 
external to their terms. This means the same terms can remain unchanged “in different 
external relations and the same relations can obtain between different terms” (1987, p. 132). 
Harris argues however that if relations are external, “they fall between their terms, and then 
they fail to relate them or to bring them together […] a new relation must be sought between 
each of the terms […] so relatedness degenerates into an infinite regress” (1987, p. 133). 
According to criterion (i), the thesis of internal relations maintains that “physical entities are 
[…] related in such a way that the nature of the terms depends on their mutual relations and 
vice versa” (1991, p. 24). For Harris, an internally related system is one whose relations 
determine and are reciprocally determined by the nature of their components. Hence, any 
changes in entities or internal relations are concomitant and thereby alter the system to which 
they belong.  
In order to apply this thesis and flesh out its implications, it is important to understand 
what it does not claim. First, it is crucial to notice that Harris does not consider internal 
relations between individual entities but only within or among a system of entities.17 Second, 
this position is not claiming that all relations modify or in some way influence their terms, i.e. 
that all relations are internal.18 The latter would imply, “the idea that whenever there are 
some things, there exists a whole that consists exactly of those things—i.e., that there is 
always a mereological sum (or “fusion”) of two or more parts” (Achille, 2014). Here we can 
have a gerrymandered set of entities, in which case alteration of the set does not change the 
entities therein and vice versa – such a whole is conventional and arbitrary. Lastly, Harris 
                                                
17 Providing general support for Harris’s thesis, Blanshard considers the relations between two entities A and B: 
“If the absence of that relation would leave A as it was, the relation is external. If, when the relation was absent, 
A would be different, or would cease to be, the relation is internal” (1989, p. 3). Note that this ‘difference’ must 
be fundamental to the phenomena in question, not arbitrary/ conventional. Additionally, it would be incoherent 
to speak of internal relations between two individual entities unless those entities themselves compose a system. 
18 This was the very position that Moore (1919, p. 3) (perhaps unnecessarily) argued against. 
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would agree that any given relation such as X is taller than Y, is not going to somehow impact 
the nature of the respective terms (e.g. Y changes when X’s height is increased). These 
relations are indeed external and extrinsic.  
 Harris claims that within a whole, “the membership of each part will be conditioned by its 
relations to the other parts, and it will be the member it is because of these relations and 
because the other parts are as they are” (2000, p. 112). Internal relations are here understood 
to be intrinsic to the nature of the entities and according to Harris, all entities must have some 
such relations. One particularly important implication of this contention is that internal 
relations become necessary for identifying, and thus individuating an entity. In other words, it 
follows from Harris’s reasoning that what are typically considered intrinsic properties, 
obtaining just in case some entity exists, are in physical reality, derived from a system of 
internal relations.19 The argument is that any identifiable entity must be part of a system and 
that its nature depends upon certain relations within that system: relation R is internal iff it 
obtains between entity X and system Y, such that alteration of R results in an alteration of X 
and Y.  
Importantly, what Harris says about internal relations is meant to be relevant for both the 
world we observe and our observation of the world. On the one hand, in his Foundations, 
Harris anticipated the holomovement (discussed below) maintaining that "The-rest-of-the-
universe is a constituent of every quantitative assessment – in short, the whole is immanent in 
every part and determines the dimensions of the part” (1965, p. 107). He goes on to claim that 
quantum mechanics has shown us "[w]hole and part are mutually determining and no detail 
could be other than it is without making some difference, however slight, to all the rest" 
(ibid). Harris summarizes his philosophy of science as follows: “If the results of 
contemporary science are taken seriously we must acknowledge holism to be pervasive 
throughout the world, and all relations actually obtaining between real existents and their 
constituent parts to be internal” (1987, p. 133). On the other hand, Harris maintains that in the 
case of observation, isolated sensations are not even perceivable: “Only structures, the 
simplest of which is a figure-and-ground Gestalt, are ever cognized […] Accordingly, the 
cognition of any object whatsoever requires a synthesis of a manifold – a grasping of a 
                                                
19 It may also be noted that mass, a measure commonly referred to as intrinsic, is itself relational: the relative 
concentration of matter in a given inertial frame, the speed of which is again relative to light and other mass-
bodies. 
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plurality in unity” (1987, p. 77). Of course these are bold claims and will be reconsidered in 
due course. 
One of the earliest applications of internal relations to the philosophy of science was 
Whitehead’s Process and Reality (1978; 1929), by which Harris was considerably influenced. 
According to this early presentation of the theory, everything we consider to be concrete 
existence is more accurately understood as a process of becoming (Seibt, 2013; Hustwit, 
2015). Similarly, this is what Harris has in mind with respect to criterion (ii), that there is a 
process of participation, whereby the nature of a given entity is continually brought forth in 
virtue of certain interactions the entity has that are necessary for its being.20  
The boundary of a whole, Harris claims, is the locus of conflict that arises between a given 
whole and its other, i.e. its background or whatever is not the system. This conflict brings 
about what Harris describes as a vacillation “between denying its other and affirming its 
inevitable dependence upon it…” (1991, p. 18). In any whole the elements into which the 
system differentiates are considered to be finite in that each is limited and defined by what it 
excludes and what negates it.  
The result of this conflict is relative chaos and contingency in the unfolding of relations among 
the elements within a complex, which is overcome, and unity reestablished, only when identity in 
and through differences is acknowledged, so that the effort of the finite to maintain itself and to 
persist in its own being succeeds only when it reaches out (so to speak) beyond its own limits to 
embrace its other and unite with it in mutual complementation in a larger and more 
comprehensive whole (1991, p. 19).  
This “dependence” upon the other is what Harris describes as “self-preservation.” While 
“self-preservation” applies either to a-biotic or living systems, unlike Whitehead, Harris 
rejects the idea of mind (or prehension) in abiotic systems.  
The upshot of internal relations is that entities are dependent upon but also in conflict with 
the others within a common system. Reconciliation of oppositional and conflicting natures 
between wholes takes place through the development of new wholes, which leads to further 
differentiation. For Harris, internal relations can provide a paradigmatic frame by which 
structures of phenomenology and processes of nature may be more clearly understood. Harris 
                                                
20 Although most who invoke this thesis, including Harris, do so with the intent of making an ontological claim, 
at this point I only wish to emphasize the weaker, epistemic claim: if bodies, elements, or entities do not interact 
and relate in particular ways, we the observers cannot justifiably attribute any properties to them (nor can we be 
sure they exist). 
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has argued that one important implication of positing internal relations in nature is that the 
dialectic notion of “reconciling conflict” through “synthesis” can be extended to evolution in 
general (e.g. via symbiogenesis). In the following sections, this process is examined in greater 
detail.  
 
2.2.2 The “Unifying Principle” and “Explicative Process”  
In Harris’s system the unifying principle and explicative process are the most important 
terms to understand if one is to follow his arguments regarding evolution and the nature of 
consciousness. To do so it is imperative to understand his conception of the Concrete 
Universal. “Traditionally”, Harris claims, abstract universals are understood as “a class under 
which its particulars are subsumed”, while particulars are understood to be concrete, 
demonstrative qualities that compose individuals (1991, p. 23). For example, according to 
Newtonian physics and the empiricist philosophy, particulars were concrete and universals 
were abstract. If we are to maintain internal relations however, Harris claims that we must 
also posit a Concrete Universal: an overarching principle that specifies the physical relations 
that are possible and thus governs the evolutionary trajectory of the whole (1954, ff. p. 233; 
1965, ff. p. 467). “A principle of this kind is universal because it prevails throughout the 
system and is universal to its parts. It integrates them into a single concrete whole...” (1991, 
p. 24).  
Concerning criterion (iii), to be a system requires that components must exist within a 
“continuum” (i.e. any substance or framework organized into an interval), for without which, 
the respective elements could not interact, there would be no coherence, and thus no whole. 
Harris maintains no continuum can be homogeneous because homogeneity implies parts that 
are completely uniform and indistinguishable, which excludes the difference necessary for 
continuity of relationship. If the parts do not differ, at least in position, “space collapses to a 
single point; and a single point apart from and unrelated to other points is nowhere, and so no 
point in space” (1987, p. 138). Within say, a 2D series, there cannot be total irregularity: “For 
absolute irregularity means a total lack of continuity between the terms of the series, so that 
once again the continuum would be dissolved” (ibid). Positing such a system as totally 
homogenous or totally random amounts to what Harris calls the “fallacy of spurious 
homogeneity” (1965, p. 462). As a result, Harris holds randomness is always relative to order 
and so “order is prior to disorder; and the primary form of order is continuous seriality in a 
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heterogeneous but graded scale of overlapping terms” (pp. 139-40). This Harris claims, will 
be true for every system.  
With respect for criterion (iv), in a genuine whole, the parts are adapted to one another in a 
way that conforms with what Harris calls a unifying principle – a “system”, “Gestalt”, 
“scale”, “field”, or “phase”, that is a partial instantiation (subset) of the Concrete Universal. 
Harris maintains the determination of the parts of such principles is the same as the 
determination of these principles by the overarching Concrete Universal. “If every element in 
the whole is a particular specification of its universal principle of order, they must all have 
something in common, yet equally they must all differ…” (1987, p. 135). Harris takes an 
abstract mathematical space, or ordered manifold as the simplest example of the unifying 
principle.21 Originally, Harris maintained that in mathematics “a function at once signifies the 
uniqueness and cohesion of the totality and regulates the distinguishing relations of the 
elements of which it is composed and in and through which the organizing principle is 
expressed” (1965, p. 83). A space of this kind is considered the simplest model of such a 
whole, as it “implies an interlock between parts that are systematically interrelated (as in a 
jigsaw), so that their mutual relations are governed by a principle of order or organization that 
pervades the entire structure” (1991, pp. 17-18).  
Importantly, Harris remains nominalist about the unifying principle, thereby denying that 
such forms can really exist as abstractions. He writes, “this structural principle is nothing, or 
at best a mere abstraction, unless it is embodied and expresses itself in the multiplicity of the 
elements comprising the system” (1987, p. 144). For example, Harris appeals to the 
widespread proliferation of fractal geometry identified in the development of natural systems 
where, he argues, overarching forms are iterated across spatiotemporal scales (1991, ff. p. 
35).22 Here the materially instantiated form and function of a system is identified as a unifying 
                                                
21 For example, all shapes depend upon the system to which they belong for their properties to obtain, i.e. as in 
Escher’s (1989) plane division, there is an internal relationship between angles, faces, internality, and externality 
of an object. A more modern example is cellular automata. In this case, the nature or state of each cell depends 
upon its relations to an immediate neighborhood and that neighborhood further depends upon its relationship to 
the total system. The unifying principle can also be exemplified as the update. Here, each cell within the whole 
must interact with those in its neighborhood and the way in which they do so is determined by (and thus 
demonstrates) its overarching law(s). For further details see Wolfram’s Mathworld: 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Manifold.html; http://mathworld.wolfram.com/TotalisticCellularAutomaton.html  
22 As will be discussed in later chapters, similar conceptions have been developed in general systems theory 
(GST) under the terms of emergence, order parameter, and attractor (Hooker, 2011). 
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principle in that it imposes an organization that determines the unity of its parts, but also 
depends upon the specific material manifestation of its parts. Only as materially instantiated 
systems can the unifying principle reflect the Concrete Universal to some degree of adequacy 
(2000, ff. p. 106). In this way, Harris’s holist metaphysics is compatible with a kind of ontic 
structural realism (OSR) that takes relations and their structures as fundamental and 
interdependent.23  
Concerning criterion (v), when applied to the whole of Nature, Harris maintains, internal 
relations avoid the infinite regress of external relations and result in a boundless progress, i.e. 
the generation of a scale of forms. The “self-differentiation of system” he writes, involves the 
“explication of a totality”, an “interplay of unity and diversity” that must be understood as “a 
perpetual dynamic activity”, but one “prior to all temporality and process because it is already 
involved in any succession or movement” (1987, pp. 144-45). In other words, Harris 
considers temporal change to be a facet, not an exhaustive depiction of this process. In this 
process, Harris claims, each whole that arises supersedes, includes, and transforms those 
beneath it, while implicating those that may yet develop: “progressing by successive steps, 
from a primitive element up the scale of degrees of more adequate manifestations of the 
universal principle, the totality that is immanent in every element and every phase of the 
process develops” (1991, p. 20).  
One can imagine this progression as the formation of a picture in a jigsaw puzzle as 
convex and concave of its pieces are brought together. However, if all entities of internal 
relations “overlap”, Harris finds each relation has the potential of establishing a context 
within which new wholes may be generated (2000, pp. 108-9).24 Harris argues that in nature, 
this process is ongoing; the immanence of a whole in its parts drives the components from 
contradiction to supplementation, augmentation, and completion – the picture emerges with 
increasing clarity as more complex relationships come into being. “So the process of 
successive unifications of opposites is propelled toward the generation and eventual 
achievement of greater wholeness” (p. 113). Harris holds that a “scale of this kind is 
                                                
23 For a recent argument toward this end see McKenzie, K. (2014, a/b). I will return to this topic in § 5.2 below. 
24 Though unrecognized by Harris, Whitehead’s (1978) concept of the “society” serves as an anticipation of his 
unifying principles. For Whitehead the “society” meant any (becoming) actual occasion (or interrelated nexus of 
entities) serving as a (layered) environment that influences the becoming of its constituents. The members or 
occasions of a “society” exist in virtue of the laws of their society and also bring their laws into being (p. 91). 
Likewise, Harris’s conceptin of evolution bears striking resemblance to Whitehead’s appeal to the creative 
process, but they differ in that the former endorses teleology, while the latter dismisses it. 
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dialectical because it proceeds through opposition and distinction which is at the same time 
complementary, interdependence and mutual identity” (1991, p. 20). The Concrete Universal 
(or the form of all forms), thus exerts a conatus that “differentiates itself” into each of its 
respective phases or unifying principles (p. 24).  
Henceforth, the scale of forms is to be denoted the explicative process (E): The 
evolutionary process of self-differentiation attributed to the Concrete Universal whereby new 
wholes (or phases), permitting new forms of internal relations are generated. This Harris 
argues, is a common principle of cosmological and biological evolution, as well as 
psychological development (to be discussed in later chapters). Harris maintains that the 
following conception of material self-differentiation can be vindicated in contemporary 
science:  
energy is matrix and its laws are the principles of motion in the physical world. It manifests itself 
as curvature in the space-time continuum [...] It manifests itself likewise as gravitation governing 
the movement of matter in space, the formation and the motion of the heavenly bodies, and the 
structure of the universe generally […] in elementary particles, in atoms, in molecules, and in 
chemical bonds and affinities between diverse substances, right up to the complex 
macromolecules which make possible the self-reproductive chemical cycles typical of living 















Figure 2 – Explicative process, unifying principle, and Concrete Universal. At t0 Nature or Being is 
considered not homogenous but differentiated in a primitive way, here symbolized by a simple 
asymmetry. At t1 differentiation establishes unifying principles characterized by structures and process of 
corresponding domains. At t2 increasingly complex unifying principles emerge that build upon those of a 
previous stage. Harris refers to the transitions in complexity as steps in a scale of forms, each partially 
reflective of the whole, which he calls the Concrete Universal. The specification of a scale of forms 
through time is here denoted the explicative process. 
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Harris’s prime example of a unifying principle is the self-organization of living being. In 
his Foundations, Harris proposes auturgy as a term distinguishing living from non-living 
systems by their adaptive capacity to do self-work (1965, p. 180).25 Here for the first time in 
the scale of forms, “metabolic transformations” permit a system “to create and sustain 
individual structure, spontaneously adjusting itself to external circumstances and adapting its 
operation amid changing conditions so as to counteract influences that would otherwise bring 
the sustaining processes to an end” (1991, p. 64). This he calls “self-determination”, and in 
agreement with Hans Jonas, “the first form of freedom” that “foreshadows consciousness” 
(ibid).  
Crucial for later discussions, Harris holds that a direct implication of auturgy is embodied 
cognition, a conclusion that he derived from Aristotle and Spinoza. Accordingly, the mind 
and body are understood to be two aspects of one living system, i.e. the mind is the form of 
the body and (from the later philosopher) the body is the primary object of intention for the 
mind (e.g. 2006, pp. 98-99). Harris maintains that neither description of phenomenal 
experience, nor the actual neural discharge deserves primacy:  
It is not merely a matter of describing one set of facts in two different ways, but of one reality 
manifesting itself in two different forms […] Neither is reducible to the other. The entity which is 
both has two forms of being, just as (analogously) a triangle exists as three straight lines on a 
plane forming three angles, and as a distinctive three-cornered shape (1973, p. 84).  
Harris claims that the “most widely canvassed theories of perception today seem to agree in 
rejecting the notion that the percept is an immediately given atomic and simple datum that 
can be isolated from all others and from other elements in experience” (2000, p. 85). Rather, 
Harris holds that perception is more appropriately understood as an “achievement”, the end 
result of an active and “discursive process” that presupposes a given body of knowledge. This 
achievement, he argues, is not to be seen as intellectual, involving the manipulation of atomic 
                                                
25 Harris recognizes throughout his works that his philosophy of Nature, and conception of the whole can be 
originally traced back to Aristotle’s Scala Naturae in which there are a series of phases whose relations are “for 
the sake of their form” (1991, p. 174). Notably, Harris (e.g. 1965; 1995) also drew this conception from 
Spinoza’s monism in which there exist numerous attributes and modes of a single Substance (see Morgan 2002, 
On God; ff. p. 40). Likewise, Harris (1993) follows Hegel’s (1977) conception of Absolute Spirit as implicit in 
each phase of Nature, but ultimately realized in self-transcendent consciousness. Harris follows Collingwood’s 
(1933) development of a scale of forms “that specifies what he identifies as the philosophical universal and 
claims that it was in fact “what Hegel and his successors had called the concrete universal” (2000, p. 103).  
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symbols. Sympathetic to Merleau-Ponty, Harris maintains, “perception is a functioning of the 
body as a whole, and not just the sense organs” (2000, p. 87).  
Harris claims that there is no zero or pure beginning in the scale of forms, but it does not 
continue on unfulfilled forever either. Rather, the Concrete Universal is implicit at each phase 
and becomes complete only when fully actualized in self-awareness. Thus, he maintains that 
consciousness of the Concrete Universal is itself an essential phase of the explicative process: 
wholeness, by its very nature, involves dynamic and dialectical self-specification, by way of self-
enfoldment (with consequent overlap of specific forms). It tends towards intensification of 
centreity, increasing self-sufficiency and widening comprehension, and culminates as an all-
embracing awareness of an all-encompassing world (1991, p. 26).  
Roughly, this is how Harris’s metaphysics encapsulates his theories of life and mind. While 
he refers to his position as monistic, as I argue below, by embedding consciousness in the 
scale of forms, Harris has effectively provided a means of re-visioning neutral monism 
(NM).26  
 
2.2.3 Implications for Epistemology 
The central contention that made many of Harris’s mainstream contemporaries wary was 
his persistent criticism of the epistemology and methodology of empiricism. Harris claims the 
world-view of contemporary science contradicts the long-standing atomistic, mechanical, and 
dualistic theories about knowledge and nature. For Harris, scientific practice reveals an 
unavoidable commitment to a holistic metaphysics that contextualizes empirical observation. 
Consequently, the implicit assumption that formal and mathematical logic are the gold 
standards of reason is brought into question. He calls for a “scientific philosophy” to be 
“carried out conjointly by scientists and philosophers in collaboration” (1965, p. 32). The 
goal of this project is to critically assess the methods and fit disparate branches of science 
“into a coherent world-concept” (ibid). Following this line of thought, much of Harris’s 
career was devoted to proposing such a scientific philosophy, in which the appropriate world-
view is dialectic, holistic, organismic, teleological, and hierarchical. This section is devoted to 
unpacking Harris’s “logic of system” (1987, ff. p. 131). 
                                                
26 For an introduction to NM see Stubenberg (2014). For a recent historical analysis and revision of this position 
see Banks (2014). 
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Harris claims the verification principle upon which empiricism has been built is 
“untenable” because sense perception does not and cannot be of immediate self-evidence.27 In 
addition, he holds that appealing to abstraction so as to isolate terms of philosophical analysis 
cannot avoid this challenge. Harris’s reason for this is that perception depends on the 
identification of a context for its interpretive strength, one that is a result of thought’s 
discursive activity’. Harris claims, “[e]xperimentation is, in fact, the question that the scientist 
puts to nature, and no question arises unless some theory is already being entertained.” 
Accordingly, even the simplest observation is also “interpretation in the light of prior 
knowledge” (2000, p. 13). Here Harris takes issue with the verificationist picture of scientific 
practice and maintains that classical logic is incapable on its own, to facilitate or reflect the 
development of scientific philosophy. He argues this is because no objects of experience are 
ever based strictly on atomic observables, but depend upon presuppositions and paradigm.28  
We must notice that this priority of structure to individuation is not just an empirical discovery but 
is essential to any and every principle of individuation. What distinguishes and defines individuals 
is their relations to one another; and every relation of whatever sort presupposes a background 
system appropriate to it (1965, p. 456).  
For example, Harris takes a given “mark” on a given “body” (e.g. a thermometer) as 
having no meaning unless it is correlated with other bodies in a meaningful way, which 
presupposes an observer/experimenter with a finite complex of assumptions regarding 
relationships between elements of the system as a whole. Harris stresses that no direct 
observation is possible without a “connection between matters of fact and universal rules of 
correlation” (2000, p. 29). Importantly then, theories about the world are “constructive of 
system rather than either inductive or formally deductive, and it demands a logic akin to both 
yet identical with neither” (p. 20).  
                                                
27 Considering the history of science, Harris points out that not only some of the most important discoveries (e.g. 
those of Kepler, Galileo) have not been made by direct observation, because in many cases such observation was 
not possible due to technological constraints (1970, p. 183). On the contrary, many discoveries have come from 
theoretical inference as opposed to mere deduction from simple observable ‘facts’.  
28 Indeed the claim that “nothing exists except matter is not empirically verifiable…” (2000, p. 2).  Verification, 
he maintained, consists in systematically assembling diverse and corroborative evidence, the interconnections of 
which make denial of the resultant theory “impossible” without resulting in a “breakdown of the entire 
conceptual scheme.” Falsification “consists in failure of corroboration, which demands either modification of 
the theory or discovery of new connections that will reconcile the conflicting evidence (2000. p. 93). 
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Laws (or principles of order) are considered synthetic: “General laws are not revealed by 
direct observation, and if derived from inductive inference, they cannot be confirmed by any 
one particular observation, nor are any number sufficient” (2000, p. 26). In this vein, by 
denying the possibility of a priori knowledge as empiricism has done, Harris finds we lose 
not only metaphysics but also any sort of organizing context. As a result, all propositions 
become tautological on their own terms and unrelated to one another. Without such a 
synthesis, theoreticians and scientists alike are no longer dealing with a ‘coherent reality’, are 
unable to appeal to past experiences, and lack a basis for their claims about the world. Again, 
to make his point clear, Harris maintained that the unifying principle is a structure of both 
knowledge (e.g. scientific theory) and the world (e.g. self-organizing systems):  
A scientific theory is itself a principle or organization systematizing the observed facts within a 
specific field of experience. It formulates laws that determine and interrelate the facts, and it 
interrelates both facts and laws according to logical principles, so as to form a coherent whole. 
The logical principles are precisely those we are seeking: namely the laws of systematic and 
coherent thinking (1987, pp. 142-43).  
A theoretical system then is an example “par excellence” of systematic order and its 
parameters are the logical principles upon which the theory relies. Of utmost importance for 
the process of scientific development, facts are always, “organized by a principle or law, or a 
set of such principles themselves interrelated according to some higher principle” (1970, p. 
350). Principles thus designate the domain in which the facts are expected to obtain and 
“provides the rule of inference” (ibid). For Harris, the aim in scientific progress is to remove 
contradiction and continuously reveal the principle of order in a given domain, which 
emerges as a new theory. Certainty would require insight unto “a complete systemic whole of 
reality” (2000, p. 32), because in “any given situation the observable facts are infinite in 
number” (p. 88). Though this level of certainty is never reached, Harris maintains that human 
endeavors get ever closer to it as we achieve more holistic methods of observation and 
synthesis – that is, by accounting for a greater range of relations.29  
                                                
29 When considered categorically Harris claims a theory, “is always partial, truncated, and incomplete. It is true 
only in a slight degree, for what it omits and fails to specify, when brought into the limelight, modifies, if only 
by explication, its intrinsic meaning” (1987, p. 205). An interesting example he provides of this is the precession 
of Mercury’s orbit, which was an anomaly for Newtonian physics, but could be accounted for in relativity and as 
a result “qualifies” the limits of the previous framework (ibid). 
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Scientific practice thus reveals the presupposition of theoretical or metaphysical 
scaffolding, which takes the very form of the internally related whole discussed in the 
previous sections. Over the course of continued application to observable phenomena, the 
form of this synthetic whole is overturned by increasingly coherent alternatives. An 
alternative is preferable insofar as it exhaustively encapsulates the former systems, thereby 
accounting for the limits of their organization. This is after all a dialectical philosophy, in that 
there is a continuous effort to reveal the foundations of rival camps and vindicate them to 
some degree, putting each in their rightful place within a hierarchical whole.  
The most essential points of Harris’s system established heretofore may be summarized 
thus:  
 
(1) Properties of natural systems (unifying principles) depend upon and are derived from 
processes of internal relation that they bear to the wider system to which they belong 
(Concrete Universal). 
(2) Every proper system is organized by a unifying principle that arises from and 
instantiates some set of internal relations upon its constituents.  
(3) Process ontology combined with internal relations results in the directed genesis of 
unifying principles (a synthetic scale of forms E). 
(4) The resulting “dialectical whole” is inherent in science, philosophy, and 
phenomenology, i.e. Harris claims this structure-process is fundamental to our 
knowledge (paradigms) and to Nature (ontology).  
 
The remainder of this thesis is devoted to fleshing out implications for the anthropic principle, 
and the hard problem of consciousness that follow from Harris’s system. Toward this end, I 
next take a preliminary exploration of what are today some of the most sympathetic positions 
with respect to Harris’s holism: enactivism and Bohm’s implicate order. 
 
2.3 Analogies with Autopoietic Enactivism  
Though enactivism is relatively new, first appearing in Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s 
work the embodied mind (1991), its primary tenets can be traced to Bertalanffy’s (1950) 
outline of general systems theory (GST), Maturana and Varela’s cognition and autopoiesis 
(1972), and a host of phenomenological theories developed since the early twentieth 
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century.30 Today autopoietic enactivism (AE) can be characterized as endorsing a particular 
version of the “4-E thesis”: 
   
(1) Enaction – cognition is not a state or substance, but a self-organizing process. This 
thesis takes issue with representationalism, which claims that mind is composed of a 
symbolic manipulation system exhausted by the brain.  
(2) Embodiment – cognition obtains as a feature of an organism as a whole. This is a 
rejection of classical modularity, which posits cognitive systems (among others) as 
distinct and limited to the brain.  
(3) Embedded thesis – cognition depends upon on-going social and environmental 
interaction. This thesis rejects nativism, which maintains an individualistic and 
independent view of cognitive development.  
(4) Extended thesis – mind is (at least partially) constituted by environmental features, 
rather than being limited to computations of the brain as is the case for classical 
cognitive science. 
 
Starting with Capra’s (1996) synthesis of autopoiesis and complexity theory, numerous 
works have either elaborated or contributed to a common 4-E foundation, including: 
neurophenomenology (Varela 1996; Thompson, 2006); extended mind theories (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998); participatory spirituality (Ferrer, 2002); collective mind theories (Theiner, 
2008); extended neutral monism (Silberstein, 2009); organizational theory (Magalhaes & 
Sanchez, 2009) radical enactivism (REC) (Hutto & Mylin, 2013); and enactivist education 
theories (Reid, 2014; Li & Winchester, 2014). While all of these branches of the enactivist 
paradigm (Stewart, et al. 2010) bear significant commonality with Harris’s system, the 
present thesis is devoted only to evaluating the extent to which Harris anticipates and 
broadens the metaphysical foundation for AE. Toward this end, in the following sections I 
                                                
30 Among the philosophers that have contributed to the historical development of this thesis, William James 
(1884; 1981), Edmund Husserl (1983; 1989), Merleau Ponty (1962; 1963), and J.J. Gibson (1950; 1979) have 
been invaluable. These philosophers remain important today in part because many of their theories and concepts 
have become useful in interpreting the results of scientific experiments. For this reason, it will be helpful to 
remember that in what follows many of the arguments to be examined have stemmed from one or more of these 
respective philosophers, but unfortunately (this being a contemporary argument) space prohibits sufficient 
discussion of their original arguments. 
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show that AE is built upon many of the same metaphysical presuppositions as Harris’s 
holism, including analogues of internal relations, process ontology, and unifying principles.  
 
2.3.1 The Unit of Cognition 
The theory of autopoiesis (self-creation) is both a cornerstone and characterization of 
enactivism. I argue that this theory is the most significant modern manifestation of Harris’s 
unifying principle in the philosophy of biology. Developed by neuroscientist Francisco 
Varela and his mentor, biologist Humberto Maturana (1972), the theory of autopoiesis was 
intended to describe and explain the self-emerging, self-maintaining operation of individual 
cells. Since its early use however, the theory has been applied to the organization of virtual 
processes, the living body, and social systems. The hotly debated implications of this theory 
are far-reaching but the most important for the present purposes concern what its proponents 
consider a “deep continuity of life and mind. According to this thesis, life and mind share a 
set of basic organizational properties, and the organizational properties distinctive of mind are 
an enriched version of those fundamental to life. Mind is life-like and life mind-like” 
(Thompson, 2007, p. 128).  
According to Reid’s (2014) synthesis of Maturana and Varela’s works, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of an autopoietic system are now: (a) self-production – synthesizing its 
own components; (b) embodiment – physically instantiated; (c) self-organizing – recurrently 
maintaining itself in a steady state; (d) composite unity – being distinguishable from a 
background medium; (e) interactionally open – exchanging matter and energy with its 
environment; and (f) dynamic – recursive and emergent (ff. p. 153). In concrete terms, this 
implies that the system maintains a semipermeable boundary, a reaction network within the 
boundary, and that the two are interdependent (Thompson 2007, p. 103).  
Additionally, AE supporters maintain that when the reaction networks within such a 
system are interdependent with one another and coupled to an environment, the resulting 
dynamics are sufficient for adaptivity, which is believed to demonstrate minimal cognition 
and intentionality. This is because the system is considered to be about its own preservation. 
“Cognition” is therefore considered to be “behaviour or conduct in relation to meaning and 
norms that the system itself enacts or brings forth on the basis of its autonomy” (Thompson 
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2007, p. 126).31 To support this point, AE appeals to complex systems theory to explain the 
shift from chemical to intentional as a dynamic co-emergence:  
Dynamic co-emergence means that a whole not only arises from its parts but that the part also 
arises from the whole. Part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each other: A whole cannot 
be reduced to its parts, for the parts cannot be characterized independently of the whole; 
conversely, the parts cannot be reduced to the whole, for the whole cannot be characterized 
independently of the parts (Thompson, 2007, p. 38). 
In The Embodied Mind (1991) Varela, et al. originally argued that an organism’s world 
and respective biologic structure bring each other into being through interactive coupling. 
They hold that “organism and environment are mutually enfolded in multiple ways, and so 
what constitutes the world of a given organism is enacted by that organism’s history of 
structural coupling” (p. 202). This means that the meaning generated by an organism is not 
only permitted by its physiological structure but also, constrained by its phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic histories that have established this structure. Sensory and motor structures are 
understood to be interconnected and interdependent, such that each influences the form and 
function of the other. Qualities of the environment do not exist independently of the 
organism, just as those of the organism cannot exist independently of their environment: both 
organism and environment define each other through time. The result is what can be called an 
on-going sedimentation effect, in which past modes of coupling to an environment provide 
the means for, but also constrain future coupling. Hence, the enactivist slogan that cognition 
is like “laying down a path in walking” (Thompson 2007, p. 180).32 
Thompson argues that organizational-operational closure generates a circular relation 
between an autonomous system and its milieu. This is to say that the part and whole cannot 
be analysed independently and that each arises from the other. In consequence, (following 
Merleau-Ponty), AEs argue that the organism cannot be understood as composed of 
mechanical relations, in which each part can be understood as decomposed “one-one unites”, 
but only with “dialectical relations”:  
                                                
31 It is important to note however that natural whirlpools or the like are not autopoietic because they do not 
create their own components, nor do they maintain an internal environment of lower entropy than their external 
context. This is an issue to which I devote significant attention in chapter 6 below.  
32 Autopoiesis will be compared with Harris’s auturgy and their respective conceptions of intentionality and 
cognition will be more thoroughly discussed in § 6.2 below.  
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a dialectical relation is one in which (i) A determines B, and B determines A (bi-directional 
dependence or reciprocal determination); and (ii) neither A nor B is analyzable into discrete, 
causally efficacious elements that stand in a one-one correspondence (nondecomposability). 
Further, dialectical relations are dynamic, not static. Hence (iii) A alters B, and B alters A… 
(Thompson 2007, pp. 68-69).  
Here we can plainly see that the AE appeal to dynamic co-emergence and dialectical relations 
in their theories of mind and life follows the same reasoning as Harris’s internal relations and 
unifying principle (e.g. auturgy), which are crucial pillars in his own metaphysics.  
 
2.3.2 Embodiment Theories 
According to Wilson & Foglia’s entry in the Stanford Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, the embodiment thesis holds: “features of cognition are embodied in that they are 
deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent’s 
beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that 
agent’s cognitive processing” (Wilson & Foglia, 2011). Proponents of the embodiment mind 
thesis maintain that rather than merely processing information, we make meaning of our 
world by projecting our bodies into it (despite this projection occurring mostly 
unconsciously). The body then can serve as a constraint, a distributor, and/or a regulator, of 
cognitive functions.33 The remainder of this section introduces the kind of embodiment theory 
that AEs are poised to endorse.  
In introducing embodiment theory, Shapiro, L. A. (2012) finds that, Gibson’s ecological 
psychology (EP) concerning visual perception has provided significant motivation. “For 
Gibson, perception is strongly coupled with action, because most of the invariants within the 
optic array do not appear except against a background of change. Perceivers actively scan, 
move within, or otherwise manipulate the environment” (p. 121). EM thus rejects the “classic 
sandwich” of information processing consisting of (i) perception (input); (ii) cognition 
(information processing); and (iii) agency (output). Cognition is no longer understood as the 
use and manipulation of symbolic (brain-instantiated) representations of the external world 
                                                
33 These three terms appear especially apt for capturing a central AE notion that a given structure provides both 
means and restrictions for corresponding functions, perceptions, and observations. This insight will play an 
increasingly important role when I return to discuss Harris and AE embodiment theories in § 7.2 below. 
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(Vörös, et al. 2016, p. 191). Instead, cognition is described as a meaning making process 
resulting from whole living bodies actively fitting into their environment.  
Accordingly, the world is not merely soaked up ‘as is’ by observation, rather observation 
involves active participation, and how the world appears depends upon how we conceive and 
feel our body through time. As Harvey, et al. (2016) maintain, embodied perception 
depends not only on current sensation but also on the way sensation, and current movement, is 
systematically related to upcoming and potential sensory events, on the basis of the structure of 
the environment and the organism’s neuromuscular expertise […] This expertise comprises 
anticipatory sensitivity to the contingencies of sensory events in relation to potential or ongoing 
bodily movement, and is developed by means of individually and socially regulated experiences 
during ontogeny (p. 236).  
This is to say the sedimentation effect of sensorimotor feedback mentioned above is 
increasingly complicated, involving changes in biological structure due to environmental 
interactions as well as reinforcing influences from secondary reflection and emotional 
associations of one’s remembered history. This creates layers of reflexes with respect to a 
wide array of cognitive capacities.  
Examples of such embodied memory use the term conceptualization to address how the 
body can be a part of one’s cognitive processing, while replacement addresses how the body 
produces cognitive abilities outside of traditional schema of cognitive science (Shapiro L. A, 
2012). For instance, deictic pointers have been proposed in support of replacement. Ballard, 
et al. (1997) have found that subject’s eyes would jump to the position or deictic points 
corresponding to where original stimuli were presented within their visual field in memory 
tasks. In this case, subjects were attempting to recall the position of coloured blocks after a 
momentary presentation. Hence, an embodied theory of learning finds that memory tasks are 
more efficiently carried out with the aid of bodily cues. Sympathetic authors have concluded 
that while this doesn’t rule out representations, it does give credit to placing representational 
content in a secondary status relative to the physiological response, which can be seen as an 
adaptive function developed for the purpose of lessoning the burden of working memory.34 
                                                
34 Perhaps due to its (unnecessary) appeal to representations, the term common-code (Prinz, 1984) has been 
excluded from many recent discussions of embodiment, but it appears to lie at the heart of modern sensorimotor 
theory: deriving from William James’ ideo motor theory, it asserts that there is a common code underlying both 
perception and physiological response. The implication of this theory is, as James claimed in the case of 
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Again, this story conflicts with the classical positions that understands cognition as 
consisting “in computational operations on informationally meagre symbolic representations 
in order to produce new representations that serve cognitive functions such as perception, 
language comprehension, problem solving and so on” (Shapiro L. A. 2012, p. 122). By 
depicting cognition as characterized by bodily feedback loops, enactivists have 
characteristically attempted to walk a “razor’s edge” between solipsism or idealism on the 
one hand and direct or indirect (representational) realism on the other (Maturana 1992, p. 
241). Embodiment theorists find that taking this path renders computational and 
representational approaches inadequate. Instead, they turn to dynamic systems theory (DST), 
which avoids reducing cognition to mere input/output processes. According to DST, “[i]nputs 
are described as perturbations to the system’s intrinsic dynamics, rather than as instructions to 
be followed, and internal states are described as self-organized compensations triggered by 
perturbations rather than representations of external states of affairs” (Thompson 2007, p. 11). 
Meaning is no longer seen as one-to-one structural correlations and causations posited by the 
representationalist, but is repeatedly redefined through living.  
Although many AEs have appealed to Gibson’s theory of affordances to support their 
theory of perception, according to Fultot, Nie, & Carello (2016), careful consideration reveals 
an incompatibility between the two camps. They maintain situation X affords activity Y for 
organism Z on occasion O iff X and Z are mutually compatible on dimensions relevant to Y.  
As Chemero (2009) explains, this mutuality involves a symmetry of information between 
organism and environment: 
the principle of symmetry is that (1) the environment specifies the information available for 
perception and the information available for perception specifies what is perceived, and (2) what 
is perceived specifies the information available for perception and the information available for 
perception specifies the environment (p. 120).  
This means there is a “1:1 correspondences” between the environmental information and the 
information perceived. In virtue of its self-organized thermodynamic constraints, the XYZO 
system holds the primacy of agency – not the (autopoietic) organisms. Ecological psychology 
(and REC) maintains a direct realism about affordances and an observer-independent reality 
for meaning. Phenomenology thus becomes superfluous on EP’s account of consciousness.  
                                                                                                                                                  
confronting a bear, that we are afraid because we run, with the initial physiological response being a 
conditioned reflex that causes a specific emotional (and thus cognitive) response (James, 1884).  
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For AE proponents, however, this symmetry does not hold. Chemero explains that whereas 
the “environment-to-perception fit is at least partly causal, the per-ception-to-environment fit 
is primarily normative” (p. 121). That an environment causes the observation of a particular 
object in no way causes that object to exist, despite our being inspired to act on the basis of 
our perception. Building upon the notion of organism-environment interdependence, 
Thompson (2007) has argued for a middle way between behaviourism and cognitivism, 
maintaining that “as a skilful activity of the whole animal or person, perceptual experience 
emerges from the continuous and reciprocal (non-linear) interactions of sensory, motor, and 
cognitive processes, and is thereby constituted by motor behaviour, sensory stimulation, and 
practical knowledge” (p. 256). The environment then according to AE, is not directly 
perceived by the organism – as in Gibsonian affordances, REC, and sensorimotor enactivism 
– rather, organism and environment are enacted via sensorimotor and chemical feedback 
loops (I return to the notion of world-enactment in chapter 6). As a result, AE proponents 
have an extra step in naturalizing phenomenality, since there remains some kind of intrinsic 
internality for the subject and thus an asymmetric relation between subject and world.  
Beginning with Varela, et al. (1991), AEs have maintained that the explanatory gap is a 
problem that arises in-and-through the prevailing philosophical paradigm. In the face of this 
problem, they have proposed a pragmatic methodology for ‘living away the problem’ called 
neurophenomenology. Their working hypothesis is that phenomenological accounts of the 
structure of experience and scientific accounts of neuro-cognitive processes can be mutually 
informative and equally constraining (Thompson, et al. 2005; Varela 1996).  
Isomorphism suggests an epistemological parallelism in which the biological and 
phenomenological accounts run on parallel tracks, with no mutual interaction or influence. 
Neurophenomenology, following Merleau-Ponty’s lead, proposes a more daring idea – that 
biology and phenomenology can stand in a mutually enlightening, explanatory relation 
(Thompson 2007, p. 358).35 
Following Varela then, biology and phenomenology are not considered identical to one 
another, but as correlated dynamics, each contributing to an on-going means of accounting for 
                                                
35 For example, this type of methodology has revealed that phantom limb syndrome arises due to a failure of 
sensorimotor feedback, in that the brain sends signals to which the body cannot respond (Ramachandran, 1998). 
More specifically, it has been shown that by utilizing this feedback with the aid of mirrors to simulate the 
missing limb, it is possible to significantly alter one’s phenomenal self-model and correlated neural pathways, 
thus altering or even eradicating the phantom limb (Metzinger 2003, ff. p. 470).  
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otherwise unrecognized variables of the other. Given the results of § 2.3.1, EP’s reduction of 
phenomenology and direct realism about meaning renders AE and Harris’s holism 
incompatible with EP. As will be discussed in later chapters (7 & 8), I maintain that the 
neurophenomenological methodology and Harris’s scale of forms can each provide 
invaluable insight into the other. Moreover, when taken together, I contend Harris’s 
metaphysics and AE provide a sufficient ontological response to the “explanatory gap.”   
 
2.3.3 Embedded and Extended Theories 
Going one step further than the embodied thesis – to what some proponents of enactivism 
contend are its logical implications – according to the embedded (or situated) thesis, 
“cognition deeply depends on the natural and social environment…” (Wilson 2011, p. 3). The 
embedded mind proposes that cognition relies upon elements of a subject’s environment with 
which they are in constant interaction. Here, physical alterations of an environment (including 
the creation of tools and language) circle back to reshape our cognitive structures.36 Again 
relying upon GST, proponents of the embedded thesis maintain cognition can be adequately 
understood only by connecting biological, psychological, and social-ecological accounts of 
perception and behaviour into an interconnected and dynamical whole (Clartcey 2009, p. 12).  
For enactivists, this is more simply cashed out in terms of cultural influences. An 
important contribution toward this end originally came from Lakoff & Johnson’s Metaphors 
We Live By (1980), in which they argued that individuals actively construct metaphorical 
conceptions of themselves in the world that stem from our physiological structures and 
functions. Examples include the use of a base-ten for our counting system (i.e. our fingers), 
English speakers thinking of the future as ahead and our past as behind us, and our moods as 
being higher or lower. They contend such metaphors are far reaching, biasing our perceptions 
to a largely indeterminate extent. Hence, the embedded thesis establishes a new version of the 
feedback loop emphasised in autopoiesis and embodiment, one that is both ecological and 
cultural.  
                                                
36 To my mind it follows from both enactivism and Harris’s system that consciousness itself is an interruption or 
veto of our physiological responses. This point is more pronounced in the context of collective effects of social 
groups, i.e. consciousness is a perpetual integration of one’s non-conscious aboutness that is formed by 
conditioning. The implications of this point concerning free will are not particularly emphasized by embodiment 
theorists or Harris and for this reason certainly warrants deeper discussion. Unfortunately, space prohibits my 
sufficiently addressing the issue in the present work. 
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The point is that just as a rake extends our reach and has the potential to extend our body schema, 
so language extends our capacities for thought and therefore can be treated as extending our mind 
schema. Insofar as language is itself socially manufactured and shared by linguistic communities, 
then to that extent our cognitive powers require for their very exercise the existence of a 
sociolinguistic environment. Our minds cross out of the skull and get supported in a shared 
sociolinguistic scaffolding (Noë 2009, p. 88). 
Beginning with Clark & Chalmers (1998), proponents of the extended mind hypothesis 
(EMH) have argued cognition “is constituted by, temporally extended, interactive worldly 
engagements” (Hutto et al. p. 158). The extended mind hypothesis begins with many of the 
same premises as the embedded thesis, bringing attention to processes of either offloading 
information into an environment through intentional alteration (e.g. writing) or using 
environmental features as tools for cognition (e.g. a stick for balance) that reduces strain on 
the agent’s internal cognitive faculties. According to Rowlands (2010), for the enactivist, 
EMH is not an argument for identifying environmental structures with cognitive states, but 
rather including what we do with environmental structures (e.g. manipulations, exploitations, 
or transformations) in cognitive processes. “It is the manipulation of environmental structures 
that forms part of the cognitive process; and so these structures form part of the process only 
insofar as they are part of the process of their being manipulated” (p. 67).  
As will be discussed in chapter 6, following this kind of reasoning, both AE (Thompson, 
W. 1988; Thompson, E. 2007) and Harris (1987, p. 254) have invoked some form of 
Lovelock and Margulis’s (1974) “Gaia hypothesis,” maintaining that the biosphere as a whole 
may demonstrate life and cognition. As a result, some have argued extension theories entail 
significant implications for what disciplines hold authority on mind research: 
if extended cognitive science is an important component of scientific psychology, then 
neuroscience cannot subsume or replace scientific psychology. Because extended cognitive 
science consists in laws, generalizations, and regularities concerning brain-body-environment 
systems, neuroscience is not appropriate as a base theory (Chamero, et al. 2009, p. 71).  
As will be discussed further in later sections, from the above introductions I conclude that 
both Harris and AE find common ground in a kind of formal governance that plays a central 
role in their theories of biology and cognition. For Harris, mind and life are depicted as 
instances of unifying principles, whereas for AE they are emergent phenomena instantiated 
by nonlinear feedback loops. By grounding his holist theory in a metaphysics of Nature 
however, Harris also extends his system into the philosophy of physics.  
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2.4 Analogies with Bohm’s Holism 
In this section I take a preliminary look at the implicate order, a philosophy of physics 
reliant upon common metaphysical theses as Harris and AE, but rather than cognitive science, 
takes quantum mechanics as its initial domain of departure. The implicate order was 
developed by American educated theoretical physicist David Bohm (1917–1992) in the early 
1970’s. Bohm’s intent was to offer a holistic alternative to reductive and mechanistic 
frameworks of mind and matter.37 In his Wholeness and the implicate order (1980) Bohm 
synthesized these ideas into a coherent metaphysics and for the following ten years, applied 
his system to a host of psychological topics. In this section, I first review the central tenets of 
the implicate order in quantum mechanics, before turning to the theory’s metaphysical 
implications concerning the nature of consciousness.  
Bohm maintained that contrary to its intended aim of rendering philosophical accounts 
based upon a contemporary scientific framework, physicalism now depends upon an out-
dated understanding of matter. As a result, any explanation of mind on this basis is inevitably 
and fundamentally flawed. The goal of his implicate order was to bring the contemporary 
sciences in line with an account of consciousness and in so doing, reinterpret the results of 
quantum experiments. In his synthesis and extended application of the implicate order, 
Pylkkanen’s (2007) aptly explains the starting point for Bohm’s position as a dissatisfaction 
with the disconnected picture of nature revealed by respective domains of natural science. For 
example, whereas relativity theory entails continuity, strict causality/determinism, and 
locality, quantum mechanics requires non-continuity, non-causality and non-locality. As a 
result, the basic concepts of the two most fundamental physical theories directly contradict 
each other. If we are to reconcile their differences and establish a new and more fundamental 
theory, Bohm maintains the “best place to begin is with what they have basically in common. 
                                                
37 The work Bohm completed in his early career was radical, finding many empirical applications, e.g. the 
theory of plasmas and “Bohm diffusion”. It is particularly amusing that before Bohm was able to complete his 
Ph.D thesis, it was taken from him by the United States government because it provided assistance in the efforts 
of the Manhattan Project – he was awarded his degree anyway. Since his philosophy emphasized wholeness and 
hidden variables (discussed below) his position was counter the mainstream account of reality (i.e. the 
Copenhagen interpretation), so his system was largely marginalized. Due to Bohm’s communist affiliation in the 
early 1950’s, he was also unable to find work within the United States for many years. For further details 
concerning Bohm’s personal and professional development see Junior (2015, ff. p. 17). 
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This is undivided wholeness. Though each comes to such wholeness in a different way, it is 
clear that it is this to which they are both fundamentally pointing” (1980b, p. 84).  
To obtain such a holistic theory of nature, Bohm set a course balanced between Einstein 
and Bohr – the two contrary philosophical interpretations of physics for much of the early 
20th century (Bohr, ff. p. 212). In its inception, the implicate order was intended to share 
Einstein’s conviction that an objective reality exists independently of us, but also retain 
sympathies for Bohr, who maintained that the meaning of an experimental result and the form 
of experimental conditions are an inseparable whole that requires our participation.38 
Pylkkanen explains that what Einstein and Bohm had in common was a particular 
dissatisfaction  
with the extremely empiricist, ‘positivistic’ feature of the usual quantum theory, which did not 
allow one to discuss reality beyond the observations. Observations, in turn, were fairly limited 
(e.g. a spot appearing in a photographic plate), so it seemed that quantum theory was providing a 
truncated, fragmented view of reality (p. 14).  
In line with Bohr, Bohm recognizes that our understanding of the world is confounded by 
how we look at it. More precisely, “our scientific instruments can affect our assumptions 
about perceivability; and these in turn can affect our assumptions about what is conceivable” 
(Pylkkanen, p. 57). So what is discovered is actually derived from the experimental system as 
a whole:  
[D]escription of the experimental conditions does not drop out as a mere intermediary link of 
inference, but remains inseparable from the description of what is called the observed object. The 
‘quantum’ context thus calls for a new kind of description that does not imply the separability of 
the ‘observed object’ and ‘observing instrument’. Instead, the form of the experimental conditions 
and the meaning of the experimental results have now to be one whole, in which analysis into 
autonomously existent elements is not relevant (1980, p. 169). 
In his earlier work, Bohm considered whether probability in quantum theory (QT) is a 
result of our ignorance of what variables to use in describing the system, as is the case in 
                                                
38 The Copenhagen interpretation of QT consisting of Bohr’s philosophy physics as well as von Neumann’s later 
elaboration is considered the received or orthodox version today. Stapp (2011) claims that this view is 
fundamentally subjectivist, “in the sense that it is forthrightly about relationships among conscious human 
experiences, and it expressly recommends to scientists that they resist the temptation to try to understand the 
reality responsible for the correlations between our experiences that the theory correctly describes” (p. 13). 
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classical physics. He maintains that examining these classical situations may provide 
theoretical guidance concerning the ontology of QT:  
For example, in thermodynamics we measure the pressure, temperature, and volume of a given 
system. In very small regions of space, especially near the critical point, we find that these 
quantities no longer obey an equation of state exactly, but instead exhibit large random 
fluctuations about a mean value that is predicted by the equation of state. Hence, the deterministic 
laws of thermodynamics break down and are replaced by laws of probability. This is because the 
thermodynamic variables are no longer appropriate for the problem and must be replaced by the 
position and velocity of each molecule, which are, from the viewpoint of thermodynamics, hidden 
variables (1951, p. 29). 
For Bohm then, both quantum and classic quantifications are averages of “hidden variables”, 
whose causal laws cannot be observed by only lower-level methods, but require a description 
in terms of some higher-level structures.39 Bohm first applied this idea to the behavior of 
individual particles and in later years used the resulting framework as means of explaining the 
nature of consciousness.  
The de Broglie-Bohm theory (AKA, causal, or hidden variables interpretation of quantum 
mechanics) was first proposed by de Broglie (1927) and later adopted by Bohm (1952).40 In 
this theory particles are described as evolving according to the Schrödinger's wave-function, 
but unlike the orthodox view, particles are also physically guided by this wave. Accordingly, 
the wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation and never collapses; it does 
not represent the states of systems, but the state of a quantum field (on a higher-dimensional 
configuration space) that influences the physical system. Contrary to Copenhagen QM, this 
renders the randomness of quantum phenomena a result of our ignorance, whereas reality is 
considered determinate in virtue of hidden variables of this pilot wave.  
                                                
39 Bohm thus depicts a theory of emergence via phase transition, to be discussed in greater detail in § 5.3 below.   
40 The EPR paper (1935) argued that the wave function was not a complete description of quantum phenomena. 
It was this argument that provided a launch pad for Bohm’s project. According to Bell, von Neumann’s proof 
that there could be no deterministic interpretation of QT was unreasonable, but it is this proof that modern 
physicists rely upon. Though he is often quoted as having given significant refutation of hidden variables, Bell 
(1987) later recognized that in Bohm’s work the impossible was accomplished, i.e. a valid version of QT that did 
not rely upon reference to an observer and described its parameters as deterministic. Indeed, Goldstein (2013) 
claims that contrary to history, Bell was the primary proponent of Bohm’s position until his death. Bell's 
analysis demonstrated that any (single-world) account of QT must be nonlocal. 
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What Bohm contributed to this interpretation was an ontology in which reality is 
composed of explicate and implicate orders. He argued that relations of the implicate order 
can be invoked to explain (observed) quantum phenomena in the same way that an 
“ensemble” of glycerine within cylinders can be invoked to explain the distortion and 
reformation of ink droplets through time (1980, ff. p. 186). Particles for example, are not 
continuous entities that move “through” time and space, but rather emerging explicate 
structures, cyclically unfolding from and enfolding back into a vast sea of background 
(vacuum) energy.41 Whereas the explicate order consists of relatively separate and externally 
related entities typical of classical physics, the implicate order provides an unseen and unified 
ground from which the individuals arise (Pylkkanen, p. 24). 
To free us from the dominant mechanistic worldview, Bohm suggests that rather than 
conceiving the world as analyzed into individual parts via a lens, a “hologram” provides a 
holistic paradigm of nature (1980, pp. 224-25). He maintains that like a hologram, each 
separate and extended form in the explicate order is enfolded in the whole and in turn, the 
whole is enfolded in its forms, but “only in a limited and not completely defined way” (Bohm 
1987, p. 193). Moreover, the way in which an explicate form enfolds the whole is considered 
essential to it and to how it behaves: “So the whole is, in a deep sense, internally related to the 
parts. And, since the whole enfolds all the parts, these latter are also internally related, though 
in a weaker way than they are related to the whole” (ibid). For example, Pylkkanen holds, 
“there is an internal relationship between an electron and its environment, or between two 
electrons in a non-local relationship” (p. 53). So the incident of an electron represents the 
explicate, while the form of an electromagnetic field is that of implicate order. Likewise, 
GTR depicts the universe “in terms of a unified field” (specified by non-linear equations); 
thus space-time cannot be analyzed in terms of separable points (Bohm 1980, pp. 158-59).  
In sum, just as Harris and proponents of AE, the implicate order relies upon common 
conceptions of holism, internal/dialectical relations, and a balance between realism and 
idealism. Accordingly, “there is a kind of objective wholeness, reminiscent of the organic 
wholeness of a living being in which the very nature of each part depends on the whole” 
                                                
41 White, et al’s (2016) recent work at the NASA Johnson Space Center involving measurement of impulsive 
thrust from a closed radio-frequency cavity in vacuum has demonstrated evidence in favor of EM drive 
technology that favors Bohm’s realist interpretation of QM: “In short, the supporting physics model used to 
derive a force based on operating conditions in the test article can be categorized as a nonlocal hidden-variable 
theory, or pilot-wave theory for short” (p. 10).  
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(Bohm 1993, p. 177). Importantly Bohm’s appeals to holography and enfolded information 
are really metaphors for guiding his readers towards his preferred theory of nature, what he 
called the holomovement.  
 
2.4.1 E and the “Holomovement” 
Harris was first introduced to Bohm’s Wholeness and the Implicate Order when he 
attended a meeting of the Southern Philosophical Society in the mid 1980’s. He recalls, “I had 
not read Bohm’s book, but when I did, I was gratified to discover that a distinguished 
physicist had independently confirmed (apparently without knowing what I had written) the 
sustained thesis of my Foundations of Metaphysics in Science” (unpublished, p. 243).  
Bohm’s basic proposal “is that what is is the holomovement, and that everything is to be 
explained in terms of forms derived from this holomovement” (1980b, p. 86). His ontology is 
essentially considered a movement or cyclic process of development from enfolded potential 
to unfolded explication that then returns to implicate form.  
This enfoldment and unfoldment takes place not only in the movement of the electromagnetic 
field but also in that of other fields, such as the electronic, protonic, sound waves, etc. […] 
Moreover, the movement is only approximated by the classical concept of fields (which is 
generally used for the explanation of how the hologram works). More accurately, these fields obey 
quantum-mechanical laws, implying the properties of discontinuity and non-locality (1985b, p. 
85).42  
As a result, the “particle” for example, is understood as an abstraction “from the more 
fundamental movement of unfoldment and enfoldment” (Pylkkanen, p. 70). The way in which 
this process unfolds is always constrained or guided by the form of a more inclusive whole or 
physical system in what many have called an ‘infinite tower of pilot waves’. Like Harris’s E, 
                                                
42 The central idea of Bohm’s causal interpretation of QT is that, in addition to the classical potential (V), there 
is a new quantum potential Q. The difference between classical and quantum behaviour is thus considered the 
operation of Q and the classical limit is the point at which the effects of Q become negligible. For Bohm, 
particles are effected by the quantum potential. Specifically, because ψ is contained both in the numerator and 
the denominator for Q, it is independent of the strength or intensity of the quantum field but depends only on its 
form, which is a key difference from Newtonian physics. The particle is thus analogous to a ship being 
automatically guided by its sonar: the ship’s power is independent of the power of the sonar but is 
deterministically guided by the sonar’s form (1987, p. 185). This view is distinct from the Copenhagen account, 
in which there is no corresponding way to discuss such phenomena as it occurs in the world. 
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Bohm’s holomovement is intended as a framework for both Nature and consciousness, each 
of which I briefly outline in this section.  
Bohm’s response to the EPR experiment characterizes his conception of holomovement. In 
the EPR experiment, each of two electrons that were previously combined in a spin singlet 
state are observed after they have separated and are far enough apart that they can be 
measured before light could pass between them and therefore (due to relativity) can have no 
causal relations. Upon spin measurement, particles nevertheless demonstrate non-local, non-
causal correlations. For Bohm, the motion of a particle is guided by its pilot wave (quantum 
potential), which supplies “active information” of an environment as a whole, including its 
entanglements, thus permitting the correlated measurements (1990, p. 280). He explains the 
EPR experiment can be metaphorically understood by considering two cameras recording the 
correlated (2D) movements of a single (3D) fish within a tank. In the case of either particle or 
camera recording, each constitutes “a system as a projection of a ‘higher-dimensional’ 
reality” rather than individual phenomena (1980b, p. 96).43 
Providing an analogy (and possible elaboration) of Harris’s E and Concrete Universal, 
Bohm proposes that there must likewise be a “super-quantum potential” (super-implicate 
order) that provides form (active information) to the unfoldment of the first-order quantum 
potential (implicate orders). If so, the first-order quantum potential would act only as an 
approximation when the action of the superquantum potential could be neglected. “One could 
go on to suppose a series of orders of superquantum potentials, with each order constituting 
information that gives form to the activity of the next lower order (which is less subtle)” 
(1990, p. 283). In Bohm’s model, our (observable) explicate order is considered one such 
sub-whole obtained from a higher-level implicate order (1987, pp. 196-97).  
Awarding primacy to an indefinable, immeasurable holomovement implies that there is 
“no meaning to talk of a fundamental theory, on which all of physics could find a permanent 
basis, or to which all the phenomena of physics could ultimately be reduced” (1980b, p. 131). 
Rather, we must always “be ready to discover the limits of independence of any relatively 
autonomous structure of law, and from this to go on to look for new laws that may refer to yet 
                                                
43 More specifically, as Collins (2006) notes, accounting for Bohm’s EPR holism requires that “the quantum 
potential must be non-local, meaning that it cannot be thought of as a field spread throughout space – that is, 
with spatio-temporal parts. Instead, it is written as a field inhabiting the 3N-dimensional configuration space of 
particles in the system. (For example, assuming there are at least 1080 particles in the universe, it would inhabit 
at least a 3 x 1080-dimensional space!)” (pp. 334-35). 
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larger relatively autonomous domains of this kind” (1980b, p. 86). This holonomic principle 
does not however preclude the relevance of analysis, indeed it grants the “possibility of 
describing the ‘loosening’ of aspects from each other, so that they will be relatively 
autonomous in limited contexts (as well as the possibility of describing the interactions of 
these aspects in a system of heteronomy)” (1980, p. 198). Nevertheless, the laws of respective 
sub-totalities are abstractions that may be surpassed by identifying the origin of their 
corresponding domain, which leads to yet deeper laws, none being inherent or of an ultimate 
level (Pylkkanen, pp. 91-2).  
Extending the implicate order to biology, Bohm maintains that just as the elementary 
particle demonstrates an internal relationship with its environment, living systems too, are 
constantly exchanging matter and energy with their environment such that we are unable to 
make a sharp distinction between the two. The idea is that we find a common process of 
enfoldment and unfoldment that gives rise to different structures, depending on how an 
environment informs the entity (Pylkkanen, p. 86). For Bohm, as in AE, life is properly 
understood as a totality that includes relations of organism and environment. Specifically, 
Bohm maintains, the holomovement is “life implicit”, in that “it is the ground both of ‘life 
explicit’ and of ‘inanimate’ matter, and this ground is what is primary, self-existent and 
universal. Thus we do not fragment life and inanimate matter, nor do we try to reduce the 
former completely to nothing but an outcome of the latter” (1980b, p. 102). I return to this 
crucial contention in chapters 5 & 8 below.  
Aiming to avoid Cartesian dualism, just as epiphenomenalism, Bohm is again in 
agreement with AE, but he goes even further to contend “the implicate order applies both to 
matter (living and non-living) and to consciousness” (1980b, p. 103). He goes on to write, “it 
can therefore make possible an understanding of the general relationship of these two, from 
which we may be able to come to some notion of a common ground of both (rather as was 
also suggested in the previous section in our discussion of the relationship of inanimate 
matter and life)” (1980b, pp. 103-4).44 For Bohm, the notion of “active information” provides 
                                                
44 To support this point, in a few instances Bohm followed Pribram’s now largely neglected holographic theory 
of consciousness (1971), maintaining memories are recorded all over the brain rather than in a localized region. 
Hence, a response from memory ought to “fuse with the nervous excitation coming from the senses to give rise 
to an overall experience in which memory, logic, and sensory activity combine into a single unanalyzable 
whole” (1980 B, pp. 105-6). While this kind of holism has been retained in contemporary arguments against 
modularity for example, this conception of a “holographic consciousness” goes far outside the bounds of the 
present thesis. 
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“a rudimentary mind-like behaviour of matter, for an essential quality of mind is just the 
activity of form, rather than of substance” (1990, p. 281). The common principle of both mind 
and matter then, is considered the formative or governing force of “active information”, 
which Bohm maintains can serve “as a kind of link or 'bridge' between these two sides of 
reality as a whole” (1990, p. 282). With this move, Bohm’s theory of mind is perfectly 
compatible with the neurophenomenological methodology of AE in that cognition and matter 
can be conceptually unified by attending to their common processes of organization.  
This depiction of mind and matter being constrained by a boundless series of implicate 
orders seems prima facie to imply that ‘freedom of will’ is out of the question, but this 
conclusion misses an essential point. The implicate order is at each point incomplete and 
perpetually unfolding, not merely actualizing potentialities that were somehow previously 
established, but defining itself through time. This Pylkkanen claims, makes “genuine 
creativity” possible and implies that any given change may result in a “fundamental and 
radical transformation” (p. 126). What purportedly makes this possible are the roles of 
“recurrence and stability” that permit the existence of “relatively independent sub-totalities.” 
Human beings are considered such ‘sub-totalities’, whose relative independence implies that 
the individual has some freedom. “Recurrence and stability are required if the sub-totalities 
are to have any independence and autonomy in relation to the holomovement. Otherwise, the 
unending flux of the holomovement would destroy any independence, including the one 
required for freedom” (ibid). So for Bohm, there is relative freedom for every sub-totality. 
One formulation of such relative freedom can be seen in a joint unpublished work of 
Bohm and Pylkkanen (1990-1991), in which they proposed a theory of “overall coherence” 
applicable to both mind and nature. Pylkkanen explains that according to this view, truth 
implies “logical consistency”, but also “coherence of the state of being of the individual who 
is concerned with truth, as well as the environment” (2007, p. 154). Here, the domain of truth 
is not either internal or external to mind, but is a fundamental movement constantly 
overcoming incoherence that involves both domains: “As with consciousness, each moment 
has a certain explicate order, and in addition it enfolds all the others, though in its own way. 
So the relationship of each moment in the whole to all the others is implied by its total 
content: the way in which it ‘holds’ all the others enfolded within it” (Bohm 1980, p. 263). 
Truth is thus how coherently a subject enfolds their world through time. As Pylkkanen 
concludes, positing the holomovement as fundamental for mind and nature implies that 
although complete coherence may be unreachable, “movement toward coherence is possible, 
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and is indeed the essence of cognition” (p. 155).45  
From the above there appears clear agreement between the implicate order and Harris 
concerning dialectical relations, a balance between subjective idealism and scientific realism, 
process ontology, and the scale of forms. For AE and Bohm, the result of maintaining these 
tenets has been the formation of two partially overlapping holist theses of nature and mind. 
What Harris provides, in broader strokes, is a means of systematizing these and other 
complementary arguments across a range of domains. I now turn to deeper commonalities, 
both epistemic and ontological, that will serve as paradigmatic guides for the remainder of 
this thesis.  
 
2.5 Towards a Converging Paradigm 
At this point the theoretical similarities between Harris’s holism, enactivism, and the 
implicate order should be in reasonably sharp relief, but on the epistemic topic of 
individuation there is an even more profound commonality. Writing on the issue of body-
based perception and learning, Gallagher (2014) articulates what may serve as an AE theory 
of individuation: 
it is through our interactions with others that we learn what objects are significant or valuable. We 
learn to understand the world along these lines of significance and value, and often objects that 
fall outside of such lines don’t even register. In the same way that expert training hones the 
perceptual system so that experts are able to perceive things that non-experts fail to perceive, in 
some sense, we all become experts in everyday life through our interactions with others (p. 239).  
This clearly implies individuation depends upon the social system within which we are 
embedded. So our brain “attunes to and responds to its environment in a way that enacts a 
meaning relative to the particularities of its embodiment” (p. 243). As a result, we find what 
enactivists have called a reflexivity underlying all our epistemic practices, which implies the 
impossibility of obtaining what Nagel (1986) calls “a view from nowhere.” AEs thus align 
themselves with the aims of second-order science, in positing a fundamental circulation 
                                                
45 As discussed in § 6.3.1, I suggest that combining Harris and AE philosophies of biology results in an 
argument for seeing minimal mind and evolution as processes of increasing coherence and freedom in a way that 
follows exactly from Bohm’s conceptions above. In § 7.4.1 I examine Harris’s appeal to Spinoza’s notion of 
embodiment and again find that the primary function of mind turns out to be coherence towards increasing 
freedom. Unfortunately space prohibits a direct discussion of the philosophy of free will.  
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between “lived experience” and “scientific understanding”, that attempts to account for the 
observer and their writing of a theory, within the theory itself (Vörös, et al. 2016, p. 191). 
The purpose of which, is to account for and (partially) go beyond the biases of our present 
theoretical constructs. Individuation of an entity is thus embodied and socially enacted, 
requiring that the process of this enaction is repeatedly called into question ad infinitum. 
Indeed a similar notion is identifiable in Bohm’s works. Although the implicate order is 
considered fundamental to consciousness, we are less aware of it Bohm maintains, because 
we have become habituated to functioning in such a way that emphasizes the explicate order. 
He claims our emphasis on nouns, for example, has conditioned us to perceive a fragmented 
world of static objects. To counter this Bohm proposes the “rheomode”, a shift in semantic 
primacy from subjects and objects to verbs. Here his aim is to draw our attention to what he 
calls the act of levation – the way in which we raise an entity to relevance from its 
background.  
So when relevance or irrelevance is communicated, one has to understand that this is not a hard 
and fast division between opposing categories but, rather, an expression of an ever changing 
perception, in which it is possible, for the moment, to see a fit or a non-fit between the content 
lifted into attention and the context to which it refers (1980, p. 43).  
This implies that what appears to be irrelevant in a given context can be seen not only as 
useful, but eventually necessary for an on-going process of description, distinction, and 
definition of any phenomenon because the super-quantum potential (or implicate order) is an 
undivided whole.46 
In physicist Karen Barad’s (2007) agential realism, agency is addressed from a very 
different angle (postmodern feminist philosophy), but she has – without recognizing the 
connections to Bohm or enactivism – articulated the very point that binds the two systems and 
highlights an idea at the core of Harris’s epistemology. Following Bohr’s philosophy-physics, 
Barad maintains that agency is created through practices of “diffraction” that cut an entity 
                                                
46 For the last decade of his life, Bohm extended his system by developing dialogic tools to facilitate ways of 
communication that emphasized wholeness and movement over atomistic mechanism. Particularly, Bohm 
extended his system into what he called “sociotherapy.” This was considered a means of discovering ever-
greater holistic and coherent truth among participants, e.g. Thought as a System (1992); On Dialogue (1996), 
Although these topics are not particularly emphasized by most contemporary writers of the implicate order, this 
sort of method basically falls out of Bohm’s metaphysics and clearly parallels both Harris’s emphasis on the 
dialectic as well as AE’s interest in interdependent coupling and empathy. Unfortunately, I lack the space within 
this thesis to address these very interesting commonalities. 
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from its background. The observed or diffracted entity is thereby inseparable from the 
diffracting observer and their apparatus of observation (pp. 118-19). “Reality is composed not 
of things-in-themselves, or of things-behind-phenomena, but of things-in-phenomena. 
Because phenomena constitute a non-dualistic whole, it makes no sense to talk about 
independently existing things as somehow behind or as the causes of phenomena” (p. 205).  
In agreement with AE and Harris, according to Barad, objectivity can be achieved by 
reproducing marks on bodies left by an “intra-active cut”. This cut is determined by the 
diffractive system as a whole, that is, by relations among agents and tools (both marker and 
marked bodies) within which the object (or agent) of our investigation comes into being (p. 
320).  
laboratory manipulations, observations, interventions, concepts, and other human practices have a 
role to play, they do so as part of the material configuration of the world in its intra-active 
becoming […] Hence […] what is at issue is not knowledge of the world from above or outside, 
but knowing as part of being (p. 341).  
She goes on to contend that by implication, all bodies, “including but not limited to human 
bodies, come to matter through the world’s iterative intra-activity – its performativity. 
Boundaries, properties and meanings are differentially enacted through the intra-activity of 
mattering” (p. 392).47 Barad’s use of diffraction is thus the experimental counterpart to social 
reflexivity and analytic levation.  
Whereas autopoiesis attributes agency only to a self-organized system that we might say, 
continually enacts, levates, or diffracts itself over time, for Barad agency can be attributed to 
non-organic, non-living and even totally inanimate objects as well. This is possible just in 
case their identity, functionality and continuity is preserved (i.e. enacted) by their external 
entanglements/relations over time. “Agency […] is the enactment of iterative changes to 
particular practices – iterative reconfigurings of topological manifolds of spacetime-matter 
relations – through the dynamics of intra-activity” (p. 235). In line with Harris, Barad 
maintains the entangled relations of enacted phenomena hold both scientific and philosophic 
                                                
47 Indeed, I have neglected to mention any of the mathematical formalism or their implications regarding 
Bohmian mechanics as contrasted with agential realism. It is safe to say that there are undoubtedly many 
discrepancies between these systems as Barad draws from Bohr, whose ontological account is notoriously at 
odds with Bohm, whom attempted to maintain an objective reality with Einstein. This issue of direct realism 
versus construction will reappear in many of the following sections. Building upon Harris’s work, I offer a 
possible solution to this debate in chapter 8. 
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primacy (pp. 104; 141; 205-6). Taking all camps together, diffraction is really a broadening of 
enactivism as anticipated by Harris’s earlier (1965 and 1970) works. Again, Barad’s thesis 
relies upon analogues of dialectical relations, the unifying principle, and process ontology.48 
If the above may serve as the common epistemic points of convergence, the (preliminary) 
ontological implications may be outlined as follows. Concerning the metaphysical 
implications of AE, Silberstein & Chemero (2015) have argued that individuals in dynamic 
systems models can have parameters on each side of their boundary (e.g. skin), which means 
the non-linear behaviour of the agent is coupled to and partially constituted by its 
environment. Treating the brain, body, and environment as a single dynamical system over 
time, they argue, means the “phenomenological world of experience is neither in the ‘head’ 
nor in the ‘external world’ – it is fundamentally relational” (2015, p. 190).49 They hold that 
“extended neutral monism” (ENM) provides an alternative means of naturalizing 
phenomenology that remains connected to natural science (p. 192). On this account, neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCCs) are insufficient for consciousness, there are no qualia, no 
fundamental self, no material substances, no representations, no categorical distinction 
between the mental (the subjective) and the physical (the objective), nor between intentional 
and phenomenal processes. “The subject/ object cut is a self-consistency relation, there is 
only one reality (the field of pure ‘experience’ as James might say)” (p. 193).  
Although Silberstein & Chemero make significant progress fleshing out the metaphysical 
foundation of AE, they leave a number of issues unaddressed. For instance, they do not 
reconcile the significant conflict between emergence (upon which enactivism relies) and NM. 
More generally, their blind adoption of some vague version of NM takes with it a host of 
problems (from presumably James’ version), such as the admittedly problematic conception 
of “pure experience.” In this regard, they make limited effort in spelling out what the ‘neutral 
base’ is by positing a “relational” ontology, but much more is needed for this to provide a 
metaphysically satisfactory response to the explanatory gap.  
Bohm (1980) has already established a more rigorous physics-based conception of just 
such a neutral ground in the holomovement. He maintained, “the more comprehensive, 
deeper, and more inward actuality is neither mind nor body but rather a yet higher-
dimensional actuality, which is their common ground and which is of a nature beyond both” 
                                                
48 This epistemology is summarized the appendix § I. 
49 By this claim the authors endorse Silberstein’s (2009) contention that AE can appeal to OSR. For an 
introduction to ontic structural realism see Ladyman, (2014). 
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(p. 265). Just like his interpretation of the EPR experiment, explicate mind and matter are 
again considered correlated phenomena that are abstractions from a common implicate 
identity in the holomovement. As Harris has partially recognized (1995, pp. 34-5), treating the 
holomovement as a “common ground” is deeply reminiscent of Spinoza’s system, in that 
mind and matter are two aspects of a common underlying Substance (here a process). As 
Pylkkanen recognizes, this implies that Bohm advocated for “neutral-monism” (pp. 37; 39).50 
In agreement with Silberstein, Bohm maintains that we can no longer regard human beings as 
individuals in the conventional sense. That is, we are now treating the human in the same way 
that we treated the individual particle – as arising from a implicate system:  
if we are to give an adequate account of what actually happens and this must eventually include 
other people, going on to society and to mankind as a whole. So it will be ultimately misleading 
and indeed wrong to suppose, for example, that each human being is an independent actuality who 
interacts with other human beings and with nature. Rather, all these are projections of a single 
totality (1980b, pp. 116-17). 
When I asked Evan Thompson of the possible metaphysical and cosmological implications 
of AE with regard for Bohm and Harris’s systems, he replied as follows: 
(1) The enactive approach, as I see it, has its main home in cognitive science and is concerned to 
answer questions about the nature of cognition and how cognition requires autonomous agency. 
This viewpoint doesn't seem to me to presuppose any particular cosmology. That being said, the 
overall background conception of coupled systems arising through dependent origination could be 
taken as a cosmological view, or at least as a kind of principle that would need to inform an 
"enactive cosmology." (2) The enactive approach strikes me as based on or presupposing a 
metaphysics of process rather than a metaphysics of substance. And a metaphysics of process can 
naturally use as methodological tools the techniques of dynamic systems theory in physics 
(personal communication: 9-20-2013). 
Here we clearly have a thesis of internal/dialectical relations and co-emergence based upon a 
metaphysics of process, what I contend are perfectly analogous to the principles of Harris’s 
                                                
50 Despite his recognition of Bohm’s neutral monist metaphysics, Pylkkanen (2007) is mistaken for maintaining 
that this system also permits “panprotopsychism” (pp. 63; 190). Bohm holds that our observations of the 
unbroken whole of reality reveal mental and physical poles with active information evident at every level. It 
must be remembered however, that such an analogy of the magnet in which there are ‘two poles’ is as he 
maintains, a result of abstract thought: “the deeper reality is something beyond either mind or matter, both of 
which are only aspects that serve as terms for analysis […] To pursue this approach further might perhaps enable 
us to extend our knowledge of both poles into new domains” (Bohm 1990, p. 285).  
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holism. As mentioned above, Harris maintained that the synthesis of scientific data 
necessarily presupposes metaphysical tenets, the question is the extent to which the theorist is 
aware of these tenets, which ultimately culminate in some conception of Nature as a whole. I 
maintain that a closer inspection of Harris’s system can indeed provide an “enactivist 
cosmology” and simultaneously clarify the “neutral monist” metaphysics to which AEs and 
Bohmians adhere.51   
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This preliminary investigation has shown that Harris’s metaphysics (i.e. the marriage of 
internal/dialectical relations, embodiment, process ontology, emergence, coherence, and 
neutral-monism) bears a common framework with AE and Bohm’s implicate order. In the 
following chapters I provide further evidence to the effect that while AE and the implicate 
order address the philosophies of cognitive science on the one hand and physics on the other, 
their inevitable metaphysical implications are the same and have already been significantly 
detailed in Harris’s work. I propose the title “dialectical holism” not as reference to Harris’s 
holism, but as an umbrella term for these three systems taken as mutually constraining pillars 
of a single metaphysical paradigm.52 
The primary goals for the remainder of this thesis will be to present the arguments for 
Harris’s holism, evaluate their applications across a range of domains in philosophies of 
science and mind, and elucidate their implications. The result of this work will be to either 
vindicate or reveal possible weaknesses of a number of similar contemporary positions and 
establish whether such a dialectical holist paradigm can survive Harris’s original formation. 
With Thompson’s personal communication in mind, I claim that what follows works towards 
an “enactivist cosmology”. To address these tasks, I next consider a number of topics in the 




                                                
51 The metaphysical principles of dialectical holism are summarized in § II of the appendix below. 
52 To my knowledge, Harris used the title only once in all his works: “we should not beg the question if we 
tested the metaphysic of empiricism by its coherence, nor if we appealed to experience for evidence of the truth 
of dialectical holism” (2000, p. 238).  
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Chapter 3 




The aim for part II is to critically consider both the epistemic and ontological dimensions 
of Harris’s holism in cosmology. In § 3.2, I assess Harris’s appeal to relativity in support of 
dialectical relations and as an instance of the unifying principle. In § 3.3, I assess Harris’s 
appeals to unity in the standard model of cosmology and entanglement in QM. I conclude that 
Harris’s identification of the unifying principle at macro and micro scales of physics remains 
plausible and is echoed in contemporary works. However, Harris’s conception of the 
Concrete Universal is at odds with the reductive unity espoused by proponents of the standard 
model. In § 3.4, I introduce Harris’s appeal to anthropic reasoning. Here I clarify Harris’s 
largely implicit motivations for linking the philosophical discussions of cosmos and mind. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary conceptual tools for an analysis of 
Harris’s participatory and teleological anthropic principles, to be addressed what follows.  
 
3.2 Harris’s Spacetime Holism 
Harris claims that 20th Century paradigm shifts in physics called for a holistic metaphysics. 
In this section I reveal the extent to which Harris’s conception of the unifying principle is 
supported by relativity theory and orient the resulting holism with respect to other holist 
theories in contemporary physics. Following scientists like Einstein, Bohr, and Maxwell, 
Harris maintains physics, “is no longer ‘materialistic’.” Matter, he claims, has been replaced 
by energy, which has been further transformed into space-time curvature. “The space-time (or 
material) field, moreover, is a structure of relations dependent on an act of thought…” or, an 
“arbitrarily chosen reference frame” (2000, p. 35). In this way for Harris, relativity reveals the 
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necessity to posit a synthetic whole, within which the observer is an inextricable 
participant.53  
Harris claims that according to special relativity, as mass increases with velocity and 
velocity approaches the speed of light, mass approaches infinity. The mass of a moving body 
then depends upon velocity and as velocity is relative to respective reference frames and the 
speed of light, there is no identifiable state of absolute rest. As an epistemic consequence 
“lengths, durations, and positions […] are mutually determinant. No statement about any one 
of them is free from entailment of statements referring to some or all of the others” (1965, p. 
51). The principle of relativity thus reveals, “laws of physics are invariant, with respect to the 
Lorentz transformations, for transition from one inertial system to any other” (1970, p. 120).  
Measurements of either space, time, or velocity are here considered inseparable and 
interdependent, meaning “intrinsic physical properties of bodies are mutually dependent, and 
all physical relations are internal to their terms” (2000, p. 98). For Harris, this is to say that 
parameters such as time, location, speed, and mass, are all abstractions obtaining only as 
interconnected relations within a material whole. Harris argues that the formalization of 
Lorenz transformations between reference frames in SR and tensor calculus in GTR provides 
sufficient evidence to posit a unifying principle of space-time (1993, p. 144). “In short, space-
time involves and imposes on its contents a principle of organization. One may say that 
space-time is such a principle, or is a system of such principles. Spatio-temporal relations are 
organizing relations, and without them there is no physical space-time at all” (1965, p. 79).54  
However, Harris maintains that “the space-time of physics is not the amorphous 
continuum of pure mathematics. It is the actual field of physical events and its geometry is 
revealed in the behaviour of the physicists measuring devices” (1965, p. 80). In this way, 
                                                
53 In his (1965) work Bohm likewise proposes there is an “irreducible participation of the observer” that arises in 
an analogous way to Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle, in which there is a limitation to what can be known 
at any instant. In special relativity he explains, due to the principle of relativity (laws are isotropic in the 
universe) and the impossibility to transmit signals faster than light, “the observer is part of the universe” and 
“does not stand outside of space and time and the laws of physics […] he is trying to study” (p. 137). 
Unfortunately, neither Bohm nor Harris further elaborated this idea of at this point of their discussion.    
54 Harris appears to anticipate what has more recently been called the temporal exclusion principle (Pike, 2009, 
pp. 51-52). Harris maintains that the most primitive kind of material difference requires a transition in time 
steps. He goes on to clarify that “time and change are identical, and as diversity manifests itself physically only 
either spatially or temporally, and spatial diversity is the infusion of time into space, time may be seen as 
essentially the principle of differentiation in the real” (1965, p. 471). 
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although Harris does not talk about the dynamical object of spacetime independent of our 
observation, he nevertheless considers this object a level of nature. Harris concludes that 
curved space-time demonstrates “polyphasic unity” in virtue of the contrasting values of the 
field and is thus “the primitive type of a scale of forms – a scale (or procession) of changes of 
direction (or some analogous structure of relationships) governed by a principle of order” 
(1965, p. 470). Hence, considering the spacetime field as an example of one particular 
unifying principle, Harris concludes that the physical world is to be understood as “a single 
whole […] in which the primary principle of order determines all physical laws and governs 
all occurrences and relationships within it” (2000, p. 99). It must be remembered that in 
Harris’s dialectic approach, the space-time field arises from the interrelation of bodies, but as 
a unifying principle, this field also constrains the bodies within it. Though he does not 
emphasize his conclusion, as with all other unifying principles, the space-time field is 
considered a partial reflection of the Concrete Universal.  
Concerning the structure of the universe, Harris contends that Faraday’s discovery of the 
electromagnetic field and Maxwell’s subsequent mathematical depiction of it provided a 
paradigmatic case of a unifying principle: 
The electromagnetic field in principle fills the whole of space and in accordance with the general 
theory of relativity, space-time itself is regarded as the metrical field from which the measured 
quantities are inseparable, and in which the elements that have them are inextricably embedded. 
Energy and mass thus become degrees of curvature in space-time… (2000, pp. 98-99).  
As a consequence, Harris believed that the curvature of space-time, due to the presence of 
matter, would bend the Universe upon itself to form a four-dimensional “hypersphere”, one 
with finite volume but no spatiotemporal boundary (2000, p. 99; 1991, p. 12).  
 
3.2.1 Prospects for Interpreting Spacetime as a Unifying Principle 
One of the central goals for the philosophy of physics is investigation of what fundamental 
kinds of things exist in the world. Establishing or dissolving ontological theories of spacetime 
understandably takes high priority. This means confronting the debate between “relationalist” 
and “substantivalist” theories of spacetime. As Pooley (2013) explains, the difference 
between the relationalist and substantivalist can be seen by their respective conceptions of the 
spacetime coordinate system being mapped onto ℝ. The substantivalist contends the 
coordinates of spacetime refer to an actual entity that exists among the fundamental objects in 
the universe. The relationalist on the other hand, maintains the coordinate system assigns sets 
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of real numbers to material events rather than to points of spacetime, hence some sets of 
coordinates are not assigned to anything at all (p. 4). In addition to establishing Harris’s 
position with respect to this debate, I consider what kind of whole he claims spacetime to be 
in light of three contemporary options: (i) ontological holism, (ii) property holism, and (iii) 
nomological holism (Healey, 2008). 
In recent years numerous physicists and philosophers including Lange (2007; 2009; 2011), 
Morrison (1995; 2013), Yudell (2012), and Bangu (2013) have recognized higher order laws 
of nature in the form of symmetry principles that provide key ingredients for the Standard 
Model of cosmology (SM). For example Yudell states, “Symmetry principles are laws about 
laws, and they seem to constrain or govern the laws just as laws constrain or govern 
particulars, and hence seem to deserve the title meta-laws” (2012, p. 1). Indeed, Lange (2011) 
argues that “Einstein’s special theory of relativity incorporates a meta-law” that is considered 
a “symmetry principle” because first-order laws must be “unchanged (covariant) under a 
given [Lorentz] transformation” (p. 1). To the extent that such meta-laws exhibit the sort of 
global self-organization proposed by Harris’s unifying principles, his appeal to relativity may 
be justified.  
However, Margaret Morrison’s sustained thesis has been that history is ripe with examples 
of elegance and order being injected into nature via formalism without sufficient justification 
(e.g. the theories of Plato, Kepler, and Pythagoras are examples of this blunder). For example, 
“symmetries from which we are able to derive a particular conservation law are themselves 
exact symmetries of the equations of motion, the Lagrangian, rather than exact symmetries of 
nature itself” (1995, p. 176). This kind of scepticism as to whether such overarching order 
exists in the world or is merely a product of our formalism is paradigmatic of relationalists. 
Pooley notes the kinematic argument in support of this view: 
Imagine a possible world W′ just like the actual world except that, at every moment, the absolute 
velocity of each material object in W′ differs from its actual value by a fixed amount (say, by two 
meters per second in a direction due North). W′ is an example of a world that is kinematically 
shifted relative to the actual universe. Two kinematically shifted worlds are observationally 
indistinguishable because, by construction, the histories of relative distances between material 
objects in each world are exactly the same. The worlds differ only over how the material universe 
as a whole is moving with respect to space. Since substantival space is not directly detectible, this 
is not an observable difference (2013, p. 5). 
Hence, if we are to take a conservative route, contemporary spacetime theories do not directly 
provide support for a unifying principle as ontologically conceived. On the other hand, 
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conceiving of spacetime as a unifying principle may be considered a valuable a priori posit 
insofar as it is utilized in viable spacetime theories. This would only grant the unifying 
principle (or meta-law) as an epistemic constraint, rather than an ontic level of nature.  
Nevertheless, numerous authors have advocated for the substantivist position. Nerlich 
(2003) maintains “in GTR, space-time geometry and matter distribution constrain each other 
at each point in accordance with a fundamental law written G=KT (roughly G encodes 
geometric structure and T describes matter and energy) […] In GTR, space-time is a 
dynamical object” (p. 288). Likewise, following Maldacena, Clayton (2004) maintains, that 
“General relativity requires that space-time be treated like a four-dimensional fluid and not as 
a nonphysical structuring separate from what exists within it (such as mass)” (p. 581).55 
Rovelli (2007) elaborates, “GR is the discovery that spacetime and the gravitational field are 
the same entity. What we call ‘spacetime’ is itself a physical object in many respects similar 
to the electromagnetic field” (p. 1307). However, he says the gravitational field is dynamical, 
which “implies that physical entities – particles and fields – are not all immersed in space, 
and moving in time. They do not live on spacetime. They live, so to speak, on each other” 
(ibid). This is to say that general relativity does not deal with values at spacetime points, but 
with values of dynamical quantities at spacetime locations “determined by other dynamical 
quantities” (p. 1310). Entities are not all composed of, nor conceived as particles, but 
crucially include fields such as gravitation, and are localized only with respect to one another 
(p. 1313). Such substantivist accounts provide support for Harris’s internal relations and if 
sound, would provide a realist interpretation of (at least) one such unifying principle.56 
 After a thorough review of the major arguments both for and against substantialism and 
relationalism, Pooley (2013) concludes that the former is “recommended by a rather 
straightforward realist interpretation of our best physics. This physics presupposes geometric 
structure that it is natural to interpret as primitive and as physically instantiated in an entity 
ontologically independent of matter” (p. 10). As implied above, he goes on to write, “the only 
strong consideration in favour of relationalism is Ockham's razor” (ibid). So, current theories 
can support a substantivist conception of space-time as instantiating a meta-law or unifying 
                                                
55 The interested reader may wish to see the following link for further details: 
 https://einstein.stanford.edu/content/relativity/a11332.html 
56 In response to Harris’s conception of the internally related whole is paradigmatically exemplified by 
spacetime, Blanshard (1986) has agreeably maintained that in GR: “every body is related to every other body in 
a four-dimensional space-time whole. No part of it, no part of such a part, no figure or size of such a part, would 
be what it is without its spatial and temporal relations to the other parts” (p. 6).  
	   91	  
principle. For Harris however, conceiving space-time as “primitive” or “independent of 
matter” goes too far.  
After an extensive historical analysis of space-time theories, Gunn (2011) maintains an 
interpretation of GTR that I propose is most adequately reflective of Harris’s position. On the 
one hand, he contends space-time is passive to matter since matter is the source of gravity, 
which dictates the dynamical metric field of space-time. By this account, space-time can be 
considered an “ideal” construction derived from matter. On the other hand Gunn argues,  
the energy-momentum of non-gravitational matter cannot even be conceived independently of 
space and time […] In addition gravitational waves require moving charges for the generation and 
the existence of their motion requires space-time to already exist. In these respects, then, matter 
would seem to be posterior rather than prior to space-time (p. 138). 
Thus he concludes that there exists a “co-dependency of space-time and matter” (ibid). Gunn 
reasons that the “simultaneous reality and ideality of each with respect to the other, indicates 
that […] both exist together in something else which unites them both, and relative to which 
they are absolutely ideal, something like thinking and extension are in Spinoza’s system” (pp. 
138-39). Furthermore, he concludes that after relativity theory, it is no longer reasonable to 
treat field theory as mechanical, nor to treat its dynamical principle as analytical, “in so far as 
‘analytical’ refers to an explanation of the whole in terms of its parts…” (p. 145).57 Indeed 
Gunn’s identification of “ideal” and “analytical” (abstract) concepts mistaken for reality is 
precisely in tune with Harris’s (1974, p. 92) appeal to what Spinoza called the confused idea. 
(This issue is revisited in chapter 7).   
Taking spacetime as an example, it is now possible to consider what kind of contemporary 
holism supports Harris’s unifying principles. (i) Ontological holism maintains that some 
objects are not completely composed of basic physical parts. Due to Harris’s apparent 
rejection of substantivalism, the ‘higher’ scale cannot be different from its composition, since 
this would permit ontological plurality. Hence, ontic holism is rejected. (ii) Property holism 
maintains that some objects bear properties that are not determined by the physical properties 
of their underlying constituents. From Harris’s anticipation of meta-laws and paradigmatic 
appeal to internally related fields, the dialectical holist can agree with this thesis just in case 
                                                
57 Additionally, compare with Barrow’s (2007) likeminded account: “The geometry of space and the rate of flow 
of time are no longer absolutely fixed and independent of the material content of space and time. The matter 
content and its motion determine the geometry and the rate of flow of time, and symbiotically this geometry 
dictates how matter is to move” (p. 80). 
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“properties” be replaced by relational processes. (iii) Nomological holism maintains that 
certain phenomena instantiate laws that are not determined by fundamental physical laws 
governing the structure and behaviour of their underlying constituents. This fits with Harris’s 
unifying principle because while the overarching meta-law is a result of its composition, as a 
whole this composition instantiates a kind of order that is not found in its isolated parts and 
that cannot be deduced from an understanding of these parts. A consequence of Harris’s 
contention that GTR instantiates a unifying principle reflective of the Concrete Universe is 
that the substantivist versus relationalist debate may be avoided. This move is most 
adequately captured by Gunn, for whom matter, space, and time are abstractions from a more 
fundamental “self-determining” space-time field that is likewise an abstraction from 
something still more fundamental, i.e. what Gunn calls “pneumetical force” (largely 
analogous to Bohm’s holomovement).58 
Though viable when first proposed, recent research has shed a different light on Harris’s 
theory that the topology of space-time is that of a hypersphere. Current models are limited 
because they exclude details prior to decoupling (CBR era) and (obviously) from the future 
states of our currently expanding universe. As a result, theories concerning cosmic topology 
could be verified if we happened to be living in a “small universe” whose size were the same 
as, or barely larger than the observable cosmos. Unfortunately all “we can truly conclude is 
that the Universe is much larger than the volume we can directly observe” (NASA.gov, 
2014). Our light cone thus creates an epistemic glass ceiling, by restricting what can be 
observed, beyond which any discussion becomes speculative. Cosmologists attempt to side-
step this obstacle by extrapolating GTR to all of spacetime (Smeenk 2013, p. 2). After a 
thorough examination of spacetime topology, Manchalk (2013) concludes “general relativity 
allows for a wide variety of global spacetime properties”, including a range of possible 
topologies, and deciding among them remains an open issue (p. 12). According to the most 
recent WMAP data however, the universe is flat with only a 0.4% margin of error.59 That is, 
observations from our past light cone have revealed a Friedman-Lemaitre, Robertson-Walker 
                                                
58 Despite their similarities, Gunn later contends that Hegel’s dialectic cannot be found in contemporary physics, 
though in these cases he is referring to (what is perhaps a miss-reading of) the thesis, antithesis, synthesis sense 
of the word. Unfortunately I do not have space to compare and contrast Gunn’s likely accurate understanding of 
physics with Harris’s use of the dialectic in terms of cosmological evolution. My elaboration of Harris’s notions 
of dialectic evolution and emergence in chapters 5 and 6 will have to suffice. 
59 http://map.gsfc.nasa.gov/universe/uni_shape.html  
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(FLRW) topology that is isotropic and homogenous. Hence, Harris’s posit of the hypersphere 
is no longer in fashion and given recent data, is likely incorrect.  
This section has shown that GTR can be interpreted so as to offer support for the thesis of 
dialectical relations, and provides an example of a unifying principle. In this case, the meta-
laws that govern the spacetime system are however beyond empirical verification, rather 
acting as synthetic constraints upon our understanding of observable phenomena. As a result, 
Harris’s claim that relativity theories provide evidence for an organizing principle can be 
granted only on epistemic (i.e. a priori) grounds. This is to say that in discussing physical 
phenomena of relativistic distances and speeds, such a principle is pragmatically invoked in 
order to account for the available observations.  
 
3.3 Haris’s Appeal to Unity and Irreducibility in QT 
Towards a defense of the Concrete Universal, Harris appeals to the aim of contemporary 
physics to unify all known fundamental forces into the illusive Theory of Everything (ToE). 
Indeed experimental particle collisions performed by the large hadron collider (LHC) have 
provided increasing support for the Standard Model, encouraging many to believe that we 
may yet achieve the goal of unification. However, recent works have also raised substantial 
challenges to such unity and fierce debates continue in the philosophy of physics today. 
Harris also claims that QT requires a ‘holistic logic’ (as opposed to reductive analysis) that 
provides further evidence for a unifying principle, this time at a microscopic scale. I maintain 
these two contentions of reducibility and non-reducibility are clearly at odds with one another 
and so the purpose of this section is to clarify Harris’s position.  
According to Harris, QT provides evidence in favor of dialectical relations in a multitude 
of ways. Paramount among them is the guiding theme of the Standard Model that the 
fundamental forces have given rise to a family of particles, each relating to one another 
according to symmetry principles. Harris claims that this shows the “properties of each 
particle are a consequence of its relation to all the rest of the universe” (1965, p. 97). In 
support of his Concrete Universal, Harris claims contemporary physicists are now “seeking a 
single primordial force, which subsequently differentiated itself into those now known as 
primary (strong, and weak, gravitation, and electromagnetism) according to a single 
fundamental law” (1988, p. 56). He maintains that since the electro-weak and strong forces 
have been unified via “gauge theory”, all that remains is for the Standard Model or a rival, 
e.g. string theory, to include gravity for a “final unification” (1991, ff. p. 39). However, as 
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implied above, Harris also claimed explanation of Nature requires not a mere reduction, but 
an explication of its respective unifying principles: 
[S]elf enfoldment and new dimensions of complexification give rise to new types of whole and 
correspondingly new laws of action, so that different levels of integrated complexity produce 
different orders of reality, which may be mutually continuous without being mutually reducible. 
This is because the principle of organization in every totality determines its character throughout 
and in detail, and that principle is fully realized only in the completed whole. The ultimate key to 
explanation, therefore, is that which explains the most complex and highly developed, not that 
which applies only to the lowest level of complexity, even though the former is and must be, in a 
sense implicit or potential from the start (1970, p. 369).60  
Citing Max Planck’s (1936), Harris holds there exists an ‘inter-connection between parts 
of a whole’, that emphasizes the importance of local context. Particles, he claims, “exist as 
distinguishables only qua features of the system and not as separate individual entities. They 
are not individuals and can be termed particular distincta only in terms of their participation 
in the articulated structure of the system to which they belong” (1965, p. 136). In addition, he 
maintained that the individual quanta are now more accurately understood as waves that 
cannot be considered in isolation but only as interdependent systems: 
Even free-moving particles attached to no particular group, such as neutrons expelled from atoms 
under bombardment, are seen as wave packets, presupposing some wave field in which the waves 
have become superposed. As soon as one speaks of waves, one is committed to the concept of 
periodicity and ordered structure… (2000, pp. 157-58).  
Such ‘periodicity and ordered structure’ is for Harris demonstrative of a unifying principle. 
Likewise, in the case of a quantum system, Harris maintains, the whole assumes “priority 
over determination of the exact position, or the precise momentum, of particles within it…” 
(1991, p. 31).  
Harris endorses Bohm’s theory of ‘hidden variables’ (1965, p. 123), and (as discussed in § 
2.5) later cites Bohm’s (1980) conception of the implicate order in support of his holist 
interpretation of QM. Accordingly he maintains, we must “regard what is measured and the 
measuring instrument as a single indivisible complex, within which what is measured comes 
to be” (1991, p. 32; see also 2000, ff. p. 100). For example, Harris invokes Bohm and 
Aharanov’s modification of the EPR experiment as evidence that “events separated by a 
                                                
60 I return to this issue on many occasions and especially in chapter 8 below. 
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space-like interval are necessarily (even through not causally) bound together by faster than 
light influences” (1991, p. 33).61  
This is all to say that for Harris (as for Bohm), the supposed intrinsic properties of 
parameters, events, and fundamental particles depend upon organizing relations within a 
system-as-a-whole. The “proper interpretation of quantum mechanics” for Harris is therefore 
likely to “depend upon the recognition that the physical real to which it refers is a whole or 
structured totality in which individuality is constituted by form, and particulate existence is 
only provisional, approximate, temporary and adjectival to the dynamic pattern in which it 
occurs” (1965, p. 139). Harris holds that given the above, “space-time and energy are seen to 
be inseparable aspects of a single reality, as are energy and matter, wave and particle” (1991, 
p. 38). On this account, he concludes that classical logic is insufficient to express the 
discoveries of 20th century science: 
There can be no atomic facts and no atomic propositions. The logic that assumes their existence 
may still be of use – if the subject matter to which it relates is to be regarded (for theoretical 
convenience) as a mere aggregate, but to the system of the real world, as science now conceives it, 
such logic must be wholly inappropriate (2000, pp. 101-2). 
 
3.3.1 Reductive Versus Synthetic Unity 
In this section I show that despite various supporting points, some of Harris’s claims 
concerning the dialectical whole as overarching nature bear many more differences to the 
Standard Model than he was originally able or willing to recognize. On the one hand, a 
number of theorists, including Bangu (2013) and Carr (2006), are optimistic that experimental 
results, in combination with theoretical symmetry principles are getting us closer to a GUT.62 
                                                
61 Diagrammatically then, aperiodic effects of quasicrystal structures described by Penrose (1989) capture the 
kind of non-local unity Harris has in mind (1991, p. 33). Indeed the aperiodic, overlapping, and self-assembling 
nature of quasicrystals may serve as a paradigmatic example of Harris’s conception of the dialectical whole. For 
a technical overview see Samavat, et al. (2012); for an interesting consideration of quasicrystals creating an 
instance of paradigm shift see Ashkenazi, et al. (2014). 
62 The simplest possibility for a GUT is based on the symmetry group SU(5): “In SU(5), we have 24 gauge 
bosons. In this scenario, SU(5) should be spontaneously broken to UY (1) Å~ SUL (2) Å~ SU(3) at “low” 
energies. Below the SU(5) breaking scale, the masses of 12 gauge bosons would be of the order the SU(5) 
breaking scale, while UY (1) Å~ SUL (2) Å~ SU(3) would remain the residual symmetry above the electroweak 
scale with 12 massless gauge bosons” (Bambi, et al., 2016  p. 46). 
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For example Carr agrees with Davies’ (1993) assertion of an organizing principle implicated 
by the coherence of the laws of our universe. He holds that there is an inherent beauty to the 
universe involving “mathematical elegance, simplicity, and inevitability.” He goes on to say, 
all the laws of nature seem to be a consequence of a simple set of symmetry principles. For 
example, symmetrizing electricity and magnetism gives Maxwell’s equations; symmetrizing space 
and time gives special relativity; and invoking gauge symmetries leads to the unification of the 
forces of nature (Carr, 2006 p. 147).  
On the other hand, invoking symmetry appears to now require a bit more philosophical 
legwork (empirical observation being unavailable), to arrive at the kind of ontological 
conclusions Harris so confidently maintains. Morrison (2013) supports the interpretation that 
a grand unification in modern terms would mean the discovery that all known particles can be 
understood as “one and the same force” (p. 382). She cautions however that unification in the 
Standard Model is tenuous because of the use of free parameters “and the fact that the theory 
is an amalgam of three different symmetry groups SU(3) x SU(2) x U(1) rather than a single 
group…” (p. 383).63 As a result, it would appear that Harris was mistaken to believe that 
adding gravity to this system is a final step, because the weak, strong, and electromagnetic 
forces have yet to be reductively unified.64 
 In considering the challenges to Harris’s appeal to the Standard Model, it is instructive to 
realize that there are different kinds of unification. For example, Barrow (2004) considers a 
range of principles by which scientific theories unify and advance, the third of which is 
reduction: “the discovery that the value of one constant of nature is determined by the 
numerical values of others” (p. 407). In order to carry out a reduction of a given physical 
force, parameter, or phenomenon, we need already to know some likely set of constants 
Barrow says, then we “develop a broader explanation that links their domains of application” 
(p. 408) (see also Morrison 2013, p. 386). A common example of reduction in the number of 
constants that Barrow supports is the unification of electromagnetism.  
                                                
63 Symmetry types include: 1. Space-time/non-space-time; 2. Continuous/discrete; 3. Local (gauge)/global 
(ridged); 4. Geometrical/dynamical; 5. Discrete vs. continuous symmetry, e.g. square vs. circle “invariance” 
(Bangu 2013, p. 4). 
64 Moreover, gravity itself may not be a fundamental force as “there are no particles that couple to the 
gravitational field and act as force carriers; the effects of gravitation are ascribed to space-time curvature instead 
of a force per se” (Morrison, p. 383). 
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Indeed Morrison finds Maxwell’s electrodynamics to be the first unified field theory of 
physics and a rare example of reduction. The laws of physics were understood to take “the 
same form in all inertial frames” and “the relationship between electricity and magnetism 
could be represented by the transformation properties of the electromagnetic field tensor […] 
Hence, the magnetic field appears as an effect of the transformation from one frame of 
reference to another” (pp. 393-94). The upshot is that in certain cases a single phenomenon 
can be mistakenly analyzed as two or more different kinds until a reductive unification 
provides a framework for understanding their underlying unity. Though Harris did not 
distinguish between kinds of “unification” in the philosophy of physics, he nevertheless 
appealed to electrodynamics as a case of unification in support of his metaphysics – thereby 
implicitly endorsing reduction.  
Barrow’s fourth principle elucidation, which is said to occur “when a theory predicts that 
some observed quantity – a temperature or a mass for example – is given by a new 
combination of constants. The combination tells us something about the interrelatedness of 
different parts of science” (2004, p. 408). Barrow’s example here is Hawking’s prediction of 
the evaporation of black holes, as this requires combining our understanding of 
thermodynamics, light, gravity, and Planck’s constant. Morrison finds that most attempts at 
reduction of physical phenomena end up being cases of what she calls synthetic unity, in 
which the respective phenomena remain independent but are described within one 
overarching theory. In such cases there is no unification of the sort that would permit deriving 
the formalism of one theory from a more fundamental theory.  
Morrison claims that synthetic unity can be characterized by the electroweak theory, but 
that such unity is “not possible with the larger Standard Model”.65 This is because in contrast 
to the Standard Model, the electroweak unification  
was largely structural rather than substantial and as a result does not fit with the idea of reducing 
elements of the weak and electromagnetic force to the same basic entity […] The SU(2) x U(1) 
gauge theory […] specifies the form of the interactions between the weak and electromagnetic 
forces but provides no causal account as to how the fields must be unified […] the unity that is 
supposedly achieved results from the unique way in which these forces interact (pp. 399-400).  
                                                
65 The electroweak theory results from combining the SU (2) group governing isospin/weak interactions (10-15 
cm range) and the U (1) group of electromagnetism (∞ range). The Standard Model results from the combination 
of Quantum chromodynamics (QCD, SU (3) symmetry group) of the strong interactions with the electroweak 
theory.  
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The two fields are thus integrated under an overarching framework that results from the 
interaction of their independent symmetry groups. This unity resulted in a reconceptualization 
of the electromagnetic potential and positing of additional dynamics. Such a synthesis, she 
maintains, preserves independence for each domain while providing a broader theoretical 
framework within which their integrations obtain (p. 402). As a result, it is widely accepted 
that electroweak unification results from formal operations rather than the discovery of 
empirical unity. 
Barrow’s fourth principle, enumeration is considered the holy grail of physics: “the 
calculation of the value of a constant of Nature from first principles, showing that its value is 
explained” (2004, p. 407). Though it has yet to unify the known constants, Bangu (2013) 
remains encouraged by methods involving to mathematical symmetries. He maintains that 
symmetry is an indispensable tool for particle classification and prediction, e.g. our success in 
discovering the Higgs.  
Their taxonomic function brings with it two main benefits. The first is that order can be imposed 
over a huge variety of elementary particles. The second comes from the use of these schemes of 
classification as guides toward the fundamental ontology: while the known particles neatly fitted 
the schemes, physicists also perceived “gaps” in the schemes, that is, positions for which no 
corresponding particle was detected. The existence of these gaps suggests that the physical 
particles that would fill them might themselves exist… (p. 290). 
In this way the on-going revelation of symmetry in nature implies wholeness, and 
interrelations that run deeper than we can empirically observe.66 However, jumping to 
conclusions about which interrelations obtain in nature would be hasty at this point.  
Unfortunately, the Standard Model is ripe with “unnatural fine-tuning” of its parameters. 
For example, the mass of the Higgs was established because of fine-tuning, which was 
required to make it small enough for a number of other theories to remain consistent. This 
brings Morrison to conclude that despite the significance of the Higgs discovery, we still lack 
a truly cohesive and naturally unified model of nature. In this vein, new discoveries involving 
the Higgs at the LHC may overturn this model in favor of another.  
                                                
66 For example Bangu notes that the discrete symmetry – consisting of charge conjugation symmetry (S), parity 
(P), time reversal symmetry T(T), and spatial/antiparticle inversion (CP), resulting in an exact symmetry, or 
(CPT) – of particle groups has made many particle predictions and has been confirmed through experiment 
(Bangu, p. 294). QCD has also been used to predict quarks of various colours and hadrons (p. 302). 
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An examination of evidence from both experiment and theorizing suggests the following 
characteristics of unity: it is something that can be achieved in certain local contexts, it is 
characterizable in different ways, but cannot be extended to a “unity of nature” that is 
systematically defined (Morrison, p. 407). 
She maintains that grand unification is possible but this will likely depend upon effective field 
theory (EFT) – incorporating only the particles and scales that are important for a given 
investigation – fundamental theories, and phenomenological models.  
This section has shown that Harris was mistaken to appeal to the Standard Model as a 
means of supporting his holism. Aside from the interrelation of particle types – which may 
provide support for dialectical relations – the very notion of scales in nature that Harris 
advocated is not supported, but rather eschewed by this model. Whereas Morrison voices 
doubt that Nature can itself be unified in accordance with reductive theories, Harris went to 
great pains to show the necessity of utilizing synthetic (i.e. interdisciplinary) methods in 
providing a holistic theory of Nature (to be addressed in later chapters). His mistake then was 
adopting too many theories that appear “holistic”, without distinguishing among them. As a 
result, there is a danger that Harris’s conception of “unity” is vague enough to be trivial, or is 
threatened by contradiction to the extent that he both appeals to the Standard Model and 
maintains irreducible emergence of unifying principles (e.g. spacetime). In chapter 5, I return 
to a more thorough consideration of emergence and reducibility, but the following section 
provides a first pass of these issues in the context of QT. 
 
3.3.2 Entanglement as a Purported Example of a Unifying Principle 
In the first instance, to justify the central thread of Harris’s appeal to QT, only the most 
mainstream accounts need be invoked. According to Serway, et al. (2013), in contemporary 
QT the wave function is not merely associated with the particle, but “is determined by the 
particle and its interaction with its environment, so, like energy, it more rightfully belongs to 
a system” (p. 1087).67 Similarly, when dealing with a pair of particles (or ‘composite system’) 
there are rules for understanding its state-space that adds further support to Harris’s holism. 
These rules tells physicists how the state-spaces (HA and HB) for two respective particles 
                                                
67 Indeed the simplest unit of information according to QT, the qubit, is itself understood as a physical system 
(Deutsch p. 100). For Zeilinger (2004), the qubit “could be any dicotomic, that is, two-valued, observable, for 
example an electron’s spin, [or] a photon’s polarization…” (p. 214). 
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obtains the state-space (or ‘tensor product’ HA⊗HB) of the pair: (i) if HA and HB are Hilbert 
spaces, HA⊗HB will be as well; but (ii) The state of a composite system HA⊗HB is not 
uniquely defined by those of its components HA and HB. Thus, it can be argued that there is 
“non-trivial” knowledge about complex composite quantum systems that does not supervene 
upon the knowledge about their components (Jenann 2015).  
More specifically, Harris’s holist interpretation of quantum phenomena appears in line 
with what is now called relational physics, supported by Rovelli & Smerlak (2007), Crane 
(1993), and Smolin (1997). For the relational quantum theorist, the respective values of Ψ (p, 
p’, p’’…) are made determinate through the interaction of the quantum system with some 
external environmental system (O). Hence, “there is no meaning in saying that a certain 
quantum event has happened or that a variable of the system S has taken the value q: rather, 
there is meaning in saying that the event q has happened or the variable has taken the value q 
for O, or with respect to O” (Laudisa & Rovelli, 2013). Thus concepts of absolute states, 
events, or values are denied, the isolated system becomes a meaningless concept, and the 
physical world is described as a net of relations across disparate systems.  
In this way, Harris’s claims of irreducible systems in QT can be further supported by 
Teller’s (1986) relational holism, in which quantum systems exhibit relations irreducible to 
and non-supervenient upon their underlying components. Interestingly, relational holism has 
been adopted by AE as a means of establishing a general theory of emergence:  
certain wholes possess emergent features that are not determined by the intrinsic properties of 
their most basic parts. Such emergent features are irreducibly relational. They are constituted by 
relations that are not exhaustively determined by or reducible to the intrinsic properties of the 
elements so related (Thompson 2007, pp. 427-28).68 
This account also retains close ties with Bohm, because as Unger and Smolin (2015) point 
out, theories capable of accounting for the nature and effects of “‘hidden variables’ could 
only be relational views: they would show how the particles, fields, and forces studied by 
quantum mechanics relate, through reciprocated action, to features of the universe that have 
remained outside its scope of inquiry” (p. 195).69  
                                                
68  Philosophical issues and physical theories of emergence will be further discussed in § 5.3.2 below. 
69 For a technical treatment of Bohm’s argument for indivisibility of the EPR experiment see his (1980, ff. p. 
117; 1993, ff. p. 134). For further details regarding the formalism of hidden variables see David (2015, ff. p. 
116). For a philosophical introduction to Action at a Distance in Quantum Mechanics, see Berkovitz (2016).  
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For example, according to the property-assignment rules of orthodox QM, in the spin 
singlet state of the EPR experiment particles are entangled in an anti-correlational state that 
cannot be decomposed into a product of separate states (i.e. of L- and the R-particles with 
individual spins). Thus, according to Berkovitz (2016), (i) state separability fails; (ii) Teller’s 
relational holism is vindicated because properties of the particle pair fail to supervene upon 
the intrinsic qualitative properties of the particles and their spatiotemporal relations; and (iii) 
process non-separability is vindicated because the process that leads to each of the 
measurement outcomes is likewise non-separable. As Barad (2007) explains, the apparent 
paradox of superluminal action at-a-distance  
arises out of a mistaken belief in metaphysical individualism. That is, the paradox arises out of the 
mistaken assumption that there are individually determinate entities from the outset; this 
assumption, which is the basis for classical physics, is precisely what is being called into question 
here […] in the EPR case the entities are not separately determinate individuals but rather 
inseparable parts of a single phenomenon (pp. 315-16).  
In this case then, we are not dealing with pre-existing individually determinate entities with 
determinate spatial positions communicating instantaneously at a distance from one another, 
but “a phenomenon that determinately resolves the boundaries and properties of the entangled 
components in a way that gives meaning to the notion of individual” (ibid).  
Even on an orthodox interpretation, the double slit experiment appears to depict a 
contradiction, the result of which Maudlin (2003) agrees there is an ontological and 
irreducible form of holism, for which classical logic is insufficient. Maudlin explains that in 
QT “a disjunction [C (A ∨ B) ∧ C] can be true even through neither disjunct [(A ∧ C) ∨ (B ∧ 
C)] is true, so classical logic fails” (p. 479). This is to say that in a double slit experiment, a 
particle must go through one of two slits, which is true, but also false because the particle 
does not go through either one or the other. Maudlin finds that we can avoid this contradiction 
if we understand that facts about unions are not reducible to disjunctions of corresponding 
facts about their parts. He concludes the deepest metaphysical innovation of QT “lies in the 
holistic nature of the wavefunction, and the fact that the quantum state of an entangled system 
cannot be recovered from the quantum states of its parts” (pp. 485-86).70 This line of 
                                                
70 What quantum logic reveals is a logic of measurement-outcomes in closed subspaces of Hilbert space H 
forming an algebra called a Hilbert lattice L(H), where not all measurements are commutable (Wilce, 2012). As 
a result, the standard distributivity law of propositions does not hold and “the set of projectors on a Hilbert space 
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reasoning demonstrates only that there is a constraint on how current formalism reflects 
“individuals” in the world, i.e. some phenomena cannot be decomposed into components but 
must be treated as a whole.71 
This section has shown that Harris was right in appealing to a prevailing holism of QT 
(e.g. EPR entanglement) that requires logic contrary to the analysis of separable entities. In 
order to draw out further details regarding Harris’s philosophy of physics however, it is 
necessary to consider how he used the above contentions to discuss a wider class of natural 
phenomena. To this end, I next consider an issue at the foundation of Harris’s philosophy of 
Nature: the interdependence of cosmology and consciousness studies.  
 
3.4 What Does Cosmology have to do with Consciousness? 
Admittedly the results of this chapter have not been particularly surprising thus far and 
neither would Harris have expected them to be. What these results have done however is 
prepare the way for a consideration of what is a guiding theme of his system. As discussed in 
§ 2.2, for Harris scientific practices must be seen as the application of a whole system, one 
that depends upon the coherent arrangement of all its parts. This means that if any one theory 
is inconsistent with the worldview, the system itself must be reconsidered, rather than the part 
alone. He reasons that the scientific method is a “systematic explanatory scheme”, a “whole” 
whose elements are “interdependent.” 
Such a whole must be complete, and no scientific theory is complete until it embraces the entire 
universe. At this stage it becomes a cosmology […] Every such worldview is a metaphysic; so the 
edict of empiricism against metaphysics is without a shred of justification, for intrinsic to all 
science and all experimental method a metaphysic is presupposed (2000, p. 21).  
Unfortunately, Harris did not spell out in sufficient detail why cosmology is a metaphysic. 
Nor did he explain the importance of considering theories of mind and cosmos together, but 
merely demonstrated it in his methods of investigation and attributed the approach to Hegel’s 
                                                                                                                                                  
do not generate a Boolean algebra, but a more complicated structure, called an orthomodular lattice” (David 
2015, p. 81).  
71 Harris contends that “the theory of relativity gave precedence to the concept of the field over that of the 
particle” (2000, p. 98). Indeed, Earman (2007) has noted that in quantum field theory (QFT) “fields are the 
fundamental entities and particles are epiphenomena of field behaviour” (p. 1407). 
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dialectic phenomenology. Hence, the present and following section serve to fill in this gap so 
as to provide a clearer means of evaluating the merit of his later arguments.  
Derived from its Latin origin Universe is composed of uni and versus, resulting in 
universum, meaning everything rolled into one. Hence, from its earliest Western conception 
the cosmos is a whole, as anything else becomes utterly incoherent. Philosopher of 
cosmology George Ellis (2007a) explains that cosmology involves the study of all that 
physically exists, not merely the study of all that we can observe, the aim of which being to 
delineate the overall structure and evolution of the Universe. “Thus cosmology is of 
substantial interest to the whole of the scientific endeavour, for it sets the framework for the 
rest of science, and indeed for the very existence of observers and scientists” (p. 1184). On 
this view, cosmology provides an ontological framework for all scientific practices and a 
theoretical foundation for naturalistic accounts of all phenomena, including life and conscious 
observers.  
Smeenk (2013) further explains that “Cosmology confronts a number of questions dear to 
the hearts of philosophers of science: the limits of scientific explanation, the nature of 
physical laws, and different types of underdetermination, for example” (p. 607). However, 
before the 1960’s this discipline, much like metaphysics before 1980 (Loux, M.J. & 
Zimmerman, 2003), was characterized as unscientific and speculative at best. As Smeenk puts 
it, the challenge is: how can one formulate a scientific theory of the ‘universe as a whole’? He 
goes on to maintain that this field is a legitimate part of science despite it having its own 
unique challenges. Based on the great achievements cosmologists have made in discovering 
and confirming theories like big bang nucleosynthesis, Smeenk explains there “are no 
convincing, general no-go arguments showing the impossibility of secure knowledge in 
cosmology; there are instead specific problems that arise in attempting to gain observational 
and theoretical access to the universe” (Smeenk, p. 608). This restriction on our observational 
powers highlights the significance of what is known as our selection effect.  
A unique feature of cosmology as a science is its inherently speculative and philosophical 
nature due to our inability to probe the very early and distant reaches of our universe (Carr 
2007, pp. 3-4). Starting in the 1920s-30s, data were enriched by a widening of our 
observational spectrum from optical to ultraviolet, infrared, X-ray, etc. The cosmic 
background radiation (CBR) observations of COBE and the WMAP satellites have provided 
crucial evidence for the global topology of our universe. Today, astronomers use as many 
means of observation as possible (the widest spectrum as well as taking account of 
dynamicity through time). This is because objects are often detectable at certain wavelengths 
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but not at others. Hence the selection effect of cosmology highlights a lesson applicable to all 
of sciences: our conception of reality depends upon our methods, tools, and disposition of 
observation.  
Additionally, Ellis explains, “philosophical choice will to some degree shape the nature of 
cosmological theory, particularly when it moves beyond the purely descriptive to the 
explanatory role…” (2007a, p. 1184). He emphasizes in this vein that cosmology is far more 
than merely choosing or determining a number of physical parameters, as some hardnosed 
physicists maintain: cosmology assumes that the universe is “expanding and evolving”, and 
that “the laws of physics are the same everywhere, and underlie the evolution of the universe” 
(p. 1185, emphasis omitted). Indeed the Standard Model of cosmology extrapolates local laws 
to the universe as a whole; a move that implies global-to-local constraints that are not yet 
adequately accounted for. However, because our observations are made from a region of the 
universe that is hospitable to the existence of observers this results in the biasing of any 
global theories we construct (Carr 2007, p. 15).72  
The important conclusion from this overview of cosmology has been anticipated by 
Harris’s reasoning and eloquently captured by Gunn (2011): “as a whole”, the Universe “is 
not an object of experience, nor can it ever become such” (p. 258).73 Indeed Gunn goes on to 
argue that even if we could somehow “transcend” the Universe and “reengage it” our object 
would now only constitute part of the Universe proper. Hence, it remains “beyond all 
empirical determination” (ibid). In the following section I examine one implication of this 
conclusion that reads between the lines of Harris’s original framework for the study of 
consciousness. 
 
                                                
72 Following convention, in the remaining chapters I will use the capital “Universe” to denote all that either has 
or will ever obtain in physical reality and I will use the terms “universe” or “world” to denote everything within 
our cosmic horizon, or as some region of the Universe that is distinguished by law-like parameters. 
73 In Husserl’s phenomenological terminology for the structure of experience, the situation may be understood as 
follows: “Anything that comes forth, manifests, or emerges does so in an open clearing or expanse, delimited by 
a horizon. The horizon of every possible horizon is the world. Yet the world-horizon cannot be the synthesis, 
totality, or mereological sum of all these possible horizons because it is pregiven or a priori with respect to any 
of them and thus is sui generis” (Thompson 2007, pp. 35-36).  
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3.4.1 Anthropic Reasoning 
What can be understood about the nature of our universe from examining the presence of 
intelligent observers and the conditions of their cosmic neighbourhood? To address this 
question is to consider the anthropic cosmological principle, which says observations of the 
cosmos must reveal physical parameters of a universe that are capable of supporting the 
emergence of its observers. Typically, the anthropic principle is used to constrain our physical 
theories by taking into account the presence of and necessary conditions for observers. This 
principle was first used in cosmology by Robert Dicke (1961), who noticed the prevalence of 
very large numbers with respect to the combination of fundamental physical constants. Later, 
Brandon Carter (1974) introduced the term anthropic principle with respect for the large 
number coincidences (LNCs) and distinguished between strong and weak versions 
respectively.74  
Interestingly, all of these dimensionless LNCs – including the age/expansion rate of the 
universe, the gravitation/mass ratio of all stars, and the ratio of the Planck energy density to 
the (apparent) vacuum density – are related in that they are each some power of N=1040. For 
example McMullin notes the following: “(1) the ratio of the gravitational to the electric force 
is ∼N−1; (2) the ratio of the mass of the universe to the mass of the proton is ∼N2; and (3) the 
Hubble age of the universe in atomic units is ∼N” (2008, p. 71). What is further interesting 
about these respective ratios is that we appear to be in a unique location and epoch of cosmic 
history to observe them. For example, the time it takes for carbon to be cooked up in and 
dispersed by stars, the age of the universe, and the time it has taken light to travel to us since 
the Big Bang are all 1010y (Carr 2007, p. 77). In addition, the matter density and vacuum 
energy density run through a different scale of values over the history of the Universe and as 
Vilenkin (2007) explains, there is only one epoch at which they are roughly equivalent 
according to the Standard Model – the one we are currently living in. This has resulted in 
what has been called the cosmic coincidence problem. The anthropic principle provides a 
number of ways to answer this problem by considering how we have become a part of the 
universe at this most auspicious time in history.  
                                                
74 Brandon Carter coined the term but later lamented that it was improper because it really has nothing to do 
with humans beings. More accurately, it refers to the relationship between complex systems and the physical 
conditions necessary and sufficient for the emergence of observers in a given space time region. Overlooking 
this distinction can lead to a number of unwarranted conclusions, like extending the principle to theological 
interpretations that give humanity a privileged position in the Universe (Carr, 2007 pp. 85-86).   
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Weinberg (2007) explains that anthropic reasoning (AR) makes sense for a given constant 
if its landscape of “possible” variation is large compared with its anthropically conducive 
subset of values (p. 33). Nevertheless, he considers it understandable why some find AR 
distasteful because such theories “based on anthropic calculations certainly represent a retreat 
from what we had hoped for: the calculations of all fundamental parameters from first 
principles” (p. 39). As discussed in § 2.3, Harris maintained that the unavoidable use of 
metaphysics in scientific philosophy requires that one take as first principles both one’s own 
existence and the Universe (the whole of which one is a part). The development of knowledge 
then proceeds as follows: “Self-awareness and reflection go hand in hand with an insistent 
demand for self-knowledge, for understanding of ourselves and our place in the world; and 
that demand carries with it the inevitable need to unify and systematize our experience of that 
world and of ourselves” (1988, p. 11). Hence, on Harris’s account, to have self-knowledge 
requires a systematized worldview, one which relies upon empirical observation and is 
organized by metaphysics. However, he also maintained that the “anthropic principle” is 
“scientific” and “if respected, can give rise to significant observational predictions crucial to 
the acceptance of cosmological hypotheses” (1991, p. 1). This is to say that recognizing 
inherent selection effects in what and how we conceive of the Universe is necessary for 
scientific progress. So while our view of the world is inherently biased by our selection effect, 
critically assessing this bias results in ever clearer depictions of both cosmos and mind.  
Indeed this idea has been echoed by numerous cosmologists in recent years. Like Harris, 
Linde (2004) notes that our theory of physical reality has been so successful that we have 
forgotten that our starting point was our phenomenal experiences. Although the anthropic 
principle runs the risk of serving as a mere “painkiller” for our confusion if uncritically 
embraced, he considers many criticisms of AR to be unwarranted. He maintains this principle 
could “help us to understand that some of the most complicated and fundamental problems 
may become nearly trivial if one looks at them from a different perspective” (2004, p. 427). 
In a later (2007) work Linde maintains that “in order to answer the question of why we live in 
our part of the Universe, we must first learn the answers to the questions ‘What is life?’ and 
‘What is consciousness?’” (p. 140).75  
                                                
75 To my mind this is to invoke the coherence theory of truth Harris was so fond of, in that scientists must now 
‘fit’ observers into their cosmological models. In this vein Livio (2008) cites four cosmological observations that 
deeply inform an investigation into the nature of emergent life in the universe: (i) The spectra of distant galaxies 
are red shifted; (ii) to a precision of better than 10−4, the cosmic microwave background (CMB) is thermal, with 
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Following physicist John Wheeler’s spirit, Gleiser (2004) points out that in asking “How 
come us?” by implication we are positing “the existence of (i) a universe capable of (ii) 
harbouring life which, furthermore, is (iii) intelligent enough to ask about its origins” (p. 
638). The question thus “encompasses all three origins, of cosmos, life, and mind; they may 
be (and often are) treated separately, but they are part of an indivisible whole (ibid). 
Additionally – short of being realists about the mathematical objects comprising our theories 
– any sufficient theory addressing the nature of the Universe must include an explanation of 
how the theory fits into its own model, i.e. a theory of the structures of knowledge arising in 
minds.76 As Nesteruk (2013) claims, in the effort to maintain a naturalistic epistemology, 
through the search for its own facticity, scientists are lead to a transcendental problematic: 
“the complete picture of physical reality must include the conditions of its explicability and 
constitution” (pp. 2-3).77  
For Harris there is a two-way street (i.e. a biconditional) connecting ontological theories of 
mind and the Universe (the whole to which mind belongs). On the one hand, the conditions of 
mind are precisely what have resulted in our selection effect, which must be accounted for in 
order to establish an adequate cosmological theory. On the other hand, statements about the 
necessary conditions of mind must be grounded in some background theory about what is not 
mind, that is, a theory about how the cosmos (natural processes) exclude and permit 
consciousness. This background theory (cosmology) changes depending upon where and how 
we draw the boarder that distinguishes the conditions of mind from the rest of nature. Thus, 
having a complete theory of mind is possible iff we acquire a complete theory of the 
Universe. 
Implicit in Harris’s works is the notion that any adequate theory of either consciousness or 
the Universe will be grounded upon theories of the other, i.e. that these theories are 
epistemically interdependent. This a priori contention is evidently derived from his process-
relational ontology and dialectical methodology (as outlined in chapter 2), which posits that 
adequately speaking of a given phenomenon requires explaining its relationship to the system 
                                                                                                                                                  
a temperature of 2.73 K; (iii) Light elements like deuterium and helium, have been synthesized in a high 
temperature phase of the early universe; and (iv) Deep observations have shown that galaxies farther away 
appear younger (e.g. smaller with higher fraction of irregular morphologies) (p. 114). Taken together, these 
observations reveal good evidence that the universe is expanding and cooling; evidence he considers not proof 
of, but “consistent with the Hot Big Bang model” (p. 115).   
76 Harris was here anticipating the self-referential ToE, such as (CTMU) Langen (2002) and Rapoport (2009).  
77 To this issue I will return in § 8.3, but a great deal of terrain must be covered beforehand.  
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within which it occurs.78 Quite simply then, if we wish to have an ontology of consciousness 
that is scientifically grounded, we are obliged to fit this theory within the total paradigm of 
the natural sciences. This system is organized by cosmology, and hence such a theory of 
consciousness is adequate only when related within an overarching theory of the Universe. 
Likewise, an adequate theory of the Universe requires that we account for the conditions of 
consciousness – our selection effects. The Universe however, is an object that is beyond the 
scope of direct scientific investigation; a unique object more adequately understood as a 
metaphysical concept or idea. This establishes a bipolar structure for the dialectical holist 
epistemology (at this stage) but its ontology remains to be seen.79 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In § 3.2, I have shown that Harris’s appeal to relativity theory to support his conception of 
the unifying principle has received support from numerous authors. While these theorists 
have taken different approaches to the ontological interpretation of space-time, they make 
common appeals to interdependence, self-organization, and irreducibility of global order, 
more recently articulated as meta-laws. Harris’s optimism concerning the unity of particle 
physics is another story. The discussions of § 3.3 have revealed that while such optimism is 
shared by advocates of the Standard Model, this model aims for reduction, which is counter 
Harris’s system. Nevertheless, recent conceptions of EPR entanglement, synthetic unity 
(EFT) appear to support Harris’s conception of the whole as self-differentiated into 
irreducible scales – an issue to which I return in chapter 5.  
In § 3.4, I have clarified the foundation of Harris’s AR and supported his contention that 
cosmology is dependent upon philosophical choices or presuppositions that (in line with Ellis 
2007, ff. p. 1242-45) shape the details of our physical theories. Hence, metaphysics is 
inherently interwoven into scientific theory. One consequence of this reasoning is Harris’s 
largely implicit argument concerning the interdependence of cosmology and consciousness 
studies. Although Harris has attempted to use this line of thought to arrive at ontic 
conclusions regarding mind and cosmos, at present the supporting evidence only permits a 
                                                
78 Note that for Harris this is not merely to posit the necessary and sufficient conditions of a given phenomenon 
(ontic individuation) but to also examine the epistemic system within which the phenomenon obtains. 
79 For a summary of this argument for the interdependence of cosmology and consciousness studies see § III of 
the appendix below.  
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dialectical holist to endorse epistemic interdependence between studies of mind and cosmos: 
implicating central roles for anthropic and unifying principles.  
Given the above, an invaluable means of evaluating Harris’s metaphysics is to consider 
the extent to which the anthropic and unifying principles may provide insight into the hard 
problem of consciousness. Toward this end, in the following chapter I examine how Harris’s 
a priori conception of wholeness leads him to the stronger versions of the anthropic principle 
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Chapter 4 




 In October of 1986 Harris attended a symposium at Colorado State University that was 
intended to address the question “Does the new physics need a new metaphysics?” Here 
Harris’s received his first inspiration for what would become Cosmos and Anthropos (1991). 
In the preface of this work Harris recalls that the scientists who participated “unanimously” 
called for a “holistic metaphysic” of the kind he had been working on for most of his career.80 
Further inspiration came when presenting a paper at George Mason University on the 
Anthropic Principle, which was so well received that Harris was inspired to elaborate his 
arguments on this topic. Having secured a fellowship position at Boston University for this 
purpose, the text that Harris produced was an application of his longstanding metaphysics to 
the anthropic principle.81  
In this chapter, I examine Harris’s appeal to four versions of the anthropic principle in 
light of four recently developed multiverse theories that some cosmologists consider effective 
for avoiding the conclusions of stronger AR. In § 4.2, I introduce the weak anthropic 
principle and three kinds of selection effects that are implied by Harris’s reasoning. The 
purpose of this section is to elucidate Harris’s (phenomenological) means of avoiding 
multiverse theories. In § 4.3, I argue that a weaker version of Harris’s participatory anthropic 
reasoning can be revised and upheld by appealing to Bohmian QT and AE. In § 4.4, I contend 
the final anthropic principle is largely irrelevant with respect to Harris’s project and in § 4.5 
                                                
80 Two years prior, Grier noted that Barrow and Tipler’s (1986) discussion of the relation between the 
“cosmological anthropic principle” and the “tradition of teleological explanation” has been anticipated by 
Harris’s earlier work: “In Harris’s work, stretching back over several decades, one can find a very sophisticated 
philosophical defence of just such a development in scientific theory” (1989, p. xiii).  
81 When this project was completed Harris was again driven to extend this portrayal of holism and his recent 
insights concerning the anthropic principle into social, moral, and religious domains, resulting in a following 
text Cosmos and Theos (1992). Alas, the space of this thesis is insufficient for unpacking any the lines of 
argument contained in this work. 
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these discussions culminate with the introduction of Harris’s (paradigmatic) teleological 
anthropic reasoning. I conclude that dialectical holism avoids many appeals to multiverse 
theories as means of refuting/deflating stronger AR, but Harris’s ontological conclusions 
must nevertheless confront numerous unforeseen challenges to be addressed in the following 
chapters.  
 
4.2 The Weak Anthropic Principle 
According to the Newtonian worldview, the Universe is a machine guided by the laws of 
physics that can be understood independently of observers. The weak anthropic principle 
(WAP) is essentially modern cosmology’s revision of this worldview, stating that we can 
only observe a universe from a space-time location that is habitable by observers. According 
to Carter’s original (1974) assessment, our region of the universe, the planet Earth within its 
stable solar system, must be understood as necessarily privileged. However, the WAP makes 
no claims about whether observation itself is necessary. According to Vilenkin, the WAP 
recognizes that there are certain values of some variable(s) (X) whose potentiality varies 
across spacetime and influences the chances of intelligent observers evolving: “Xmin < X < 
Xmax” (2007, p. 164). Both the lower and higher values of X will not be observed because 
they are inconsistent with the development of observers. The WAP thus constrains our 
theories about where we are in space and time and thus constrains the predictions we make 
basis of what values of X an observer can potentially measure.82 
Importantly, unlike stronger versions, the WAP makes no ontic claim about the nature of 
observers within the Universe, besides the (seemingly) trivial point that the historical 
conditions of the universe have permitted observers to exist and we should expect to observe 
the universe from a habitable vantage point. Hence, the WAP has been widely considered by 
philosophers and physicists to be a basic epistemic principle for the logic of modern 
cosmology (e.g. Carr 2007; Tegmark 2014, p. 111; Ellis 2007b, p. 1254).83  
                                                
82 The WAP and Velenkin’s (2007) ‘principle of mediocrity’ are really two sides of the same coin. Whereas the 
WAP notes that we should expect our location in space and time to be ‘fine-tuned’ to the extent of being 
compatible with our own status as ‘observers’, the idea behind the principle of mediocriry is that we should not 
expect our location to be ‘over-tuned’, i.e. we should expect it to be no more privileged than necessary to 
explain our status as observers. 
83 For a summary of WAP reasoning see § III-a in the appendix below. 
	   112	  
Appealing to the WAP, Harris claims that the discoveries in contemporary physics depict a 
universe in which life can now be “understood as a development continuous with the non-
living; and the world is observed as providing conditions for the emergence of intelligent 
beings” (1991, p. 4). Harris maintains, “we exist because the universe is the way we observe 
it to be, so we could not observe it otherwise” (ibid). This is to claim that our existence in 
some sense constrains and is constrained by the world-as-it-is-observed. A fortiori he 
maintains, “[w]e can only imagine the universe – any universe – as it would appear to our 
observation, even if it were different from what we actually observe” (ibid). While this may 
prima facie appear to be a mere truism, Harris clarifies that “[w]hat we observe is conditioned 
not only by the fact of our existence, but also by the nature and capacities of our perceptive 
and intellectual faculties” (p. 5). In this vein, I propose three types of selection effects largely 
implicit in Harris’s system and invaluable for evaluating his appeal to AR:  
 
(i) Epistemological selection effect (ESE) – denotes the limitations of a posteriori 
knowledge resulting from the method of investigation and choice of relevance. A 
common metaphor is the mesh of a net used for fishing, which permits fish smaller 
than the mesh size to escape and therefore avoid being observed.  
(ii) Physical selection effect (PSE) – involves any force acting on material entities such 
that certain observations are restricted while others are made possible. The above 
metaphor is here taken literally as the physical constraint that some entity (e.g. a net) 
has upon a system (e.g. a population of fish). The PSE necessarily contributes to the 
ESE, but does not exhaust it. 
(iii) Metaphysical selection effect (MSE) – considers the impact that a priori 
presuppositions have on the form of the observer’s physical theories, e.g. rules of 
logic, the rules for mapping abstract terms onto objects of the real world, and choice 
of methodology. Here the constraint arises from our paradigm, which creates a 
limitation on how accurately physical entities can be individuated. The MSEs are a 
sub-category of the ESE.84 
 
In discussions of AR, multiverse theories may arise simply by authors remaining realist 
about the unseen and logically possible values of certain cosmological parameters X. This 
move is captured by Barrow’s seventh pillar of scientific advance, transfiguration: “the 
                                                
84 For a summary of these respective selection effects see § III-b of the appendix below. For further 
considerations of the typical selection effects in the philosophy of cosmology see Bostrom (2002, 2007). 
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discovery that our supposed constants are a small part of a vastly more exotic structure” 
(2004, p. 407). Barrow explains the constants of nature “may not be specified by the self-
consistency of a ‘theory of everything’ and so they may be permitted to take on any (or a 
wide range of) values” (p. 411). As a result, transfiguration permits a number of multiverse 
theories, to which appeals have been made both for and against AR (discussed below). 
Harris does not try to deny a priori that some multiverse might turn out to be a viable 
theory, but maintains such theories must be theoretically coherent, and experimentally 
fruitful. He states the “Universe is everything that is and ever has or will be; there can be only 
one. To speak of many Universes is therefore a misuse of the term” (1991, p. 11). This is a 
fair and apparently benign etymological reminder, but he goes on to explain a crucial 
implication. Each region (or universe) “must somehow, and in some sense, be mutually 
related; otherwise they could not be distinguished, or counted, or regarded as many” (ibid). 
Likewise, the totality must “constitute a single complex, within which there may be many 
distinguishable regions or epochs, but these would not strictly be Universes, even if between 
them no communication of information could pass” (ibid). He argues that if “we cannot 
observe them, for whatever reason, we must at least be able to infer to their existence from 
what we do observe, or else their postulation becomes scientifically otiose” (ibid).85 
Ultimately, Harris eventually concludes on metaphysical grounds that multiverse theories are 
of little consequence in the face of his teleological AR. To clarify Harris’s approach, in the 
following section I introduce two multiverse theories and exemplify the three selection effects 
listed above.  
 
4.2.1 Level I & II Multiverses 
According to Tegmark, the level I multiverse is totally uncontroversial, requiring only that 
space and matter are homogenous beyond our cosmic horizon. This kind of multiverse has 
the same effective and fundamental laws throughout, but random quantum density 
fluctuations give rise to an infinite ergodic space containing Hubble volumes of all possible 
initial conditions. This means that the probability distributions of events in any given volume 
                                                
85 Ellis (2007b) agrees, “the idea of a completely disconnected multiverse – with regular properties but no 
common causal mechanism – is not viable. Some pre-realization causal mechanism must necessarily determine 
the properties of the universe in the ensemble. What are claimed to be totally disjoint universes must in some 
sense be causally connected, albeit in some prephysical or meta-physical domain” (p. 398).  
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is the same distribution that we would find by sampling different Hubble volumes, i.e. 
everything that could in principle have happened here has or will happen somewhere else at 
some calculable distance from Earth (Tegmark 2004, p. 464).86 Interestingly, Tegmark argues 
that this level dissolves the debate between free will and determinism:  
If there are indeed many copies of ‘you’ with identical past lives and memories, you would not be 
able to compute your own future even if you had complete knowledge of the entire cosmos! The 
reason is that there is no way for you to determine which of these copies is ‘you’. Yet their lives 
will necessarily differ eventually, so the best you can do is predict probabilities for what you will 
experience from now on (2007, p. 104). 
Tegmark contends that we can accept the existence of things that are at present 
unobservable on the basis that they are in principle observable under certain conditions (like a 
ship beyond the horizon) (2014b, ff. p. 100). In this way, our inference to the existence of this 
multiverse is by no means costly or ungrounded. Although Harris did not address this version 
of the multiverse directly, it certainly satisfies his requirement that such theories must have 
empirical import in order to be admissible.  
Concerning AR, Tegmark and Carr agree that if quantum density fluctuations of the early 
Universe are to blame for the conditions that give rise to living observers, then they are 
contingent on accidental features of symmetry breaking arising from the initial conditions of 
our universe. In this case the WAP would be necessary to discern which initial conditions 
(our presumed PSE) have given rise to our Hubble volume out of a range of possibilities 
(derived from some MSE).87 On the other hand, if a future ToE will determine all universes 
uniquely then there would (purportedly) be no room for AR, since it would be possible to 
derive the parameters of our universe from this theory (Carr, p. 83). Since this multiverse 
                                                
86 The Hubble parameter measures the expansion rate of the observable universe. The value of the Hubble 
parameter is called the Hubble constant and it is usually denoted as H0. Today h0 ≈ 0. 70. The distance that light 
has travelled in 13.8 billion years (the oldest observable stars) composes a sphere whose radius defines our 
observable universe, or ‘Hubble volume’ and denotes our observable horizon. “Above the Virgo Supercluster, 
we find the visible Universe: it contains about 108 superclusters, which all together count something like 1011 
galaxies, its total mass is 1023 M

, and its radius is about 15 [gigiparsec] Gpc” (Bambi, et al. 2016, p. 15).  
87 Likewise Weinberg concludes that the multiverse represents an approach to cosmology analogous to what 
natural selection provided for biology: “Just as Darwin and Wallace explained how the wonderful adaptations of 
living forms could arise without supernatural intervention, so the string landscape may explain how the 
constants of nature that we observe can take values suitable for life without being fine-tuned by a benevolent 
creator” (2007, p. 39). In chapter 5 below I argue this kind of reasoning from randomness is incoherent.  
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theory is relatively non-contentious, it is the later versions that will reveal much more about 
Harris’s AR.  
The level II multiverse posits an infinite set of level I multiverses as a result of chaotic 
inflation.88 Level II bubbles arise from the same fundamental laws but contain different 
constants, particles (due to symmetry breaking), dimensionality, and starting conditions. The 
level II multiverse implies an endless Universe in space and time with no ultimate Big Bang 
to get it started, i.e. the big bang is always occurring somewhere. In further contrast to the 
level I multiverse, we could never observe or get from any one of the worlds in the level II 
multiverse to another because of ongoing inflation. Though more controversial, Tegmark 
explains that we have come to many theoretical insights that go beyond what we can 
immediately observe (ESE). Arguing from analogy he says that if a fish never left the ocean it 
might “mistakenly conclude that the properties of water are universal, not realizing that there 
is also ice and steam” (2007, p. 100). He claims likewise, “Space can ‘freeze’, transitioning 
between different phases in a landscape of possibilities, just like water can be solid, liquid or 
gas. In different phases, the effective laws of physics (particles, symmetries, etc.) could vary” 
(ibid).  
Linde (2007) holds that inflation theory explains local homogeneity by suggesting that at 
distances beyond our light cone the Universe is completely inhomogeneous. Based on chaotic 
inflation, the level II multiverse appears as an intricate fractal that expands eternally, the 
structure of which predicted by mathematical laws (MSE). “The different parts of this fractal 
are enormous and may have dramatically different properties. They are connected to each 
other, but the distance between them is so large that for all practical purposes they look like 
separate universes” (p. 128). In a rapidly expanding universe such as the chaotic inflationary 
model, it is argued that a scalar field goes down slowly “like a ball in a viscous liquid, with 
the viscosity being proportional to the speed of expansion” (pp. 129-30). He goes on to say, 
when the field value becomes small, inflation ends and the field oscillates near the minimum 
and like  
any rapidly oscillating classical field, it loses its energy by creating pairs of elementary particles. 
These particles interact with each other and come to a state of thermal equilibrium with some 
Temperature T. From this time on, the Universe can be described by the standard hot big bang 
theory (p. 130).  
                                                
88 For introductions to inflationary cosmology see Guth (1998) and Linde (2004, 2007). 
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As previously discussed, such a theory will by its very nature be beyond empirical proof. 
For Harris such theories are unavoidable and our only available strategy is to make sure that 
the theory is parsimonious and congruent with observations that are available. Likewise, Rees 
(2007) warns, “consistency is not enough; there must be grounds for confidence that such a 
theory is not a mere mathematical construct, but applies to external reality” (p. 64). He 
proposes that such confidence can be achieved by a theory of the Universe or Multiverse 
structure “accounting for things we can observe that are otherwise unexplained” (ibid).89  
What evidence is available for level II? Tegmark (2007) finds that since the Level II 
multiverse is a direct result of inflationary cosmology, evidence in favor of inflation should 
do the job of supporting this multiverse. He claims “cosmological measurements have 
confirmed two key predictions of inflation: that space has negligible curvature and that the 
clumpiness in the cosmic matter distribution was approximately scale-invariant” (p. 106). 
Tegmark (in agreement with Linde, 2007 p. 131) points out that Level II necessitates AR 
because in a multiverse with different constants, “physicists will never be able to determine 
the values of all physical constants from first principles. All they can do is compute 
probability distributions for what they should expect to find, taking selection effects into 
account” (p. 109). 
One of the most important implications of chaotic inflation is universality, according to 
which, everything that is possible inevitably comes into existence at some point. Ellis (2007b) 
concedes that this scenario would validate the WAP but points out that the physics for this 
position relies upon the undiscovered inflation field(s) (PSE). Importantly, these fields arise 
from the universe itself at a fundamental level, acting as order parameters for the phase 
transitions (i.e. evolution) of the respective worlds. In this regard Ellis asks, “[w]hat 
determines what is possible?” (p. 1257). Importantly, what is physically possible in this sense 
(PSE) may or may not be identical with what is considered to be logically possible (MSE). 
Nevertheless, in either case Harris’s Concrete Universal appears to be retained. Hence, level I 
                                                
89 By analogy Rees (2007) contends that despite the fact that limitations in our current technology prevent the 
observation of many galaxies, they are still included in our cosmological discourse, on the basis of what 
knowledge we have about the observable universe. Hence, space-times completely disjoint from ours and 
perhaps even governed by different ‘laws’ are no less ‘real’ legitimate objects of scientific consideration than 
regions (e.g. with redshift 10) that never come within our horizon.  
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and II multiverses do not conflict with Harris’s system but much more remains to be 
discussed.90 
 
4.2.2 Weak Anthropic Reasoning 
By my reading, Harris (1991, ff. p. 2) attempts to demonstrate both mischaracterizations 
(e.g. he cites Hawking 1988, p. 124) and what he considers to be the fruits of the WAP. 
Harris first considers whether taking our selection effects seriously implies that “our theories 
reveal more about their authors than about their subject-matter” (1991, p. 5). He admits that 
theorizing about the world is possible even in cases where observation is “confined within 
irremovable horizons” (e.g. black holes), via extrapolations from known laws (ibid). He 
recognizes that “[t]o speak of the selection effect is to presume a known (or at least 
ascertainable) range of facts beyond what is selected” (p. 6). This he maintains must be true 
of both our (present) sense faculties and our theoretical models. Aiming to avoid Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, Harris argues, if on the other hand, we consider our sense faculties to 
be “incorrigibly” afflicted by selection effects, we are destined for “subjectivism” and 
“epistemological disaster”, because science would no longer provide knowledge of the real 
world (ibid). The WAP is then “scientifically important because it indicates a significant 
selection effect must be treated with the utmost caution and restraint” (ibid). So for Harris, 
selection effects not only reveal that our observation is consistent with some presumed PSE, 
but also emphasizes our limitation in individuating the parameters of our physical world as a 
result of our ESE. In what follows, I fill out Harris’s reasoning so as to further inform his 
later arguments. 
Towards an illumination of Harris’s AR regarding selection effects, Carr, Barrow 
Hawking’s explanations of the WAP provide important contrasts. Taking a conventional 
approach, Carr holds this principle “accepts the constants of nature as given and then shows 
that our existence imposes a selection effect on when (and where) we observe the Universe” 
                                                
90 Although Harris devoted chapter 4 of Cosmos and Anthropos (1991) to discussing evidence for ‘fine-tuning’ 
of the relevant cosmological parameters, this material appears to conflate different arguments over a priori AR 
and those for the physical nature of this fine-tuning. Unfortunately, while his summary of physical observations 
appears mostly accurate, I have found this material to add nothing to the central vein of his AR and so have 
neglected its discussion in the present chapter. For a summary of apparent fine-tuning in support of AR see 
Appendix § III – c. For further sources and discussion concerning fine tuning see McMullin (2008); Carr (2007); 
Rees (2007); Ellis (2007b), p. 388; Tegmark (2007), pp. 108-9; Vilenkin (2007); Barrow, et al. (2008). 
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(2007, p. 78). More specifically, Barrow maintains that our observations “must not be viewed 
as having been taken from some unconstrained ensemble of possibilities but from some 
subset conditioned by the necessary conditions for carbon-based observers like ourselves to 
have evolved before the stars die” (2007, p. 193). Going even further, Hawking (2007) takes a 
“top down” approach, in which the history of the Universe is given by the Feynman path 
integral that “allows every possible history for the Universe”, and is constrained by our 
present measurement surface. As a result, the “histories of the Universe depend on what is 
being measured, contrary to the usual idea that the Universe has an objective, observer-
independent, history” (p. 97). Consequently, they each endorse at least one of the following 
three assumptions:  
 
(i) The constants of nature are sufficiently individuated within our current models;  
(ii) These parameters imply a corresponding space of physical universes;   
(iii) Our measurements impose a physical influence upon the history of our universe.  
 
Evidently, Barrow, Carr, and Hawking are all committed to (i). For Carr and Barrow, taking 
the relevant physical constants as given implies that their logical manipulations reveal a 
material possibility space (ii). Hawking further endorses (iii) that the history of our cosmos is 
adequately individuated by the path integral, which is itself influenced by observers. The 
concern is that many arrangements of physical constants that are logically possible (MSE) 
might never physically obtain (PSE). Arguments are needed to justify either (a) the two 
conceptually distinct possibility spaces are not being conflated; or (b) they are coincident.  
 Barrow (2011) actually anticipates this concern with a sense of humility. He cautions that 
at present we do not know what it truly means to consider the counterfactual alteration of a 
given constant: 
At present we can imagine the effects of changing rates of radioactive decay without worrying if 
there are consequences for gravity or atomic structure. A fully unified theory would reveal all 
those interconnections and ensure that a small change in one part of physics would have extra 
consequences elsewhere (p. 231). 
More recently, Harris’s abandon of AR that invokes multiverse models has been supported by 
Smeenk (2013). Despite the purported explanatory power of chaotic inflation, Smeenk 
questions the theoretical integrity of the level II multiverse. His first worry is that “the 
detailed accounts of how the multiverse arises are typically beyond theoretical control” (p. 
645). This he claims creates a risk that “the claimed multiverse explanations are just so stories 
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where the mechanisms of generating the multiverse is contrived to do the job” (ibid). He goes 
on to say that it is not at all clear why it is helpful to shift our attention from explanations of 
the apparent value of some parameter(s) X, which is contingent upon historic events of our 
universe, into questions about the location of our universe within a much larger ontological 
landscape where the parameter varies. “Analogously, the success of historical explanations in 
evolutionary biology does not imply the existence of other worlds where pandas have more 
elegant thumbs” (ibid). Emphasizing parsimony, it would appear that Smeenk finds no reason 
why in explaining X, we must posit the existence of multiple universes to house the 
alternative values for X. Such a multiverse may in this sense be an excessive ontological 
commitment.  
While a great deal of scientific progress proceeds in an inductive manner, it would appear 
to become problematic in cosmology because in this case we assume that the Universe may 
be characterized by the parameters we observe, despite our present (likely insurmountable) 
inability to examine these constants from alternative perspectives, let alone a view-from-
nowhere (i.e. from first principles). In this respect, Ellis (2007b) poses a further word of 
caution:  
Reality is not fully reflected in either observational or theoretical models. Problems arise from 
confusion of epistemology (the theory of knowledge) with ontology (the nature of existence): 
existence is not always manifest clearly in the available evidence. The theories and models of 
reality we use as our basis for understanding are necessarily partial and incomplete reflections of 
the true nature of reality, helpful in many ways but also inevitably misleading in others. They 
should not be confused with reality itself! (p. 1247, emphasis omitted). 
Two of the most important examples of this confusion that he offers can be seen in computer 
simulations of reality and the laws of physics themselves being confused with our 
mathematical formalism. Ellis concludes that because the supposed causal (or pre-causal) 
processes of multiverse theories are either unproven or untestable, they are not physics but 
rather metaphysics (p. 1263). 
The upshot of the present approach to the WAP, I maintain, can be understood in much the 
same way as Bohm’s implicate order is applied to QT: As appeals to probability in QT are for 
Bohm due to our ignorance of an implicate order guiding quantum particles, appeals to 
multiverse cosmology can be used as a crutch for our inability to sufficiently individuate the 
necessary parameter(s) X (of a super-implicate order) that instantiates observers. 
Consequently, appealing to a possibility space that explains the occurrence of observers 
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commits a hysteron proteron by presuming precisely what we do not and may never have, i.e. 
sufficient empirical knowledge of nature-as-a-whole that permits proper derivation 
(individuation) of X parameters and their relation to observers (∃R). In lieu of empirical 
experimentation on the universe itself, appeals to multiverse cosmology may therefore 
conflate two selection effects – the coherence of mathematical systems and the physical 
organization of the Universe – resulting in an MSE-PSE fallacy (MPF). I maintain that this 
(rather ironically) reveals the true philosophical fruit of the WAP.  
So while the WAP may not appear impressive, merely proclaiming that we will find 
ourselves in a galactic region suitable for (consistent with) observation, it also reveals the 
antiquity of an objective worldview. Additionally, on the dialectical holist account, the WAP 
reveals that theories about the Universe must confront the same challenges as efforts to 
establish a foundation in metaphysics. Central to Harris’s system is the importance of 
accounting for the biases inherent in our individuation (diffractive/levative) practices in our 
efforts to establish such a foundation. 
Towards this end, Harris’s claim that ‘we could not observe the universe besides how it is 
revealed to us’ requires further elaboration and investigation into the strong anthropic 
principle (SAP). The SAP in its original form was conceived by Carter as saying that “the 
Universe (and hence the fundamental parameters on which it depends) must be such as to 
admit the creation of observers within it at some stage” (1974, p. 294). Beginning with 
Barrow and Tipler (1986), arguments for the SAP concerning vitalism and design have been 
significantly elaborated. Though widely discussed in subsequent years, the SAP has been 
mostly criticized by scientists and invoked by theists. In the following sections I consider 
three means by which authors have maintained the necessity of observers despite our inability 
to acquire knowledge of the trajectory and initial conditions of the cosmos. These are the 
participatory, final, and teleological anthropic principles respectively. I maintain that 
arguments for the participatory and final anthropic principles are weak at best, but that each 
may be subsumed by Harris’s teleological anthropic principle, which has not yet received an 
adequate evaluation.  
 
4.3 The Participatory Anthropic Principle   
The participatory anthropic principle (PAP), first articulated by Wheeler (1983) proposes 
that observation is required for the universe to come into being (Wheeler and Zurek, ff. p. 
182). Harris aims to defend the PAP in an extreme but particularly nuanced form that makes 
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use of both orthodox and Bohmian QTs. In this section I orient Harris’s PAP among some 
alternatives and evaluate its likely implications for dialectical holism moving forward.  
Harris first introduces the PAP by appealing to the orthodox QT conception of uncertainty, 
from which it was originally developed. He maintains the uncertainty imposed by Planck-
level influence upon measurements of quantum systems is not just a feature of our 
knowledge, but of nature itself.91  
The Psi-function describing the state of the system defines only a probability amplitude for such 
quantities, so that the system has no determinate properties until a measurement is made, when the 
probability amplitude collapses, and only then can the property disclosed be assigned to the 
system as determinate and actual. Observation and measurement thus become prerequisite to the 
actuality of all determinate properties of quantum entities, without which they do not exist in 
reality but are merely potential […] It then follows that intelligent beings, through their 
observation and measurements, must participate in the actualization of the universe at large (1991, 
pp. 6-7).  
Experimentation is by this reasoning necessary to bring about a switch from an abstract 
possibility of quantum formalism to physicality. Hence, by appealing to the collapse of the 
wave function, the PAP begins with an epistemic qualification about how we can speak about 
quantum phenomena and attempts to distil an ontology about how observing beings relate to 
nature (∃R).  
Harris recognizes that this interpretation may result in a circularity given that it took 
billions of years for observers to arrive on the scene. He considers it incoherent to maintain a 
mutual dependence, such that “[i]f physical reality depends on the existence of mind, and 
mind depends on the prior existence of physical reality, neither can exist unless both can 
come into being simultaneously” (1991, p. 7). Harris also rejects a Berkeleyan subjective 
idealist interpretation, criticizing that it will inevitably lead to solipsism. On the one hand, he 
endorses the Copenhagen interpretation for purportedly maintaining that particles are “latent, 
or potential, before they are observed” (1991, p. 146). In a later work he maintains that the 
                                                
91 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (more accurately indeterminacy principle) states the following: “If the 
position of a particle is known with an uncertainty Δx, its momentum can only be known with an uncertainty 
Δpx such that the product of the two uncertainties is never smaller than h/2: ΔxΔpx≥ħ/2 where ħ = h/(2π). That is, 
it is physically impossible to measure or know simultaneously the exact position and exact momentum of a 
particle. The uncertainties Δx and Δpx do not arise from imperfections in practical measuring instruments. 
Rather, these inescapable uncertainties arise from the quantum mechanical nature of matter” (Serway, et al., 
2013, p. 1089-90). 
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measuring instrument and what it measures constitute “a single indivisible complex, within 
which the measured property comes into being. What the measuring instrument registers, 
however, has meaning as a value only when (and as) read by an investigator” (2000, p. 100). 
 On the other hand, Harris’s appeal to Bohmian hidden variables is consistent with his 
emphasis on indivisible wholeness and (qualified) realism. According to Harris, Bohm’s 
theory shows we can “no longer insist upon strict individuation of particles and must 
therefore acquiesce in their dependence upon the energy system for their properties and 
behaviour” (1965, p. 138). He goes on to say, 
The proper interpretation of quantum mechanics, therefore, may depend upon the recognition that 
the physical real to which it refers is a whole or structured totality in which individuality is 
constituted by form, and particulate existence is only provisional, approximate, temporary and 
adjectival to the dynamic pattern in which it occurs (p. 139). 
Harris appreciated Bohm’s implicate order because he claims it “maintains the holistic 
conception of a physical reality that requires dialectical explication […] the system only 
becomes clearly explicit when cognized and expressed in scientific terms, so that the 
Participatory Anthropic Principle still holds” (1991, p. 147). 
 Despite his apparent sympathies for Bohmian holism, Harris attempts to remain agnostic 
claiming that in one form or another QT can justify both claims that, (1) observer and 
measurement are “inseparable from the very actuality of elementary particles”; and (2) 
“reflective awareness, in the guise of observation and interpretation, is constitutive of the very 
being of the universe” (1991, p. 145). While Harris recognized that the two systems are 
incompatible, he made no attempt at synthesis nor did he decide between orthodox and 
Bohmian QT. Crucially, to establish a PAP of Bohm’s QT is a task that neither Harris, nor (to 
my knowledge) anyone since has explicitly undertaken. Hence, questions remain concerning 
what such a “dialectic explanation” entails and which QT is most accommodating of Harris’s 
metaphysics. Toward a clarification of these issues I next highlight Bohm and Harris’s mutual 
dismissal of Everettian QT. 
 
4.3.1 Level III Multiverse 
According to Tegmark, the Level III multiverse is a result of Everett’s (1957) many-worlds 
interpretation of QT (MWI). This interpretation grew out of dissatisfaction with Bohr’s 
Copenhagen interpretation. Advocates for Everett’s view such as Mukhanov (2007), 
complain that the timing for the collapse of the wave-function is not derivable from the 
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equations of orthodox QT. Moreover, orthodox equations are so overly complicated that 
when applied to the Universe, appear as a “joke”. To avoid having to contend with 
“schizophrenic” superpositions, Everett argued that there is no collapse of the wave-function 
and at these points the universe splits into respective probabilistic outcomes or worlds 
instead.92  
Counter the PAP Mukhanov maintains in MWI, we can preserve the classical conception 
that there is a “one-to-one correspondence between reality and the mathematical symbols 
which are used to describe it. We also return to the idea that physics describes not only ‘our 
knowledge and perceptions’ but also the world ‘out there’, which existed and will exist 
without any observers” (p. 270). As Vaidman (2014) explains, while quantum events appear 
random, according to MWI, the wave-function evolves deterministically in a 3D Hilbert 
space, whose state vector branches into all possible outcomes. The temporal evolution of this 
structure thereby provides a foundational ontology. Hence Hogan (2007) maintains “the 
cosmic wave-function never collapses, but only appears to collapse from the point of view of 
observers who are part of the wave-function” (p. 227).  
Importantly, Tegmark (2007) notes, the Level III branching effects may be found in level 
I, with the key difference that in level I, the “branches” are far away in spacetime, whereas in 
level III, they exist in a Hilbert space. Moreover, according to Wallace (2013) within this 
Hilbert space, the terms or coefficients in QT (branches) can interact, reinforce, and cancel 
out.93 He goes on to say, instead of indefiniteness, in MWI microscopic quantum 
superpositions are cases in which one or more definite thing is occurring at the same time. 
Wallace explains this plurality consists of two parts:  
                                                
92 Though maintaining determinism, in Carter’s (2007) revision of the Everettian view (called the micro-
anthropic principle of QM) he concludes that his view is in accordance with Ockham’s principle and he claims 
(unspecified) Eastern philosophies within Hinduism and Buddhism (p. 308). In this theory “the number of 
distinct perceptors which can most economically be postulated” is “just one”. While he admits that this 
conclusion is devoid of scientific implications it carries a strong ethical impact in that “the injunction to ‘love 
one’s neighbour as oneself’ acquires a new significance when one recognizes that the ‘neighbour’ may be 
another incarnation of ‘oneself’” (p. 318). As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 8, such a view is in 
striking accord with Harris’s ontology of mind. Unfortunately however, the details of Carter’s theory are too 
technical for a rigorous comparison with Harris’s system within the present thesis. 
93 Interestingly, according to Wallace, most physicists are inclined to opt for a change to the philosophy of QT, 
as per Bohr’s interpretation in order to account for the seemingly contradictory experimental results; while most 
philosophers opt for a change in the physics with Bohm in order to save “objective reality” (hidden variables). 
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a contingent physical postulate, that the state of the Universe is faithfully represented by a 
unitarily evolving quantum state; and an a priori claim about that quantum state, that if it is 
interpreted realistically it must be understood as describing a multiplicity of approximately 
classical, approximately noninteracting regions that look very much like the “classical” world (p. 
465).  
Tegmark argues that the same reasoning also applies to Level II, except that at Level III the 
“process of symmetry–breaking did not produce a unique outcome but rather a superposition 
of all outcomes, which rapidly went their separate ways” (2007, p. 113).  
Hence, Hogan maintains AR is built into MWI at a basic level: “Viewed from a 
disinterested perspective outside the Universe, it is as though living beings swim like salmon 
up their favorite branches of the wave-function, chasing their favorite places” (p. 227). In this 
weak sense it is relevant to consider our selection effect to establish what branch we inhabit. 
However, supporters of MWI would not claim that observation serves as some sort of ‘higher 
level’ causal force as in the PAP. Indeed, a proponent of MWI can contend that the conditions 
required for the existence of intelligent observers emerge from quantum fluctuations and 
since every possible fluctuation is actualized, observation plays no special role in the process. 
Harris contends that MWI “violates wildly Occam’s principle of parsimony, entia non 
multiplicand sunt praeter necessitate…” (1991, p. 13). Though he did not recognize that 
MWI retains one of the simplest QT formalism on offer, Harris finds the theory 
metaphysically excessive. He argues, to the extent that these parallel worlds are “inaccessible 
to inspection” and incapable of “mutual communication”, they appear to be “cosmological 
lumber of no scientific use” (ibid). He thus concludes:  
At best (if “best” is an appropriate word), they are things-in-themselves, whose existence is 
postulated without means of verification. They are, in the worst sense, “metaphysical entities.” 
Much less can the theory remove the objections to an anthropic selection effect, or to any of the 
four versions of the Anthropic Principle (ibid). 
Here Harris maintains that MWI cannot surpass our selection effects via a view-from-
nowhere and that the theory cannot avoid his stronger AR. Importantly, It has been widely 
recognized that while Bohmian mechanics “philosophically” achieves more than the MWI, it 
does so “at the price of adding the non-local dynamics of Bohmian particle positions” 
(Vaidman, 2014). This means Harris’s appeal to Bohm’s realist holism of the EPR 
experiment (§ 3.3) marks a metaphysical disjunction separating him from MWI; but this is a 
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choice based on consistency and taste, not parsimony. Nevertheless, his claim that MWI 
cannot escape his stronger AR may yet be vindicated.  
For his part, Bohm (1993) recognizes that some may well consider the greatest advantage 
of MWI that “everything can be put in some correspondence with Hilbert space” (p. 316).94 
So his alternative interpretation of QT is arguably superior to MWI not for its parsimony, but 
for more technical reasons. He claims his view provides an explanation of why QT “implies a 
relatively autonomous domain in which the quantum potential can be neglected so that an 
approximately classical behaviour will result” (p. 314). Additionally, he claims his approach 
provides an “intuitively understandable account of how quantum processes take place” (p. 
315). In agreement with Harris, Bohm maintains it “defies the imagination to grasp 
intuitively” how both world and awareness “could split into many parts that are not aware of 
each other, and even more so how awareness could be, in effect identified with some part of a 
vector in Hilbert space” (ibid).  
 
4.3.2 Participatory Anthropic Reasoning 
Returning to the origins of the PAP, Davies (2004) maintains that observation entails 
“meaningful information” and that “[m]easurement implies a transformation from the realm 
of mindless material stuff to the realm of knowledge” (p. 8). It was this idea that lead Wheeler 
to conceive of the participatory universe: 
one that makes full sense only when observers are implicated; one that is less than fully real until 
observed. He envisaged a meaning circuit, in which atomic events are amplified and recorded and 
delivered to the minds of humans – events transformed into meaningful knowledge – and then 
conjectured a return portion of that meaning circuit, in which the community of observers 
somehow loops back into the atomic realm (ibid).  
One way this circuit can be completed is with the wave/particle dual nature that is effectively 
“decided” by an experimental arrangement. Davies points out however that the PAP does not 
                                                
94 It follows that while we are directly aware of the explicate particle aspect of nature via the senses, the subtler 
wave function aspect is inferred. So Bohm’s approach does not assume that all we are aware of are particles as 
in MWI, but maintains “at least in science as we know it thus far, all information comes ultimately through the 
manifest level (recalling that it comes not only through the particles, but also through the classical limit of 
electromagnetic field beablels)” (p. 314). Bohm holds that another advantage of his interpretation is “we do not 
have to assume the relation p = | ψ |2 ab initio, but that we are able to arrive at this as an equilibrium distribution 
resulting from chaotic processes” (1993, pp. 314-15).  
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claim that “the universe doesn’t exist unless it is observed”, but rather that past states do not 
possess “a full set of physical attributes, such as all particles having a definite position, 
motion, etc.” (p. 10).95 In this way observers in the present are believed to determine the 
actuality of the past, but observation itself is not bringing Nature into being.  
With these strictures in mind, if the dialectical holist were to invoke orthodox QT in 
defending the PAP, Stapp’s (2011) proposal for the mindful universe seems a likely source of 
refuge. Stapp argues that the conscious choice of an observer is an irreducible and necessary 
component of physical reality, however (contra Harris), Stapp recognizes that orthodox QT is 
“intrinsically dualistic” (p. 49; ff. p. 79). Following von Neumann’s orthodox QT, three 
processes are required:  
 
Process 1 – the act of intervention that partitions a system by experimental arrangement 
and entails an “acquisition of knowledge”;  
Process 2 – the evolutionary process governed by Schrodinger’s equation that unfolds as 
“a representation of this acquired knowledge”; and  
Process 3 – the result of 1 and 2, in which we receive some form of phenomenological 
data, e.g. a Geiger counter reading (p. 24).  
 
Stapp maintains that “process zero” is the free choice of the experimenter that ties together 
physical and psychological aspects of reality into one “whole” quantum event. 
Following what Stapp calls “Whiteheadian quantum ontology” he considers real what 
Bohr accepted only pragmatically, namely that our conscious intentions are the cause of our 
actions and the psychological correlate of a process 1 action.  
                                                
95 On an orthodox account, Dyson (2004) explains that quantum probability consists of preparation, 
transformation, and measurement. However, the past can only be in the form of classical particle physics 
whereas the future is conceived as a probability or wave-function (Ψ). (p. 83). Hence, QT pertains only to the 
future. This Dyson asserts, is the role of the observer, to “draw the line” between the two. “What really happens 
is that the quantum mechanical description of an event ceases to be meaningful as the observer changes the point 
of reference from before the event to after it” (p. 84). Likewise Zeilinger (2004) highlights the pitfalls of 
idealistic interpretations of QT, noting that the experimentalist’s “choice of apparatus” can determine what 
quality becomes reality in the experiment, and so “is constitutive of reality”. He warns however not to take a 
“subjective interpretation of the role of the experimentalist or the observer” because “the consciousness of the 
observer does not influence the particle at all, in contradiction to a widespread but unfortunate interpretation of 
the quantum situation” (p. 209). 
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Within orthodox thinking, the physical process 1 action results from, as von Neumann’s words 
emphasize, an intervention from outside the physically described domain. This process has, 
according to contemporary quantum theory, no sufficient causal roots in the physical alone. The 
experimenter’s ‘free choice’ participates in the selection of the needed partition that physical 
processes alone are unable to achieve (p. 108).96  
Note that Stapp’s position amounts to an argument from ignorance for free will (i.e. orthodox 
QT cannot account for experiment choices), but does not detail any ontological relationship 
between observation and the cosmos: (i) The meaning made by us may be an essential part of 
reality, but this requires its own argument and even if it were true, in no way does it imply (ii) 
that the meaning we make influences reality beyond the empirical results of our experimental 
arrangements. So far neither view is justified. Consequently, a dialectical holist PAP remains 
unsupported by orthodox QT unless one is willing to admit dualism. 
Expanding upon the implications of QT for the nature of information, Zeilinger (2004) 
argues that any theory about reality must be based on “information we receive” and so “the 
concept of a reality without at least the ability in principle to […] obtain information about its 
features is devoid of any possibility of confirmation or proof. This implies that the distinction 
between information that is knowledge, and reality is devoid of any meaning” (pp. 218-19). 
Zeilinger here contends that it is meaningless to speak of a world that we are in principle 
incapable of observing and likewise, what we can take to be ‘real’ is knowledge based upon 
our worldly engagements. The aim of these points is to deflate the orthodox PAP and render 
meaningless the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal domains. Admirable as they 
are, I maintain these moves are achieved at the expense of also glossing over any prospect of 
theoretically accounting for present or future selection effects. That is, we cannot maintain 
both that the world-as-scientifically-observed establishes knowledge (i.e. is real) and admit 
                                                
96 Stapp argues that repeating process 1 intervention in rapid succession, for example answering ‘yes’ to raising 
one’s arm, the mixed quantum state evolves into a discrete state. In this way, mental effort increases a sequence 
of “identical intentional acts”, which then causes what he calls the “template for action” to be sustained. This 
template for action is said to produce the brain activity that permits a given intended feedback (p. 36). This he 
calls the quantum Zeno effect, the mechanism by which the mind is believed to have a downward causation to 
the brain and body (p. 114).  
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that indeed any one of our theories may be wrong in the face of future discoveries accounting 
for present selection effects (i.e. what is determined to be “real” at any particular time?).97  
Initially in agreement with Zeilinger, Bohm (1980b) maintains, we risk rendering our 
explanandum meaningless if the observing apparatus is divided from what is observed 
“because the content of the observed fact cannot coherently be regarded as separate from 
modes of observation and instrumentation and modes of theoretical understanding” (p. 124). 
Following Bohm, Pylkkanen (2007) notes, “we do not check a preexisting property of the 
observed system without influencing it” (p. 196). As science progresses, Bohm holds a “new 
whole” is comprehended with a new range of relevant aspects that will itself doubtlessly “be 
revealed as an aspect in yet another new whole” (1980b, p. 137). Consequently Bohm 
maintained, “the observing apparatus and the observed system […] each participates in the 
other to such an extent that it is not possible to attribute the observed result of their interaction 
unambiguously to the observed system alone” (1990, p. 275).  
Just two years after Harris published his work on the anthropic principle, Bohm wrote the 
following passage without ever mentioning AR, but nevertheless provided some indication of 
what his response to the issue would be: 
In a certain sense we could say that the overall quantum world measures and observes itself. For 
the classical ‘sub-world’ that contains the apparatus is inseparably contained within the subtle 
quantum world, especially through those nonlocal interactions that bring about the classical 
behaviour. In no sense is the ‘observing instrument’ really separate from what is observed. The 
relative autonomy of the classical level […] is then what makes it possible for the total quantum 
world to manifest and reveal itself within itself in a measurement. Thus in contrast to the classical 
notion of measurement we should regard a quantum measurement as a manifesting process (Bohm 
& Hiley, 1993, p. 179). 
While Harris agrees that reality exists prior to observation, with Bohm he further contends 
that the very conception of “particle” is (dialectically) inseparable from an experimental 
arrangement that includes observer participation. As Bohm’s analysis reveals however, we 
are continually accounting for and thus moving beyond any given means of observation. 
Additionally, Bohm, like Harris, maintains that we will never achieve an exhaustive account 
                                                
97 As will be addressed further in § 8.3, there is a further concern that we as yet have no means of knowing at 
what point we have transcended or safeguarded against all relevant errors in empirical theory. Although this also 
presents a problem for Harris, I believe his metaphysics can provide a sufficient response.  
	   129	  
of how respective means of participation explicates the world, i.e. thereby transcending our 
selection effect(s).  
Further clarity of such a “dialectical” interpretation may be found in Barad’s ‘agential 
realist’ account. Barad’s point is not merely that knowledge practices have material 
consequences, but that “practices of knowing are specific material engagements that 
participate in (re)configuring the world. Which practices we enact matter – in both senses of 
the word” (p. 91). The construction of knowledge is more than establishing facts, but is about 
“making specific worldly configurations – not in the sense of making them up ex nihilo, or 
out of language, beliefs, or ideas, but in the sense of materially engaging as part of the world 
in giving it specific material form” (ibid).	  Knowledge then is generated as part of the world, 
meaning it is subjective, but does not presume “the preexisting distinction between object and 
subject that feeds representationalist thinking). At the same time, objectivity cannot be about 
producing undistorted representations from afar; rather, objectivity is about being accountable 
to the specific materializations of which we are a part” (ibid). As a result, “matter” is 
reconsidered as a “process of materialization” that is neither a social construction, nor a term 
corresponding with something outside of the subject (p. 210). 
Likewise, according to Nesteruk (2013), the PAP may be maintained on 
“phenomenological” grounds. He explains, the physics discoveries of the 20th century led 
Wheeler towards “a phenomenological stance” that situated the human observer at “the centre 
of disclosure and manifestation of the world” (p. 2). He goes on to say that Wheeler 
attempted to approach physical reality not as something “out there”, which is passively described 
by observers, but to see it as a genesis through conscious dialogue between observers-participants 
and physical reality, so that the universe emerges as a special articulation of the relationship 
between human intelligence and physical reality (ibid).  
He contends that in the PAP, meaning emerges through a “dialectic relationship between man 
and the world” and that it is a mistake to say that meaning of one ‘first’ comes from the other 
(p. 6).98 “Embodiment”, he claims must be the starting point of any discussion on corporeity, 
space, time, etc. This is “living being in relation to other beings and to the world, in whom 
                                                
98 I maintain Harris’s approach to the anthropic principle and cosmology in general is essentially 
phenomenological. This appears to be an approach to the philosophies of science and nature that, with few 
exceptions, has been largely ignored (e.g. Rosen, 2008, considered below). Perhaps the only work to explicitly 
connect phenomenology and anthropic reasoning is Nesteruk’s (2015) Sense of the Universe, which deserves to 
be brought into discourse with dialectical holism in the future.   
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this relation is announced and articulated by the way of its sense reaction and its 
comportment, or its action in situation” (p. 11). By this reasoning, knowledge about objects in 
the world arises in and through relations to this very embodiment that may be considered our 
primal ESE.  
The above sympathetic reading of Harris’s PAP reveals that his (1) claim, that the observer 
is inseparable from the very nature of elementary particles has received sufficient support on 
epistemic grounds. This is to say we are epistemically restricted from positing objective 
elements external to a whole system partially constituted by observer participation because 
without which, the supposed information in such a system would no longer be grounded upon 
meaningful relations. This line of reasoning thus reiterates the findings of § 3.4.1 concerning 
the epistemic interdependence of Universe and mind. Here an indivisible loop is posited from 
the constrained information we receive from the world (ESE), to our synthetic theories about 
this world (MSE), which demands a participatory qualification on our conception of what 
physical conditions (PSE) have made this conception possible. The resulting PAP does not 
support the subjective idealistic conclusion that only what obtains in and as mental is real, and 
neither does it maintain with Kant that the world-in-itself is unknowable. Rather, this 
principle maintains that the world we discover is grounded upon and inseparable from 
embodied and participatory relations – not representations or mere constructions, but 
biological, social, and technological enactments of the world.  
Bearing in mind the above discussion of § 2.5, this interpretation once again establishes an 
isomorphism between Harris’s thesis (through Bohm) and AE conceptions of reflexive 
meaning-making, dynamic co-emergence, and now what Varela, et al. have called the 
groundlessness of experience (1991, ff. p. 217). Consequently (for the dialectical holist), 
counterfactual physical alteration of the parameters (X) as they are presently individuated 
becomes inconceivable insofar as observations of the resulting uninhabited universes would 
not be possible even in principle. This implies, rather than possibly true or false but irrelevant 
(as Harris originally believed), multiverse theories are on the present phenomenological 
account considered meaningless. Nevertheless, Harris has not yet found contemporary 
support for his (2) claim of an efficacious force (PSE) of observation, i.e. there is as yet no 
justification for labeling observation a PSE. The ontological question remains as to how (if at 
all) observation itself alters the Universe. To this issue I return in § 8.3. Remaining with the 
task of elucidating Harris’s AR, I next consider prospects for a post-humanist future.99 
                                                
99 For a summary of the a priori argument for the dialectic PAP see Appendix § III – d. 
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4.4 The Final Anthropic Principle 
Whether appealing to our as yet unlimited technological potential (Hoefflinger, 2012; 
2016), our intellectual development, or human-computer interfacing (Graimann, et al. 2010) 
the final anthropic principle (FAP) claims “Intelligent information-processing must come 
into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out” 
(Barrow & Tipler p. 23). This is to say that the lineage following present observers and/or 
their technology will evolve to such a degree that observation and information processing are 
maintained indefinitely (Barrow 2007, p. 190). In this section I clarify Harris’s appeal to the 
FAP only to set it aside for reasons that will become clear anon.  
Typically, those who invoke the FAP rely upon a singularity (Vernor, 1993) of some kind 
that will presumably permit humanity to transcend our biological (i.e. mortal) constraints 
(More 2013, p. 361). Such views are maintained most rigorously by authors such as Shanahan 
(2015), Kurzweil (2013), and Tipler (1996), who consider the different forms that such a 
singularity might take as well as the moral, socio-political, and technological complications 
they entail. Some of the most popular means by which we are suspected to reach the 
singularity are via the potential development(s) of artificial intelligence (AI), artificial life 
(AL), and/or the transhumanist dream of transferring a human mind into software and thus 
achieving immortality.100 Thus we find the FAP appealing to our sense of anthropocentrism 
as well as our fear of death, in postulating that irrespective of the evolution of the universe – 
likely ending in heat death (Davies 2013, p. 24) – our collective ingenuity will equip us with 
the means to persevere indefinitely.  
For proponents of this stance, moving from the SAP to the FAP depends upon a 
fundamental assumption that “information processing” is a necessary function of the 
Universe (i.e. it must come into being and proliferate). To defend this particularly strong 
move, some consider the universe as a kind of computer (Zenil, 2012). Without regard for the 
FAP, Lloyd (2013) lends support to this move. He argues that as long as the laws of a given 
universe support universal quantum computation (PSE) all that is needed is access to free 
energy and a range of increasingly complex, information processing systems will be 
                                                
100 It is worth mentioning that of all the anthropic principles, aspects of the FAP have certainly received the most 
scientific attention. Perhaps this is because it has the most immediate and tangible implications for contemporary 
research: the transcendence of nature and immortality are apparently desirable. 
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generated. In a similar vein, Carr maintains that careful study of the Big Bang theory can 
support a cosmic history of increasing organization in which “Heat death is avoided because 
local pockets of order can be purchased at the expense of a global increase in entropy, and, if 
the Universe continues to expand forever, intelligent beings may be able to delay their 
disintegration indefinitely” (2007, p. 86).101 
Futurists like Kurzweil take the exponential increase of information processing as given 
and predict that within a few generations, humans will have fused with technology to 
transcend our biological constraints. Tipler (1996) on the other hand, takes a pseudo religious 
approach in appealing to an “Omega Point”. He hypothesizes that beings of the far future 
could have infinite computing power acquired through the final stages of a Big Crunch. 
Consequently, he maintains these beings would have “unlimited subjective time” and the 
ability to (re)create conscious beings of their own. 
Initially, Harris expresses caution against enthusiasm for AI manifesting in ‘von 
Neumann-probes’, or self-replicating biotechnology that could live on indefinitely. Such a 
claim, he says, “seems rather speculatively ambitious and smacks of over-confidence” (1991, 
p. 8). Harris considers it a real possibility that due to our “greed, short-sightedness, and 
imprudence” technological achievements may bring about the extinction of humanity far 
sooner than its “transcendence.” Moreover, Harris reasons that unless such technology 
achieves self-reflectivity, (conceiving oneself as part of the universe) it could not be 
considered a success of the FAP.  
Numerous recent authors have raised similar criticisms. Copeland and Proudfoot (2012 a 
and b) argue that futurists such as Kurzweil tacitly assume that the mind is Turing 
computable. This is the pivotal step that would permit the kind of psycho-technological 
interface required to transcend our biophysical constraints. Unfortunately, they point out, 
there is as yet no evidence that downloading a mind is, or will ever be possible. Similarly, 
Bostrom (2002) holds that if reframed as a hypothesis about the future of intelligent 
observers, there may be some value to the postulate, but as a principle he agrees with 
                                                
101 Susskind (2007) explains one well known means by which heat death can be overcome is that even after 
thermal equilibrium, over enough time (Tr = expS, in Planck time units) Poincare recurrence shows that in any 
closed system large fluctuations will occur such that “the phase point will return over and over to the 
neighbourhood of any point in phase space, including the original starting point” (p. 254). Faced with this 
scenario, he claims sting theory and AR become a favourable solution: “With nothing favouring one vacuum 
over another, the Anthropic Principle comes to the fore, whether or not we like the idea. String theory provides a 
framework in which this can be studied in a rigorous way” (p. 262).   
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Gardner’s (1986) criticism that it is pure speculation and more accurately dubbed the 
“completely ridiculous anthropic principle” (CRAP).  
In defense of the FAP however, Harris maintained that the generation of complexity (or 
scale of forms) could not continue forever, but that it would inevitably reach a final 
culmination. In at least partial agreement with Tipler, Harris advanced his own view of the 
Omega Point (1988) and later fleshed out what he thought were the theological and moral 
implications of this end-directed explicative process (1992). These works however were not 
based upon any speculations about the future abilities of consciousness or technology, but 
came more elegantly from his a priori conception of nature-as-a-whole.102 Barring AI, Harris 
reasons that under certain conditions the FAP would be inescapable:  
If the universe as a systematic whole can only achieve completion in reflective consciousness, so 
that such self-awareness is, as it were, built into its implicate order, the emergence of intelligent 
life must be intrinsic to its very nature. In that case, the extinction of humanity in this planetary 
system will simply stimulate the development of intelligent creatures in some other, as the 
plucking of dead heads from a rose bush encourages the blossoming of new roses (1991, p. 158). 
Although Harris is appealing to a metaphor, this passage does further illustrate the kind of 
relationship between consciousness and the Universe that he has in mind. Harris is at this 
point in line with some of the more extreme futurists in so far as he considers self-reflective 
awareness to be an irremovable function of the universe. Unfortunately however, Harris’s 
defense of the FAP relies upon the collapse of the wave function brought about by an 
observer, a move that has already been shown to be incompatible with dialectical holism. 
Since he makes no further use of ‘information processing’, something else would be needed 
to validate a dialectical holist appeal to the FAP.  
Putting the above speculations aside, despite Harris’s stern and repeated assertion that 
there must be a culmination to the explicative process, recent observations paint a much more 
desolate view of the universe’s evolutionary future. 
At t≈1 second, the Standard Model describes the universe as filled with matter and radiation, 
where the latter initially has much higher energy density. Because the energy density of radiation 
                                                
102 Harris was particularly dismissive of AI. He holds that some commit an equivocation between “the 
manipulation of ‘bits’ of information by mechanical means” of computers with the “self-reflective reason” of 
‘rational thinking’ (1991, p. 156). He claims that there is no evidence that AI can achieve the latter even if it one 
day writes its own programs, correct errors, and reproduces. This issue concerning the criteria of consciousness 
is a digression at this point and will have to wait until Part IV for further consideration. 
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dilutes more rapidly than that of matter, the initial radiation-dominated phase is followed by a 
matter-dominated phase that extends until the present. Current observations indicate the presence 
of “dark energy” […] with properties like a Λ term. Supposing these are correct, in the future the 
universe will eventually transition to a dark-energy-dominated phase of exponential expansion, 
given that the energy density of a Λ does not dilute at all with expansion (Smeenk 2013, p. 612). 
Although this principle was important to Harris, when we consider his faulty reasoning, I 
maintain that beyond this point it adds nothing to an understanding of his system that cannot 
be gained by an analysis of teleology. Hence, I set the FAP aside and move on to an analysis 
of the latter topic that will take center stage in the discussions to follow.  
 
4.5 The Teleological Anthropic Principle 
The teleological anthropic principle (TAP) states “[t]here exists one possible Universe 
'designed' with the goal of generating and sustaining 'observers’” (Barrow & Tipler, p. 22). 
Following Aristotle, the telos or ‘final cause’ is that “for the sake of which a thing is done” 
(Physics 2.3). This means that an end goal directs a series of events as their superordinate 
purpose. Here, the means is not necessarily important, only the result or end product. Though 
the Aristotelian view of nature held sway for nearly two thousand years, with the rise of 
Newtonian physics in the early 18th century, nature was reduced to a chain of efficient 
causation with no room for purpose.103 For many authors, the TAP is either immediately 
dismissed for its unwarranted appeal to ‘design’, or invoked to support such design. Inherent 
in Harris’s conception of the dialectical whole is a specific brand of teleology that does not 
require Godly intervention, and if adequately understood, provides complete insight into the 
structure of his metaphysics. 
From those who address the TAP, a number of objections have recently arisen.  
 
(i) Teleology is unscientific on the grounds that it posits some future event that causes a 
present or past event.  
                                                
103 However, Newton himself can be understood to have invoked a curious version of the TAP with his belief 
that god was required to ‘wind up the universe’ from time to time so as to keep it from ending in gravitational 
catastrophe. This we must find just a bit ironic considering the philosophico-historical application of his physics 
that excludes any but efficient causation, objective observation, and mechanistic explanation. 
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(ii) Teleology depends upon an external force that guides material processes to a desired 
end.104 
(iii) Positing purpose to inorganic and non-conscious processes is anthropocentric and 
ignores firmly established explanations of efficient causation in modern science.  
 
If Harris (or a subsequent dialectical holist) is to justify teleology, adequate responses to the 
above concerns must therefore be provided. Invoking a brand of teleology derived from Kant 
and Hegel, Harris clearly dismisses the first two concerns: “Explanation would be 
‘teleological’ if it made the parts of a whole intelligible in terms of the organizing principle 
that constituted them a totality, or processes understandable in terms of the dynamic system to 
which they belonged” (1965, p. 262). Denying (i), he maintains that in his teleology, the 
principles that direct the activity “are not to be identified wholly with the final event in any 
series of effects” (1965, p. 262).  
With regard for (ii), Harris disputes super-natural determination by holding, “[i]t is the 
immanence of the principle of order in the parts of a structured whole that constitutes its 
teleology” (1991, p. 168). Importantly, when Harris says the parts are explained “in terms of 
the whole”, he means a “teleological process is one in which the whole being generated 
determines the stages by which it comes to maturity. It is a process directed by the organizing 
principle of the whole” (1991, p. 27). Possible forms, relations, etc., are considered implicit 
throughout the evolutionary process, which renders the whole “inadequate” at each stage until 
its possible forms become actual. Like the completion of a painting, the development of a 
seed into a tree, an embryo into an adult, or the enactment of a musical score, for Harris the 
aim is not the final state, “but the symphonic whole” (1991, p. 168). What these metaphors 
purportedly exemplify is that “the activity is the goal in the making, and the goal is what the 
activity is all the time generating” (2000, p. 135).105 Harris’s TAP therefore maintains that 
some set of later (or higher level) laws and their corresponding material systems (e.g. life) are 
determined by the Concrete Universal.  
                                                
104 On this point Bostrom (2002) points out a seeming inconsistency in that “anthropic reasoning could rather be 
said to be anti-theological and anti-teleological, since it holds up the prospect of an alternative explanation for 
the appearance of finetuning…” (p. 48). 
105 Particularly relevant for later discussions, concerning teleological description more generally construed, 
Harris contends that if “a process is teleological in the sense described, no explanation will be complete that 
omits the principle regulating its variations and its course as a whole, or that overlooks the structural totality it is 
generating” (2000, p. 138). 
	   136	  
At this point it warrants further emphasizing that extending Bohm’s ontology into 
cosmology almost completely mirrors Harris’s TAP. Bohm holds that a “super-implicate 
order” unfolds into “an infinite number of levels” that “objectively and self-actively 
differentiates and organizes itself into independent sub-wholes, while determining how these 
are interrelated to make up the whole” (Bohm 1987b, p. 46). Harris adds that the Universe 
“must tend to explicate itself in and as an intelligent experience” (1991, p. 28). In this way, 
teleological explanation is invoked not in the sense of causation by a final state, but rather, by 
progressing through a scale there is a “satisfaction” in having made the process complete. As 
Harris’s response to (iii) is the most complex however, consideration of this concern will 
have to wait until chapter 5. I next introduce Tegmark’s mathematical universe hypothesis 
(MUH) so as to bring to the fore a number of issues latent in Harris’s TAP. 
 
4.5.1 Level IV Multiverse 
With the Level IV multiverse we must confront one of the oldest debates in philosophy, 
between the Aristotelian and Platonic interpretations of reality. According to the Aristotelian, 
mathematical formalisms are merely abstract approximations to reality. On the other hand, 
the Platonist views formal systems such as hypothetical laws, functions, sets, spaces, and 
operators, as actual. While Tegmark aims to defend this Platonic view as it applies to the 
mathematical formalisms that describe non-actual worlds, Harris has attempted to subsume 
Platonic and empirical theses within his own metaphysics. Arguing from the mathematical 
notion of equivalence Tegmark proposes the MUH: 
if some mathematical equations completely describe both our external physical reality and a 
mathematical structure, then our external physical reality and the mathematical structure are one 
and the same, and then the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis is true: our external physical reality 
is a mathematical structure (2014b, p. 217).  
In addition to endorsing this hypothesis, Tegmark maintains that every sufficiently coherent 
mathematical system is identical to a universe. The resulting set of universes is the ‘Level IV 
multiverse’.  
Importantly, by appealing to the Level IV multiverse, Tegmark maintains there is no 
distinction between mathematical (MSE) and physical (PSE) structures. The Level IV 
multiverse subsumes the previous multiverses (Levels I-III), since it entails that all exists as 
mathematical structures. By implication, as long as our statements are mathematically 
consistent, we are describing structures of reality; the question is whether we are describing 
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our world or another because across Level IV universes, “even the fundamental laws are 
different” (p. 250). Level IV multiverses contain alternative mathematical structures, what is 
possible is no longer limited to what we presently deem logically consistent.106  
Here Ellis (2007a) poses a valuable criticism that in discussing the Universe, any mention 
of probability becomes deeply problematic (p. 1218). He claims that in order to discuss a 
multiverse we first need to define the possibility space, which “means making some kind of 
assumptions about physics and geometry that will then apply across the whole family of 
models considered possible in the multiverse, and excluding all other possibilities” (p. 1260). 
He contends, we would need “a distribution function f(m) of actually realized universes” (p. 
1261, emphasis in original) and it is currently unclear how or if we will ever have access to 
such information. Consequently he considers the multiverse an untestable philosophical 
proposal and not a scientific theory. 
Direct observations cannot prove or disprove that a multiverse exists, for the necessary causal 
relations allowing observation or testing of their existence are absent. Their existence cannot be 
predicted from known physics, because the supposed causal or pre-causal processes are either 
unproven or indeed untestable. However some self-consistency conditions for specific multiverse 
models can be tested (p. 1263, emphasis omitted). 
While Ellis’s contention would be welcomed by Harris and appears well warranted with 
regard for Levels II and III, at Level IV this criticism loses traction. One powerful but 
counterintuitive argument in support of Level IV also replies to Harris’s requirement of 
parsimony. Concerning elegance and simplicity, Tegmark contends an entire ensemble of 
universes is simpler than any one of its members:  
The algorithmic information content in a number is, roughly speaking, the length of the shortest 
computer program that will produce that number as output […] the set can be generated by a 
trivial computer program, whereas a single number can be hugely long. Therefore the whole set is 
actually simpler (2007, p. 123). 
He goes on to say that the “lesson is that complexity increases when we restrict our attention 
to one particular element in an ensemble, thereby losing the symmetry and simplicity that 
were inherent in the totality of all the elements taken together” (ibid). Tegmark maintains that 
Level I removes our need to specify initial conditions, while at Level II we no longer need to 
                                                
106 In this way, the Level IV multiverse subsumes and goes considerably beyond David Lewis’s (1986) modal 
realism, the main difference being that Lewis’ worlds are all spatiotemporal, whereas Tegmark’s need not be. 
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specify physical constants, and Level IV requires no specification at all, i.e. there is no 
difference between mathematical possibility and true existence.107  
The Level IV multiverse hereby provides a means of bypassing Ellis’s concern that 
multiverse theories are philosophy rather than physics since mathematical possibility is 
reality. Moreover, Tegmark avoids what I have previously dubbed the MPF – concerning the 
unjustified conflation of metaphysical and physical structures – by maintaining that our task 
is to identify the maximally stable set of mathematical structures obtaining within our 
universe (i.e. our cosmic postal address) (2014, p. 253). Although this would clearly hold an 
important role for the WAP as outlined above, Tegmark’s response to the TAP requires 
further elucidation.  
 
4.5.2 Teleological Anthropic Reasoning 
What has been key (albeit implicit) throughout the present and previous chapters is the 
need to posit a synthetic form beyond what is observable that accounts for the regularity of 
(and our relation to) all observable phenomena. Discussing the balance between necessary 
and excessive metaphysical postulation, in Bangu’s (2013) final analysis he advocates for 
Wigner’s superprinciple (or “principles of invariance”): “That is, just as the laws constrain 
what events might take place in the world, such a superprinciple would constrain or determine 
the laws – in other words, it would have the role of a meta-law which would somehow 
explain the laws” (Bangu, p. 311). In his own words, Nobel laureate, Eugene Wigner 
asserted:  
 
it is hard, if not impossible, to believe that the laws of nature should have such complexity as 
implied by four or five different types of interactions between which no connection, no analogy, 
can be discovered. 
                                                
107 Davies (2008) cautions against the typical method of positing a multiverse that contains some biofriendly 
subspace within which our parameter(s) X obtain(s). While a future theory might render all parameters “fixed” 
so they have no freedom to vary independently, “a final theory that contained no free parameters would be a 
curve in the M-dimensional space that would pass through the biofriendly volume. This curve would define a 
particular multiverse model, being the ensemble of universes corresponding to the points on the curve. A 
different curve would define a different multiverse model characterized by a different final theory” (pp. 110-11). 
Requiring an explanation for why our curve takes on biofriendly values it does, Davies claims we are liable to 
posit a series of such curves, thus shifting “the problem up one level, changing the question from Why this 
universe? to Why this multiverse?” (p. 111). Interestingly, the MUH is immune to this problem.    
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It is natural, therefore, to ask for a superprinciple which is in a similar relation to the laws of 
nature as these are to the events. The laws of nature permit us to foresee events on the basis of the 
knowledge of other events; the principles of invariance should permit us to establish new 
correlations between events, on the basis of the knowledge of established correlations between 
events (1963, p. 10). 
 
It is from Wigner’s proposal that contemporary discussions of meta-laws have developed. 
Harris (1954; 1965) appears to have independently posited its analogue in the form of his 
Concrete Universal, the philosophical implications of which guide his entire metaphysics. 
Harris holds that however conceived, the overarching form of Nature and its component 
worlds “can be imagined only on the basis of what we already know. If they can be imagined 
at all, and if they can be legitimately postulated, the Anthropic Principle is relevant to them in 
the same way as it is relevant to the region that we inhabit and the epoch in which we live” 
(1991, p. 11). As a result, he claims this makes “any such Anthropic Principle applicable to 
our world automatically applicable to the Universe of which it is inevitably a part” (ibid). At 
first glance this means that just as we expect to observe our world from a life-habitable 
spacetime location, so too we should expect to find ourselves in a life-habitable Universe. 
More importantly however, Harris is not maintaining that if there are many, all universes will 
necessarily give rise to life. Indeed citing prevalence of life (whether high or low) is a red 
herring concerning Harris’s TAP. Harris means to argue that even if we admit such a 
multiverse mostly devoid of intelligent observers, what matters is identifying the unifying 
principles therein, those that have been necessitated by the presumed Concrete Universal.  
As Ellis (2007b) points out, in discussing the multiverse we make a set of assumptions, the 
most important of which is the (either explicit or implicit) posit of a meta-law that provides a 
space of possibilities within which our observed universe obtains: “The very description of 
the space M of possibilities is based on an assumed set of […] meta-laws that determine the 
laws of physics” (p. 390). In another work Ellis (2007a) adds however that the concept of a 
unique law of physics that applies only to one object is “questionable” (p. 1217). This is 
because unlike effective laws, this law cannot be deduced from anything else, meaning the 
Universe is not a class of entity that belongs to a larger super-set. So Ellis concludes, “we 
cannot establish higher-level effective laws that apply to all universes and determine their 
structure, as we can at all other levels of the hierarchy of complexes” (2007a, p. 1217). 
Nevertheless, Ellis argues some such superprinciple or meta-law is required to establish 
“regularities of properties across the class of universes” and provide a common “generating 
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mechanism” and causal connection (even if it functions across distributed spacetimes), 
otherwise we could not even describe the Universe, let alone calculate a distribution function 
(2007b, p. 398).  
Tegmark (2014) recognizes that while the different mathematical structures in the Level 
IV multiverse are not connected physically, “at the meta-level” they bear a range of important 
relations. “For example […] one can be the combination of others […] one structure can in a 
sense describe another: the elements in the first structure can correspond to the relations in the 
second, and relations in the first can describe what happens when you combine relations in 
the second” (p. 254). Conveniently, “initial conditions” are rejected because a ToE positing 
that everything just “started out” in an unspecified state is considered an incomplete 
description (p. 262). Responding to Ellis’s worry regarding our requirement of a distribution 
function, according to the MUH, “physical reality is a mathematical structure that is 
completely specified” by its place within what Tegmark calls a “master list” of all possible 
(computable) structures (ibid). This implies the Universe could “be simulated by quite a short 
computer program”, and if our world is such a computable structure, then “these 
computations don’t evolve our Universe, but describe it by evaluating its relations” (p. 269). 
Evidetly this atemporal conception of mathematical realism conflicts with Harris’s process 
ontology, but the issue of teleology remains to be seen.  
Towards this end, it is instructive to briefly consider Lange’s (2009) eloquent metaphor for 
discussing laws of nature. The laws, he maintains, fail to supervene on the Humean mosaic 
(local matters of fact), just as  
the rules of a game fail to supervene on the moves that are actually made on one occasion (or 
every occasion) when the game is played. If neither player ever castles in the course of a game 
like chess, for instance, then the moves they make leave undetermined whether castling was 
permitted (p. 52).  
Lange maintains that laws can be externally related such that some may never be instantiated, 
while others could have been counterfactually absent without influencing the Universe.108 
The dialectical holist would immediately take issue with both claims of unrealized 
possibilities on one hand and counter-factuality of laws on the other. It is important to realize 
                                                
108 For example he argues, “the fundamental dynamical law [F=ma] would still have held, had the world been 
populated by different kinds of forces or different kinds of fundamental particles, or had the strengths of those 
forces or the characteristic properties of those particles been different” (Lange 2009, p. 39). For the dialectical 
holist this demonstrates a clear MPF as per the reasoning of § 4.2.2. 
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that the rules of a chess game supervene upon the superordinate social system to which they 
belong. It is possible therefore to claim that the rook and king could have castled after what 
might have been the only game ever played, but this is only because we can define chess 
through media beyond the bounds of the game, e.g. we can write down possible moves. In the 
case of the concrete Universe, there is nothing external to which counterfactual appeals can 
be made unless one is willing to permit realism about subjunctive (abstract) possibilities.  
For Harris, it is nonsense to consider the counterfactual deletion of laws insofar as these 
laws are dialectically related and serve to explicate the Universe. In his earlier (1965) work 
addressing teleology and counterfactuals Harris argues,  
there are no causal chains but only causal networks and proliferations, and that events are linked 
not in successive pairs but in interlacing complexes. In every case the determining factor is the 
structure of the system, and necessity arises from the impossibility of altering a single nexus 
without subverting the entire system. Not two of the distinguishable relata depend upon 
themselves alone for their relational web. Within this web, and given the law of its construction, it 
is never possible that any nexus could be other than it is and the rest remain the same (p. 475).  
Here, Harris assumes (for now) that the Universe is the total space of dialectical relations 
among its unifying principles or “nexes” (chess pieces and their moves), each dictated by and 
expressions of the Concrete Universal.109  
 Tegmark evidently has no problem maintaining that unrealized moves are possible, 
because for him, there is no difference between possibility and reality – as mathematical 
structures, everything that is possible just is. This however does not in itself respond to 
Harris’s TAP. Getting to the heart of the matter, one of the most interesting implications of 
Tegmark’s MUH is an implicit appeal to dialectical relations, for what amounts to the same 
reasoning as Harris provides above (see § 2.3):  
The MUH solves the infamous infinite regress problem where the properties of nature can only be 
explained from the properties of its parts, which require further explanation, ad infinitum: the 
properties of nature stem not from properties of its ultimate building blocks (which have no 
properties at all), but from the relations between these building blocks (2014b, p. 210). 
Tegmark further claims that according to his MUH, “[r]egardless of whether anything seems 
random to an observer, it must ultimately be an illusion, not existing at the fundamental level, 
because there’s nothing random about a mathematical structure” (2014b, p. 262). If this is to 
                                                
109 Much more will be discussed regarding such issues in chapter 5 below, which will focus upon arguments for 
the explicative process and its constituent scales respectively. 
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say that such structures are necessitated given the form of the system within which they 
obtain, then Tegmark’s MUH may inevitably support Harris’s notion of teleology. 
In sum, four important points should be remembered: for Harris’s TAP, it is irrelevant 
whether (i) intelligent observers are described as a natural kind, mathematical structure, etc.; 
or if (ii) any, all, or none of the respective multiverses obtain; (iii) what matters is whether 
observers may be characterized as unifying principles and thereby bear a dialectical 
relationship to the (heretofore presumed) Concrete Universal. What remains to be examined 
concerning Tegmark’s system is whether he does indeed posit consciousness as one such 
‘structure’ in a manner similar to Harris’s ‘unifying principles’ – an issue to which I return in 
chapter 8. (iv) Nevertheless, dialectical holism takes issue with Tegmark’s claim that it is 
possible to establish our cosmic postal address, because the former camp cannot endorse the 




The above overview of Harris’s appeal to AR has brought to the fore a number of issues 
with import for the philosophies of science and mind. In spite of his apparent disregard for the 
multiverse, § 4.2 reveals that Harris’s conception of the Concrete Universal actually supports 
at least the level II multiverse theory, in that each bubble of chaotic inflation may be 
governed by their own principle of order. While level I and II multiverses might be 
unavoidable if chaotic inflation is an accurate theory, these levels nonetheless imply our 
reliance upon the WAP. Following Harris, as our ESE confounds our ability to make large-
scale claims regarding the nature of our universe, unverifiable projections of theoretical 
structure (MSE) onto nature-as-a-whole become necessary on both scientific and 
philosophical grounds. Working from this foundation however entails a great limitation on 
how we individuate the constants of nature, meaning their counterfactual multiplication and 
alteration on a theoretical basis cannot be justified on a phenomenological basis – thereby 
resulting in the MPF.  
Although Harris’s reasoning concerning the orthodox PAP is demonstrably at odds with 
the rest of his system, in § 4.3 I have attempted to show that his reasoning supports a weaker 
                                                
110 This clearly creates significant demands on how (if at all) the dialectical holist can establish mind’s ontic 
relation to the cosmos. I return to this issue in chapter 8 below. 
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‘phenomenological’ version of the PAP. I have shown that the level III multiverse is 
discarded on Harris’s account and indeed the majority of his system supports Bohmian QT. 
Accordingly, the observers’ inability to exhaustively account for their selection effect(s) 
makes it impossible to coherently conceive of the Universe independent of our biased relation 
to it   (∃R). Positing a universe in which this relation is void undermines the coherence of at 
least AE epistemology, i.e. such a universe is meaningless. The resulting reflexivity of mind 
and Universe thus justifies the PAP on epistemic grounds. The question remains open 
however as to whether this reflexivity can be ontologically interpreted to provide a full PAP.  
The above analysis has shown that none of the multiverse theories pose a significant 
challenge to Harris’s AR: regardless of whether a particular multiverse obtains, it is irrelevant 
in the face of his TAP. 111 In this vein, it no longer matters whether we describe the essence of 
the world to be mathematical or material, what matters is rather what unifying principles can 
be identified. For Harris, the Concrete Universal is expressed as the full space of forms that 
are instantiated and (as will be discussed below) he argues consciousness is one such form. 
Concerning the level IV multiverse, I have shown that despite his Platonic sympathies, 
Tegmark’s implicit appeal to dialectical relations can be interpreted such that Harris’s TAP is 
inevitable. Given the above, Harris’s TAP may be the simplest and most fundamental 
(foundation for) what Barrow has called a cosmological transfiguration. As Harris aims to 
establish his theory in ontological terms however, his reasoning for how the development of 
unifying principles may be empirically observed and theoretically justified must be critically 
assessed. The remainder of this thesis is devoted to this task. Towards this end, in Part III I 
consider a range of contemporary theories concerning cosmological and biological evolution 










                                                
111 For a summary of the resulting TAP see the below appendix  § III-d.  
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Chapter 5 




In opposition to the classical paradigm that considers both knowledge and nature to be 
ultimately composed of externally related basic entities, Harris proposes a framework of 
process, dialectical relations, and a self-directed series of irreducible unifying principles. 
These principles characterize a metaphysics that he claims to most adequately account for 
self-organization in contemporary sciences. In Part III I discuss how a number of disparate, 
though mutually informing contemporary theories can further elucidate Harris’s original 
proposal for the nature of evolution (E).  
In this chapter I examine in greater detail Harris’s conception of cosmic evolution that he 
claims follows from the postulate of the Concrete Universal in support of his TAP. In § 5.2, I 
begin with a sketch of Harris’s conception of cosmogenesis as characterized by self-
organization. In the following sub-sections I asses how Harris’s reasoning dovetails with 
various contemporary metaphysical and scientific theories. In § 5.3, Harris’s arguments for 
the scale of forms will be critically examined and updated in light of current theories of 
chaos, complexity, and emergence. My aim in this section, as in the previous sections, is to 
develop a sympathetic reading of Harris’s system and demonstrate the extent to which he 
anticipated contemporary works. The primary questions to be considered in these sections are 
as follows:  
 
(1) What current theories support Harris’s conception of E?  
(2) What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a scale in Harris’s 
system? 
(3) To what extent do Harris’s depictions of E and the scale of forms provide an adequate 
conceptual bridge from cosmological to biological evolution?  
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5.2 Cosmogenesis (E) 
As discussed above, Harris begins his depiction of cosmic evolution by positing a single 
“field”, or “matrix”. He claims that as the field expands, it differentiates into a series of 
contrasting forces that further manifest as a range of waves and particles, energy and matter 
(1991, p. 42). Harris claims that atomic physics “shows individuation to be secondary to 
system.” In this case, what Harris means by “individuation” is that the differentiation of a 
system into respective forms is always the result of some pre-existing order. He goes on to 
argue that “if the principle of organization is prior to the discrimination of units, what 
produces order cannot possibly be the random shuffling of those units” (1965, pp. 148-49). In 
a later work he elaborates this contention:  
The whole, with its principle of structure is, therefore, prior to the parts. It is the universal or 
pervasive influence of this structural principle that makes the distinguishable and diverse elements 
what they are, that determines their relations to one another, and adjusts one of them reciprocally 
to every other. It is the universal principle which the differentiations are manifestations or (as we 
shall shortly see more convincingly) exemplifications (1987, p. 143).  
By reductio he reasons, “a possible world without physical laws could be conceived […] 
even if it were total chaos”, but to do so would “strain the meaning of possibility intolerably; 
for […] pure chaos is a self-destructive notion, chaos being always parasitic on order of some 
kind…” (1991, p. 50). In earlier works Harris develops these ideas more fully, arguing that 
the more frequently order is reversed, the more random or chaotic the system: “as the 
frequency increases to infinity so the continuum approaches homogeneity” (1970, p. 325). He 
goes on to claim that complete homogeneity is impossible and order is thus “marked by its 
degree of departure from complete homogeneity” (ibid).112 Identity is by this reasoning based 
upon ‘recurrences’ and ‘periodicities’ within a ‘manifold’, relations that “serve as clues to the 
principle of order fundamental to the structure” (ibid). Consequently, order involves change 
and difference but also requires “some element of sameness, similarity or recurrence” (p. 
326). Harris argues that if we take abstract homogeneity to obtain in nature and thereby 
                                                
112 Interestingly, Harris’s point may be exemplified by the relationship between symmetry and the phenomenon 
of ferromagnetism. As Rosen (2008) describes, “If a magnet is heated, the many small magnets of which it is 
composed become agitated and begin jiggling about erratically. When this happens, the mini-magnets lose their 
common orientation and their axes become randomly distributed. With no preferred orientation, the many 
different orientations can be described as “canceling each other out.” It is this overall absence of difference that 
is said to constitute symmetry” (p. 182). More will be said of this point in the following sections. 
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consider it real, we become victims of what he calls “the fallacy of spurious homogeneity” 
(1965, p. 462). Ultimately then, Harris is identifying total chaos with homogeneity and 
considers it contradictory to attribute such a state to Nature because any conception of Nature 
must involve some principle of order.  
Harris hereby models cosmogenesis as a process by which the prior organization of the 
whole directs the evolution of its respective phases. By this reasoning, being and non-being 
are empty concepts when considered independently. This demands “Being” be reconsidered 
as “a dynamic and not a static concept, and in its dynamic opposition and interchange with 
nonbeing it issues as Becoming” (1987, p. 174). By “Becoming” Harris means “subsumation” 
(1965, p. 283), “sublation” (1987, p. 180), or “Aufheben” (1993, ff. p. 50), a genesis of 
increasingly complex systems over cosmic history guided by a “nisus” akin to “Spinoza’s 
doctrine of the conatus in suo esse perseverare” (1965, p. 154): 
the advance seems constantly to result from a kind of self-enfoldment of the simpler form: if a 
field of force (energy) is curvature in space, matter is a higher degree of such curvature – a 
superposition of curvatures […] – and the atom is a convolution of fields – the bending in upon 
itself of the wave-packet which constituted the electron around the complication of nuclear fields 
(ibid).  
To Harris’s mind, the series from energy to matter, from the simplest to the most 
complicated molecules, demonstrates a continuous differentiation and merging of opposites: 
“each develops from and incorporates its predecessor […] energy (waves) opposed to matter 
(particles), which nevertheless overlap as wave packets, proton (positive) opposed to electron 
(negative), each excluding yet complementary to the other” (1988, pp. 58-59). In this way, 
considering the numerous kinds of atom, molecules, and chemical compounds, he holds that 
each step of the series “is not only more complex but also more comprehensive in content 
than its predecessor” (1965, p. 154).113 For Harris, all events within the Universe are to be 
understood as “the infinitely various specific manifestations of the principles of order implicit 
in this whole – that is, of the laws of physics – and the temporal process is simply the self-
differentiation of the whole" (1988, p. 58). These passages are key because they show that for 
Harris, rather than existing eternally, laws emerge through cosmogenesis.  
                                                
113 An example that Harris finds in support of his case is the versatility of carbon, second only to hydrogen, that 
forms an astonishing number of compounds. This is significant, Harris claims, because carbon is capable of 
storing more information than any other element and “the generation and reproduction of information is the 
essential characteristic of life” (1991, p. 56).  
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Although contemporary science has not yet identified the supposed nisus, Harris finds that 
recent discoveries depict “a gamut of evolving physical forms, that manifestly grow out of 
one another in increasing complexity in a manner which demands explanation in terms of 
some persistent tendency toward self-enfoldment, self-differentiation and self-elaboration” 
(1965, p. 155). In other words, Harris argues the genesis of diverse forms and processes 
within the Universe requires teleological explanation because each is the consequence of the 
whole preforming some function upon itself. At the time, Harris suspected the “proper 
science” to study the underlying “teleological mechanisms” that drives the explication of 




By this reasoning, Harris attempts to establish a continuum, a common language from 
particles differentiation to social complexity. On this account there will be identifiable 
dynamics underlying evolutionary processes at every spatiotemporal scale in virtue of their 
common source, namely the function of the Concrete Universal (E). If Harris is correct, then 
cosmic evolution will demonstrate a propensity for self-organization and enfoldment of one 
element or system into the next, on a trajectory of increasing complexity towards life and 
Figure 3 – Aperiodic quasicrystal. To understand this account it is helpful to set aside the well-known 
model of the universe exploding outward and instead, to imagine one system undergoing a kind of self-
differentiation as an ever widening range of structures/processes manifest upon its topology. In line with 
Harris’s reference to Escher’s plane division (1987, ff. p. 140) and his appeal to these same structures 
above (§ 3.3), quasicrystals provide a useful means of visualizing E. In aperiodic quasicrystals, 
identifiable 2 and 3D patterns (like the above) can be projections from a higher 6D structure (Steurer & 
Deloudi, 2009 ff. p. 61). For Harris (in line with Bohm), in the case of Nature, the totality of this higher 
dimensional process remains hidden from view. Penrose tiling recreated with permission from Jos Leys:  
http://www.josleys.com/show_image.php?galid=238&imageid=7197. 
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mind. This however remains to be seen. In the following sections I consider responses to 
Harris’s thesis from the contemporary philosophy of complex systems. 
 
5.2.1 Metaphysical Implications of GST 
To what extent is Harris’s metaphysical posit of E supported by contemporary conceptions 
of cosmic evolution? A brief examination of the metaphysical underpinnings of AE may 
reveal further clarification of Harris’s approach. Opposed to the classical view that finds low-
level efficient causation sufficient to provide exhaustive explanations of all phenomena, an 
increasing number of general systems theorists have maintained that such reductivism has 
serious limitations (Hooker, 2011). They instead find it necessary to appeal to formal and 
final causation (discussed below) in the analysis of complex and non-linear systems. If this 
kind of reasoning can be extrapolated to the universe at large (the topic of § 5.2.2), Harris’s 
conception of teleology could find significant theoretical and empirical support.  
In establishing the philosophical basis of enactivism, Thompson (2007) appeals to 
complex systems theory and argues for a form of holism not dissimilar from Harris’s. 
Thompson contends that emergence through collective self-organization has two aspects: 
“One is local-to-global determination, as a result of which novel macro-level structures and 
processes emerge. The other is global-to-local determination whereby global structures and 
processes constrain local interactions” (p. 61). Thompson bases AE in terms of “emergent 
process” rather than “emergent properties” because, he reasons 
it does not make sense to say that a property emerges, but only that it comes to be realized, 
instantiated, or exemplified in a process or entity that emerges in time. Emergence is a temporal 
process, but properties (whether considered as universal or as linguistic abstractions) are 
atemporal) (p. 418).  
On Thompson’s view, emergent processes are part of networks whose “coupled elements 
have nonlinear interactions” that are “nonadditive or nonproportional”, producing “systems 
whose activities cannot be derived aggregatively from the properties of their components” (p. 
419). For Thompson, complex systems are non-decomposable, such that parts emerge from 
the whole, but the whole also depends upon the relations of its parts through time.  
However, Thompson considers downward causation a misnomer. As introduced above (§ 
2.3.1), rather than lower level entities being affected by higher, there is what Thompson calls 
“dynamic co-emergence”, in which “part and whole co-emerge and mutually specify each 
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other” (2007 p. 431).114 In complex systems however, there is “reflexive global-to-local 
influence that happens in a system that has dynamic global coherence in and through 
collective self-organization” (p. 434). Hence, in this scheme, the emphasis is on self-
organization as a global function that both emerges from and also constrains the 
spatiotemporal relations of its composition (e.g. Thomson cites attractors p. 419).  
Examining the metaphysical implications of GST, Bishop (2011) clearly endorses a 
metaphysical view akin to Thompson’s, arguing that the “analysis of determinism in complex 
systems is complicated by the fact that there are additional forms of causation arising in such 
systems that must be taken into account” (p. 125). To this end he explains that “in complex 
systems the formation of control hierarchies often comes about when a new form of dynamics 
arises that exhibits downward constraint on system constituents and is self-sustaining…” (p. 
127). Like Harris, Bishop further realizes the unfortunate tendency of analytic philosophers to 
completely ignore the formal in preference for efficient causation. Such ignorance he adds, 
misses many of the dynamical relations relevant to complex systems analysis. For example, 
concerning laws of nature, he argues we should not appeal to either efficient or formal 
causation as primary in our explanations. Rather, in accordance with a relational scheme: 
“Sound explanations of complex systems are likely to involve both appeals to causal 
mechanisms and ordering/constraining structure via the interrelationships among the lower-
level and higher-level dynamics” (p. 130). Again, he maintains “[h]ierarchies and wholes in 
complex systems act to constrain or direct the possibilities made available by lower-level 
laws as opposed to somehow violating those laws” (ibid).  
Given the above, Silberstein’s (2009) contention that AE essentially relies upon OSR 
appears vindicated. Indeed, AE’s appeal to complexity renders relations, rather than entities 
of a particular scale, as fundamental. More specifically however, both AE and Harris appear 
to side with McKenzie’s (2014a) revision of OSR, where “fundamentality” in the philosophy 
of physics is granted neither to structures (abstract symmetry relations) nor to their relata 
(kinds of physical entity): “If we conceptualize priority in terms of ontological dependence, 
then, rather than symmetries being more fundamental than particles the two seem to be on an 
                                                
114 “A dynamical system is a collection of interdependent variables that change in time. The state of the system 
at any time t is defined by the values of all the variables at that time; it can be represented by a position in an 
abstract ‘state space’, whose coordinates are the values of all the variables at t. The system’s behavior consists of 
transitions between states and is described geometrically by a trajectory in the state space, which corresponds to 
the consecutive positions the system occupies as time passes” (Cosmelli, et al. 2007, pp. 733-34). 
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ontological par” (p. 1101). She goes on to conclude that this latter assessment should sit well 
with those whose “hunch is that physical symmetries cannot exist independently of physical 
objects—any more than that there can be laws of nature without anything to behave in 
accordance with them” (ibid). Likewise, Wolkenhauer et al. (2011) state, “[i]n systems theory 
objects and relations between objects have identical ontological status” (p. 355). 
For AEs and Harris however, this position is motivated by a prior appeal to dialectical 
relations and process ontology.115 As Capra clarifies, in systems theory neither structures nor 
relations correspond to independent units in the world, rather “every structure is seen as the 
manifestation of underlying processes” (2014, p. 81). Likewise, according to Thompson,  
there is no bottom level of basic particulars with intrinsic properties that upwardly determines 
everything else. Everything is process all the way “down” and all the way “up”, and processes are 
irreducibly relational – they exist only in patterns, networks, organizations, configurations, or 
webs (2007, p. 440).  
Here Thompson is claiming that according to systems theory, nature is composed of co-
emerging structures and irreducible relational processes with no fundamental level. Bickhard 
(2011) has agreeably argued that complex systems theory relies upon process metaphysics. In 
agreement with Harris’s contention that chaos presupposes order, Bickhard argues “process 
has whatever causal powers that it does in part in virtue of its organization […] organization 
cannot be delegitimated as a potential locus of causality without eliminating causality from 
the universe” (p. 95). Consequently, Bickhard maintains that in physics fields are granted 
primacy over particles and as a result, any “return to a substance or particle framework is 
precluded by the empirical confirmation of multiple non-localities, and dynamic space-time 
and vacuum effects. Such phenomena are not consistent with the local independence and 
fixedness of particles and substances” (p. 97). By turning to a process metaphysic, he 
maintains, many of our traditional assumptions concerning boundaries and individuation are 
brought into question. Informed by the analysis of complex systems, “boundaries that do 
exist, or are at least posited, must be explained in terms of their natures, origins, and forms of 
maintenance” (p. 98). Extrapolating this view to the cosmos would therefore mean endorsing 
Bickhard’s contention that a “process metaphysic” is not only central to systems theory but 
“is arguably the only framework that offers a viable orientation for the scientific future” (p. 
102). 
                                                
115  For an introduction to process philosophy, see Seibt (2013).  
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This brief overview of the metaphysical commitments of systems theory has provided 
further illumination of the commonalities between AE and Harris. In this framework, the 
emphasis is on formal-governance and self-organization (or constraint and co-emergence). 
The upshot is that – in opposition to classical conceptions – contemporary science reveals that 
nature does not consist of “basic particulars”, but rather “fields and processes”, which implies 
that understanding self-organization is no less important than understanding efficient 
causation. Under this paradigm the cosmos as a whole is regarded as being a self-organizing 
system such that each form that develops is determined by and is a reflection of the whole, 
yet this does not conflicts with the efficient causation of local interactions.116 I maintain that 
this “constraint” on efficient causation may be identified with what Harris calls “nisus”. 
Harris therefore appears to have foreshadowed in his metaphysics how the now well-
established conceptions of GST can be applied to the Universe as a whole. If this is right, a 
plausible way of vindicating Harris’s TAP would be to argue that if some sufficient criteria of 
complex systems (e.g. Bishop, p. 112; Yin, et al. 2011, p. 404) can be extrapolated to the 
Universe, it would be reasonable to posit such governance upon the evolution of its 
constituent forms (E).117 What remains to be seen however, is support from cosmologists and 
physicists that the evolution of the universe can and should be understood as such a self-
determining complex system. 
 
5.2.2 Empirical Evidence for E: Towards an Enactivist Cosmology 
According to Harris’s metaphysics it should be possible to identify common principles 
guiding the evolution of complexity in both living and nonliving systems. In this section I 
consider two theories in particular that may serve this end: Karakin’s (2011) self-organizing 
fractal theory (SOFT) and Brender’s (2013) appeal to symmetry breaking. I show: (i) that 
these works provide empirical support for Harris’s original conception of cosmic evolution; 
(ii) these works reveal a number of cosmological consequences implied by AE metaphysics as 
outlined in the previous section. 
                                                
116 Indeed this thesis further agrees with Gunn’s (2011) contention that fundamentally matter is “pneumatical”, 
which he defines as self-moving, holistic, and self-creating. While much of his argument would lend support for 
Harris’s thesis at this point, Gunn’s extensive analysis of the history of philosophy of physics is too technical for 
anything but a passing recognition of the evident parallel between their respective works. 
117 See the below appendix § IV for a summary of this reasoning considering the universe as a complex system. 
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Kurakin begins by considering an apparent conflict between the second law of 
thermodynamics and the evolution of complex systems. He maintains that this conflict only 
exists if we assume that  
the energy/matter comprising the Universe is near equilibrium and that it evolves toward an 
equilibrium state via disorganization and disordering, obeying the laws of equilibrium 
thermodynamics. The conflict disappears, however, if we postulate that the energy/matter making 
up the Universe is far from equilibrium, that it exists as an evolving flow, and that the 
energy/matter flowing through and comprising the Universe evolves from simplicity and disorder 
to complexity and order via self-organization, in accordance with the empirical laws of 
nonequilibrium thermodynamics (Kurakin, p. 2). 
Providing a theoretical foundation for Kurakin’s project, Brender (2013) argues for a 
paradigmatic use of symmetry breaking as a means of explaining the emergence of 
complexity. Here symmetry is considered invariance under transformation, which means the 
greater the transformations that maintain invariance, the greater the symmetry.118 Contrary to 
intuition but in line with Kurakin, greater symmetry does not imply greater order or structure 
but rather a structureless uniformity. Crucially then, form only arises due to a symmetry 
breaking that introduces differences. Disorder, Brender explains, is more symmetrical than 
order: “Thus the question of the genesis of form is not how symmetry arises out of disorder, 
but rather how the symmetry of disorder gets broken in determinate ways to produce the 
characteristic asymmetries of the forms we find in nature” (p. 267). 
Contrary to the classical view that attempts to conceptualize the emergence of form by 
appeal to identity, where each difference is caused by a prior equally complex effect, Brander 
finds this approach inadequate in its linearity and addresses the issue via nonlinear systems 
theory. Here he claims, we can have “the emergence of behaviours that are less symmetrical 
than their causes” (p. 268). The patterns of convection rolls for example, are said to arise ‘for 
free’, not with the addition of some imposed order, but through the ‘subtraction’ of 
symmetries that results in the apparent form. 
In perfect alignment with Brender’s paradigmatic appeal to symmetry breaking, Kurakin 
describes an example wherein a temperature gradient gives rise to self-organizaiton:  
                                                
118 To make his point Brender exemplifies 1. a hexagram, 2. a circle, and 3. a uniform field (homogenous space). 
He maintains that 1-3 increase in symmetry but decrease in rotations and reflections: 1. six reflections, 2. infinite 
reflections, to 3.  unbounded reflections (p. 266).  
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When the temperature gradient is relatively weak, heat propagates from the bottom to the top by 
conduction. Molecules move in a seemingly uncorrelated fashion, and no macro-order is 
discernible. However, once the imposed temperature gradient reaches a certain threshold value, an 
abrupt organizational transition takes place within the liquid layer, leading to the emergence of a 
metastable macroorganization of molecular motion. Molecules start moving coherently, forming 
hexagonal convection cells of a characteristic size. As a result of the organizational transition, 
conduction is replaced by convection, and the rate of energy/matter transfer through the layer 
increases in a stepwise manner (Kurakin, p. 4). 
Importantly, a flow of energy/matter through an open physicochemical system of interacting 
components will “spontaneously” result in the coupling of gradients, which in turn results in a 
self-organizing, non-equilibrium systems (e.g. Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction and Benard 
cells).119 Macrostructure processes that emerge in far-from-equilibrium systems “display both 
configurational dynamics and flow dynamics”, constraints that connect everything within the 
system, mediating its evolution, transformation, and the organization of its internal structures 
(ibid).  
Following this line of reasoning, both Kurakin (2011) and Chaisson (2013) have 
independently made the same point about the evolution of complexity. Chaisson aims to 
defend the thesis that “specific energy flow” itself can help us to understand the nature of 
evolution in general. His working hypothesis is that the energy rate density (ɸm), “the amount 
of energy flowing through a system per unity time and per unit mass” is the most fundamental 
process “capable of building structures, evolving systems, and creating complexity in the 
universe” (p. 71, emphasis omitted). Anticipating Chaisson’s thesis, Kurakin argues that what 
guides the evolution of complex systems is the relationship between the system’s level of 
complexity and rate of energy flow: 
A relatively higher degree of complexity and order requires and, at the same time, supports a 
relatively higher rate of energy/matter flow. Increasing the rate of energy/matter flow normally 
leads to a stepwise increase in relative complexity and order within an evolving nonequilibrium 
system. Conversely, decreasing the rate of energy/matter flow results in organizational relaxation 
via a stepwise decrease in relative complexity and order (p. 4).  
                                                
119 The resulting emergence of global order is due to a self-organized phase transition when the system passes a 
critical threshold of energy/matter flow rate. Theories of emergence and phase transition will be discussed in 
greater detail in §§ 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 respectively. 
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By Chaisson’s analysis, “energy flow as a universal process helps suppress entropy within 
increasingly ordered localized systems evolving amidst increasingly disordered, surrounding 
environments” (p. 73).120 While earlier stars and galaxies demonstrate the lowest energy rate 
densities, our galaxy, the biosphere, and human societies he claims, have the highest known. 
However, despite their lower complexity he finds galaxies have nearly the same degree of 
“adaptability” and “metabolic” capacity as life forms. Chaisson proposes that this theory 
depicts evolution as a “universal phenomenon” and stands as “a unifying principle throughout 
natural science.” He goes on to conclude: 
 
Energy is a common currency; energy rate density (ɸm) generally correlates with system 
complexity and may drive, at least in part, the process of evolution itself. 
Selection and adaptation are ubiquitous in Nature; the emergence, maintenance, and fate of all 
complex systems are often determined, again partly, by their ability to utilize energy (Chaisson, p. 
78). 
 
Kurakin further develops this line of thought in a way that renders Harris’s anticipation 
painfully evident. Kurakin argues that if the “Universe is far from equilibrium”, then the 
evolving flow of energy/matter through the “Universe spontaneously self-organizes into self-
similar (fractal) structures-processes on all scales” (p. 5).121 Moreover, these “scale-specific” 
forms are “interconnected and co-evolve as a nested set of self-organizing and interdependent 
structures-processes” (ibid). Providing a concrete example of what actually undergoes 
symmetry breaking in cosmological evolution, Kurakin proposes a general nonequilibrium 
model of electron transfer (ET). He maintains ET chains can provide “scale-invariant” and 
“universal principles” applicable to any structurally adaptive, living or non-living medium:  
 
                                                
120 Chaisson’s account of ɸm is not unlike David Ingram’s (2007) conception of “entropy management” (p. 103) 
as a framework for understanding a range of phenomena. Incidentally, Ingram – a former graduate student of the 
University of Canterbury – also demonstrated particular sympathy for GST and enactivism more specifically. 
121 Though unnoticed by Kurakin, Smolin (1997) has made a very similar argument: “if there is no time at which 
the universe will come to equilibrium, then it might be useful to view it permanently as a self-organized 
nonequilibrium system” (p. 159). Moreover, and like Harris, this line of reasoning led Smolin to contend that 
life is expected to proliferate throughout the history of the cosmos and that the theoretical underpinnings of this 
self-organization justifies the Gaia theory (discussed in chapter 6). It should be further noted that although cyclic 
cosmologies are usually mutually exclusive, many appear compatible with the basic premise of the Universe as 
an open thermodynamic system, e.g. Rosen’s self-evolving cosmos (2008, p. 206); Penrose’ conformal cyclic 
cosmology (2010, p. 147); and Unger & Smolin’s proposal in natural philosophy (2015).  
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(1) Different environments will favour different ET chains. As a result, environmental and 
internal changes in energy/matter flow will drive the emergence, evolution, and 
adaptation of the ET chains.  
(2) In instances of local relaxation, individual chain components will compete for the 
momentarily viable pathways of the existing chains, which will lead to encouraging 
and/or dissolving the chains that are available.  
(3) Following global relaxation, alternative ET chains will compete until some of the 
chains are optimized for efficient electron transport under the environmental 
circumstances.  
(4) The system of ET as a whole will co-evolve with the constraints of its environment and 
thus, the ET chains that are most efficient, adaptive, and stable will persist. 
Consequently, if the universe is a complex open thermodynamic system, it is expected 
to give rise to new and increasingly complex systems over time (Kurakin, p. 16).  
 
According to Brender, following symmetry breaking to its wider metaphysical conclusions 
provides a means of reconciling our dichotomous conceptions of “being and non-being” as 
well as “form and matter.” He goes on to say, “Being is no longer defined by self-identity, but 
rather by self-differentiation. The opposite of being is not non-being or negation, but rather 
the absence of negation; uniformity or indifference” (p. 269).122 In combination with 
Kurakin’s ET model, Brender’s conception of symmetry-breaking seems to have reconciled 
the apparently paradoxical contention that whole and part arise from each other, while the 
whole is nonetheless prior to the parts. Brender has thus offered a tremendous insight into 
conceptions of Harris’s E and AE’s dynamic co-emergence. However, Brender seems to have 
simply not noticed Harris’s by now, all too familiar warning: It is anti-naturalistic to posit that 
our physical Universe under some condition could have such homogeneity as to be formless 
or absolutely disordered since these terms are abstractions at best and contradictions at worst 
(from §§ 2.2.2 and 5.2). In the following section I examine this issue more closely with 
respect to one way natural order can be conceived in dialectical holism.  
 
                                                
122 If we apply the concept of symmetry breaking to the history of the universe we find one system with high 
symmetry (low order and low entropy) in its early phase, lowest symmetry (highest order and medium entropy) 
in its middle phase, and a return to high symmetry (with low order and high entropy) in its late phase. I thank 
Stephen Pike for helpful discussions on this issue.  
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Implications for the “Law(s) of Nature” 
Although Harris at no point in his works explicitly posits a theory of laws of nature, I 
argue that some very clear implications for how laws ought to be conceived in dialectical 
holism can be derived from what has been said above concerning cosmic evolution. The 
purpose of this section is to assemble some recent works that demonstrate roughly how this 
line of reasoning can run.  
Beginning with the above conception of meta-laws (§§ 3.2 & 4.5), the dialectical holist 
clearly appeals to Ellis’s contention that “laws may depend on the boundary conditions of the 
universe” and the cosmos itself may “influence the nature of local physical laws, rather than 
just their initial conditions” (2007a, p. 1239, emphasis in original).123 Contrary to Descartes’ 
story of an orderly world created out of disorder then (one that would by definition have no 
initial constraints), whatever phenomena arises, requires some kind of prerequisite order and 
must be consistent with the parameters of our universe throughout its history. Ellis calls this 
prerequisite order a possibility space. As novel physical phenomena emerge over the course 
of cosmic history their very existence,  
is allowed by the boundary conditions provided by the universe for local systems, together with 
the possibility space generated by the underlying physics. While their physical existence is novel, 
every new thing that comes into being is foreshadowed in possibility structures that precede their 
existence (2007a, p. 1242, emphasis omitted).  
Interestingly, the Universe is the only system that necessarily sets its own boundary 
conditions with no prior constraints. On the other hand, excluding the presupposition of an 
ordered physical superprinciple or Concrete Universal has permitted physicists like Laurence 
Krouss to conceive A Universe from Nothing (2012). As Vilenkin (2006) has previously 
warned however, the very process of a universe tunneling into existence from nothing would 
be “governed by the same fundamental laws that describe the subsequent evolution of the 
                                                
123 Ellis (2006b) argues that top down action can be seen in the relationship between the Universe as a whole and 
variables like the arrow of time. He argues that the arrow of time is not determined by fundamental physical 
laws but by the boundary conditions at the beginning and end of the universe that “select which solutions of the 
fundamental physical laws are accepted as physically allowed solutions” (p. 90). Ellis reminds however, the 
“reasons underlying the choice between different contingent possibilities for the universe (why one occurred 
rather than another) cannot be explored scientifically. It is an issue to be examined through philosophy or 
metaphysics” (Ellis, 2007a, p. 1236, emphasis omitted).  
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universe” (2006, p. 205).124 It follows, he argues, that the laws must be understood to exist 
“prior to the universe itself.” He goes on to say that without space, time, and matter, the laws 
are expressed in the form of mathematical equations, but the medium of mathematics is the 
mind, and thus we are left with the (unwanted) question of whether mind precedes the 
universe (ibid).  
Though Vilenkin may have gone too far in believing that this line of reasoning results in 
presupposing mind before Nature, it is clear that such speculation must face either some form 
of idealism or an infinite regress. While this kind of reasoning might be permitted by those 
who invoke nomic necessity about laws (e.g. Lange 2009), for Harris and AEs alike, such an 
explanation will not provide scientifically or philosophically satisfying answers concerning 
the origins or nature of complex systems. The reason for this dissatisfaction is that nomic 
theories reduce physical laws to abstract rules that just are the case, independently of both 
observers and matter. As Harris has argued above, in a physical condition of absolute 
disorder no principles, patterns, or laws can obtain. Likewise, a state of perfect symmetry is 
one that lacks all contrasts, patterns, and regularity, i.e. order. To posit a state of Nature is to 
distinguish an instance of order, because positing such a state devoid of order is tantamount to 
saying that Nature is no-thing, or abstract homogeneity. Therefore, nature can never be in, nor 
arise from a state of absolute randomness or perfect symmetry, i.e. disorder presupposes 
order.125 
Harris’s posit of a Concrete Universal is meant to account for this presupposed order. By a 
sympathetic account of Harris’s reasoning, even the highest level of symmetry in nature must 
also be governed by an overarching order that specifies the (concrete) possibility space and 
constrains the process of symmetry breaking that follows. Harris has consistently maintained 
that the 
influence of the universal is transmitted uninterrupted, through forms of growing complication 
and self-enfoldment, along a scale of increasing degrees of adequacy in its exemplification, which 
guarantees that life is the fruition of what is already potentially present in the physical. Its 
                                                
124 Brading & Castellani provide a particular example vindicating Harris’s claim of non-random emergence, 
holding that a theory with constraints involves constraint equations that require initial data and evolution 
equations: “In GTR, four of the ten field equations connect the curvature of the initial data hypersurface with the 
distribution of mass-energy on that hypersurface, and the remaining six field equations are evolution equations. 
To sum up, in a theory with constraints, the initial “disorder” cannot be so disordered after all, but must itself 
satisfy constraints set down by the laws of the theory” (2007a, pp. 1352-53). 
125 For a summary of this argument from absolute chaos, see the below appendix, § IV-a.  
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emergence is simply the continuation of an already-evident tendency to build more integral, more 
versatile, and more self-maintaining wholes (1991, p. 61).  
To my mind, the monistic picture of cosmogenesis that has been laid out thus far leads 
directly to a dialectical holist theory of laws. Supportive of Kurakin’s SOFT and Harris’s 
TAP, Gleiser (2004) proposes his own principle that characterizes just such a theory:  
[T]he set of physical laws is also an emergent property of the cosmos, together with the cosmos 
itself […] it may be meaningless to talk about physical laws before the existence of a physical 
reality where these laws are enacted: I propose that the laws and the material reality they describe 
can only exist together. The emergence of cosmic order may be the result of an optimization 
process rooted on the evolution of complex material structures, resulting from random 
experimentation between form and functionality. The laws we use to describe nature are a 
consequence of this optimization process, not its cause. That is, the only truly fundamental 
principle in nature is that of economy of performance, what could be called a cosmic optimization 
principle, or COP (2004, p. 641). 
In apparent agreement with Harris, Gleiser suggests that a result of this principle is that to 
some (unspecified) degree, the universe could not have been different. For Harris, the reason 
the universe could not have been different is strictly because what obtains ultimately consists 
of material relations – thus it is nonsensical to claim that either the Concrete Universal or its 
constituent material forms/relations can be altered without altering the other.126  
In a number of different works bearing striking resemblance to this line of reasoning, 
Davies has argued that the principle that underlies the evolution of complexity in the universe 
“can be traced to symmetry breaking” (2013, p. 27) overarched by a Cosmic Blueprint, and 
specified into a series of “organizing principles” across a range spatial scales (2004a ff. p. 
152). Davies argues for the “predisposition thesis”: “the laws of nature are such that matter 
will inevitably be led along the road of increasing complexity toward life. In the same vein, 
the existence of intelligence and conscious beings is also regarded as part of a natural 
progression that is somehow built into the laws” (p. 201). Davies likewise claims that this 
theory “receives support from those experiments that show how complexity and organization 
arise spontaneously and naturally under a wide range of conditions” (p. 202). In agreement 
                                                
126 Nevertheless, there remains a possible discrepancy depending on what exactly Gleiser meant by “random.” 
As mentioned above, Harris considered randomness to be something that appears within and between the kinds 
of phenomena that arise, but not among them.  
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with Harris, Davies claims that in a model of this kind, the general pattern of development is 
‘predestined’, but the details are not (ibid).  
Davies’ teleological conclusion depends upon an argument for the non-duality of laws and 
matter. As he has persistently argued "[i]f one accepts the idea of evolving laws then the 
distinction between fundamental and phenomenological laws fades away. As new and ever 
more elaborate physical systems come into existence with time, so might the laws that apply 
to them" (1995, p. 262). His thesis of evolving laws comes from a dissatisfaction with (i) the 
common dualist tendencies to depict laws as the software of physical events; (ii) any 
objectivist picture of nature; and (iii) intuitions that there is a fundamental level to laws of 
nature. "If one were to pursue this as far as cosmology, it would imply that the universe is a 
sort of gigantic feedback system where the laws that apply today depend on the details of 
cosmic history" (p. 263). In this vein, laws are inseparable from the self-organizing systems 
whose regularities they enact.127 
Why should we believe that the non-duality of laws and matter result in what Davies 
(2007) describes as an unavoidable teleology of life and mind (p. 499)? Appealing to analogy 
from cellular automata, Davies argues that the state of a given cell depends not only on the 
state of its neighbour, but also upon the “global state”. He explains that in this scheme, 
“physics and biology co-evolve under the action of a (precise) principle operating at the 
multiverse level, in such a manner that teleological behaviour emerges” (p. 500). A key 
difference between this model and Darwinian evolution is that there is a causal link between 
laws and product states: “Thus life is neither a statistical fluke in an indifferently random set 
of laws/universes, nor is the Universe designed in an ad hoc way for life. Instead, life and 
mind, laws and universe, are common products of an overarching principle” (p. 503). Hence, 
in accordance with the conception of the complex system noted above, he claims there must 
be a “self-consistent, self-supporting loop” between the composite systems and their 
“overarching principle” (ibid). In line with Gleiser’s COP and Harris’s TAP, in a later work 
Davies concludes, it is possible that the state of the world evolves in a way that reflects “law-
like optimality rather than any optimality in the intrinsic property of the states themselves” 
                                                
127  Again, Smolin’s recent work The singular universe and the reality of time, apparently agrees with these 
points: “Laws evolve. Our most important point is that taking laws to be mutable and subject to evolution rather 
than timeless and immutable brings questions as to the choices nature has had to make about which laws govern 
the single universe within the domain of scientific explanation” (2015, p. 358). In this way Smolin, like Davies, 
emphasizes the presupposition of order or ‘choice’ at the level of the universe as a whole, which leads to a 
model of evolving laws of nature. 
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(2013, p. 39). It is in this sense he considers the universe “fine-tuned for life, mind, and 
comprehension…” (ibid). 
Extrapolating the developmentalist perspective (of GST) to its limit, Coffman (2011) has 
articulated a view of laws and causation that is naturalistic, yet anti-reductionistic: 
[T]he ultimate arbiters of causality, the ‘laws of physics’, are themselves no more than 
organizational constraints produced by (and contingent upon) the early development of the 
universe. The causal relationships that define chemistry and biology are more highly specified 
organizational constraints produced by later development (p. 287).128  
More specifically he claims “systems develop within systems that evolve over time, an 
iterative, bootstrapping process wherein the organization that emerges developmentally 
within a given system is constrained by the information (regulatory networks) that developed 
previously in a larger, more general system” (p. 300). These “organizational constraints” 
appear to be analogous to Harris’s unifying principles or scales (to be further discussed in the 
following section).  
Coffman finds that given the evidence, it can be argued that a model of this kind “may 
even characterize the birth of our universe…” (p. 301, emphasis omitted). Consequently, far 
from equilibrium complex systems create autocatalytic cycles that create their own 
evolutionary trajectory by constraining future dynamics at each stage of development. 
Coffman claims, they first  
create information by selectively organizing a system, which in turn establishes attractors that 
constrain the flow of energy toward producing specific outcomes […] this process ultimately 
leads to a senescent state that lays the groundwork for the emergence of new systems that develop 
even higher levels of specification (p. 302, emphasis omitted). 
In line with Harris and Brender’s symmetry breaking, ‘evolution’ Coffman maintains, ‘leads 
to individuation’ and he thus finds it appropriate to invoke Aristotle in summarizing the 
developmentalist perspective of causality: “stochastic events constrained by the 
                                                
128 Interestingly, Coffman defines information as a decrease in symmetry: “that which brings about a reduction 
of uncertainty or indeterminacy. Information is a manifestation of asymmetry (i.e., reduction in degrees of 
freedom, mutuality between events, or expectation of one thing given another, and is the basis of predictability, 
the holy grail of the scientific enterprise” (p. 292, emphasis omitted). Formally he defines it as I = H – Hr, where 
H is a priori uncertainty and Hr is the residual uncertainty after measurement or the ‘development of a system’. 
Logically then it follows that the max information is also the maximum a priori uncertainty, what he terms Imax 
= H. 
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organizational context of a specified flow network provide circumstances (formal causes) that 
generate specific developmental attractors (final causes) which entrain the effects of physical 
chemical mechanisms (material and efficient causes)” (p. 302). Again, if the universe can be 
depicted as an open thermodynamic system as Kurakin and others have argued, then the 
developmentalist model supports Harris’s E.129  
At this point I only hope to have revealed: (i) the extent to which Harris anticipated what 
are today a number of interrelated (though mutually unrecognized) theses concerning 
cosmological evolution premised on self-organization; and (ii) that when brought together, 
this picture of cosmic evolution follows directly from some of the founding principles of AE 
– namely, nominalism, process ontology, dialectical relations, and symmetry breaking. 
Nevertheless, Harris’s notion of teleological scales or unifying principles requires further 
clarification. In what follows, I critically assess and develop Harris’s theory of the scale, 
which will serve to ground his later discussions of life and mind.  
 
5.3 Updating Harris’s Scale of Forms 
In the interest of evaluating Harris’s TAP, the previous sections of the present chapter 
have been devoted to revealing the extent to which his E can be identified in modern theories 
of cosmological evolution. The remainder of this chapter more carefully examines Harris’s 
conception of the Levels of Nature. Harris maintained that chaos theory provides a non-
reductive paradigm through which to view natural phenomena across a wide range of sciences 
                                                
129 Barrow (2008) has argued that in a chaotic system small perturbations can result in exponential amplification 
of trajectory uncertainty after each collision, which prima facie, would seem to support Gould’s conclusion that 
the evolutionary process should have a different outcome if history were to be replayed with a slightly different 
starting point. However, if the motions of molecules in a room are chaotically unpredictable, “despite this 
unpredictability in the small, we have Boyle’s Law in the large, linking the pressure, P, volume, V, and 
temperature, T, of the gas by the simple relation PV/T = constant. Thus, although the individual molecular 
motions are chaotically unpredictable, their average behavior is entirely predictable and satisfies a particular 
probability distribution (the Maxwell–Boltzmann distribution). Quantities, such as the temperature that appear in 
Boyle’s Law are measures of the average speed of the molecules. If we reran the ‘tape’ of the history of our gas, 
we would find essentially the same average behavior, in accord with Boyle’s Law, even though the individual 
trajectories of the molecules would be quite different” (p. 146). Barrow’s appeal to Boyle’s law has essentially 
the same structure as Harris’s argument for the primacy of order/E. 
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and has become integral to his defence of unifying principles (henceforth ϕ). For example, in 
one of his later works he argues as follows: 
The same conviction of holism has emerged from the study of turbulence in what has come to be 
known as chaos theory, which has revealed the delicate sensitivity of complex, dynamic systems 
to initial conditions and the unexpectedly intricate and beautiful patterns of order underlying what 
seem at first sight to be chaotic processes. The discovery of what came to be called “strange 
attractors” operative in turbulence led investigators to seek patterns amid apparent randomness 
rather than local mechanisms […] So the study of complex, dynamic systems has persuaded its 
pursuers that no reductionist program in science can produce genuine explanations, and that only a 
grasp of the entire system can render the details intelligible (2000, pp. 100-101).130  
Here he makes explicit appeal to the notion of patterns arising from apparent randomness 
(e.g. the butterfly effect), to provide evidence for emergence and ontological hierarchy. 
Specifically, Harris appeals to chaos theory and fractal geometry to make five central claims 
in defense of his scale of forms:  
(1) Harris argues the self-specification found in fractal geometry can be connected to 
Bohm’s articulation of the implicate order, which “is enfolded in the ‘holomovement’ of 
physical activity, such that an organizing principle is implicit in every point in space-time, as 
in a hologram – the whole immanent in each part” (1991, p. 35). He later writes, the “concrete 
universal […] is a self-representative system, dialectically structured, like a fractal curve in 
complex dynamic systems theory” (1993, p. 238). Bearing in mind the discussion of § 5.2, 
Harris appealed to fractal geometry as empirical evidence for a self-specifying Concrete 
Universal that is differentiated into a series of levels, each reflective of the whole.  
(2) Harris maintained ϕs are irreducible, for example “physical and chemical properties” 
are “consequences of the structure as a whole, and are determined by its organizing principle 
of unity and not by a simple summation of the properties of its several constituents or parts” 
(1965, p. 166). Additionally he found, “Problems of phase transitions (e.g., between solid and 
liquid, liquid and gaseous states, the magnetizing of metals […]) proved tractable when 
treated in terms of fractals, revealing that they all obey the same rules” (1991, p. 35). In these 
instances (and others) it is clear that Harris believed phase transitions could provide a way of 
not only identifying, but also systematizing what he considered the irreducible scales of 
Nature.  
                                                
130 As can be imagined, Harris had an affinity with (and high hopes for the soundness of) Gleik’s (1988) 
sentiment that chaos was to usher in an end of reductionism. 
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(3) By the terms of § 2.2 above, Harris maintains that attractors are proper wholes and so 
ϕs should involve attractors. He claims there is “a periodic repetition of similar patterns on 
different scales”, which he takes to be indicative of “a universal law governing ‘strange 
attractors,’ which turn out to be, or at least to involve, fractal curves” (ibid). This is to say 
attractors are indicative of ϕ in virtue of being “a dynamic structure toward which all motions 
in a complex dynamic system tend at specific degrees of energy flow” (ibid). Harris 
maintained that the strange attractor demonstrated that “the whole” has become of utmost 
importance for science, “apart from which it is futile to examine and try to understand the 
parts” (1991, p. 36).  
(4) With regard for the relationship between scales, Harris goes on to say that “[t]hresholds 
governing phase transitions are the boundaries between the pulls of strange attractors, and 
these boundaries are themselves fractal forms, which (as it turns out) correspond to the shapes 
and dispositions of natural objects…” (1991, p. 36). With this claim, Harris attempted to 
supply evidence that each ϕ will be dialectically related (i.e. they should appear co-emergent 
or interdependent) and that their boundaries will appear fractal in nature.   
Towards an elaboration of ϕ, it will be instructive to consider one instance in which Harris 
explicitly discussed emergence. Harris considers attempts by analytic philosophers such as 
Kim (1984) to preserve downward causation “by giving it a conceptual interpretation: that is, 
as referring to concepts rather than phenomena or properties in the real world; by describing 
them in different languages” (2006, p. 167). Harris argues that such epiphenomenal or 
conceptual distinction amounts to paying epistemic lip service to different Levels of Nature. 
With this complaint, Harris is making it clear that mere conventional or epistemic emergence 
is too weak. 
Harris suspects that a particular hindrance to typical analyses of emergence is the 
presumption that such phenomena are externally related to their background. In accord with 
Thompson’s comments above, Harris claims this mistake arises directly from the 
philosopher’s tendency to abstract natural phenomena until what remains are a-temporal 
properties.131 Harris claims that proper examination of nature reveals a series of self-
organizing forms, each dialectically related to the rest, so what the analytician neglects is “the 
central condition for the emergence of new qualities […] the holism of the configuration from 
which they emerge” (2006, p. 168). Appealing to dialectical relations, he claims, means that 
                                                
131 Indeed, Thompson (2007, ff. p. 430) appears to be well aware of this mistake and like Harris (2006) devotes 
the better part of his own appendix to criticizing Kim for similar reasons. 
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“downward causation never occurs except in the sense of final causation, which, properly 
understood, is the regulation and determination of the parts or elements of a complex 
structure and the process of their development by the configuration of the whole” (2006, p. 
169).132  
(5) By this reasoning, Harris is again (albeit implicitly) led to the conclusion that laws 
evolve and are characterized by respective kinds of self-organization (ϕ) via the ‘interlock’ 
and ‘cooperation’ of components: 
Kim and his Analyst followers, therefore, have simply missed the main point of the Emergentists’ 
doctrine: that special configurations of entities at one level of development give rise to new 
wholes on a higher level, in which the interlock of the constituents modifies them so as to 
cooperate to produce a new entity with new properties inexplicable by the laws that govern those 
at the lower level […] The lower level constituents are necessarily involved, but in the new 
configuration are transformed so as to cooperate according to higher level laws to which they are 
not subject in isolation, or in causal collation, at their own original stage of development (2006, p. 
169). 
What is ontologically emergent then are the lawful regularities instantiated by ϕ. Note 
however that just as a different set of unifying principles could not be identified with the 
same Concrete Universal, each ϕ or mode of self-organization, likewise, cannot be 
instantiated by totally different underlying ϕs. This does not however mean that Harris is 
poised to argue against multiple-realizability (e.g. of identifiable relations or functions), only 
that a given ϕ is to be defined by some necessary and sufficient “cooperation” of composite 
ϕs.133 
Harris’s argument for the nature of ϕs (which have been discussed above as meta-laws or 
unifying principles) can be considered on epistemic, ontological, and empirical terms:  
 
(a) Ontologically speaking, each instantiate unique (meta-)laws characteristic of particular 
spatiotemporal scales;  
                                                
132 As noted in the previous section, the strange attractor has indeed been understood to enrich conceptions of 
causation. For example, Coffman has argued, “an attractor is a final cause accessed by the regulatory network, 
which is in turn a formal cause established by organization that developed via the selective agency of 
autocatalytic cycles” (2011, p. 300).  
133 To my mind, this move of equating scales with forms/systems appears necessary to evaluate Harris’s appeal 
to a scale of forms. It should be mentioned however that Harris does not state this to be his argument, though it 
appears to me to follow from the form of his metaphysics as a whole.  
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(b) In epistemic terms, each is expected to resist reduction to any other level; and  
(c) The boundary or limit of each scale should be marked by phase transitions appearing 
fractal in their interrelations with one another.  
 
In consideration of Harris’s proposal for a scale of forms, the questions we must ask are: (i) 
Does modern physics provide necessary and sufficient conditions of disparate scales in 
accord with or in contrast to Harris? (ii) What if any bearing does Harris’s view of scales 
provide in conceiving of typical spatiotemporal scales? (iii) What bearing does this thesis 
have on the current debate concerning emergence? (iv) To what extent can the respective 
scales be rendered necessary with respect for Harris’s TAP? I now examine what replies to 
Harris’s claims may be found in current literature concerning scales and emergence.  
 
5.3.1 What is a Scale?  
Toward establishing a more adequate understanding of scale and emergence, an invaluable 
first step is to dispel some long held misconceptions about both of these concepts. To do so, 
an examination of the scale of classical mechanics will serve as an invaluable starting point. 
Wilson (2013) points out that our epistemic state of affairs is far more tumultuous than many 
might expect:  
the thesis emerges that physics cannot begin its descriptive task until it has first indulged in a 
preliminary degree of essential idealization: smallish portions of materials must be credited with 
patently incorrect characteristics. After we reach a complete modeling, we can throw away the 
idealized ladder we have climbed, for our final equations will describe materials that behave 
identically at every scale (p. 101, emphasis in original).  
He later elaborates, a result of this “idealization” is that if one were to look for the 
“foundation” of classical physics “we are likely to feel as if we have become trapped in a 
novel by Kafka, with particular branches of a vast bureaucracy claiming greater authorities 
than they truly possess and, when challenged, shunting us off to other departments that assist 
us no further in our quest” (p. 104). This however is just what one would expect of a 
dialectically related system of the sort articulated by Harris, Bohm, and AE, in which each 
level depends upon its relations within the system-as-a-whole.  
Contrary to the orthodox interpretation, a purported advantage of Bohm’s (1993) 
ontological interpretation of QT is that it implies “an approximately classical behaviour for 
objects containing a sufficiently large number of particles (which means that there is a 
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classical level that is essentially independent of measuring instruments)” (p. 160). Prima facie 
his account appears reductive because “autonomy” arises “wherever the quantum potential 
can be neglected”, meaning the classical domain “is actually an abstraction from the subtle 
quantum world” (p. 177). However, Bohm argues the action of a quantum potential depends 
on its form and not on its magnitude, which implies it can have dominant effects even when 
its intensity is small. As a result there is 
a strong nonlocal connection of distant particles and a strong dependence of the particle on its 
general environmental context. The forces between particles depend on the wave function of the 
whole system, so that we have what we may call ‘indivisible wholeness’. This means that for 
different wave functions we can have radically different connections between particles (not 
expressible, for example, in terms of a predetermined interaction potential) (ibid). 
This is to argue that the classical world is irreducible to the quantum and the quantum 
world actually “contains an approximately classical ‘sub-world’ that gradually emerges…” 
from its own “nonlocality and undivided wholeness” (p. 178).134 As previously discussed, 
Bohm goes further to maintain that the quantum is itself an abstraction contained within the 
super implicate order: “Evidently we could go on indefinitely to higher levels of implicate 
order. Since each is related to the one below, as the one below is related to the one still further 
below […] we have an order of implicate orders” (p. 380). At this point the reader will do 
well to remember the discussion of § 2.4.1, in which I noted Bohm’s resistance to 
fundamentality in physics. With this in mind, his contentions here reveal that the influence of 
“hidden variables” may come from either “above” or “below” the scale of a given 
phenomenon. So for Bohm, it is a mistake to seek a first scale at some microscopic level, 
rather, higher and lower distinctions are abstractions from a unified holomovement whose 
                                                
134  Writing on the relation between classical and quantum domains from an orthodox perspective, Joos (2006) 
agrees that macroscopic properties “emerge from, or are created by, irreversible interactions with the 
environment. In this way the local classical properties with which we are so familiar have their origin in the 
nonlocality of (entangled) quantum states” (p. 71). In line with Bohm and Wilson, Joos goes on to argue that 
“micro- and macro-objects are so strongly dynamically coupled that we do not even know where the boundary 
between the two supposed realms could possibly be found” (pp. 74-75). McGivern & Rueger (2010) likewise 
maintains the “occurrence of classical behavior at a macro level from a quantum mechanical micro level is 
another standard candidate for emergence. Here “classical behavior” is considered “novel with respect to the 
quantum mechanical base. In our classification, this would be a case of synchronic emergence, and, indeed, the 
mathematical treatment of the relation between the levels involves taking the ‘classical limit’ h→ 0 of the 
Schrödinger operator h2 /2m (∂2 /∂x2 )” (p. 229).  
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self-differentiation gives rise to quantum and classical domains – in agreement with 
symmetry breaking (E).   
Addressing reductionism and scales, Batterman (2013) holds a view that properties at one 
scale indeed depend upon “dynamical changes” that take place between others. He explains 
that the macro properties of steel for instance, cannot be reduced to the micro alone (p. 258). 
He contends that it is even “naïve” to believe that “one can, in any straightforward way derive 
or deduce from atomic facts what are the phenomenological parameters required for a 
continuum model of a given material” (p. 272). The result is that neither the quantum, nor the 
classical scales can be derived from the other. Instead, as Batterman maintains, we need to 
recognize the interdependence of numerous levels of description: 
Bottom-up modeling of systems that exist across a large range of scales is not sufficient to yield 
observed properties of those systems at higher scales. Neither is top-down modeling. After all, we 
know that the parameters appearing in continuum models must depend upon details at lower scale 
levels. The interplay between the two strategies – a kind of mutual adjustment in which lower 
scale physics informs upper scale models and upper scale physics corrects lower scale models – is 
complex, fascinating, and unavoidable (p. 283). 
So when carefully examined, the very notion of an objective chain of efficient causation at 
the classical and continuum levels becomes an idealization. With this in mind, the notion of 
intrinsic properties identified on any particular level of nature may at least be called into 
question and could even become antiquated given further investigation. Instead (when we 
retain phenomenological honesty), identifiable properties that serve to characterize a given 
scale appear only in virtue of relations across spatiotemporal levels. In the dialectical holist 
spirit, Batterman concludes a later work by noting that there has been too much focus in the 
reduction/emergence debate on “what is the actual fundamental level and whether, if there is 
a fundamental level, non-fundamental (idealized) models are dispensable. I am arguing here 
that the focus on the ‘fundamental’ is just misguided” (2015, p. 133).135 
                                                
135 Capturing the issue in brilliant clarity Meyer-Ortmanns (2015) concludes her argument concerning reduction 
as follows: “whenever reductionism is pushed to its extreme, it will exact a price from us. It is as if hidden 
subtleties pop up and take revenge for the decomposition into simple constituents, so that the effort required of 
us is kept constant” (p. 33). She argues (in part) that it is not a matter of computational power to exhaustively 
account for higher scale phenomena with fundamental laws, but that such a final theory may be impossible 
because of our reliance upon idealization (ff. p. 36).  
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In order to better understand how one might distinguish between respective scales it is 
instructive to consider emergence. According to Bishop (2011) emergence may be 
characterized as follows: 
When the behaviors of the constituents of a system are highly coherent and correlated, the system 
cannot be treated even approximately as a collection of uncoupled individual parts (‘the whole is 
different than the sum of its parts’). Rather, some particular global or nonlocal description is 
required taking into account that individual constituents cannot be fully characterized without 
reference to larger-scale structures of the system (p. 114). 
How, the reader might ask, is it helpful to appeal to emergence to distinguish scales when the 
very definition of emergence relies upon a distinction of scale? This question brings us closer 
to realizing the point at issue: the notion of spatio-temporal scale is only intelligible with 
reference to significant and identifiable spatio-temporal differences in structure, efficacious 
relations, and dynamics of material systems, i.e. emergence. In the following section I orient 
dialectical holism among four orders of emergence more specifically.  
 
5.3.2 What Kind of Emergence? 
First-Order Emergence  
This level of emergence is typically invoked with the expressed intention of maintaining 
ontic reductionism, while preserving respective levels of description. As Davies (2006) notes, 
for many working scientists the motivation for invoking this type of emergence is to permit a 
final ToE that explains the fundamental constituents of matter and thus, the natural world in 
toto (p. 35). This weak emergence is characterized by “systems for which the micro-level 
laws in principle capture the entire physics of the system, but for which nothing less than 
inspection of the real system, or simulation, would reveal its behaviour” (p. 37).136 Or in 
Silberstein’s words, “X bears predictive/explanatory emergence with respect to Y if Y cannot 
(reductively) predict/explain X” (2006, p. 786). 
                                                
136 Empirical examples include the surface tension of liquid, laminar flow, viscosity, the generic properties of 
gases, liquids and solids, chemical bonds such as H20, conductivity, and heat capacity. Boyle’s Law for instance 
states that the absolute pressure of the mass of an ideal gas is inversely proportional to its volume if the 
temperature and amount of gas remains constant in a closed system, which provides knowledge of a global level 
of description. While this law (PV=K) follows from the underlying constituents, it cannot be known a priori, but 
only from considering the micro constituents.  
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Deacon (2006) describes this level as non-recurrent and instantiated by the relational 
qualities of higher-order (but nevertheless simple) thermodynamic phenomena. Weakly 
emergent phenomena occur precisely because of the way a group of entities fit together to 
give rise to relations at a higher spatial scale. Ellis (2006b) further explains, at this level we 
find bottom-up action plus boundary conditions leading to higher-level generic structures not 
directly implied by the boundary conditions, but no “higher-level complex structures or 
functions” (p. 99, emphasis omitted). Gillett (2006) offers one necessary criterion towards the 
distinction of weak or epistemic emergence: 
A property instance X, in an individual s, is W-emergent only if (i) X is a microphysically realized 
property instance; (ii) the law statements (and/or theories and/or explanations) true of X cannot be 
derived from the law statements (and/or theories and/or explanations) holding of the 
microphysical properties which realize X; and (iii) all microphysical events are determined insofar 
as they are determined, by the laws of physics applying to simple systems (p. 808).  
In this way, first-order emergent phenomena supervenes upon the lower level – the higher 
level is over-determined by the lower level, which means a change in the former depends 
upon a change in the latter.  
This kind of emergence is also exemplified by chaotic systems and fractal geometry in 
virtual models. In this case, emergence results from sensitive dependence to initial conditions 
(SDIC) that restrict our ability to make accurate predictions about a system’s behaviour 
despite knowing that the system is determined by some underlying mechanism(s), e.g. 
equations or laws. Importantly, this implies that one cannot derive a later state from an earlier 
state, but must compute each and every composite state.137 For a concrete example, Wallace 
(2013) claims that this kind of weak emergence can be seen in cases where “there are 
structural facts about many microphysical systems which although perfectly real and 
                                                
137 A primary quality of chaotic systems is that they are “holistic”. Following Kellert (1993), Bishop (2009) 
maintains three primary distinctions between chaotic and classical explanations: (i) Due to SDIC chaotic 
explanations are predictions of qualitative behavior rather than quantitative detail. (ii) This is a description of 
geometric mechanisms rather than causal processes. Since Chaotic explanations are resistant to reductive 
analysis, models and systems that exhibit similar patterns of behavior are grouped together without regard for 
their underlying causal differences. (iii) These include patterns (e.g. bifurcation points, attractors, and fractals) 
rather than law-like necessity. “Chaos explanations do not rely on nomic considerations at all; rather, they rely 
on patterns of behavior and various properties characterizing this behavior. In brief, chaos studies search for 
patterns rather than laws” (Bishop, 2009). Chaos does not propose any revision to laws in the same manner as 
QT and GR. Debate continues as to whether chaos is a product of the world, or only our models of the world.   
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objective […] simply cannot be seen if we persist in analyzing those systems in purely 
microphysical terms” (Wallace, p. 472). For example Wallace claims this may occur in 
statistical mechanics:  
the temperature of bulk matter is an emergent property, salient because of its explanatory role in 
behavior of that matter. (It is a common error in textbooks to suppose that statistical-mechanical 
methods are used only because in practice we cannot calculate what each atom is doing 
separately: even if we could do so, we would be missing important objective properties of the 
system in question…) (p. 473).  
In sum, instances of first order emergence are additive and synchronic in nature, present in 
cases that require that our descriptions of phenomena are distinguished by boundaries and 
shapes, but these ‘higher levels’ remain supervenient upon and reducible to their 
microphysical base. Nevertheless, I propose that at the threshold of first-order emergence 
PSEs may be identified. In the interest of elucidating Harris’s conception of scale (to be 
addressed in the final section) I propose that Hans Jenny’s (2001) triadic phenomenology can 
be extended to the respective orders of emergence presently considered.138 Specifically, in 
such cases of chaotic models and global thermodynamic phenomena, what emerges at this 
level can be characterized by Jenny’s first parameter of static structure, which distinguishes 
respective spatial levels of description. Clearly Harris’s claims imply a version of emergence 
that is non-supervenient, prospects for which I now consider in the second-order. 
 
Second-Order Emergence  
Second-order emergence is believed to occur when simple thermodynamic dispositions 
(e.g. the tendency for entropy of a system to increase) are overridden by structural regularities 
as a function of time. Deacon (2006) eloquently describes this order of emergence as simple-
recurrent and claims that it introduces morphodynamics. By these terms he means we find “a 
deviation-amplifying dynamic that propagates throughout the system” (p. 130). At this order, 
it is argued, chaotic and self-organized dynamics can introduce regularities and unpredictable 
global relations typically initiated by phase transitions and symmetry breaking.  
                                                
138 Triadic phenomenology was originally devised as a theoretical framework encapsulating a range of 
phenomena in cymatics – that is, the structures, kinetics, and periodicity that arise by passing sound waves 
through a material medium. 
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In the case of crystallization for example, we discover shape-determined dynamics in 
which microscopic interactions cascade throughout a system to instantiate an organized lattice 
structure. Likewise, bearing symmetry breaking in mind, in Benard instability the “global 
system ‘harnesses’ the local forces, but at no stage is there a need for an extra type of force to 
act on an individual molecule to make it comply with a ‘convective master plan’” (Davies 
2006, p. 38). The resulting hexagonal structure arises and is sustained because it most 
uniformly distributes the dissipation of heat in liquid, i.e. all the other forms were selected 
against by entropy (Deacon, ff. p. 131). At this order however, reference to the global features 
and environmental context (such as boundary conditions) is required in order to provide a 
satisfactory account of local dynamics, but there is no need to invoke two (local and global) 
causes respectively. 
Crucially, this order of emergence is characterized by feedback loops: a circular causal 
process in which some portion of a system’s output is fed back into the system’s input, 
creating autocatalytic (self-generating) phenomena. According to Thompson (2007), feedback 
is captured by collective variables known as order parameters, which 
constrain or govern the behavior of the individual components, entraining them so that they no 
longer have the same behavioral alternatives open to them as they would if they were not 
interdependently woven into the coherent and ordered global pattern. At the same time, the 
behavior of the components generates and sustains the global order (p. 62). 
More specifically, Snyder, et al. (2011) define two types of feedback as follows: “Negative 
feedbacks act to stabilize the system, decreasing a new output change. In contrast, positive 
feedbacks act to destabilize the system, increasing or amplifying a new output change” (p. 
470). They go on to explain that, one implication of feedback in the case of weather systems 
is that what emerges cannot be predicted in terms of the constituent components one level 
below the target phenomenon (ff. p. 473).139  
                                                
139 Further examples include sand dune formations, magnetism, cellular automata, autocatalytic cycles, 
gravitational structure formation, and laser physics. In these cases statistical physics becomes inadequate (Ellis, 
2006, p. 99). Davies (2006) cites Mach’s principle as an example of whole-part influence: the force of inertia 
captured by a local particle derives from gravitational interactions with all the matter within the universe. 
Likewise, the second law of thermodynamics requires that we appeal to the global concept of ‘closed system’ to 
posit the conditions by which entropy can never go down: “implicit in the second law is some sort of global 
constraint (or compulsion) on what happens locally” (p. 41). Davies also includes the phenomena of condensed 
matter physics; global restrictions in the instance of a black hole, whose event horizon prevents a ‘naked 
singularity’; closed timelike lines that prevent time travel into the past; and Pauli’s exclusion principle. Wallace 
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Feedback loops of second-order emergence are particularly important for permitting a new 
categorical distinction of natural phenomena. In his introduction to the philosophy of complex 
systems Hooker (2011) maintains it is “most useful to consider self-organisation to occur 
where (and only where) a system bifurcates, sufficiently under its own dynamics, so as to 
bring to bear an additional system-wide constraint (or at any rate an additional multi-
component, that is, relatively macro, constraint)” (p. 27). Such a macro constraint he claims 
establishes “a new level proper in the system” (ibid). Hence, associated with this level of 
emergence is a non-linear, non-additive, and “intrinsically global coherence” that in addition 
to limiting dynamical trajectories of the system’s state space, also enables certain states that 
were otherwise unavailable (pp. 28-29). Hooker reasons, “since self-organisation involves a 
new dynamical form, it is reasonable to say that it obeys new dynamical laws characteristic of 
that form” (p. 38). In apparent agreement with Harris, Hooker finds that this emergence of 
laws includes and surpasses first-order or epistemic emergence:  
trying to simplify the problem by leaving out globally organized constraints, when they are central 
to functional characterization, much less by ignoring organization entirely, is to aim at capturing a 
physics-centered class of cases at the expense of missing much of the special importance and 
challenge of complexity (p. 40).  
Among others (O’Connor & Wong, 2005), Bickhard (2011) concludes that supervenience 
does not apply to diachronic emergent systems because “local versions of supervenience 
cannot handle relational phenomena…” (p. 101). For example, he notes that far from 
equilibrium processes of organization, such as a candle flame, requires persistent exchanges 
with its environment in order to maintain their existence. In these instances, there is no fixed 
set of particles that exhaust the phenomenon, but can only be understood as a holistic 
organizational process (p. 102).  
Important for later discussions, second-order emergence also appears to be manifest in the 
phenomena of soft matter. This class of material includes classical and chemically active 
systems composed of polymers (e.g. plastics, proteins, and DNA), fluids (e.g. solvents, paints, 
and soaps), gels, elastomers, colloids, foams, and membranes. Here unique symmetry breaks 
result in liquid crystal (anisotropic materials) forming layers of molecules such as polymers 
aligned in a translational order. Specifically, while a crystal is fixed in space along X, Y, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
(2013) adds vibrations of QT crystals (quasi-particles). Accordingly, QT “crystal vibrations are described in 
terms of photons; waves in magnetization direction of a Ferromagnet are described in terms of magnons, 
collective waves in a plasma are described in terms of plasmons, and so on” (p. 473).  
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Z, axes, a liquid crystal is only constrained along some coordinates (e.g. X and Y) involving 
layers and vertical orientation.140 Consequently, soft matter can undergo reversible 
topological distortions of several hundred percent and in contrast to the broader category of 
condensed matter, soft matter gives rise to dynamics that cannot be easily predicted from the 
underlying atomic or molecular constituents because of their propensity for self-organization 
(Bouligand 2011, ff. p. 56). 
Taking the above sentiments together, at this order of emergence new laws can be 
identified as a result of feedback loops across underlying constituents of a system. This line 
of reasoning can be traced back to Hans Jenny’s (2001) triadic phenomenology, in which 
what emerges can be characterized by structures combined with the additional parameter of 
kinetics and has inspired Deacon’s label of “morphodynamic emergence” (p. 136). Indeed, 
numerous arguments from philosophy and physics maintain that at this level of emergence we 
find self-organization and symmetry breaking, by which the lower-level laws are not violated 
but are overarched by diachronic forms of governance, i.e. what will be considered formal 
governance henceforth. In line with the findings of § 5.2.1, second-order emergence appears 
to minimally characterize the metaphysical underpinnings of AE, but issues remain 
concerning how higher-order phenomena are to be classified. 
 
Third-Order Emergence  
Purportedly exemplified by living, evolving, and possibly even conscious systems, this 
level is characterized by causal influences that are not wholly determined by their 
microphysics. Gillett (2006) has argued that this level of emergence has been unjustly 
dismissed throughout much of the 20th century due to unrecognized metaphysical 
assumptions in scientific theory. This reductivist paradigm posits the ‘completeness of 
physics’ in the hope of discovering a ToE that shows all “microphysical events are 
determined, insofar as they are determined, by prior microphysical events and the laws of 
physics” (p. 815). In the face of this reductive explanation, Davies captures the motivation of 
                                                
140 A great deal of theoretical work has been devoted to accounting for this geometric elasticity universal to 
sufficiently soft solids. These characteristics have apparently been utilized in biological evolution and 
development to give rise to innumerable forms and functions. For example, the surface of the human brain may 
have formed because the cerebral cortex grows faster than the interior and results in the more efficient gyri 
folding patterns as a result of its composite soft matter dynamics http://www.softmatterworld.org/; 
http://www.durhamemergenceproject.co.uk/understand/3. 
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many who invoke third-order emergence, contending that “a final theory would not in 
practice provide a very useful account of much that we observe in the world [… it] would not 
explain the origin of life, nor have much to say about the nature of consciousness” (2006, p. 
35). I maintain third-order emergence is a paradigmatic corner stone of both AE and Harris’s 
metaphysics alike. As Silberstein (2006, p. 217) notes, at this order of emergence the 
following three theses are disputed: 
 
Completeness of Physics (CoP): All physical events are determined by prior physical 
events, the physical laws that govern them, and efficient causation at each time step.  
Physicalism (PHY): All phenomena are exhaustively constituted by and identical to their 
microphysical parts. 
Causal Inheritance Principle (CIP): The causal powers of all higher level phenomena are 
identical with, or determined by, the causal powers of their lower-level base.  
 
Third-order emergent systems are comprised of at least two interconnected 
morphodynamic processes (autocatalysis and self-assembly). Whereas autocatalytic cycles 
concern the cyclic processes of chemical reactions, self-assembly involves the crystallization 
of molecules that assemble into geometric structures. In addition to the emergence of 
feedback constraints noted above, the third-order involves some form of information storage 
and/or ‘memory’ structures such as DNA in the context of a cell, adaptivity, and evolutionary 
learning. For example Gregersen (2006) claims this order instantiates ‘self-reference, self-
organization, and autopoiesis’. The result is that causality is extended across time and space 
in virtue of memory.  
In systems that are third-order emergent there is an “additional loop of recursive causality 
that transcends and encloses the second-order recursive causality of self-organized systems” 
(Deacon, p. 137). Like morphodynamics of the second-order, such systems provide biases of 
cancellation, amplification, and selection of the system’s own influences. Along these lines, 
Yin & Herfel (2011) define complex adaptive systems by three criteria: 
 
1. diversity and individuality of components, 
2. localized interactions among those components, and  
3. an autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those interactions to select a subset of those 
components for replication or enhancement (p. 394). 
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Such sampling causes the influences to be selectively reintegrated back into the system over 
time (one non-equilibrium process that converges to a stable pattern and is then reinforced), 
resulting in a “higher-order” stochastic process over time. As Deacon claims, descriptions of 
such systems rely upon a “combination of multi-scale, historical, and semiotic analyses 
(analyses based on the relationships between signs)” (p. 139). This is to say that third-order 
emergent systems essentially produce and use first-order structures and second-order 
processes toward some end. 
In sum, third-order emergence denotes systems whose self-organization, and self-reference 
creates new laws and provides unique contexts and constraints for the further emergence of 
novel structures and functions. With this feature in mind, I claim that the third-order of 
emergence can again be traced to the third level of Jenny’s triadic phenomenology, being 
periodicity.141 Thus analysis of these phenomena requires reference to concepts of 
representation, adaptation, information, and function. In agreement with Ellis (2006b, ff. p. 
100) and Silberstein’s defence of emergence in AE (2006, p. 218), Deacon further claims that 
these features of third-order emergence are to be understood as teleolodynamic (p. 143). As 
AEs and Harris appeal to this kind of emergence in their respective arguments for life, 
evolution, and consciousness, I now end this brief overview only to return to these issues in 
later sections. What remains for any proponent of dialectical holism is to defend the 
irreducibility of third-order emergence and (my next task) to explain its philosophical 
boundary.  
 
Fourth-Order Emergence  
Unlike first-order emergence but just as third-order, this thesis maintains there are no 
bridge laws connecting the higher and lower levels (Silberstein 2002, p. 91). Also known as 
ontological emergence, fourth-order emergence refers to high-level causes that fundamentally 
change the system from which they arise and whose components are insufficient for said 
force.  
In contrast with the previous orders, Gillett (2006) holds that in ontological emergence “A 
property instance X, in an individual s, is O-emergent only if (i) X is instantiated in s, where 
                                                
141 The relevance and importance of connecting the particular theory of emergence endorsed by dialectical 
holism with triadic phenomenology will become increasingly evident in the following sections, but is especially 
germane for my discussions in chapter 8.  
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this individual is either constituted by microphysical individuals or is a non-physical 
individual; (ii) X is an unrealized property; and (iii) X is causally efficacious” (p. 809). What 
he means by X’s being “unrealized” is that X is not found in the compositional hierarchy of 
the natural world but is granted causal efficacy. Similarly, Ellis finds that the structures of 
human creativity and culture indicate the existence of free conscious agents on the one hand 
(2006b, p. 100) and a Platonic realm of rational ideas on the other (2007a, p. 1272). Neither 
of these, he maintains, can be reduced to any other level of explanation. They instead exist as 
independent and efficacious possibility structures in their own right (2016, p. 422).  
This kind of top-down efficiant causation may more fittingly be described as emergentism 
of the gaps. That is, this thesis has been the go-to for various authors, e.g. Bergson (1911); 
Alexander (1929); Peacocke (1993, 2006); Clayton (2004) hoping to insert a soul, God, elan 
vital, etc., into the gaps of scientific understanding. Such ontological emergence is then an 
explicit means of positing, or has the unrecognized implication of dualism. Hence, rather than 
enriching science or philosophical understanding, appeals of this sort draw a veil of mystery 
over prospects of naturalizing knowledge and mind.142 Given the discussions of §§ 3.2, 3.3, 
and 5.2, in which I have maintained that Harris supports relational holism and nomological 
holism, but not ontological holism; insofar as a (neutral) monistic position is to be 
maintained, fourth-order emergence could not be endorsed by a proponent of dialectical 
holism. 
To keep these issues straight the reader should bear in mind that for Harris, nature is to be 
subdivided into respective forms or unifying principles, each reflective of the Concrete 
Universal via characteristic laws. As I have argued above, third-order emergence is the 
paradigmatic corner stone of enactivism and Harris’s holism alike. This means that the 
validity of dialectical holism in the context of cosmology rests upon the soundness of this 
type of emergence: If supposed empirical instances of such emergence can be reductively 
interpreted, then extrapolation to the Universe (as per § 5.2.1) becomes increasingly 
problematic. The consequence for my evaluation of Harris is that his appeal to teleology 
would potentially fail and the scale of forms (while possibly remaining irreducible for 
epistemic reasons) could not be considered ontologic and necessary by any empirical means. 
Thus a remaining task for anyone in the dialectical holist camp is to show that life and mind 
are indeed third-order emergentist phenomena. Toward this end, in the following section I 
                                                
142 This issue of naturalizing knowledge, Platonic realism, etc., will be revisited in chapter 8 below. 
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exemplify ϕ in contemporary terms before examining Harris’s application of this theory to an 
analysis of life in the following chapter. 
 
5.3.3 A Clarification of Harris’s Unifying Principle   
As previously discussed (§ 3.2), Harris considers the space-time field – distinguishing the 
scale of our universe – as an example of what now appears to be second-order emergence. 
Likewise, the quantum scale, he claims can be distinguished by Pauli’s exclusion principle 
(PEP), which prohibits any two like particles in a system from having the same state (1965, 
pp. 131-32; 1991, p. 31).143 As Harris explains, due to the PEP:  
Under appropriate conditions, molecules coalesce to form crystals, within the so-called leptocosm 
of which they are arranged in accordance with the same laws and principles, exemplifying the 
original universal at a higher level. More complex molecules combine into polymers, and the scale 
proceeds to organic substances, such as proteins and nucleic acids, necessary for the emergence of 
life (1991, p. 43).  
For Harris, crystalline structures are another example of one such level of nature, as their 
form depends upon an underlying constraint, involving the “interlock” (e.g. chemical bonds 
and the exclusion principle) of atoms and may obtain within a range of phases depending 
upon the parameters (e.g. temperature and pressure) of their environment. Consequently, each 
unifying principle is not considered a basic unit of nature, but is described as a “polyphasic 
unity” (1965, ff. p. 166). This means each ϕ both contains and depends upon such constraints 
from larger and smaller scales.  
Towards an argument for the necessary and sufficient conditions of ϕ, Thompson’s (2007) 
criteria for AE emergence provides an invaluable starting point. He maintains a network (N) 
of interrelated components in nonlinear dynamics (D) demonstrates an emergent process (E) 
with emergent properties (P) iff: 
 
                                                
143 Indeed, the PEP states “No two electrons can ever be in the same quantum state; therefore, no two electrons 
in the same atom can have the same set of quantum numbers” (Serway, et al., 2013, p. 1127). Both Davies 
(2006) and Clayton each exhibit this principle for the same reason as Harris. For example: “PEP specifies that no 
two electrons of an atom can have the same set of four quantum numbers. Thus a maximum of two electrons can 
occupy an atomic orbital. This requirement on the way electrons fill up orbitals is basic for understanding 
modern chemistry […] A rather simple principle thus has as its outcome the complex chemical distribution of 
the elements” (Clayton 2004, p. 581).  
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(1) E is a global process that instantiates P, and arises from the coupling of N’s components and 
the nonlinear dynamics, D, of their local interactions.  
(2) E and P have a global-to-local (“downward”) determinative influence on the dynamics D of the 
components of N.  
And possibly 
(3) E and P are not exhaustively determined by the intrinsic properties of the components of N, that 
is, they exhibit “relational holism” (p. 418).144  
 
In this passage (1) specifies what kind of component dynamics will be necessary for a 
emergent whole, whereas (2) characterizes the (at least second-order) formal governance 
itself. Concerning the transition to (3) however, it can be argued that the identification of a 
dynamical nonlinear system is synonymous with that of an emergent whole. As Davies 
(2004b) maintains, “In a non-linear system the whole is much more than the sum of its parts, 
and it cannot be reduced or analysed in terms of simple subunits acting together. The 
resulting properties can often be unexpected, complicated and mathematically intractable” (p. 
25). Additionally, with respect for dynamic co-emergence and relational holism, it appears 
more appropriate to replace properties (P) with relational process across spatio-temporal 
scales (R). Hence, given 1 and 2, R will not be exhaustively determined by the endogenous 
relations of N.   
Taking a sympathetic reading of Harris’s line of reasoning and building on AE co-
emergence implies that when theorists and scientists appropriately identify a scale of nature, 
they are always distinguishing characteristic space-time dynamics that obtain through global 
constraint(s) imposed by a self-organizing material system as a whole. Importantly, each ϕ is 
what it is in virtue of R, and is hypothesized to ‘reflect’ a more general whole to which it 
belongs. In the remainder of this section, I consider two empirical research projects 
concerning phase transitions and soliton waves respectively, which may provide support for 
the present conception of ϕ.145 
                                                
144 For a recent logical analysis of the enactivist proposal of dynamic co-emergence see Wu, R. (2016). 
145 It is worth noting that the present consideration of scales satisfies the typical criteria of natural kinds (1) 
Members of a natural kind should have some (natural) properties in common;  (2) Natural kinds should permit 
inductive inferences; (3) Natural kinds should participate in laws of nature; (4) Members of a natural kind should 
form a kind; (5) Natural kinds should form a hierarchy; and (6) natural kinds should be categorically distinct 
(Bird & Tobin 2015, pp. 3-4). However, I have found the discussions concerning natural kinds to be particularly 
torturous and in need of revision, hence the formal meeting of scales and natural kinds will have to wait until a 
later work.   
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A number of theorists have recently recognized the philosophical utility of effective field 
theories (EFTs) and symmetry breaking for not only establishing a theory of emergence, but 
also redefining unity in physics. The common practice in physics has been to consider the 
appearance of singularities to be an indication of modelling failure and that in order to learn 
about the physical system we must rid the theory of such information sinks. Batterman (2011) 
argues that a potentially finite theory that is devoid of these infinities (typically found in 
quantum field theory and condensed matter physics), cannot explain the existence of what he 
calls “emergent protected states of matter” (p. 1032). Likewise Morrison (2013) maintains the 
most significant hindrance to reductive unification is the modelling of emergent phenomena 
seen in condensed matter physics (including superconductivity and superfluidity). Such 
emergent phenomena mark what she calls a “decoupling of physics at different energy levels” 
and to be described, require choosing a relevant length scale while ignoring others (p. 383). 
This is because the “defining feature of these phenomena […] cannot be explained, predicted, 
or reduced to their micro constituents and the laws that govern them” (p. 384). 
Appealing to renormalizable group theory, Batterman argues, when a critical temperature 
is approached “there is a breaking of symmetry”, which causes the order parameter of the 
system to undergo “a discontinuous jump from zero to nonzero values…” (p. 1038).146 At 
these critical points we find singularities in our models that are key signatures of “the 
emergence at different scales of distinct and apparently ‘protected’ states of matter” (p. 
1039). These “protectorates” are considered effectively “decoupled and largely independent 
of physics at shorter length/higher energy scales” (p. 1040). He explains the correlation length 
(ξ) “is the typical distance over which the behaviour of one microscopic variable or degree of 
freedom can be correlated with the behaviour of another” (p. 1042). At the critical 
temperature of phase transition (Tc), the correlation length “diverges” to infinity: ξ(T )→∞ as 
T →Tc, at which point many degrees of freedom become coupled, i.e. thereby instantiating a 
constraint. He concludes, if such decoupling of scales is related to the existence of emergent 
protected states of matter, it is natural to expect infinities and divergences to be involved in 
our understanding of how those protectorates are possible. So Batterman holds the 
identifiable infinities provide answers to “why” questions about the stability of protectorates 
that more fundamental theories devoid of such divergences are incapable of answering.  
                                                
146 Such a phase transition can be seen when at temperatures above a superfluid transition a substance will 
assume random values (as in the orientation of a paramagnet), but if it is cooled through the superfluid transition 
phase the arrows align (as the ferromagnet).   
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Emergent protectorates are thus considered to be regulated by higher organizing principles 
that are independent of microscopics, which Batterman considers “the universal behaviour of 
lower energy protectorates” (p. 1041). What renormalizable group theory does is to relate 
what Batterman calls an “intractable problem” concerning an infinite correlation length to a 
tractable problem characterized by a correlation length reduced by some factor. In this way 
we may reduce coupled degrees of freedom but in the process demonstrate “scaling or self-
similar behaviour” (p. 1042). Concerning unity in physics, Morrison has argued that this 
theory shows “phenomena at critical points have an underlying order. Indeed what makes the 
behaviour of critical point phenomena predictable, even in a limited way is the existence of 
certain scaling properties that exhibit ‘universal’ behaviour” (p. 413). In other words, when 
various systems (e.g. liquids, solids, paramagnets, ferromagnets and superconductors) 
approach a phase transition they bear a common “cooperative behavior” irrespective of their 
microscopic constituents or spatial scale, and so belong to the same universality class.147 
Morrison points out that this kind of unity has no reliance upon analysis of “microstructure” 
and is in this way, quite different from reductive unification. To my mind, this is one way of 
exemplifying the kind of fractalesque unity-in-diversity characterized by phase transitions 
that Harris was attempting to articulate.148  
Considering Harris’s contention that the respective Levels of Nature should reflect one 
another and some higher-level unity, Gleiser’s (2013) proposal of the oscillon is particularly 
fitting. Gleiser claims that progress regarding the generation of spatiotemporal complexity 
can be made by discovering the “fundamental properties of non-linear field models which are 
common to several areas of physics…” (p. 113). Towards this end he proposes the soliton 
wave, whose partial differential equations appear in many areas of physics.149 For example, 
“symmetry-breaking during phase transitions can give rise to solitons” (p. 114). He argues 
that if we ‘relax’ our criteria to include time-independent but spatially localized systems; we 
                                                
147 Morrison offers one example of which being “liquid-vapor systems whose correlation lengths appear to 
diverge in precisely the same way as ferromagnets” (ibid). 
148 For a critical assessment of both Batterman and Morrison’s arguments for emergence see Crowther (2015). 
Though she presents a positive account of emergence, she proposes that counter philosophical discussions, the 
physics do not reveal that emergence obtains in opposition with reductionism. Rather, the issue concerns 
“dependence” and “independence” between high and low energy physics.  
149 A famous benchmark in the history of science, Scottish engineer John Scott Russell was first to observe and 
describe solitons. In 1834, Russell found that within canals, a wave could be generated that remained robust 
against perturbations and would thus conserve its energy for miles (Scott 2007, ff. p. 43). 
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find “oscillating soliton like structures” or “oscillons” in a wide class of fundamental models 
including “symmetry breaking in elementary particle physics, cosmology, and in condensed 
matter systems” (p. 115). He defines the oscillon as “any long-lived, oscillating coherent field 
configuration found in non-linear field models in arbitrary spatial dimensions. These can 
involve a single real scalar field […] or several interacting fields…” (p. 116).  
In line with Harris’s suspicion that scales will involve self-organized attractors, Gleiser 
shows that mathematically such oscillon systems “evolve into an attractor configuration” and 
“emerge spontaneously as a system attempts to regain thermal equilibrium after a sudden 
change in the nature of its interactions…” (p. 117). He goes on to say that “[i]t is during the 
early stages of this evolution to a new equilibrium state that self-organized oscillon-like 
patterns emerge…” (p. 122). It is because oscillons tend to emerge in phase Gleiser argues, 
that they act as “bottlenecks to equipartition”, meaning that oscillons “lock within them long-
wavelength modes, impeding them from interacting with shorter wavelength modes and thus 
from reaching equilibrium with the rest of the system” (p. 123).  
Considered together, Morrison’s appeal to “universality classes”, Batterman’s 
“protectorates”, and Glieser’s “oscillons” all agree with Harris’s conception of “ϕs” insofar as 
each depicts at least second-order emergence, and reflects a common capacity for 
instantiating laws at particular spatiotemporal scales. Hence, a way of further evaluating the 
applicability of ϕ is to consider the extent to which oscillons and phase transitions may 
provide a means of modelling and unifying the dynamics of a range of phenomena including 
gravitational fields, cells, ecosystems, brains, and societies.150 It must be noted that at this 
point it remains an open question as to whether respective ϕs are ontological or merely 
designate the epistemic joints of our theoretical and cognitive capacities, an issue to which I 
return in chapter 8.151  
 
                                                
150 Interestingly, the soliton has already provided a solution to Einstein’s field equations in Belinski, & 
Verdaguer’s (2001) Gravitational Solitons, and in recent years Tomizawa & Mishima (2014) have applied 
soliton solutions to Faraday rotation and black holes. As will be discussed below, soliton models have likewise 
proven useful for recent theories of cellular and neurodynamical phenomena. 
151 Though it is to my awareness not mentioned by any of the above authors, autocatikenetics is perhaps the 
oldest and most general theory of self-organization. I do not mention this theory any further however because 
those who appeal to it (e.g. Swenson 1991, ff. p. 215; Davis & Turveyy 2016, pp. 331-32) tend to misunderstand 
and inappropriately dispute autopoiesis. As will be argued below, autopoiesis does not result in relativism and 
can fit into many such theories of self-organization.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
From the above discussions, I conclude that Harris’s depiction of a necessary scale of 
forms is alive and well, albeit spread throughout a number of scientific and philosophic 
views. As discussed in § 5.2, Harris’s appeal to process metaphysics, dialectical relations, 
self-organization, and monism to describe cosmogenesis has anticipated various philosophical 
and scientific theories of complexity involving symmetry breaking, teleology, and evolving 
laws. In § 5.3, I have proposed that Harris’s conception of the ϕ can be identified in a number 
of interrelated theses concerning the interdependence of scales, second- and third-order 
emergence, the oscillon, protectorates, and universality classes in physics. As a consequence 
of this metaphysics being founded in GST, I have also proposed that the synthesis that has 
resulted from the above discussion can be considered the logical extension of AE into 
cosmology. 
Combining the lessons of these two sections it should be clear that Harris’s conception of 
cosmic evolution (E) is one of symmetry breaking, in which each bifurcation is characterized 
by a unique mode of governance (ϕ) that is literally a partial reflection of the whole (Concrete 
Universal). According to dialectical holism, it should be possible to trace this proposed scale 
of forms from the abiotic to the biological and the cognitive, revealing an uninterrupted chain 
that by Harris’s reasoning, could render life and human consciousness continuous with the 
organizing principles of matter. In the following chapter I examine the extension of ϕ and E 
to theories of life and evolution respectively, so as to lay a foundation for addressing Harris’s 
response to the hard problem of consciousness.152 
 
                                                
152 For a revised criteria of scales, see the below appendix, § IV-b. 
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Chapter 6 




In the previous chapters I have outlined Harris’s contention that the Universe must be 
conceived in terms of the dialectical whole. In chapter 4, I have discussed Harris’s TAP 
concerning his argument for the a priori necessity of consciousness. In these sections I have 
revealed significant empirical support for the unifying principle (or meta-law), but I have also 
shown that despite his ontological conclusions, Harris’s reasoning has thus far only permitted 
epistemic restrictions in how consciousness and the Universe can be discussed in certain 
philosophical camps. In chapter 5, I have argued that Harris’s original conception of 
cosmogenesis anticipates numerous theories in the philosophy of physics in general and 
reveals wider implications of AE metaphysics in particular. In this chapter I assess Harris’s 
success in extending his conception of unifying principles (ϕ) and explicative evolution (E) 
to biological phenomena. 
In § 6.2, The scale of life, I set out Harris’s necessary and sufficient conditions for life and 
in subsequent sections I compare these contentions with a number of contemporary accounts. 
The central issues to be discussed in this chapter will be whether the notion of the unifying 
principle (ϕ) can be applied to the simplest unit of life and if so, what if any further 
philosophical insight this provides into the natures of life, evolution, and mind. In § 6.3, 
Dialectical evolution, I outline and assess Harris’s argument that the explicative process E 
subsumes and broadens contemporary conceptions of biological evolution. The crucial 
question in this section is whether, formal governance in collective living systems provides 
teleological direction to biological evolution. In the final section I show that for both Harris 
and the AEs, positing formal governance across a range of biological systems implies the 
Gaia theory. The goal of this chapter is to present and clarify the dialectical holist stance on 
key topics in philosophy of biology so as to lay a theoretical bridge to Harris’s metaphysics of 
mind, to be discussed in the remaining chapters.  
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6.2 Harris’s Scale of Life 
It is widely accepted by biologists today that self-organization is explicable in terms of 
physical laws and chemistry, whereas self-preservation remains resistant to this kind of 
analysis. This difficulty has led to arguments that living systems cannot be understood 
mechanistically and so demand to be framed along the lines of either third-order emergence 
or (fourth-order) “irreducible complexity” as introduced above. In the present section I will 
show that a wide range of research in contemporary biology now supports Harris’s push for a 
paradigm shift concerning the nature of minimal life not as irreducibly complex but as 
naturally teleonomic and holistic. Specifically, I argue that Harris anticipates recent 
arguments for what can be called formal governance endorsed by AEs and GST biology more 
broadly.  
For Harris, biological self-preservation is an invaluable topic that any philosophy of 
Nature is required to address because if neglected, we are left with a glaring chasm between 
accounts of cosmos and mind. For Harris, self-preservation is both the mark of minimal life 
and also closes the gap between is and ought. In other words, life is considered yet another 
phase in the scale of forms that is characterized by norms. Anyone who follows this line of 
thought is charged with providing arguments for the following: (1) the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of life; (2) an explanation as to why satisfying these conditions should 
introduce norms; and (3) a systematic account of life as an instance of φ. 
In his attempt to identify the primary qualities that distinguish living from non-living 
systems, Harris notes four possible criteria but then adds that each can also occur in the case 
of non-living systems: (i) specific bodily form and structure (e.g. crystals); (ii) growth and 
development (e.g. ice); (iii) metabolic change, or continuous exchange of energy and 
chemical transformation within a stable form (e.g. fire); and (iv) reproduction (e.g. viruses) 
(1965, p. 163). Living systems he contends are both “self-regulatory” and “adaptive” (1965, 
p. 164). Following Schrodinger, Harris holds that in the scale of forms the growth and 
replication (i.e. self-organization) of “aperiodic crystals” such as chromosomes provide the 
transition step from the inorganic to those that distinguish living systems (1965, p. 171). 
These structures establish “new principles of combination” that are “selective and directive in 
special ways” (ibid). However, the line between living and non-living phenomena is marked 
by “process rather than simply of spatial pattern” (1965, p. 172) and denotes an “open 
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system” involving continuous matter and energy flow (1965, p. 173).153 For example, systems 
as simple as a Paramecium “actively pursues and accumulates energy supplies” (1965, p. 
178). Here he recognizes that the system maintains lower entropy within its boundary than 
that of its external context; the key questions are how and why does the system do so? 
Harris claims the “principle of order” (ϕ) for living systems is one of “self-maintenance” 
that at this stage is “termed functional”, in that “structure becomes secondary and 
instrumental” (1965, p. 180). His original proposal runs as follows: 
I propose to use the word ‘auturgy’, now rarely seen, to indicate the capacity of the living system 
to ‘work upon itself’ and spontaneously to adjust its own internal processes to external conditions 
so as to maintain its systematic coherence. I shall call an organization of chemical processes 
auturgic the interrelations of which are regulated according to an overriding principle of order in 
such a way as to maintain the system in being as an integral whole despite variations in external 
conditions. The activity of an auturgic system is regulated so as to maintain a steady state, and the 
system is nothing more nor less than the active process, mutually adjusted within it, that constitute 
this steady state. The various phases and aspects of these constitutive processes are in 
consequence mutually ends and means. Anything less than a system of this kind fails to qualify as 
an example of life (1965, pp. 180-181).154 
In other words, the function is considered one of adaptation via “negative feedback” in the 
face of environmental forces that would otherwise destroy the system (1991, pp. 64-65).  
Harris claims that the living system is a “polyphasic unity” that achieves “self-
maintenance […] not by eliminating or abolishing physico-chemical and thermodynamic 
laws, but by using them…” (1965, p. 182). Consequently, he holds we will not attain an 
adequate understanding of minimal life through analysis of a system’s parts, but must attend 
to its function. To do so he begins with the conception of a whole and its relations with an 
                                                
153 With this statement Harris appears to be emphasizing what is today the nonlinear relationship between 
organism and environment, widely regarded as a dynamic state far from equilibrium, e.g. Clayton (2004); Shutz 
(2011); Dehmelt & Bastiaens  (2011); Kauffman (2013); Hooker (2011).  
154 Harris’s purposes that initial emergence of living from the non-living may have been due to a “non-local 
faster than light influences” akin to the EPR experiment, which at “some threshold in the concrescence of 
convoluted polymers may have occurred in the primeval seas, which spontaneously initiated the generation and 
fecundation of living bacteria” (1991, p. 68). Harris made this appeal so as to defend his conclusion that living 
unitiy is implicit within and necessitated by prior processes of QM. Though this line of consideration is beyond 
the scope of the present thesis, Harris appears to have anticipated what is now a flourishing area of research 
concerned with the Quantum Aspects of Life (Abbott, et al., 2008).  
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environment. Here the “whole is ab initio prior to the parts, and the nature and interrelation of 
the parts are explicable only by reference to the systematic structure of the whole” (1991, p. 
68). This of course is an epistemic point about part and whole. In ontological terms Harris 
later makes two further claims: (i) there is “a constant interchange of energy and material 
between the living organism and its surroundings, so that strictly it is impossible to draw a 
sharp distinction between them; they are in organic interrelation” (2000, p. 121); and (ii) the 
“dominance of the whole over its constituent parts is more obvious and marked than in any of 
the inorganic forms. The organism is a dynamic, open system in which none of the metabolic 
processes can maintain itself, or even exist, apart from the totality” (ibid).155  
This is to say that directing our attention to the system’s boundary (fuzzy as it may be), 
affords a means of distinguishing and possibly characterizing the living via its functions not 
found in the inorganic. Claiming the whole is “more marked” in the living system than lower 
forms is to further emphasize that the living whole is its own scale in virtue of this function. 
In accordance with the scale of forms, life is thus “a new type of organization more fully and 
successfully exerting the general tendency of things in nature […] to form and elaborate 
wholes of ever-increasing stability and integration” (1965, p. 184). This capacity of auturgic 
systems he considered to be “a higher degree of self-reference and individuality…” (1991, p. 
64). By “self-reference” Harris means that metabolism and “self-determination” are linked in 
the organism and “foreshadow consciousness”: 
Within the organism, structure and functions are merely two aspects of a single process, 
constructive of the organ in the course of its functioning. The function, meanwhile, is always and 
only contributory to the maintenance and integrity of the system. Consequently, it is the system or 
whole that determines the nature and activity of the parts, and not vice versa, and it is this that 
constitutes the self-determination (or freedom) of the organism and distinguishes it, as a successor 
and further degree of wholeness to any simply physico-chemical entity… (1991, p. 66). 
In considering these claims it is important to remember that for Harris, wholeness at any 
scale is a process of relation. Hence, we may understand the ‘function of the organism’ to be 
                                                
155 Ayn Rand (1961) is among the first to have made a similar point with explicit reference to single celled 
systems (e.g. an amoeba, p. 4), claiming that the very existence of the living establishes value: “In answer to 
those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of 
reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of 
an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be 
achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So 
much for the issue of the relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’” (p. 5). 
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the system’s mode of relation, one that is to Harris’s mind, for the sake of the organism’s 
‘maintenance’. This means the organic “activity” is an on-going distinction of the system 
from its background for sake of itself, thus introducing ‘the first form of freedom’, or self-
determination. Hence, it is in virtue of the adaptive self-governance that the activities of the 
organism are believed to “transcend” those “processes occurring below the organismic level” 
and to provide an explanation of the organism’s parts (1965, p. 192).156  
In line with discussions from the previous chapter, what Harris here considers the 
simultaneous complementarity and opposition of organism and environment may now more 
elegantly be considered a further symmetry break in the scale of forms. He later adds, “the 
existence of feed-back is always a sure sign of auturgic wholeness and integral, polyphasic 
organization” (1965, p. 224). Harris is claiming that the living system, no matter the degree of 
complexity, must maintain its homeostasis by way of negative feedback, whereby disparate 
states can be identified and counteracted with respect to a ‘norm’ or steady state specified by 
the whole.  
Organism and environment are at one and the same time mutually continuous and mutually 
complementary, while also in opposition and conflict […] Life relates to the non-living as 
opposite, and equally as complement, and also as a new and higher degree of specification of the 
universal organizing principle of reality, now manifesting its unity in its own active and auturgic 
self-maintenance at a higher level of self-sufficiency and individual self-determination (1991, p. 
75). 
For example, “living growth is never the mere accumulation of material, but is always nicely 
regulated to fit the requirements of the total system” (1991, p. 69). Life then is considered a 
complexification and enfoldment of a pre-existing self-organizing nisus of Nature as a whole, 
i.e. adaptive freedom marks the φ of life. 
To Harris’s mind, it follows that auturgic wholeness introduces its own “nisus”, one 
directed “towards self-elaboration” (1965, ff. p. 208). He claims examples of this kind of 
adjustment include reconstructive processes in response to organic damage and removal of 
systemic components. Processes such as morphogenesis and embryogenesis he holds, not 
only begin but (perhaps more importantly) also stop in such a manner that mere efficient 
causation is inadequate for their explanations (1965, pp. 210-13). By Harris’s lights these are 
                                                
156 With this assertion, Harris (1991, p. 64) and later Thompson (2007, p. 152) follow Hans Jonas (1966), who 
articulated this very conception of freedom.   
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example of form that gives primacy to the field over the constituent effects of DNA, 
providing support for formal and final causation in individual organisms.  
The higher-level morphogenetic field restricts the probabilities of the lower levels. Accordingly, it 
would seem, not only are the structures hierarchical, but also the formative causation. Thus, in the 
case of developing structures, such as organisms, the higher-level morphic units (the system in its 
more complex forms) will exercise a directive influence upon the simpler and more germinal 
forms. In short, the causation is final, the efficient causation being provided, presumably, by 
physico-chemical activity (1991, p. 73).  
Additionally he suggests, “the strange attractor, with the forms it generates (of which the 
Mandelbrot set is the compendium), is the same thing as the morphogenetic field. Biological 
forms were, in fact, just what these scientists succeeded in generating in their computer 
graphics” (1991, p. 74). This is to claim the forms of life, just as an unfolding fractal, 
differentiate in in accord with an overarching principle of order.157 Ultimately he reasons, “we 
may regard self-maintaining systems, and explanation in terms of organizing relations, as 
teleological without ceasing to be scientific” (1965, p. 263). Thus Harris extends his 
teleological explanation discussed in the context of cosmology to living systems. 
As is discussed in the following sections, Harris’s broadening of causation in biology finds 
sympathy in current philosophical and scientific theories. Nevertheless, his theory of the 
living system as a scale of nature has certainly left a number of gaps that although partially 
addressed by AE, still require a great deal more argumentation to arrive at Harris’s 
conclusion. 
 
6.2.1 The Nature of Living-Being 
Towards an understanding of the nature of life it is instructive to begin by examining some 
of their necessary and sufficient conditions. Beginning just below the threshold of life, 
Dehmelt & Bastiaens (2011) have argued that “organization based on information stored in 
templates, blueprints, or recipes, such as the base sequence in DNA [are] not related to self-
organization. In contrast, self-organized processes display global pattern formation, based on 
                                                
157 To this end Harris follows Rupert Sheldrake’s speculative postulate of the morphogenetic field in 
combination with a marriage between chaos and biology (1991, p. 74). Since the connection of fractal geometry 
to biology has already demonstrated itself to be a fruitful (e.g. Wolfram, 2002; Scott, 2007; Hooker, 2011; 
Hancock, 2014), Sheldrake’s postulation of a (metaphysical) morphogenetic field appears redundant to the 
extent that it succeeds and excessively speculative to the extent that it posits as yet unseen forces of nature.  
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dynamic interplay and teamwork of lower-order system components” (p. 220). They go on to 
say that in such a self-organizing system the “organization is not imposed form outside”, 
rather what we may consider a second-order emergent pattern at the global level results from 
the rules specifying dynamic interactions among the system’s lower-level components using 
only local information (ibid). For this reason they contend such a global pattern (e.g. calcium 
waves, sand ripples, termite colonies, or Benard convection cells) can be understood as 
increasing the complexity or information of the system just in case it is open and far from 
equilibrium because energy is needed to sustain the global patterns that are created.  
However, Dehmelt, et al. continue, external regulators, receptors, and growth factors can 
be understood to execute pre-determined or template-based processes: “The information 
stored in the base sequence of genomic DNA is used to generate a complementary sequence 
of messenger RNA, which is then decoded to generate a protein. In that way, the genomic 
DNA can be understood as a recipe for generating a protein…” (p. 221). Self-organization is 
thus a prerequisite for living systems and their composite functions such as DNA 
transcription. If self-organization can be understood as wholly bottom-up processes as many 
authors maintain, the complex functions of living systems may eventually be reduced to the 
relations among what has been described above as first- and second-order emergent 
phenomena. However, what appears to be missing in analyses of this type is an account of 
periodic feedback that arises between the emergent form and the underlying constituents.  
Gleiser contends that life may be identified when “a certain level of morphological 
complexity is reached that allows for the spontaneous unfolding of functional complexity” 
while the function itself arises from form and again, “optimization may indeed play a key 
role” (Gleiser, 2004, p. 642). He goes on to say that over time “Living organisms must also 
keep their coherent structures, their ‘identities’” (ibid). He apparently agrees with both 
Thompson (2007, p. 212) and Harris (1991, pp. 65-66) that replication is clearly required for 
a species to survive but not for an individual organism to be alive: “Preservation of 
biochemical identity and interaction with the environment seem to suffice” (Gleiser, 2004, p. 
643).158 As a precursor to replication and genetic influence, Gleiser proposes, “some of the 
                                                
158 The most lucid argument to this effect is offered by Wolpert (2013). Embryogenesis, he contends, is a clear 
example of an increase in biological complexity over time, but one that reveals why evolution cannot be held 
responsible. “At best, one might argue that the embryo’s increase in complexity arose via competition occurring 
in the past, between its ancestors and their antagonists. This is a rather torturous connection between a current 
rise in complexity of a system and the process of natural selection. It also doesn’t address the possibility of 
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key physical mechanisms of living systems may be modelled with oscillon-like structures” 
(2013, p. 127). For example, oscillons demonstrate longevity and coherence of spatiotemporal 
structure in the face of environmental perturbation. Additionally, he points out, in the theory 
of phase transitions a perturbation can lead to nucleation, which permits the formation of 
crystals and bubbles, which can grow, fission, and fuse. This he believes would provide a 
“metabolism first” framework for protocells, within in which “more complex chemical 
reactions can occur” (2013, p. 127).159 
Following his SOFT theory (see § 5.2.2 above) Kurakin (2011) proposes that living and 
non-living systems can be understood as respective phases of matter characterized by the 
system’s ET chains. Under far-from-equilibrium conditions Kurakin says there is competition 
between alternative electron-conducting pathways and respective conformations within the 
intervening media. The pathways and conformations that are actually “selected and 
stabilized” within the animate media further depend upon the environment and internal state 
of a particular conducting medium. He argues that in a stable environment, the pathways and 
conformations that are optimized via electron transfer (ET) efficiency will persist longer than 
those that have proven to be less efficient:  
in order to persist and grow in size and complexity, any living organization must be coupled to a 
source of and a sink for energy/matter. Moreover, to survive and prosper in conditions of 
continuous competition with other living organizations and life forms for energy/matter flow, any 
living organism/organization will strive to couple to its environment, both physical and social, in 
such a way as to maximize the rate of energy/matter flow through its internal organization, while 
minimizing the cost of maintaining and managing this flow (p. 26). 
Accordingly, living matter originates from a plasma-like organizational phase and 
preserves essential characteristics of this phase as it develops and expands over ever larger 
“spatiotemporal scales in the form of an evolving multiscale hierarchical organization of 
energy/matter flow/circulation” (p. 56). Kurakin finds that both living systems and electrons 
move between ionized centres that are situated close enough to influence their nearby 
                                                                                                                                                  
hand-crafting an artificial embryo so that its complexity will rise in an artificial womb, without that womb 
having any ancestors” (p. 247). In other words, biological self-organization whether of an individual cell or 
development through ontogenesis is presupposed by natural selection rather than its effect. 
159 Towards a metabolism-first model, Davies (2008) considers the ‘citric-acid cycle’ to be one example of an 
autocatalytic system serving as a self-organizing precursor of living beings, “which forms the basis of 
intermediary metabolism” (p. 109). More recently, Zeravcica and Brennerc (2017) have made great strides 
towards such a model with their research on soft-matter self-organization involving colloidal spheres.  
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neighbours, which in both cases leads to collective dynamics. Based upon his principle of 
scale-symmetry, electrons passing between ionized centres in far-from-equilibrium conditions 
are believed to be responsible for the central characteristics of living systems. To illustrate 
this scale-free process shared by living and non-living alike, he notes that the plasma lamp is 
a common example of this very phenomenon. 
Plasmas are ionized gases, whereas living matter can be conceptualized as an ionized fluid-like 
condensed phase. Plasmas are electrically conductive, whereas living matter appears to exhibit 
both insulating and conductive properties and, thus, can be conceptualized as a disordered 
conductor… (p. 57).  
In clear support of Harris’s aim of modeling life as continuous with the cosmological E, 
Kurakin argues further that if the difference between living and nonliving matter is that of 
organization, then “life is a natural consequence of the evolution of nonliving matter. In other 
words, life is likely to be a rule rather than an exception in the Universe at large” (p. 26).160 
Similarly, Nikolai, et al.’s highly acclaimed (2014) paper advanced the argument that it is 
possible to identify a “general tendency in driven many-particle systems towards self-
organization into states formed through exceptionally reliable absorption and dissipation of 
work energy from the surrounding environment” (p. 1). They find that while this tendency is 
independent of self-replication and natural selection (p. 14), physical systems with sufficient 
energy input should be expected to develop towards adaptation and life. They contend that the 
structures that are most likely to form are the result “of competing pressures to fall to lower 
internal energy, to further increase heat dissipation through work absorption, and to dissipate 
that heat as reliably as possible” (p. 11). Thus their model purportedly shows  
why driven systems should tend preferentially to traverse organized states that have exceptional 
properties in terms of the reliable absorption and dissipation of energy for the particular driving 
environment they experience […] the driven system progresses to states that are better adapted to 
the drive over time, and it is clear that this emergent adaptation should be accompanied by 
                                                
160  In this vein Ball (2009) has argued extensively that among other phenomena, lightning, convective roll cells, 
and river networks are structures “that arise because they offer ‘channels’ for relieving energy stress and 
producing entropy efficiently”. Following a number of predecessors, he goes on to write, “life itself is an 
example of non-equilibrium regularity and structure”, what he considers one of a number of “inevitable ordered 
forms, waiting to burst forth as soon as the universe gets the chance” (p. 208). Additionally see de Duve’s 
numerous works (e.g. 1995 - 2008), in which he considers life as a cosmic imperative.  
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organization into particular special shapes whose physical properties would appear to us to be 
tailored to the features of the particular environment (p. 14).161 
Concerning self-organisation from the standpoint of complex systems theory, Hooker 
(2011) finds that in many cases there is no self that is doing the organizing, e.g. the 
emergence of crystal lattices in iron or convection rolls. He finds that while all living systems 
are “ipso facto non-linear, irreversible, open, self-organizing, globally constrained”, non-
living systems may also manifest one or more of these qualities (p. 35). However, as 
discussed above, Hooker claims the macro constraint of biological systems results in intrinsic 
global coherence, meaning functions of the system as a whole – such as the metabolic and 
chemotaxing processes of a cell – are irreducible to the kind of analysis found in (what I call) 
first- or even second-order emergence.  
Though the detail, especially the dynamical boundaries, vary in graded ways across living 
organisms, this autonomy requirement picks out all and only living individuals – from cells, to 
multicellular organisms to various multi-organism communities, including many suitable 
organized business firms, cities and nations. But because only autonomous systems have their 
functions serve their own physical regeneration, in turn supporting their functioning (they are 
‘recursive self-maintenant’ […]), they represent a distinctively new category of complex system 
organization (ibid). 
Walker (2014) has elaborated upon this premise, providing an argument that biological 
systems are a unique class of physical system characterized by their manner of creating and 
managing information. This conceptualization of living systems provides a novel way of 
framing the emergence of living from non-living, which she believes can be understood as a 
transition in causal information flow. Accordingly, living systems do not passively store 
information but they also process and use it to influence the physical world and themselves. 
Moreover, Walker argues that insofar as living systems are capable of “universal 
construction” that is, recreating all of their own components, the living being is “self-
                                                
161 They contend that “an endless variety of far-from-equilibrium many-particle Newtonian systems are capable 
of exhibiting self-organization phenomena in which strikingly patterned structures emerge in the presence of 
dissipative external drives” (Nikolai, et al., 2014, p. 23). The types of phenomena they have in mind include 
sand dunes, snowflakes, hurricanes, spiral bundles of protein filaments, and motors, a list that appears redundant 
after the above discussion concerning emergence. Indeed the “nonequilibrium world offers many test cases for 
the general hypothesis that organized, kinetically stable structures emerge and persist because their formation is 
reliably accompanied by extra work absorption and dissi-pation” (ibid).  
	   195	  
referencing” (p. 427). Taking these points together, she contends the influential aspect of 
information flow provides a top-down causal structure for the living system. 
Walker notes that “while information is abstract, in the sense that it involves one entity 
symbolically representing another, it is nonetheless physical and only exists when physically 
instantiated (it therefore holds similar ontological status to energy…)” (p. 430). So top-down 
causation by information control is purportedly achieved via the flow of information among 
and between the systems’ primary functions and has the goal of conserving these very 
functions. “Top-down causation operates through functional equivalence classes. Functional 
equivalence occurs when a given ‘higher-level’ state leads to the same high-level outcome, 
independent of which ‘lower-level’ state instantiates it” (p. 430). This means that there is a 
“decoupling of ‘software’ (information controlling the dynamics of the chemical system) and 
‘hardware’ (the chemical substrate)” (p. 435). She claims this decoupling signifies the 
transitions in the complexity of chemical systems that “enabled the emergence of new layers 
of control architectures (feedback from state to dynamics or top-down causation from 
‘software’ to ‘hardware’)” (p. 436).162 Thus Walker concludes, living systems are considered 
“a unique state of matter” characterized by self-creation, top-down causation, adaptive 
selection, and information control.163 
The research cited in this section has shown a number of mutually reinforcing ways that 
the processes characteristic of living being can be understood as an instance of third-order 
emergence. More specifically, these processes evidently make use of second-order emergent 
structures and as a result, life has been widely considered a (potentially inevitable) “phase of 
matter” resulting from processes of energy dissipation. These findings clearly agree with 
many of the founding premises of Harris’s theory of auturgy as a scale and are consistent with 
the arguments of the previous chapter. Specifically, Walker’s proposal for living process to be 
depicted as a ‘phase of matter’ that introduces functionality (multiple/universal realizability) 
fits with the above line of reasoning in that the ‘decoupling’ of higher and lower levels via 
                                                
162 In agreement with Harris’s above line of reasoning, Goodenough & Deacon (2006) contend, many have 
misunderstood this situation, claiming that in such simple semiotic systems, “the genes are driving the system, 
that genes are ‘selfish’, that genes rule […] Genomes are in fact the handmaidens of emergent properties, not the 
other way around” (p. 859).  
163 Walker’s (2014) theory is in line with Tononi’s integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT). In 
either case, she holds “φ quantifies how much information is generated by a physical system when it enters a 
particular state through the causal interactions among its elements, above and beyond the information generated 
independently by its parts” (p. 433). I discuss this theory at greater length in chapter 8 below. 
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functional equivalence may be considered a further symmetry break, continuous with 
previous levels of complexity. While, Walker’s conception of information flow fits with 
Harris’s claims that organic form instantiates a nisus, there remains a deeply puzzling 
question about the agent of causation: In what way can the organism as a whole be 
understood to use information? It is this issue to which I turn in the following section.164 
 
6.2.2 Agency and Formal Governance  
In equating living systems with a scale, what Harris has claimed is that we must recognize 
a new level of (formal) governance characterized by freedom, adaptation, and the 
instantiation of norms. To more precisely evaluate these claims, I now turn to a number of 
contemporary works that either explicitly or implicitly posit a theory of living systems in 
these terms.  
In a later work Harris (2006, pp. 118-19) follows Kauffman (2000) arguing that the 
transition from autocatalytic (or self-organizing) to living process is to be distinguished by 
‘actions made on one’s own behalf’, that both writers are happy to call agency. For example, 
Kauffman (2004) considers it reasonable to say a bacterium swimming upstream in a glucose 
gradient, “is acting on its own behalf in an environment”, it is what he calls an “autonomous 
agent” (p. 654). Positing agency, he maintains, demands something beyond the mere analysis 
of efficient relata. He claims that even in understanding matter, energy, entropy, and 
information we still cannot adequately account for this “organization of process” (2004, p. 
656). Apparently unaware of AE, Kauffman holds that in discussing cellular construction, 
propagation, and division, “we have, as yet, no developed language in physics, chemistry, or 
biology” (p. 661).  
For his argument, Kauffman has since appealed to Kant’s view of the organism, for which 
parts exist in virtue of their whole and vice versa. He holds that “the function of a part is its 
causal role in sustaining the existence of the Kantian whole” (2013, p. 168). However, the 
simplest kind of Kantian whole, collective autocatalytic sets (CAS), Kauffman maintains, 
cannot be captured by mechanistic Newtonian and efficient laws. Rather, he concludes, “the 
                                                
164 In agreement with Harris and the present above systematic assessment, Banavar & Maritan (2008) summarize 
seven characteristics that all living systems have in common: (i) building from the bottom up; (ii) uses a few 
themes to generate many variations; (iii) organizes with information; (iv) tends to optimize rather than 
maximize; (v) is opportunistic; (vi) competes within a cooperative framework; and (vii) is interconnected and 
interdependent with its environment (pp. 225-226). 
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theory of the spontaneous emergence of collectively autocatalytic sets is a new kind of law: a 
formal cause law” (2013, p. 171). Kauffman’s sustained thesis has been that positing agency 
on the basis of formal causation has significant implications for scientific explanation. For 
Kauffman, the autonomous agent introduces “a new state of matter”, in which the “function 
of a part of an organism is a subset of its causal consequences” (2004, p. 664). The very 
postulate of ‘function’ thereby depends upon the context of a self-creating, non-equilibrium 
system, which bring us for the first time (over the course of cosmic evolution) to consider 
“doings” rather than mere “happenings”. To understand the function of an organism’s agency, 
he concludes, “we must study the whole organism in its environment”, which he recognizes 
implies “an unavoidable holism to biology…” (ibid).165 
Articulating a position that is to my mind more precise than either Harris or Kauffman, and 
following Varela, Thompson (2007) defines an autonomous system as one in which “the 
constituent processes (i) recursively depends on each other for their generation and their 
realization as a network, (ii) constitute the system as a unity in whatever domain they exist, 
and (iii) determine a domain of possible interactions with the environment” (p. 44).166 
According to AE, the simplest systems to count as living such as prokaryotic bacteria cells, 
are more specifically considered autopoietic: the system is thermodynamically far-from-
equilibrium (constantly exchanging matter and energy with its surroundings), 
organizationally closed (the system is self-referential circular and recursive), operationally 
closed (the products of the system are reentrant) (p. 45), and coupled to an environment (the 
system’s motor activity loops through its environment to affect and enable its sensory 
capacities) (p. 49).  
In alignment with Harris’s understanding of wholeness as a process of completion, 
Thompson follows Varela and Goguen’s (1978), for whom the wholeness of a system is 
“embodied in its organizational closure”. In this vein, the whole is not the sum of its parts but 
                                                
165 The apparent inability of physics to account for the dynamics of living systems is responsible for inspiring 
Bertalanffy (1950) to first articulate general systems theory. See Hofkirchner & Schafranek (2011) for an 
excellent historical introduction to the paradigm.  
166 Whereas an ant colony may be autonomous, it is not autopoietic because the components do not bear a 
circular causal relationship with its boundary. Similarly, allopoietic systems such as ribosomes or vesicles are 
not autonomous since they lack this circularity, their end product being different from themselves. Viruses are 
exemplified as systems that are also non-autonomous because outside of a host they “do not exchange matter or 
energy with the environment” and are “completely inert […] subject to the vicissitudes of the environment” (p. 
123). 
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rather, the “organizational closure of its parts” (Thompson 2007, p. 449). For example, 
accounting for how the system orients itself with respect to sugar concentrations, “the local 
molecular effects happen as they do because of the global organizational context in which 
they are embedded. And it is this global level that defines the bacterium as a biological 
individual and sucrose as food” (p. 75). So, he continues, self-preservation instantiates a 
relation “between organism and environment that is meaningful and normative” (ibid). This 
may also be taken to mean the system is adaptive in maintaining autopoietic coupling to its 
environment. Additionally, Thompson endorses teleology as follows: (i) because an organism 
is a self-organized being (being both cause and effect of itself), it is “intrinsically 
teleological”; (ii) teleology, he claims cannot be subsumed under efficient causation or 
mechanism of non-living systems, since the two are “incommensurable in principle”; and (iii) 
any extension of efficient causes in biology would still have to be understood within the 
context of the teleological organism (2007, p. 130).  
Hence, environmental coupling implies an instantiation of meaning and norms in all living 
systems for both AE and Harris. Considering the above, this is a conclusion that Kauffman 
should likewise be willing to endorse. However, this does not yet provide a clear response to 
Walker’s above conception of top-down causation in living systems. In agreement with Harris 
and AEs (though citing neither), Walsh (2008) maintains “[u]nreduced teleology is a 
legitimate, wholly natural explanatory mode; moreover, it is not only available to 
evolutionary biology, it is indispensable […] It is naturalistically acceptable, metaphysically 
unimpeachable, and explanatorily autonomous” (p. 113). In the case of living systems he 
argues, because the organism is the cause and consequent of its own self-organization, self-
reproduction, and self-nourishment, such goal-directed processes “cannot be accounted for 
by pure mechanism alone. Teleology is needed to account for the distinctive characteristics of 
organisms” (p. 115).  
Concerning the relationship between parts and whole of the organism, Walsh actually 
endorses dialectical relations and scales without recognizing it. The parts of an organism, he 
holds, are created by the organism itself and have the properties they do “because of the goals 
of the organism that it subserves […] each part is explained by the overall functioning of the 
organism, and the function of the organism is realized by and explained by the parts” (ibid). 
Walsh proposes formal causation as a means of retaining teleological explanation in biology: 
“The matter of which an organism is constituted is organized by the form. At the same time, 
the form of an organism is realized in, and constrained by, its matter. In biology, as in any 
other natural science, one must know both the form and the matter” (p. 119). By implication, 
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individual functions cannot be used to prescribe teleology to a system. Rather he contends, 
‘adaptiveness’ affords the irreducible teleological description (p. 130). While statements of 
this kind are in agreement with Thompson, Kauffman, and Harris’s notion of teleology, the 
physical locus of organic causality remains unclear. 
In apparent agreement with the above, Hooker (2011) holds that the functions of a living 
system are both cause and effect of itself, which requires appealing to “holistic, organisational 
features” including “autonomy” that are “central to being alive” and “cannot be captured by 
analysis into machine mechanisms” (p. 45). Nevertheless, he voices reservations with respect 
to autopoiesis on account of its strict requirement of operational closure. These concerns are 
however with reference to much earlier articulations of the theory (e.g. Maturana 1981, § 2.2) 
that did not emphasise adaptive meaning making or environmental coupling, which implies 
an additional openness of dynamic states.167 In clear agreement with current AE conceptions, 
Hooker holds “[a]utonomous self-regeneration constitutes the fundamental mental basis for 
normative evaluation because it is the sine qua non and reference point for all else” (pp. 46-
47). Moreover he claims, meaning depends upon adaptivity, which is the system’s “capacity 
to alter its specific traits in mutually coordinated ways so as to […] satisfy autonomy in, a 
wider range of life-environments than its current one” (p. 47).168  
Hooker’s latter point is indeed quite loaded and will require further consideration in the 
following section, but at this point it is useful to consider whether the present account is 
descriptive or if it provides explanatory value as well. Recent works concerning adaptation 
and learning in relatively simple organisms may provide an example of explanatory import, 
or rule it out. For example, Mitchell et al. (2009) have argued that anticipation analogous to 
“Pavlovian conditioning” has been identified in single celled organisms and acts as an 
adaptive trait. Their research purportedly demonstrates that over the span of a few 
generations, E. coli can be conditioned to anticipate changes of sugar types within their 
environment by activating the agentic pathways appropriate for metabolism based upon a 
learned response to otherwise unrelated stimuli:  
pre-exposure to the stimulus that typically appears early in the ecology improves the organism’s 
fitness when encountered with a second stimulus. Additionally, we observe loss of the conditioned 
                                                
167 Thompson recognises the confusion that has resulted from conflating operational and organizational closure, 
pointing out that Varela did not distinguish between the two  (2007, p. 448 end note 4).  
168 Harris’s response to these conceptions of mentality and the purported openness of autonomous or autopoietic 
systems will require further consideration in the following section.  
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response in E. Coli strains that were repeatedly exposed in a laboratory evolution experiment only 
to the first stimulus […] Our work indicates that environmental anticipation is an adaptive trait 
that was repeatedly selected for during evolution and thus may be ubiquitous in biology (p. 220). 
To my mind, this is precisely what should have been hypothesized on either Harris or AE’s 
account. Insofar as further evidence can be provided in support of such adaptive anticipation 
or ‘learning’, the organism may be understood to exert a dynamic downward constraint on its 
internal functions on the basis of recognized stimuli.  
Getting to the heart of the issue, considering the organization of living systems Tabaczek 
(2013) calls for pluralistic causality. By Tabaczek’s lights (and in agreement with 
Thompson’s above remarks § 5.2.1) the downward causation (DC) of living systems cannot 
be understood in terms of efficient causation without conflicting with the efficient causation 
already apparent at lower levels. The way beyond this impasse is to hold that the causal 
influence of an emergent system on its components is not efficient but formal, in that the form 
of a system constrains the interactions of its constituents. However, “the higher level is not a 
concrete substance, but an organizational level […] understood by analogy to the concept of 
‘attractor’ in a dynamical system that is a steady state toward which the system may evolve” 
(p. 396).169  
Taking Hooker, Tabaczek, and Mitchell et al. together appears to provide a possible 
dialectical holist response to Walker’s above comments on top-down causation and 
information flow. The steady state may be established not just through organic response to 
recognizable information, but rather, the information and maintenance of the steady state 
would have to reciprocally define and create one another. This is to say that the organism 
makes and uses information in “meaningful” or “normative” ways precisely because it is 
sensitive to and may make adjustments for the sake of its steady state. This steady state can 
further be considered the form or organisational closure of the system that specifies a viable 
space of environmental coupling, beyond which the system dies. Again, this means the 
organism does not supervene upon its lower level constituents or efficient causal chains 
because as a whole, the living system only exists in and through time as an open-ended (4D) 
trajectory specified by its steady state.170 
                                                
169 For technical details concerning chaos and attractors in individual cells see Grytsay, & Musatenko, (2013). 
170  Though space prevents my further discussion of the issue, Bohm’s extension of the implicate order to the 
nature of living systems is largely in agreement with the contentions of this section and the previous. For further 
details see Pylkkanen (2007, ff. p. 84) and Bohm (1969a/b).  
	   201	  
It should be clear at this point that Kauffman, Thompson, Walsh, Hooker, and Tabczek’s 
arguments are really clarifications of third-order emergence, as introduced in § 5.3. Positing 
unique forms of governance for the living system, each thesis offers support for Harris’s 
contention that the living system can be considered a scale characterized by minimal freedom 
and norms. With these perspectives to consider, the living process may be more intimately 
related to non-living systems by instantiating a higher order of self-organization and 
downward constraint, i.e. what Harris considered another instance of ϕ. Although much more 
discussion is needed to assess this possibility, it can be concluded that Harris finds significant 
support in contemporary philosophers of biology concerning agency, self-organization, and 
self-preservation. What must now be considered in greater detail are conceptions of sentience 
and goal directed behavior in simple living systems. 
 
Conceptualizing Minimal Cognition and Intentionality 
In this section I aim to reconcile what appears to be an un-intentional contradiction 
committed by Harris in discussing the relationship between life, intentionality, and minimal 
cognition. According to AE, an autopoietic (or auturgic) system demonstrates minimal 
intentionality and cognition in virtue of adaptation and discrimination (as previously 
discussed in § 2.3). I claim that although he initially disagrees with this conclusion, Harris’s 
own reasoning leads him to the same conclusions. To reveal this contradiction I examine 
discrepancies across Harris’s earlier (1965, 1991) and later (2006) works and compare his 
reasoning with Thompson’s (2007) arguments.  
In some of his earliest remarks on the issue Harris claims that the existence of a simple 
type of sensation can be established on the basis of behavioural analysis.  
In its most elementary form, conscious behaviour is that which depends upon sensitivity. It is 
response to a stimulus and the behaviouristic formula S-R, is […] a tacit admission of the 
presence at least of sensation, for what is not felt cannot stimulate behaviour. In a mere chemical 
reaction there is neither stimulus nor response but only interchange of matter and energy (1965, p. 
296). 
For Harris, rather than a state of consciousness, he considers that “feeling” broadly “covers 
sentience of every kind prior to discrimination of modalities or the distinctions between 
sensation, emotion and pleasure-pain tonality” (p. 310). From the above we obtain the 
argument, if there is behaviour there must be some kind of feeling. Additionally, Harris 
appears content to extend behaviour to any living system that acts on its own behalf, e.g. a 
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Paramecium swimming toward oxygen (1991, p. 107). Thus for Harris, if a system is living 
and acting on its own behalf it is endowed with feeling.  
In later writings Harris reserves the term intentionality for referring to higher levels of 
conscious awareness and deliberate choice (e.g. 2000, p. 85; 2006, p. 40). Harris reasons that 
because “in primitive sentience there is no discrimination of feeling, self and other (subject 
and object) […] there is no intentionality” (1991, p. 107). Harris argues that “[i]f sentience is 
a higher degree of unity than physiological organicism, it will transform physiology into 
behaviour, which is a single activity of discriminative response to a presented situation…” (p. 
108). He contends that with primitive sentience, “the organism has internalized the diversity 
of the physical and biotic world as a single and confused whole of feeling […] what may be 
called the psychical field” (p. 109). Importantly, this ‘primitive psychical field’ is believed to 
be ‘non-discriminative’ and ‘homogenous’ until attention is introduced (p. 110). He reasons 
that a primitive sentient system “being indiscriminate, is necessarily pre-perceptual, which 
means that it is precognitive” (p. 111). With these remarks Harris is arguing that if sentience 
introduces a further degree of wholeness to the scale of forms, it should be identifiable by an 
increase in functionality. Such systems endowed with primitive sentience are non-intentional 
and non-cognitive.  
In the following passage Harris establishes a more in-depth definition of attention as a 
requirement for intention and cognition: 
Because sentience has a diverse and variegated content that (as merely sentient) is indiscriminate, 
it is in contradiction with itself. On the one hand, its unity demands the amalgamation of its 
constituent qualities into a whole, while, on the other, its wholeness implies and requires 
differentiation. The contradiction needs to be resolved, and the sentient organism fulfills this need 
by turning its sentient activity back upon itself. The felt impulse of the organism to maintain its 
systematic coherence, differentiated as it is into specific urges, directs the sentient activity upon 
special features that answer to its present demands, so that it concentrates itself in the selective 
operation of attention (1991, pp. 111-12).  
Here Harris is arguing that attention, while differentiating a field of sensation, serves to unify 
the sensing organism into a self in contrast to the outside world. By Harris’s view such 
attention is the hallmark of some degree of consciousness. He further qualifies this point: 
“Only after a minimal figure-and-ground complex has been singled out by attention from the 
sentient field can the experience be described as cognitive” (1991, p. 113). Harris’s claim that 
consciousness requires cognition of one’s self (the subject-object distinction) appears 
unobjectionable. However his separation of figure-ground distinction from the primitive 
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sentience of living systems simply does not follow from his previous remarks. For if 
behaviour is linked with a ‘discriminative response’ to a sensed situation and simple living 
beings are understood to be capable of goal-directed behaviour on the basis of self-
preservation, they already meet Harris’s conditions for intentionality and cognition.  
The “pull in the direction of self-maintenance” constitutes what Harris calls a felt interest 
for the system to direct “attention to the relevant element in the psychical field” (1965, p. 
326). This is to say that attention acts as the means of organizing the field and provides what 
he calls an “auturgic nisus that directs the organization of the living system as a whole” (ibid). 
He concludes that “[a]ttention, felt want or appetite, leading to desire, are the expressions of 
auturgy raised to the psychical phase […] They are, as Spinoza averred, the conatus in suo 
esse perseverare, expressing itself on the level of life and mind” (1965, p. 328).  
In a later text, Harris appears to realize that he had previously created an unnecessary gap 
between phases of life and mind and grants this very conception to all living systems. He 
proposes that “attention” is “agency operating on the psychical level. If this is correct the 
innate ability to direct attention to arresting sensations is neither more nor less than being 
alive. It is the innate urge to self-preservation” (2006, p. 119). Hence, in all cases of living 
systems he maintains, there must be some level of attention to a diversity of feelings in 
response to internal and external stimuli: 
On the hypothesis I am putting forward, it would be legitimate to presume that even a single 
celled animal, being already a highly complex, integrated organic system, might be in some 
degree sentient. If so, a presumed feeling of privation and discomfort in Paramoecium might be 
assuaged by chance contact with a bubble and the protozoan, being alive, might be capable of 
“learning” by association of this feeling of relief with bubbles (ibid).171  
Ultimately, the contradiction Harris identifies at the biological level is here not the same as 
that of his dialectical scales. This contradiction is only in his use of terms. Indeed 
discriminative sensation and action are exactly what the paramecium above is claimed to 
achieve and consequently, it meets Harris conditions for cognition. In addition the system 
                                                
171 In all his works, we find only one instance in which Harris mentions autopoiesis. He makes reference to 
Maturana and Varela’s (1980) Autopoiesis and Cognition, to which he remarks that it is by no means new, 
originating from Aristotle, but that it is certainly in line with his understanding of the irreducibility of an 
organism to its parts. Nevertheless, he finds fault with the theory on account of its being potentially relativistic 
concerning how such a system makes meaning (2006, p. 171). See (1965, pp. 327-28) for Harris’s nearest 
anticipation of this theory.  
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may be understood to be about the sensed differences of its environment on the basis of its 
self-preservation, thus instantiating minimal intentionality.  
According to AE, all living systems are said to exchange matter and energy with their 
environment and orient themselves according to what they sense. Moreover, what they sense 
is said to depend upon how they are able to orient themselves within their environment. This 
sensorimotor feedback loop establishes the self-world distinction: 
Whereas autopoietic closure brings forth a minimal “bodily self” at the level of cellular 
metabolism, sensorimotor closure produces a “sensorimotor self” at the level of perception and 
action. In the one case the passage from network closure to selfhood (and correlative otherness) 
happens at the level of an active semipermeable boundary or membrane, which regulates 
interaction with the outside environment. In the other case it happens at the level of behavior and 
intentional action. In both cases we see the co-emergence of […] selfhood and a correlative world 
or environment of otherness… (Thompson 2007, p. 49).  
By this reasoning, adaptive living systems satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
autopoiesis, thus fulfilling the criteria for mind: “First, the instantiation of the autopoietic 
organization in an actual, concrete system entails a cognitive relation between that system and 
its environment. Second, this cognitive relation reflects and is subordinated to the 
maintenance of autopoiesis” (p. 124).172 Certain aspects of the organism’s environment 
hereby count as relevant cues for the alteration of its behavior, i.e. the organism as a whole is 
informed.173 This means cognition “is behavior or conduct in relation to meaning and norms 
that the system itself enacts or brings forth on the basis of its autonomy” (p. 126). Thompson 
later summarizes:  
 
(i) Autopoiesis entails the emergence of a bodily self;  
(ii) The emergence of a self entails the emergence of a world;  
(iii) The emergence of a world is equated with sense making/enaction; thus  
                                                
172 Minimal autopoiesis consists only of this maintenance of identity in the circular process of material exchange 
but it lacks a metabolic network. Autopoiesis plus adaptivity (i.e. active monitoring of internal homeostatic or 
homeodynamic mechanisms) are required for meaning making according to Thompson (p. 148-49). As he 
further admits, a living material system requires the proactive quality of the latter (e.g. searching for food). To 
my mind this terminology is excessive in that the former may just as well be considered autocatalytic.  
173 In clear agreement with autopoiesis (though it remains un-cited), Shapiro contends that “[l]ife requires 
cognition at all levels” (2011, p. 7; pp. 143-44). Also see Shapiro (2007) and Spiro (2009).  
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(iv) “Intentionality arises from the operational closer and interactive dynamics of 
autopoiesis” (p. 159).  
 
Hence for AE, meaning-making (cognition), and intentionality are believed to be 
indispensable in describing the functionality of the living system. It can thus be seen that both 
Harris and AE agree that if minimal sentience is the regular response of a physical self-
organized system to elements of its external environment, then minimal intentionality is no 
more or less than such a system’s capacity for differentiated response to elements of its 
environment on the basis of self-preservation. Rather than an intrinsic property of a system, 
cognition is constituted by a necessary and sufficient dynamical (and dialectical) relation 
between a living system and the wider system to which it belongs. Importantly, as AE 
maintains, there exists an “interactional asymmetry” between organism and environment 
because the former can adaptively “modulate” its coupling to the environment (Thompson 
2011, p. 121). Illuminated by Harris’s metaphysics, intentionality of living systems (i.e. the 
co-emergence of self and Other) can be understood to introduce a further symmetry break in 
accord with E.  
To my mind, the most sympathetic interpretation of Harris’s line of thought regarding the 
natures of cognition and intentionality is twofold: First one should exclude his earlier 
conclusion that non-discriminating, non-intentional sentience may be found in auturgic 
systems because this claim is inconsistent with the rest of his system; and second, permit 
Harris’s later claims regarding differentiation of “attention” and “feeling” to extend to any 
behaving, living system as per his (2006) assertions. For Harris, at a certain level of 
functional complexity we find the emergence of purposeful discrimination on the basis of 
self-preservation, whereas for AE linking this discrimination to self-preservation in its 
simplest physiological instantiation entails that minimal cognitive intentionality is attributed 
to all living systems. I maintain that Harris is most charitably understood as agreeing with AE 
on this point and so dialectical holism remains consistent. 
 
6.3 Dialectical Evolution 
Extensive debates surround the nature, parameters, mechanisms, and possible trajectory of 
biological evolution. With this in mind, in clarifying dialectical evolution (as with previous 
sections) I confine myself to explaining Harris’s ideas and elucidating connections these ideas 
bear to contemporary research. More specifically, I aim to show that various conclusions 
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regarding the unit of selection and teleological evolution (i.e. formal governance) follow from 
Harris’s depiction of the emergence of living systems (§ 6.2) and are consistent with recent 
works in systems biology. For Harris, the goal of this stage of his thesis is to reconsider E in 
light of biological processes in order to establish a seamless bridge from cosmological to 
biological evolution. Harris’s strategy to address the increase of biological complexity takes a 
number of steps that ultimately conclude with his proposal for directed evolution.174  
(1) Mechanisms of evolution – From the outset Harris argues against Neo-Darwinism and 
the notion that random variation and natural selection are sufficient to create the life forms we 
observe today. As with the rest of his philosophical discussions, Harris maintains we must 
begin by positing a dialectical whole, which in this instance is the self-organizing auturgic 
system. He claims the “presumption of its existence must be made before we can speak of 
mutation or selection or even of accidental change” (1965, p. 230). It is by careful 
examination of this presupposed system that Harris believes we might arrive at a more 
accurate understanding of evolution. Harris holds, “selection by itself cannot produce specific 
changes. Only mutation can do that” (1965, p. 227). Though mutations do occur randomly, he 
maintains that not all known mutations are random and we have yet to establish all the causes 
of mutation. In this vein Harris argues that if natural selection presupposes reproducing 
organisms capable of “inherent adaptability […] however much may be effected by random 
mutation and natural selection, they cannot be the only determining principles in the 
evolutionary process” (1965, pp. 232). He points out that, if mutations were to occur 
independently they would likely be deleterious to the organism at each step and selected 
against. Moreover, he considers it improbable that mutations “should occur one by one in the 
right order, even if interspersed with disadvantageous modifications…” (1965, p. 235).175 
Such stepwise random development he claims, would have taken far longer than the time 
available over evolutionary history and so some other mechanism is needed.  
(2) Information – For Harris, considering the relationship between information and the 
organism provides insight into the nature of evolving forms. “Information is equivalent to 
                                                
174 In this section, as with those above, the central argument I am depicting on Harris’s behalf was originally 
posited in his 1965 work and I have included citations from later works only to supplement further details of his 
reasoning.   
175 For example, Harris argues that “in embryogenesis (which often recapitulates evolution), the retinal nerve 
stimulates the development of the lens long before it is ever exposed to light, implying that neither is due to an 
independent chance variation” (2000, p. 122). 
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form. It is technically defined as negative entropy (or order) and corresponds, in general, to 
structure or organization. That the organism is a system with a specific form means that it 
contains information” (1991, p. 66). This information, Harris maintains is what natural 
selection acts upon and importantly “without specific form there would be nothing to 
select…” (1991, p. 66). Harris understands Neo-Darwinian selection as a negative force, 
whereby the unfit is eliminated but “makes no positive contribution” to the organism that is 
‘fit’ (1991, p. 80). The negative selection effect of Neo-Darwinism, he claims, “applies only 
to the occurrence of disadvantageous variations […]”, but selection must also provide “a 
positive effect in making successful varieties predominant in the population, so that fresh 
mutations will occur, for the most part, in forms already best adapted to the environment” 
(1991, pp. 80-81). Towards this end he contends that the genome influences traits as a whole 
system, which precludes piecemeal random mutations being responsible for the increase of 
complexity. “Geneticists have established that single genes do not control or determine single 
characteristics, but that the chromosome functions as a whole, as does, in fact, the entire 
genome” (1991, p. 84. See also 1965, p. 243; 2000, p. 123). In this way he proposes that the 
information or form of an organism provides a directing constraint or positive/physical 
selection effect (PSE) on future mutations.  
(3) Neo-Lamarckianism – Concerning the “interplay of structure and function” he claims, 
a “mutation affecting any aspect of either must relevantly affect some fact in the other for the 
system to work” (1965, p. 237, emphasis added). He maintains that heredity of adaptive traits 
is not limited to genetic material but crucially involves behavior, e.g. Venusia Veniculata 
tucking its antennae so as to aid in camouflage (p. 238). According to Harris what is utterly 
missing from the Neo-Darwinist picture of ‘random mutations and selection’, is a process of 
integration and diversification, a “principle” that is present for the “organism as a whole” in 
relation “with its environment” (ibid). Here, Harris intends to unify his conceptions of self-
preservation and development with evolution under the guiding notion that the same 
principles apply, albeit on different scales: “the process of evolution, like metabolism, growth 
and development […] may be described as a process giving rise, for the most part, to 
progressively more highly organized systems, more diversified yet more closely unified, more 
efficient and auturgically self-maintaining” (p. 242). Harris admits that by this reasoning 
“Lamarckian evolution is simulated” (p. 246). This means that an organism’s acquisition of 
traits through adaptive environmental interaction (intentionality) plays a central role in 
evolution.  
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(4) Collective Organization – By this view, “reproduction” is considered another “process 
of self-maintenance”, through which selection (of another form) can operate (1965, p. 247). 
Harris argues that what is selected are the systems that “decrease entropy and increase 
information. As this goes counter thermodynamic trends, it requires for its explanation some 
nisus towards greater order and complexity, some organismic principle” (1991, p. 84). In a 
later work he finds that the arrival of multicellular organisms is an example of just such an 
increase in wholeness and information. He argues that as evolution proceeded,  
to maintain themselves more effectively, single cells collected together in colonies and adjusted 
their functioning one to another. The colonial creatures subsequently become more organically 
integrated as multicellular individuals with organs functioning mutually as means and ends one to 
another and each to the whole (1988, p. 67). 
Harris says mutations are “integrated” into their wider ecosystem and then “what is selected 
is the more efficiently self-maintaining and self-determining whole” (1991, p. 84). In the case 
of multicellular systems this means that we are witnessing the emergence of a higher order 
constraint, i.e. a new unifying principle (φ). As with individual cells, self-determination of a 
collective system is characterized by an increase in “versatility and freedom” in virtue of the 
organism’s “behaviour” (ibid). Behaviour is again considered “informed” and “purposive” 
activity in the service of increasing coherent wholeness (1991, p. 90).  
(5) Gaia – Harris extends this reasoning concerning the wholeness of an individual cell to 
the biosphere, originally advocating for “biocoenosis” (1965, ff. p. 251; 1987, p. 195). He 
claims that the ecological niche within which organisms live is itself to be considered a 
biologic whole (1988, p. 76). In addition the “world of life as a whole is thus a single system 
of interlocking life-processes […]” and he maintains that the biosphere “supervenes in time”, 
rather than space, upon the concentric inorganic levels of the earth (1965, p. 252). Organisms 
thus “belong to larger and more comprehensive biological unities in the sphere of life, just as 
in that of physics we find an over-arching polyphasic unity composed of members which are 
themselves polyphasic unities, and these are so united as to form a hierarchy” (p. 253). 
Evolution then, is an “on-gong directional process” involving the “continuous self-
organization of an entire world” (ibid). Harris concludes that “organism and environment are 
inseparable, and in the last resort we are dealing with a single totality – the biosphere – the 
morphology of which is generating and incorporating focal organisms in a single process” (p. 
277). Ultimately Harris recognizes that just as each living system is in a “symbiotic” 
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relationship with its environment, the same must be said of individual ecosystems, thus he 
endorses the “Gaia theory” (1991, ff. p. 94).  
In a later work Harris summarizes his conclusion, stating that at the scale of biological 
evolution we again find the same unifying principle considered heretofore: “the concrete 
universal which differentiates itself into its own particulars. The process of life, of 
metabolism, reproduction and evolution, all mutually continuous, constitute a single 
indivisible process of self-differentiation of one whole, in effect, a cosmic organism” (1988, 
p. 78).176 Hence, for Harris, evolution may be understood as an instance of the same self-
organizing cosmic process, now manifest across individual and collective levels of living 
systems. To vindicate his contentions then, requires identifying common self-directing 
principles of individual organic behaviour and ecological constraint that supports the sort of 
Neo-Lamarckian feedback loop Harris has in mind.  
 
6.3.1 Evolution According to Systems Biology  
The goal of this section is to consider the impact of systems biology upon the traditional 
Neo-Darwinian view, and to assess what bearing the paradigm has in relation to Harris’s line 
of reasoning as outlined in the previous section. Towards this end it is instructive to begin 
with a summary of the prevailing account of Neo-Darwinism (Hewlett 2006, p. 175; Lennox 
2007, p. 80; Schuster 2011, p. 45):  
 
(1) There are several mechanisms of evolution including natural selection, random genetic 
mutation, and genetic drift. 
(2) Characteristics are inherited as discrete entities called genes and population variation is 
due to different alleles of a gene. 
(3) Changes in genes are due to mutations that occur randomly, i.e. they are unpredictable. 
(4) The traits of an organism (phenotype) are the direct expression of difference in genetic 
information (genotype), i.e. adenine, cytosine, thymine, and guanine. 
(5) Natural selection acts on the information of genes composed of base pairs that make up 
chromosomes by excluding those genetic variants with lower reproductive fitness 
from succeeding generations.  
(6) Speciation is due to the (typically gradual) accumulation of individual genetic changes 
in accordance with natural selection. 
                                                
176 For a summary of the resulting argument for dialectical evolution, see the below appendix, § IV-c. 
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The changes that occur are believed to have no inherent directionality and are constrained 
only by the requirement that they produce viable organisms. The upshot, Newman (2011) 
claims, is that the “possible evolutionary steps that can be taken in any lineage, therefore, are 
only those phenotypic modifications that occur as a consequence of genetic variation” (pp. 
235-36).  
Arguments have begun to accumulate however that the Neo-Darwinian picture of 
evolution by these mechanisms is antiquated. Shapiro (2011) finds that this view has been 
retained by contemporary writers not for scientific, but for philosophical reasons. In place of 
this view he maintains, we must make room for the paradigm of systems biology as supported 
by the most recent empirical research. Accordingly, genetic variation is not the only factor 
influencing phenotype modification and genetic change along with other mechanisms can 
occur after the organism’s primary form and functions have developed. This implies the 
relationship between the whole system and its environment plays a crucial role in an adequate 
understanding biological evolution. In this vein, theoretical chemist Peter Schuster (2011) 
holds that while reduction is a necessary methodological tool for understanding complex 
biological phenomena via molecular mechanisms, ontological irreducibility reigns in 
contemporary biology (p. 46). 
Appealing to systems biology, AE has gone some way to embracing this paradigm and in 
doing so resonates with Harris’s original thesis. Thompson maintains, rather than seeing the 
gene as information, “information is what counts as information for some process at some 
time” (2007 p. 191). Likewise, Hutto, et al. (2013) note that instead of being “directed by 
information” in genes, “the relevant structures become manifest only through a 
developmental process in which factors belonging to the organism and factors belonging to its 
environment play equally important roles” (pp. 33-34). In this vein, AE agrees with and 
elaborate upon Harris’s view of information. Specifically, Thompson explains that this means 
“information is context-dependent and agent-relative; it belongs to the coupling of a system 
and its environment. What counts as information is determined by the history, structure, and 
needs of the system acting in its environment” (2007, pp. 51-53).  
By extension, Thompson recognizes the chicken and egg state of affairs we are left with 
concerning DNA and proteins: “proteins can arise only from a DNA/RNA “reading” process, 
but this process cannot happen without proteins.” He goes on to say that “the DNA “writing” 
and “reading” processes must be properly situated within the intracellular environment, but 
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this environment is a result of those very processes” (pp. 55-56). As a result he contends that 
the information of DNA is embodied in autopoietic unity:  
it is unacceptable to say that DNA contains the information for phenotypic design, because this 
statement attributes an intrinsic semantic-informational status to one particular type of component 
and thereby divests this component of its necessary embedding in the dynamics of the autopoietic 
network. It is this network in its entirety that specifies the phenotypic characteristics of a cell, not 
one of its components, and it is this network as a whole that serves as the precondition and causal 
basis of DNA replication […] information exists only as dynamically embodied (p. 57).  
Central to an AE critique of Neo-Darwinian, or ‘genocentric evolution’, is the claim that 
evolution will continue just in case there are heritable traits, irrespective of the mechanisms 
(p. 176). For example, phenotypes can be transmitted via mechanisms other than DNA 
replication, called “epigenetic inheritance systems.”177 Indeed, as he points out, many 
organisms including humans, pass on their symbiotic bacterial partners directly to their 
offspring.178  
Concerning the software/hardware metaphor for information and phenotype, Thompson 
finds that while the two can be considered independent in a computer, in the case of living 
systems the hardware must preexist the software. In addition, according to autopoiesis, the 
hardware and software must reproduce one another reciprocally. “DNA replication and gene 
activation are entirely dependent on the autopoiesis of the cell. They contribute enormously to 
this process, but they also owe their existence to it” (2007, p. 180). Hence, AE stresses that 
the network as a whole “specifies the phenotype characteristic of a cell”, functioning as the 
“precondition and causal basis of DNA replication and protein synthesis” (p. 182). In this 
way, appeal to information of or in DNA results in an unconfessed dualism (p. 187). This 
dualism results from the act of abstracting the supposed information (e.g. DNA) from the rest 
of the system (i.e. from the informed) and then applying some sort of intrinsic value to it. In 
this way information is understood to preexist the system and as Thompson says, pass 
through bodies, affecting them while remaining unaffected itself. This he calls a “reification 
                                                
177 These include a steady-state inheritance system (consisting of self-regulating and gene-regulating elements); 
structural inheritance (e.g. cytoskeleton characteristics being passed on through mitosis/meiosis); chromatin 
marking (e.g. methylation patterns on DNA); and social structures including symbiotic functionality (Thompson, 
pp. 176-77). 
178 Bacteria outnumber human cells 10 to 1 but compose only a few present of our body mass, while their 
number of genes outnumber human genes by 360 times. (http://www.nih.gov/news/health/jun2012/nhgri-
13.htm). Hence, far from being straight-forwardly individuated, the human being is an ecosystem by definition! 
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that has no explanatory value. It is information idolatry and superstition not science” (2007, p. 
187).179  
Similarly, Moreno, et al. (2011) hold that the reductive geneocentric approach to biology 
has hit a dead end, requiring that biologists change their focus from “a program inscribed in 
DNA analysis to a new distributed (namely, more holistic) program in which DNA, RNA and 
protein components operate alternatively as instructions and data” (p. 315). In direct contrast 
to the traditional reductive view that claims a one-to-one mapping of genotype –> phenotype, 
this approach requires positing multiple levels of self-organization, each with their own 
evolutionary influences:  
evolution does not operate upon an abstract functional phenotype space but through a highly 
constrained (occasionally discontinuous) space of possible morphologies […] whose formation 
requires acknowledging the environmental, material, self-organized and often random processes 
that appear networked at different scales (p. 320).  
Newman (2011) points out an interesting implication that there can be “more than one 
phenotype for organisms of a given genotype, or the same phenotype for different genotypes, 
i.e., one-many and many-one relationships among levels of organization…” (p. 236). 
Schuster (2011) elaborates upon this point claiming that current molecular biology reveals 
epigenetic mechanisms are what make possible the inheritance of characteristics “that are not 
encoded by the DNA of the individual […] epigenetics and environmental influences provide 
additional effects that are indispensable for understanding and modelling the relations 
between genotypes and phenotypes” (pp. 56-57). Far from the geneocentric view, the origin 
of complexity in evolution, he claims “results primarily from genotype-phenotype relations 
and from the influences of the environment” (pp. 76-77). Hence (reiterating third-order 
emergence), the systems biological paradigm requires that we de-couple the one-way efficient 
causal chains of genotype and phenotype:  
                                                
179 In line with this sentiment, Lineweaver and Davies (2013) emphasize that information in DNA should be 
understood as being about its corresponding niches (i.e. like the organism it is context dependent) and that it has 
even come from those same niches via natural selection. Davies contends that a gene is “a coded set of 
instructions for a ribosome to make a protein. Instructional information is clearly more than a mere bit string. 
There has to be a molecular milieu that can interpret and act on those instructions. In other words, biological 
information is contextual […] Context is manifestly a global property. You cannot tell by looking at the local 
level whether this or that base pair in DNA is instructional information or just junk” (Davies, 2013, pp. 33-34). 
Dehmelt, & Bastiaens (2011) provide further sympathetic accounts to this end. 
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The solution of long-standing evolutionary puzzles concerning the rapid appearance of body-plans 
and organ forms with conservation of a molecular toolkit and the apparently abrupt recruitment to 
unprecedented functions of novel tissue motifs and protein complexes, can be advanced by 
incorporating evidence for a causal disconnection between phenotype and genotype. This includes 
recognition that developmental systems and proteins (and their complexes) each have inherent 
dynamical properties that are only loosely related to the genes associated with them, and that each 
type of system is capable of undergoing changes in their form and function, often in a 
discontinuous fashion, through means other than genetic variation (Newman 2011, p. 348).  
Supporting this view, recent research has shown that the genome is no longer to be 
understood as read-only memory (ROM), but a read-write (RW) information-processing 
network (Shapiro 2011, pp. 25-26). This distinction means that individual organisms preform 
what Shapiro calls “natural genetic engineering” (NGE), which involves all the biochemical 
mechanisms (i.e. retrotransposons) cells use to cut, splice, copy, repair, polymerize or 
otherwise manipulate DNA:  
RNA + protein + chromatin —> new DNA structure and sequence (retrotransposition, 
retroduction, retrohoming, diversity-generating retroelements) 
Protein + ncRNA + chromatin + signals + other molecules + structures <—> phenotype & 
genotype & epigenotype (p. 26). 
Hence, NGE purportedly occurs via complex chemical feedback loops across levels of DNA, 
RNA, proteins, and phenotypic function, in direct conflict to classical Neo-Darwinism. This 
can involve cells manipulating their own DNA molecules, transporting DNA from one cell to 
another, or acquiring DNA from the environment. Though for some reason unnoticed by AE 
or Shapiro, this line of reasoning supports a kind of Neo-Lamarckianism, for which evidence 
has been steadily accumulating.180  
                                                
180 For example, Koonin & Wolf (2009) have found that both Lamarckian and Darwinian views are important 
and capture different modalities of evolution: “in principle, the backward flow of specific information from the 
phenotype – or the environment viewed as extended phenotype – to the genome is not impossible owing to the 
wide spread of reverse transcription and DNA transposition. Highly sophisticated mechanisms are required for 
this bona fide Lamarckian scenario to work, and in two remarkable cases, the CASS and the piRNA system, 
such mechanisms have been discovered” (p. 8). Additionally, Sarkies & Miska (2014) have proposed that 
mobile RNAi may provide short-term adaptation sufficient for the heritability of acquired characteristics (p. 
532). Unfortunately, space prohibits further consideration of Lamarckian connections to the present discourse. 
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Thompson (2007) finds that a further implication of systems thinking is that the 
dichotomous view of “nature and nurture”, “innate versus acquired”, etc., are replaced by an 
ontology of process and dialectical relations. He writes that  
life cycles propagate from one generation to the next by constructing and reconstructing 
themselves like a path laid down in walking), instead of unfolding according to any transmitted, 
genetic blueprint or program. The process of reconstruction involves numerous interdependent 
causal elements, which relate to each other reciprocally as process and product, rather than 
belonging to the dichotomous categories of genetic nature versus environmental nurture (p. 188).  
Information then is not passed from one generation to the next, but is reconstructed in and 
through development. From this vantage point, we are to understand organism and 
environment as “product and process” that reciprocally select each other, as opposed to a 
dichotomous conception; hence natural selection is not an external force acting on 
organisms. Similarly, Moreno et al. (2011) have noted, “it is not the environment that poses 
problems for genetically instructed phenotypes to solve, but a complex organism-environment 
interaction process that defines the adaptation and survival of an organism…” (p. 320). 
In sum, according to the systems view of evolution the organism’s self-organization and 
functionality at numerous spatiotemporal levels provides a necessary contribution to not only 
the process, but also the trajectory of evolution. Thus there exists a measure of verificaiton for 
Harris’s argument that auturgic behaviour directs evolution above and beyond the 
mechanisms of random mutation, natural selection, drift, etc.  
 
The Telos of Mind and Life 
In this section I elaborate upon the above results with respect to conceptions of teleology 
and value in living systems. I argue that Harris’s line of reasoning is in agreement with the 
AE contention that there exists an inherent relationship between autopoiesis, teleology, self-
transcendence, and value. In addition, I consider one means by which the above conception of 
cognition may be integrated into a systems theory of evolution.  
In evolution Harris maintains, modifications that provide “improvements” to the system 
(i.e. increasing its “fitness”) introduce “value” to the system (1965, p. 249). Value here 
consists in the modification contributing to the organism’s “external adaptiveness and (ipso 
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facto) to its internal wholeness” (1965, p. 250).181 In other words, he is claiming that the 
system values being ‘fit’. Selection is thus considered a consequence of adaptation and value, 
not their cause. The cause is rather, “the auturgy of the living system which exerts a constant 
nisus towards integration and order…” (1965, p. 251). Harris thus contends that the cause of 
selection, adaptation, and value is the auturgic nisus of all living systems.  
In a later work Harris asserts that “recognition of values is consequent upon purposive 
activity, which is characteristic of life…” (1987, p. 245). However, he goes on to say that 
these  
values are the goals of purposive action, and purposes derive from desire, which is the conscious 
phase of natural appetite and instinctive impulse. But these again are no more (nor less) than the 
expression of the urge intrinsic to all life to maintain itself […] all purpose is the endeavor to 
realize a design or structure of activity – the fulfillment of a whole (ibid). 
On the one hand, purposeful behaviour is considered basic to all life because it is the very 
maintenance of organic being. On the other hand, Harris has it that purposes derive from 
desire, which is characteristic of consciousness. This creates a contradiction. To reconcile this 
conflict he could either (i) maintain that value obtains only in later stages of consciousness; or 
(ii) permit that all living systems act on value.182 I maintain Harris has once again made the 
mistake of relegating qualities (in this case value) to later stages of consciousness than befits 
his own system, thus the reconciliation requires the latter strategy in accord with § 6.2.2.  
As discussed above, the inherent adaptiveness of organic being is for Harris the very same 
telos, or “universal pressure toward increasing wholeness” discussed heretofore (1965, p. 
273). Harris claims evolution likewise appears progressive “from simpler organisms to more 
complex” (“orthogenetic”), only insofar as there is a global tendency “towards integration and 
co-ordination” of form and function (pp. 274-75).183 In a later work he writes: 
                                                
181 Harris defines adaptation as a “harmonious co-ordination and integration of functions within the organism 
with reference to its environment. It is at once internal coherence and adjustment to external conditions” (1965, 
p. 250).  
182 In other works he elaborates that to be aware of value changes appetite into desire, for example: “Appetite is 
thus transformed in the light of self-consciousness, for to desire an object, we must be conscious of ourselves as 
seeking satisfaction in its attainment” (2000, p. 136).  
183 Though not emphasized by Harris, it appears to follow from his articulation of “freedom” that as the species 
or ‘swarm’ increases its specific capacity to alter an environment; over time it establishes a positive selection 
effect for specific functions in future generations. In this vein, Harris’s position seems to assert that organic 
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Sentience then becomes the means of assimilating and in some measure domesticating the 
environment […] as living beings evolve they are able to penetrate further afield and they develop 
distal sense modalities […] so progressively the organism assimilates wider and wider regions of 
its surrounding world. The environment is thus progressively inwardised (wird erinnert) (2006, p. 
147). 
Taking these points together, the simplest form of mind is instantiated by purposive action 
toward fulfilment of appetite, which renders the living system cognitive, intentional, and now 
imbues its activity with value. The “assimilation” or “inwardization” to which Harris refers is 
constituted by both environmental (domestication) and biochemical alteration in response to 
recognizable stimuli. Hence, behaviour on the basis of value results in what Harris considers 
a progressive broadening of the organism’s sensitivity to stimuli and capacity for 
environmental alteration. What must now be understood in greater detail is how this process 
of inwardization can be conceived in both phenomenological and scientific terms.  
Taking a phenomenological approach to biology, Thompson (2007) maintains “[m]ental 
life is animated by an intentional striving that aims toward and finds satisfaction in discloser 
of the intentional object. In this way, intentionality is teleological” (p. 24, emphasis omitted). 
This same principle is later extended to all living systems: “living beings embody an 
immanent purposiveness and this purposiveness manifests itself in the two complementary 
modes of autopoiesis (the intrinsic teleology of self-production) and sense-making (the 
projective teleology of adaptivity and cognition)” (pp. 148-49).184 It is this “twofold 
purposiveness” of identity through self-production, and sense-making through adaptivity and 
cognition, that makes and reshapes the sensed environing world.  
In phenomenological terms Thompson argues, “[i]f the organism must change its matter in 
order to maintain its identity, then the organism must aim beyond itself, beyond its present 
condition or point-identity in the here and now” (p. 155). This he recognizes, is precisely 
what Spinoza called “conatus, the effort and power of life to preserve itself; to stay in 
existence” (ibid). The consequence has been that, “the horizons of biological space and time 
have been greatly expanded over the course of evolution…” (ibid). Following Jonas (1966), 
this expansion, he claims, has been due to the organism opening “outward into space because 
                                                                                                                                                  
systems, both individual and collective, work toward transcending their own environmental and biological 
constraints by establishing their own. This issue will be further addressed in the following section. 
184 Thompson elaborates, the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic functions is that the former presuppose 
and supervene upon the larger context of a system (e.g. the purpose of a frying pan or car rely upon social 
context), whereas intrinsic purposiveness is a feature of the organization of the system itself.  
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its metabolism propels it forward in time, and this forward trajectory is fueled by want, 
concern, and need” (p. 156). Thus Thompson extends existential phenomenology as an 
“incessant self-transcendence” to the very root of mind and life (p. 157) and later concludes, 
“Living is a process of sense-making, of bringing forth significance and value” (p. 158). 
For AE, adaptive self-preservation is the response to what is sensed in the world on the 
basis of what is sensed within the system’s bounds, which is considered inherently 
teleological and self-transcendent. In other words, the symmetry breaking of self and world is 
not merely to be considered a structural distinction, but an ongoing and self-transcendent 
process. Since it is this nature of life that is responsible for the broadening of 
phenomenological horizons, it appears reasonable to conclude that this conception is 
congruent with Harris’s “environmental internalization” – what may now be considered the 
sentient explication of the world for dialectical holism. Of course, projecting 
phenomenological descriptions to the living process may result in a greater philosophical cost 
than payoff since phenomenology itself remains to be naturalized.185 Even if only a heuristic 
at present, I claim establishing continuity across scales is key for Harris and more 
specifically, linking cognition and evolution is a consequence of AE. Thus I consider one 
means by which processes of cognition and evolution may be unified. 
Taking a strictly scientific approach to evolution, Krakauer’s (2013) proposal goes some 
way towards accommodating the kind of teleology and cognition supported by Harris and 
AE. Krakauer contends that there is something “fundamentally lacking” in a definition of 
evolution based solely upon the mechanistic change in frequencies of genotypes over time as 
a result of fitness (p. 229). Krakauer considers organic complexity, “a measure of inferential 
or predictive capacity: the ability for a population to store adaptive responses to a variety of 
states of the environment” (p. 231). He reasons that new information can only be acquired 
through mutation and fixation, “but the greater the rate of mutation p, the lower the total 
                                                
185 Towards a defence of this attribution of phenomenology to life, Gaitsch (2016) argues modern 
anthropomorphism (MA) “legitimates itself as a methodological procedure by the insight that the ‘experiential 
dimension’ is accessible only from a first-person (and, furthermore, second-person) perspective. This 
inextricability already tells us something about its ontology. But the point here is that MA is not a reckless 
practice of attribution […] but a rigorous matter of access. Second […] MA does not take it for granted that the 
features accessed by first-person experience are strictly speaking ‘human,’ as lived experiences do not come 
along with any name badge. MA takes the risk of specifying features of life by reflecting on one’s own 
experience as a living and lived body in order to ‘attribute’ them to other living bodies” (p. 220). For further 
discussion on phenomenology and anthropomorphism see Villalobos & Ward (2016) and their response articles. 
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storage capacity of the genome L. This is an inescapable constraint operating on a genome, 
and requires mechanisms of selection or learning other than natural selection in order to be 
overcome” (p. 236). For Krakauer (in line with Kurakin, 2011; Mitchell, et al. 2009; and 
Shapiro, 2011), evolution includes “the changing frequency of alternative environment-
predictors”, a process of “overcoming fundamental constraints” through the development of 
“basic cognitive capacities: mechanisms that augment the predictive capacity of genomes 
alone” (ibid). Evolution he claims, is the same as cognitive learning to the extent that we find 
“inferential dynamics that build representations in order to predict their environments” (p. 
243).186  
In order to overcome genetic constraints, acquire and store more information to survive, 
Krakauer proposes three functions utilized in systems as widespread as “single cells, and in 
large tissue systems such as brains”, are used:  
 
(i) “self-similar structures” generated by genetic regulatory networks, i.e. fractal 
compression of hierarchical source data;  
(ii) “modification of these structures within a single generation” in response to 
“environmental cues” (p. 237); and  
(iii) the same structures must be able to be ‘written’ and ‘read’ in many different ways (p. 
240).187  
 
Cognitive mechanisms on Krakauer’s account, lend themselves to the same definition as 
evolution because behaviours that receive rewards will be reinforced whereas others will be 
extinguished. In addition, “learning will tend to maximize the amount of information that an 
individual extracts from the environment. The best behaviour will fix in the population 
excluding all others until the environment changes” (p. 241).  
                                                
186 Indeed, Stewart (2010) writing on the AE paradigm has recognized that it follows “from the equation 
‘cognition = life’ that the historical evolution in forms of life, ever since its origin, is an evolution in forms of 
cognition” (pp. 4-5).  
187 Recognizing that his account is counter the central dogma of Neo-Darwinism, Krakauer argues from what 
appears to be just the kind of “genetic engineering” mentioned above: “DNA is always associated with histone 
proteins forming the chromatin complex. Histone proteins possess long tails that can be biochemically modified. 
Changing the chemical environment of the cell leads to changes in the chemical composition of chromatin. 
Thereby DNA can be secondarily tagged along a repeating structure that is potentially as information-rich as the 
genome proper, and possesses the benefit of being directly modifiable within a single cell or organismal 
generation” (p. 239).   
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By this reasoning, biological complexity arises as “a series of cognitive innovations, all 
aimed at supplementing or overcoming the adaptive limitations of genomes, allowing for 
more efficient representation and predictions of environmental regularities inducing fitness 
consequences” (p. 242). Krakauer further argues that there are however necessary conditions 
for an increase in cognitive capacity:  
These are when regularities in the environment present themselves at a rate that exceeds the 
ability of natural selection to record an adaptive response in the genome. When environments 
change slowly, cognition offers little advantage and genomes should be sufficient to encode 
adaptive responses. Complexity therefore increases on a “need to know” basis, and does not 
follow an inexorable trend but a wavering pathway governed by the rate of information production 
by the environment, where the environment includes organisms and their products (pp. 243-44). 
Taking Thompson and Krakauer’s contentions together, this section has demonstrated that 
Harris’s conception of ‘internalizing the environment’ finds support from contemporary 
phenomenology and evolutionary theory. For Harris and Thompson the living process entails 
value and teleology akin with Spinoza’s conatus. With this in mind, the dialectical holist 
conception of cognition can be phrased as the sense-making of a living system that inspires 
transcendence of its (internal and external) physiological constraints based upon an inherent 
value of self-maintenance. To this philosophical conception Krakauer adds a much needed 
scientific framework that provides one way by which the very process of cognition can be at 
least analogous to evolution – if not considered the very same process on a different scale. In 
the following section I consider in greater detail what implications result for the theory of 
evolution if autopoiesis (or ϕ) is extended to collective biological systems.  
 
6.3.2 Ecopoiesis and Evolutionary Selection 
In this section I argue that a consequence of maintaining both the range of evolutionary 
mechanisms noted above and the autopoietic theory of mind and life, is that the same formal 
governance posited at the level of individual organisms is extended to ecosystems. I claim this 
entails a revision of evolutionary selection by endorsing multilevel selection, convergent 
evolution, and symbiogenesis. While these implications have been only partially recognized 
by Harris and proponents of AE, Harris’s conception of scales, I maintain, provides further 
clarification concerning why these theories should be accepted in concert.  
In the AE account there is an emphasis on structural coupling, a co-construction between 
organism and environment in both ontogeny and phylogeny. In agreement with Krakauer and 
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Kurakin above, the organism is not merely subject to selection because part of the inheritance 
of each successive generation is the organism’s environment, one “structured into viable 
niches by the organisms themselves” (Thompson, 2007, pp. 203-4).188 The result is a “co-
determination” in which “organism and environment enact each other through their structural 
coupling” (p. 204). The AE approach to evolution is based on the notion that the collective 
behaviour of a species changes the environment through the production of a niche that creates 
a reflexive loop between organisms and their environment (in line with third-order emergence 
discussed above). Thompson summarizes his conception of developmentalist evolution as 
follows: 
 
1. The unit of evolution at whatever level (genomic, cell lineage, individual, social group, and so 
on) is a developmental system (in the widest sense of a milieu-embedded, propagative unit). 
2. Developmental systems are composed of ecologically embedded autonomous networks, which 
exhibit rich repertoires of self-organizing configurations. 
3. Such networks are analyzable not in terms of optimality of design or fittedness to the 
environment, but rather in terms of viability in the face of an unpredictable or unspecified 
environment. 
4. Through reproductive structural coupling with their environments, these networks generate 
selection in the sense of the differential retention of inherited variation (p. 206, emphasis in 
original).189 
 
This conception of evolution provides support for Harris’s thesis because it posits that the 
units of selection are simultaneously the agents or forces of selection at some relevant scale. 
Thompson for the following three implications: 
(1) that the replicator/interactor distinction is no longer useful for conceptualizing evolutionary 
processes: (2) that there is no intelligible distinction between inherited (genetic) and acquired 
                                                
188 Recent discoveries by Chen, et al (2017) reveal evidence that the self-organization of viable niches in 
bacteria for example, is achieved by “large-scale collective oscillation” that (in agreement with Gleiser above 
remarks) once again takes the form of “travelling waves” via “symmetry breaking”.  
189 In her analysis of emergence in biology Rothschild (2006) concludes that the “proper locus of natural 
selection”, or “evolutionary individuals could very well include the individual gene, organism, deme, and 
species […] Indeed, one could argue for even more levels, such as the level of a tissue or subcellular organelle”  
(p. 160).  To my mind, this is precisely the result of interpreting “natural selection” as formal governance.  
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(environmental) characteristics; and (3) that there is no intelligible distinction between nature and 
culture (p. 192).190  
In this way “natural selection results from the ‘satisficing’ of viable trajectories effected by 
the autonomous networks themselves in their structural coupling with their environments” (p. 
207). Thompson holds natural selection is an “emergent consequence of autopoiesis”, so 
while natural selection requires reproduction, “reproduction presupposes autopoietic unities 
that reproduce” (p. 212).  
Reminiscent of Kurakin’s ET chains, rendering natural selection in the above light means 
the notions of co-emergence and co-evolution are again particularly apt. As Thurner (2011) 
explains in a broader context: 
Any element, a biological species or an industrial good, whose (re)production rate falls below a 
critical value, will vanish over time. This again can lead to a re-adjustment of (re)production rates 
of existing elements. The key aspect of evolutionary systems is that the set of existing elements 
and their corresponding reproduction rates (fitness landscapes) co-evolve (p. 120, emphasis in 
original).  
Formalizing dynamical systems in which elements co-evolve with their (re)production rates is 
however considered especially challenging. Even if the dynamics of elements could be 
exactly described with differential equations Thurner explains, “the boundary conditions of 
evolutionary systems constantly change as they evolve; they are coupled to the dynamics of 
the system itself” (ibid). It is for this reason that such systems are inaccessible with traditional 
mathematical methods.  
Thurner points out that the parameters of these evolving systems are typically more 
numerous than can be identified, let alone accounted for. This results in a high degree of 
unpredictability, meaning that it is unfruitful and problematic “to predict future fitness of 
species from their present fitness. Instead, one has to understand how species and their fitness 
landscapes co-construct each other, how they co-evolve” (p. 121). By extension, he claims 
that the notion of a niche in ecology (and economics) is actually an “a posteriori concept” 
because the niche itself cannot be predicted. “Consequently, a physical, fully causal and 
useful description of evolution has to consider abandoning the concept of fitness as the 
                                                
190 Krakauer (2013) draws a similar conclusion concerning his own conception of evolution to be considered 
below, finding that the ‘nature’ versus ‘nurture’ dichotomy rests upon the false premise that “some traits are 
fixed whereas others are variable.”  He claims that this premise is false “because nothing about a species remains 
fixed over suitably long periods of time” (p. 242). 
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central concept and to look for alternatives that operate with the information actually 
available at a given time” (ibid). Hence, fitness (of either a system or trait) and niche are 
related such that the meaning of one depends upon the nature of the other; to have an 
understanding of either one we must first identify a specific context where both niche and 
fitness provide a means of mutual explication.191  
Kauffman (2013) has gone considerably further than Thurner to propose a number of 
implications for evolution that may follow from both Harris and Thompson’s positions. “If 
we are right, entailing law, the centrepiece of physics since Newton, ends at the watershed of 
evolving life” (p. 173). Thus, for Kauffman, evolution cannot be understood mechanistically 
and so he proposes an alternative explanation. He argues that much like the boundless 
functions of a screwdriver, functionality between a cell and its environment is likewise 
boundless because both are continually altering each other: “we cannot prestate the actual 
niche of an evolving cell by which it achieves task closure in part via that niche” (p. 175). 
Moreover, “the actual niche can be considered as the boundary conditions on selection” 
(ibid). This implies that adaptations that occur through evolution, or “the very phase space of 
evolution” changes in “unprestatable” ways (ibid). Hence, we cannot know what will or can 
happen because we “do not know the sample space” (p. 179). So he finds that if organisms, as 
Kantian wholes, “co-create their worlds with one another” mechanistic laws of evolution are 
precluded (p. 183). Niches then are systems of living and non-living structures/processes that 
are not themselves explained by selection, but permit a range of unprestatable possibilities 
that collectively constrain selection – equally applicable to social systems (p. 186). Here 
Kauffman reiterates the AE thesis of co-evolution and advocates for the incompleteness of 
physics reflected in third-order emergent systems.192 
Closely associated with the developmentalist paradigm, many authors have begun to 
highlight the importance of macroevolutionary theories including symbiogenesis and multi-
level selection.193 Sepkorski (2008) argues evolution “takes place at or above the level of 
                                                
191 Similarly, Ellis (2004) recognizes that alteration of DNA through the evolution of an organism in relation to 
its ecological niche is a classic case of top-down action from the environment to biochemistry and the details of 
which could not be predicted prior to the unfolding of said relation (p. 614).  
192 In complement to this argument of organism-environment coupling, Krakauer has claimed that “there can be 
no information in the genome that is not already present in the environment”, which implies that evolutionary 
complexity “is not a property of an individual but a population” (2013, p. 233). 
193 For further discussions on levels of selection see Wilson D.S (2002, 2007); Sober & Wilson (1998); 
Richerson & Boyd (2005); Wilson (2007); Lloyd (2007); and Serrelli & Gontier (2015).   
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species” (p. 211). He claims that taxonomic groups can function as “individuals” with their 
own selection pressures and “evolutionary trajectories” (p. 212). Thus this view is 
hierarchical, but does not rely upon qualitatively “different causal mechanisms.”  
[S]election is seen to operate at both the organismic and species (or higher) levels according to 
what are effectively the same principles. In this formulation, however, the evolution of higher taxa 
is not strictly reducible to microevolution, since higher taxa have organizational principles, which 
determine the outcome of selection, that are not simply the aggregate of their constituent 
organisms (p. 217).  
By this view, species as well as “higher taxa”, can be understood to operate as individual 
evolutionary units that have their own adaptive traits (p. 221).194 As was previously discussed 
concerning the causal de-coupling of phenotype and genotype, macro-evolution is thus 
considered “decoupled from microevolution” because the mechanisms of selection operating 
on the level of individual organisms “cannot be extrapolated to explain evolution at the higher 
taxonomic levels” (p. 226). This is all to say that the “processes that explain macroevolution – 
whether species selection, sorting, extinction, or something else – are fundamentally 
irreducible to neo-Darwinian microevolutionary mechanisms” (ibid).  
Following Lynn Margulis’s (1993, 1998, 2004) pioneering works, Peacock (2011) shows 
that symbiogenesis provides a deeper insight into multi-level selection. In symbiogenesis 
networks of cooperative behaviours can be successful enough that “they are amplified by 
natural selection into a coherent, reproducing whole” (p. 235). If such a network is 
sufficiently organized that it reproduces as a whole, then the entire genetic code is considered 
a replicator. As a result, “what is ‘seen’ by natural selection, is not simple; it is not just the 
gene (whatever that is) unless by ‘gene’ one means simply any replicator. A sufficiently well 
coordinated symbiotic association can itself become a unit of selection” (pp. 235-36). 
Peacock elaborates that even those authors most sympathetic for the theories do not tend to 
notice the connection between symbiogenesis and multi-level selection:  
Apparently-altruistic behavior need not be explained merely as ‘kin selection’; an organism need 
not be in a mutualism merely with its cousins. It could be in mutualism with any other conceivable 
form of life at all, so long as the net effect is to provide a modality of survival for the organism. 
                                                
194 Here Sepkorski claims macroevolution supports Gould’s theory of punctuated equilibrium: exemplified 
through the case of a mass-extinction, much like the case of a forest fire, space is cleared for new life to emerge.  
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Here, by the way is the basis for so-called group selection, which is nothing more than selection in 
favour of mutualistic symbiosis (pp. 238-39).195  
Considering the ecosystem as emergent in its own right, Yin & Herfel (2011) describe 
such a system as complex and dissipative, a flux network that permits quantitative and 
qualitative analysis but is nevertheless relatively independent of its constituents. “1. the 
structure is an emergent property that cannot be reduced to the sum of its component species; 
2. The structure requires constant energy and material throughput to maintain its existence” 
(p. 399). Taking what they call a post-classical dynamic perspective, ecological models they 
argue, should possess a number of necessary parameters: (i) Lack of steady state, i.e. dynamic 
equilibrium; (ii) novelty and unpredictability; (iii) nonoptimality; (iv) fundamentally cyclic 
variables; (v) emergent constraints such as selection effects; (vi) historicity or path-dependent 
dynamics; (vii) diversity; and (viii) locality or site-specific dynamics (p. 404). The 
environment – including other organisms, weather patterns, and nutrient availability – 
establish self-organizing and cyclic dynamics (e.g. seasons) that constrain the form and 
function of individual organisms (e.g. the second-order emergence of circadian rhythms and 
migratory patterns).  
Taken together, the above evidence suggests that the “classical” view of ecology is 
antiquated and a richer view is required. Such a framework must account for the capacity of 
ecological systems to self-organise and establish many of their own boundary conditions 
“such as the intrinsic rates of growth, carrying capacities and interaction coefficients” 
(Odenbaugh 2011, p. 427). Towards this end, one theory of ecological self-organization is 
trophic cascades. Beschta & Ripple (2009) have compiled significant evidence to show that 
top-down influence from predators (carnivores) to herbivores (consumers) and plants 
(producers) play a significant role in determining ecosystem structure and dynamics via 
feedback relations. Estes, et al. (2011) have more recently argued that the “topology of 
ecosystem dynamics is now understood to be nonlinear and convoluted, resulting in distinct 
basins of attraction” (p. 301).196 They maintain this demands a “paradigm shift in ecology”; 
                                                
195 For a further treatment of the role symbiogenesis plays in evolution see Gontier (Ed., 2015). 
196 They argue that perhaps the greatest human influence on ecology has been the widespread elimination of  
predators across the globe, which has been largely responsible for the mass extinction currently taking place. It 
is ironic, they point out, that due to the complex web of species interdependencies, “we often cannot 
unequivocally see the effects of large apex consumers until after they have been lost from an ecosystem, at 
which point the capacity to restore top-down control has been lost” (Estes, et al. 2011, p. 302).   
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rather than being seen as “ecological passengers”, predators “exert strong cascade effects” via 
what they call “top-down forcing” (p. 306). In this way, trophic cascades may denote 
feedback loops of second and third-order emergence at the level of ecosystems. Here, 
predators act as order parameters, determining the phase transition of the ecological system 
to which they belong.197 With these arguments in mind (given the criteria of appendix § IV-
b), the ecosystem satisfies the necessary criteria for a ϕ. 
A still further means of identifying formal governance in natural selection can be seen in 
instances of convergent evolution (e.g. echolocation in dolphins and bats involving over 200 
genes).198 Coffman (2011) argues that according to developmentalism, “morphological 
homoplasy and convergent evolution would be far more common than is generally assumed 
owing to the existence of (perhaps cryptic) developmental or structural attractors generated 
by ecological organization” (p. 305). Walker (2014) has likewise argued that top-down 
causation is an important mechanism for adaptive evolution and is particularly apparent in 
cases of convergent evolution. “Convergent evolution thus provides a clear example of top-
down causation via adaptive selection, where causal influences run from macroscopic 
environmental context to microscopic biochemical structure” (p. 430). The point is that the 
ecological system as a whole specifies viable forms and functions (or modes of coupling) that 
act as attractors for those creatures that remain alive. At this point a fair consideration is that 
the recurrent forms and functions of convergent evolution are likewise indicative of scales.  
To summarize this discussion it is instructive to consider Davies’ (2013) view of 
complexity. Davies holds that evolution can be understood as “a random walk through the 
possibility space which is bounded by a ‘wall’ of minimal complexity. The wall exists for the 
elementary reason that there is a lower limit, but no obvious upper limit, to the complexity of 
a living organism” (p. 32). As many above have noted however, this boundary is created by 
the total organization of the ecological system itself, is unpredictable, and establishes a viable 
                                                
197 Li’s (2002) paper provides significant detail concerning how environmental variables are to be modelled such 
that “a theoretical framework of ecological phase transitions” is scientifically viable.  
198 Further examples include amino acids; photosynthesis; wings; antifreeze proteins in the northern sea cod 
Boreogadus saida and Antarctic Dissotichus nawsoni (consisting of repeating threonine, alanine, and proline); 
sensitivity to long-wavelength green and red visual pigments; serine protease molecules in bacteria (subtilisin) 
and vertebrates (trypsin), which have different structures but the same active site (Chela-Flores 2008, pp. 158-
59). Interestingly, Schloss (2008) has argued that convergent adaptations such as lungs, gills, guts, kidneys, 
organelles, and whole-organism branching morphologies create an internal, ‘three-dimensional’ surface area that 
effectively endow living systems with an additional, “fourth dimension” (ff. p. 330). See also Leander (2008). 
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trajectory of form and function (or fittedness). Accordingly, evolution follows a series of 
paths of entropy management created by feedback relations between ecosystem organization 
on the one hand and organism adaptation on the other. If evolutionary selection can be 
considered about the forms and functions that more efficiently use energy and decrease 
entropy, then it would be expected that symbiogenesis is necessary for speciation and a form 
of natural selection. This would warrant the notion of ecopoiesis and sufficiently qualify the 
ecosystem as an indication of ϕ.  
 
The Gaia Theory 
The concept of Gaia is by no means new, having been articulated in various forms by 
many philosophers and scientists since the Ancient Greeks. In its modern version, the claim is 
that biosphere, hydrosphere, atmosphere, and lithosphere constitute a semi-independent level 
of nature, an emergent function that is auturgic/autopoietic, demonstrating sentience and self-
directed behaviour through self-regulation.  
According to AE, a further means of characterizing a living entity is by order of 
autopoietic systems: first-order is proper autopoiesis demonstrated by the paradigmatic cell, 
whereas second-order is a network of first order systems such as insect colonies and human 
societies. A crucial question here is whether these second-order systems can meet the criteria 
of first-order autopoiesis. In this case Thompson recognizes that the idea of boundary takes 
on a wider definition. He contends that indeed such second-order systems can count as first 
order as long as the system produces and regulates “its own internal topology and functional 
boundary…” (Thompson 2007, p. 107). By this definition, the totality of living systems on 
earth is considered a self-organizing whole, “with the self-regulation of the planetary climate 
and atmosphere occurring as emergent phenomena” (p. 119).  
Thompson anticipates the most common means of refuting this theory, namely the lack of 
reproduction and selection involved in the operation of such a system. He contends that with 
regard for a definition of ‘minimal life’ such systems do not require a hereditary lineage:  
Reproduction requires an individual to be reproduced, and hence is logically and empirically 
secondary to the process whereby an autonomous system constitutes itself as an individual. 
Therefore, a self-producing but non-reproducing planetary system could count as a genuine 
biological individual. Furthermore, its self-producing and self-maintaining mechanisms, though 
not the result of natural selection acting on a population of similar systems, would nevertheless 
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hardly be “accidental.” Indeed they would presumably reflect lawful principles of self-
organization and emergence in complex systems (p. 120).199 
Thompson contends that considering the criteria of autopoiesis listed above, Gaia can clearly 
be understood to produce its own internal topology and functional boundary, circularly 
producing the components that compose the system as a whole. Interestingly, if the same 
symmetry breaking considered in cosmological evolution is utilized here, a natural 
consequence is that ecological systems are the consequent, not the cause of a planetary Gaia. 
In this vein, rather than reproduction being necessary, we find that self-differentiation is 
necessary for the continuity and congruence of not just the biosphere, but of all life. 
Extending his conception of coupled self-organization and ET flow to its further 
conclusions, Kurakin articulates a view of ecosystem form and function that renders Harris’s 
E continuous with the Gaia theory: 
As a result of molecular self-organization, driven and sustained by electron flow, various living 
structures, cells, organisms, and ecosystems continuously emerge, metamorphose, and transform 
one into another in an eternal process of transformation of forms, which unfolds simultaneously 
on multiple scales of space and time within the multiscale whole of the planetary life, held 
together and integrated by the invisible threads of moving electrons. As a consequence of such an 
arrangement, molecules, cells, organisms, and ecosystems function as scale-specific constituents 
of one multiscale whole of energy/matter flow/circulation, where they represent both means and 
ends, at one and the same time (2011, p. 26, emphasis omitted).200 
This very process of organization and exchange of energy/matter has the result of creating 
ever more complex and efficient paths of energy consumption, “with the ultimate purpose 
being the perpetuation and expansion of living matter as a whole” (p. 42). 
                                                
199  In their recent work, Capra & Luisi, (2014) establish one of the most extensive treatment of the Gaia theory 
that is informed by autopoiesis. For a wide range of papers exploring Gaia as a plausible hypothesis see Crist & 
Rinker (Eds) (2010).  
200 Though he does not cite Kurakin or the Gaia theory, Smith (2013) has argued that “phase transitions” provide 
the appropriate paradigm for understanding the biosphere. He claims some universal patterns of life should be 
understood as the order parameters of these transitions. As the phase transitions of the biosphere are dynamical 
rather than equilibrium, he argues (consistent with Bohm and Harris) the “individuality” of living systems that 
compose it is “derived” and “emergent” from the “core metabolism” of the biosphere (p. 210).  
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Among others, Peacock (2011) has set out what is perhaps the most realistic argument for 
the Gaia theory in terms of organic interrelation, i.e. mutualistic symbiosis.201 Whereas 
commensalism or parasitism at a global level leads to a reduction of free energy and 
ultimately, extinction, he contends that reinforcing feedback relations may provide selective 
pressure for cooperative behaviour sufficient for the global level of organization required (pp. 
238-39). He finds sufficient evidence to posit a “distributed genome” in symbiotic systems of 
numerous scales up to and including a planetary Gaia. This is to say that if the interactions of 
symbiotic, mutualistic organisms are capable of supporting the reproduction of each 
separately, and the self-differentiation of the system as a whole, then Gaia is a viable theory.  
Kauffman (2013) articulates a view that is in many ways indistinguishable from Harris and 
AE by extending his conception of the Kantian whole (including autocatalytic systems and 
cells) to the biosphere. Interestingly, he argues that although such wholes are themselves 
unpredictable, they can “become collectively autocatalytic”, and the process by which this 
occurs is that of “the phase transition” – the same as for all chemical reactions (p. 187). So, 
while such wholes are not irreducibly complex (due to our limited predictability), they are not 
captured by efficient causal laws. Hence, as we have seen, he proposes the “Formal Causal 
Law.” Evidently his extension of such a law to ecosystems and to the biosphere as a whole is 
all that is required to lend credit to Harris and bring Kauffman into accordance with 
dialectical holism, but he goes still further. In his conclusion, Kauffman contends that laws of 
this kind may not only “help explain the emergence of complexity in the diversifying 
biosphere”, but also reveals that a whole range of “non-equilibrium systems such as Benard 
cells, whirlpools, and perhaps even stars and galaxies, are linked sets of cross-coupled 
processes that jointly cause one another’s continued co-creative, non-equilibrium existence in 
the universe” (p. 188).202 Kauffman’s theory that systems as diverse as DNA, the biosphere, 
                                                
201 For further discussion concerning the connection between symbiosis and Gaia, see Hird’s (2010). In this 
work she argues that the dependence of environmental activity and regulation upon bacteria through symbiosis 
and symbiogenesis can be seen as Gaia’s fundamental actants, connecting life and non-living matter in 
biophysical and ‘biosocial entanglements.’ Hird also provides a lucid historical summary of how the Gaia theory 
has subsumed the theory of autopoiesis. 
202 Indeed Harris extended his theory of increasing wholeness, coherence, etc., in his writings on social 
organization (e.g. 1992, 1993, pp. 3, 10, 106). In these works Harris makes it clear that the interdependence and 
interconnectivity of diverse social systems coupled with an efficient means of energy use is not only necessary 
for human survival but teleologically given by nature itself. In this way globalization, suppression of war, and 
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economic systems, and galaxies, are linked into a mutually reinforcing whole, clearly 
resembles Harris’s theory of a scale of forms, each considered a partial reflection of an 
overarching Concrete Universal. Hence, Kauffman’s “Formal Causal Law” is not new, but is 
rather a repackaged version of the presently examined theory of ϕ.  
Four conclusions can be reached from the above: (i) AE provides arguments for 
considering Gaia in the same terms as the autopoietic system irrespective of its lack of 
reproduction and difference in boundaries. (ii) Kurakin shows how Gaia may follow from the 
above conception of evolution (E or ET transfer) that is continuous across living and non-
living systems alike. (iii) Irrespective of its soundness, the same formal governance posited at 
the scale of the self-organizing cell has been depicted as the selection effect of biological 
evolution, and the biosphere as a whole. (iv) To the extent that this principle is held 
responsible for an increase in complexity (via symmetry breaking and symbiogenesis) and 
conflicts with the the Neo-Darwinian paradigm, Harris’s teleonomic philosophy of biology 
receives significant support from contemporary research.  
 
6.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have argued that there is a clear parallel between the conceptions of life, 
cognition, and evolution articulated by Harris and contemporary systems biology. Both 
involve formal governance operating at numerous levels (e.g. genome, the organism as a 
whole, the ecosystem, and biosphere). Additionally, in agreement with Harris’s conception of 
unifying principles (φ), each of these levels have in recent years been modelled as a 
respective phases of matter.  
In § 6.2.2 have argued that the most coherent (and sympathetic) interpretation of Harris’s 
views regarding the essential parameters of mind and life result in the attribution of both 
sentience and intentionality to any (auturgic) living system, in line with AE. In § 6.3.1 have 
argued that there is significant support for a broadening of evolutionary mechanisms that 
involve individual sensorimotor engagements and genomic modification. The argument 
rehashed in favour of Harris’s theory of environmental internalization runs as follows: If self-
maintenance (entropy management) of living systems entails a basic sensation of need and 
continuous re-evaluation of values (adaptive meaning-making) on the basis of self-
                                                                                                                                                  
the increasing development renewable energy are a result of the same explicative process considered heretofore. 
Unfortunately, space prohibits any further discussion of sociological topics in this thesis.    
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preservation, then organic forms and functions are expected to generate new modes of 
sensation, behaviour and increasingly efficient social organizations (symmetry breaking). 
Thus, it appears to be a logical extension of both Harris’s and AE evolution that the cognitive 
process may play a role in driving and constraining evolutionary development via learning at 
shorter time scales than natural selection. As discussed in § 6.3.2, though not emphasized by 
Harris, organism-environment coupling, multilevel selection theory, and ecological 
emergence respectively, may be understood to introduce evolutionary selection effects (PSEs) 
irreducible to any other level of analysis. Hence, regardless of whether there is a teleological 
drive to evolution as Harris and others have claimed, were this kind of argument to receive 
ongoing empirical corroboration it would provide further evidence of third-order emergence 
(ϕ) in ecosystems and the biosphere alike.  
The above research has revealed that Neo-Darwinism is not incorrect per se, but merely 
incomplete in light of systems biology, some philosophical implications of which Harris has 
clearly anticipated. The resulting teleonomic philosophy of biology reveals a continuity 
between living and non-living systems, remains consistent with AE, and I maintain, captures 
what one should expect from extending Bohm’s implicate order to biological phenomena. In 
the final two chapters I examine Harris’s arguments for extending his metaphysics into a 
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Chapter 7 




In the remaining chapters of this thesis I evaluate the means by which Harris appealed to 
the dialectical whole to establish a theory of consciousness. As Harris’s philosophy of mind is 
fairly extensive, I confine my focus to only the central thread of his argument concerning 
efforts to naturalize subjectivity and knowledge. Toward this end, in § 7.2, I clarify Harris’s 
anticipation of the AE approach to consciousness. In this section I also establish a preliminary 
reformation of the hard problem to be elaborated in the following discussions. In § 7.3, I 
assess Harris and Damasio’s respective appeals to Spinoza’s conception of ideatum as a 
model of embodied cognition, and contrast this approach with more recent arguments from 
embodiment. In § 7.4 this line of thought is extended to Spinoza’s concept of conatus in order 
to clarify how Harris’s theory of self-awareness relates to corresponding views from 
embodied and embedded theses of mind. 
 
7.2 Harris’s Anticipation of an Enactivist Strategy 
For Harris there are two ‘critical’ points of transition in the scale of forms: “The first is 
from the physicochemical to the metabolic, marking the emergence of life. The second is 
from the sentient and perceptive to the fully self-conscious and self-reflective” (1991, p. 139). 
Neither of these transition points are abrupt however. Each is considered an enfoldment of the 
preceding scales. In this section my aim is to elucidate Harris’s conception of this second 
transition to mind in the context of human cognition.  
As discussed in chapter 6, the first critical transition from non-living to living systems is 
characterized by a constant adaptive response to elements of the system’s environment based 
upon the sensation of meaningful stimuli. For Harris, the capacity of living systems to use 
information thus demonstrates more explicitly the principle of order and progression inherent 
in our universe. However, as with the previous scales, life demonstrates this principle 
“deficiently.” He claims this is because in its more primitive forms living systems behave 
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automatically, instinctively and lack a holistic cognition, or awareness of itself-as-a-whole. 
Harris holds that the lack of holistic cognition means that the organism’s “wholeness is still 
implicit, and its centreity, while recognizable by us as observers is not for itself a subject” 
(1991, p. 103). The simple organism’s parts adapt to one another (establishing a self) and the 
organism can adapt to its environment (establishing awareness), but it nevertheless lacks self-
awareness. Harris claims that the “mere organism, as such, is self-contradictory” (1991, p. 
104) (discussed in § 6.2).  
In his use of the term “contradiction” Harris aims to mirror earlier phases of development 
involving the reconciliation of opposition leading to sublation and coalescence. At this stage 
the organism is inevitably struggling against the system to which it belongs in pursuit of its 
own survival. Hence, Harris finds that the organism strives to reconcile this contradiction 
through an evolutionary process (discussed in § 6.3.1). This process involves “an inherent 
urge” of the organism “to appropriate and internalize its other, to unite and integrate the outer 
world into its own self” (1991, p. 104). This he claims to be achieved in two ways: (i) “by 
absorption and ingestion of material substances required for the maintenance of its bodily 
integrity”, and (ii) “in the quest for this sustenance, through sentience, the feeling and 
registration of external influences and conditions…” (ibid).  
Taken together, these processes establish the “next phase transition in the self-
differentiation of the universal principle of order, the next step in the scale of forms – what 
constitutes the matrix of succeeding phase, mentality” (ibid). Harris has argued that the 
adaptive character of life arises from the requirements of self-maintenance of the organic 
unity so that living activity itself results in a progressive development, i.e. increasing the 
agent’s capacity to respond to environmental elements. His starting premise then, is that the 
progressive enfoldment of complex systems (an aspect of E) leads to the second transition of 
mind. For the remainder of this section I outline five facets of Harris’s theory of 
consciousness that will guide the discussions to follow. 
(1) The crucial problem – Harris proposes our initial question thus: “How is what the brain 
does converted into what the mind does?”; and “how is what the mind does related to its body 
and the external world?” (2006, p. 21). These questions compose what Harris denotes the 
“crucial problem”.203 In his earlier work he considers whether observable behaviour “is a 
                                                
203 Harris (2006) cites but does not discuss Chalmers’ (1996) The conscious mind, within which the ‘hard 
problem’ was famously discussed. On the other hand, Harris nowhere cites or discusses Levine’s (1983) work 
that originally outlined the Explanatory gap.   
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sufficient index of the presence of consciousness in the creature so behaving”, but concludes 
that it “does not seem to be wholly sufficient” (1965, p. 293). One page earlier Harris 
supports this conclusion by reasoning that for any behaviour one considers indicative of 
mind, a mechanism can be conceived that most would agree to be devoid of mind. In this way 
he finds the problem of mind is a discrepancy between material behaviour and mental 
awareness, such that behaviour will never be sufficient to derive conscious experiences.  
(2) Judgment – Building upon the cogito, Harris contends that judgment may be a non-
mechanical, non-behavioural function of mind sufficient for guiding further investigation:  
To doubt or deny is not to pronounce a form of words, to write them or in some other way to make 
them communicable (operations that might be performed by a machine). It is to judge, without 
necessarily communicating anything. It is, in short, to be in a state of mind or awareness with 
respect to some object. And if the subject of the judgment is one’s own awareness, all doubt of its 
occurrence must be bogus and any denial false (1965, p. 293).  
Accordingly, judgement provides a non-mechanical and pre-linguistic function of mind. 
Towards a clarification of this purportedly unique mental ability, Harris notes some of the 
innumerable cases of previously learned intellectual and physiological skills that can be 
performed without immediate awareness. He maintains that no matter the marker of 
consciousness, it is “not sui generis but emerges from processes, which are of the same 
general kind and may with equal right be called mental, but which occur on a level of activity 
which is not conscious” (1965, p. 295). Judgment then is considered to be scalar, arising from 
numerous unconscious dynamics that provides a necessary contextualization (or “synthesis”) 
that renders some sensation, impression, or conception conscious (p. 374). 
(3) Scale of forms – Harris hopes to dissolve the problem by investigating consciousness as 
a phase of evolving material systems on the one hand and of non-conscious mental processes 
on the other (1965, p. 296). Harris assumes that “this is not a relationship between two 
different substances or separate entities. It is the relationship between different phases of a 
continuous organic process” (ibid). To support this line of reasoning Harris follows the 
Gestalt form of neural-identity theory, which he uses to depict both mental and physical 
domains as respective fields:  
neither behavior nor experienced phenomena can be adequately explained in terms of the 
conjunction and conglomeration of single units, whether simple reflexes or single sensations […] 
both the physiological aspect and the phenomenal must be treated as Gestalten, wholes of parts 
which exist inseparably and only in the whole (p. 302).  
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Harris hereby dismisses any corpuscular conception for the units of mind or matter 
maintaining there is an “identification of the psychological with the neural ‘field’ […] an 
identity of structural order – an isomorphism” (pp. 302-3).204 In further agreement with 
Gestalt psychology he maintains the sensum is created by a selective activity of attention and 
it is never simple, rather it is “constituted by interrelations” of neural and psychical fields, 
each exerting internal (albeit unconscious) “‘forces’ of organization” (p. 334). 
(4) Dynamic constraint – Harris reasons that neural and sensory processes are subject to 
thresholds of impulse intensity resulting from what he calls “a fusion – a summation of 
subliminal pulses” (1965, p. 305). Although it is not yet know how this process of summation 
takes place, he suggests it may be “rooted in the metabolism of the cell body” (ibid).205 
Likewise, he claims that the nervous system acts as an organic whole that is governed by the 
wider whole of the total organism, which is in turn “governed by an auturgic principle which 
unifies it in all its multiform variety…” (ibid). He goes on to say that “at a definite level of 
integration this unity can only be expressed as, and become effective in, behaviour which is 
‘informed’, in both the senses ‘given form’ and ‘guided by knowledge’” (ibid).  
Harris later elaborates that although form and structure are generally synonymous, as 
complexity increases in the scale of forms the difference between these terms becomes 
significant and “mere spatial pattern is transcended […] The proposition now being advanced 
is that the integration of physiological processes at a high degree of complexity and intensity 
assumes a new form, the experience of feeling” (1991, p. 105). This claim may be more 
fruitfully cashed out to say that as a kind of organization, conscious behaviour is not so much 
a matter of capability – since, as noted above, all capacities of a particular level might be 
mechanically instantiated – but a matter of dynamical constraint across numerous levels of 
activity:  
There are not two agencies influencing each other, but two or more levels of activity, the lower 
ancillary to, sublated in, and integrated with, the higher, which at a certain stage of development is 
                                                
204  Note that this point does not contradict Thompson’s (2007) proposal of neurophenomenology as cited in § 
2.3.2 because – as will become increasingly evident in the following sections – Harris’s “isomorphism” is not a 
reductive identity of mind to behaviour or vice versa, nor does he imply some set of facts that can be read in one 
way or the other, but rather, both refer to one and the same phenomenon that is not captured by either mind or 
behaviour alone. This is in line with Bohm and ENM. 
205 Though they do not cite AE, Hollis, et al. (2009) argue, “[i]f metabolism is the primary function of a nervous 
system, then an elegant theory would be one in which cognitive activity emerges out of metabolism. Such a 
theory would begin to bridge the chasm between laws of physical processes and cognition” (p. 212). 
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conscious (or mental) activity. Each level, of course, has effects upon every other for they all (in 
the higher phase) belong to a single, though complex, dynamic totality (1965, p. 309).  
This is to say that “feeling” (phenomenality) and “knowledge” result from, and eventually 
guides, the sublation of disparate phases or wholes (both biological and mental). The “form of 
organized physiological functioning”, is what Harris considers conscious behaviour (2000, p. 
180).206  
 (5) Anticipation of Neurophenomenology – Harris (1965) argues that while insights from 
phenomenology have significantly influenced psychologists, their insights have been 
overlooked by philosophers. Towards a unity of phenomenal experience and the analysis of 
behaviour he again appeals to the gestalt conception of a psychical field. Harris argues that 
the perceived “units” of sensation must not only be considered dialectically related to its 
gestalt, but that this field is likewise inseparable from the spatiotemporal world:  
For the alleged datum, be it colour-patch, sound or tweak of pain would not be the whole of what 
was presented but would necessarily occur against a contrasting background and in succession to 
contrasting predecessors. In awareness there are no mere blanks, the absence of stimulation is 
itself a stimulus. Consequently, the so-called sense-datum cannot be taken as separable from its 
spatio-temporal context together with which it makes up an organized field (p. 322).  
In this vein, Harris contends that the unit of mind must be the differentiated field of 
awareness as a whole. Thus he recognizes that the epistemic aim to “build up our knowledge 
of the external world from atomic data” is one that has long overstayed its welcome (p. 324).  
Harris argues that mental organization is “continuous with biological and biological with 
physical”. Each he maintains reveals “some active nisus to wholeness and integration 
recognizable even in the spatio-temporal matrix of the physical world. The principles sought 
are those of polyphasic unity, no less immanent in the operation of the physical laws than in 
the exercise of conscious mind” (p. 341). In consequence he finds that the activity of mind 
involves both practical behaviour and cognitive processes, each characterized by its own 
scientific methods, and each inseparable from the other within a sufficient theoretical account 
of consciousness:  
                                                
206 As with the emergence of preceding scales, Harris claims that such “integration” is analogous to the unity of 
disparate lines into a solid shape (2000, ff. p. 178). Keeping Bohm’s analogy of the fish tank in mind (1980, p. 
237), though he does not appeal to the particular term, it may be helpful for later discussions to recognize that 
emergence of this kind results in an expansion of dimension. I return to this issue in § 8.2 below.  
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There is no reason to regard either of these methods as superior to the other in scientific rigour 
[…] neither the behavioral nor the phenomenological approach is sufficient by itself. Each 
demands and illuminates the other, as is to be expected if the object of study is at once both a 
pattern of movements and a form of experience (pp. 341-42).207 
(6) Anthithetical Ontologies – Harris recognizes the relations between his own position 
and a number of  alternative theses of mind. First and foremost, Harris holds that the world-
view of twentieth century science is radically different from the mechanistic picture that 
informed Descartes’ dualism and so the respective views are incompatible (1965, p. 290). 
Harris disavows the traditional identity theories that mind is nothing but a neurological 
process or bodily behaviour because the agreeable correlation is insufficient for causal 
explanation (1965, pp. 300-1). If (as discussed above) nature manifests in degrees of holism, 
then at lesser degrees of integrity qualities “prefiguring” mind should be identifiable (1991, p. 
107). Harris argues his thesis is also incompatible with Alexander’s emergentism because 
positing a disparate supervening quality “breaks the continuity of evolutionary process” 
(1965, p. 309). He admits that his monistic account bears resemblance to panpsychism in “its 
insistence on continuity between the graded phases of self-specification of the organizing 
principle, which is universal to the entire scale” (1991, p. 107). Panpsychism is dismissed 
however, because on Harris’s account the Concrete Universal is considered non-mental, since 
mind requires “a special and specific degree of wholeness before it emerges” (ibid). 
Epiphenomenalism is likewise rejected since by Harris’s lights, what mind contributes is 
influential (though non-causal) for the system that has it (1991, p. 108). 
In sum, the emergence of mind is believed to have resulted from the explicative process of 
self-differentiation “that has been operative throughout, active now with a higher degree of 
unified complexity and self-determination” (1991, p. 109). Harris holds that “a monistic 
                                                
207 Harris describes the emergence of a psychical field with the case of awakening from a head injury in a way 
clearly reminiscent of symmetry breaking: “The state of consciousness described is one of fogginess in which 
vague inhomogeneities gradually emerge, as the field of awareness becomes progressively organized. The first 
distinguishable elements are sensory, vaguely unpleasant (in this case) and emotionally colored. Then the field 
becomes bipolar with a self distinguished from a not-self […] From the first there is some inhomogeneity and 
vague differences in sensory modalities are felt before the self is distinguished as the subject of the experience. 
The awakening consciousness is from the start an activity of organizing and distinguishing” (p. 314). In a later 
chapter Harris clarifies that in these lowest stages of awareness “is the nearest approach to homogeneity in the 
psychical field that is ever experienced” (p. 331). This again suggests that Harris recognized (on some level) 
despite his later writings, that to speak of a homogenous sensory field is contrary to his system.   
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position can be set out, to which the neural-identity theory is a sort of halfway house, which is 
better able to account for our common experience and which can still accept the dualist’s 
reason for wishing to separate the mind from the body” (2000, p. 168). What Harris means is 
that while there is nothing beyond the physical, mind is considered irreducible to bodily 
behaviour.208 Nevertheless, at a particular point in the system’s development, “self-
maintenance of the system is possible only if the organism’s activity is informed by the 
character of the total situation within which it is reacting. At this stage, its organic responses 
must be so closely integrated that they become fused into a single unity” (2000, p. 176). In 
other words, self-maintenance is possible if the system is informed by the relations necessary 
for the maintenance of its respective complexity. Here Harris aims to describe bio-physical 
self-maintenance in such a way that bridges the Cartesian chasm. Hence, he must provide a 
valid line of reasoning demonstrating how self-maintenance (as a bio-physical process) gives 
rise to phenomenal awareness (i.e. mental states). 
 
7.3 Ideatum: The Idea of the Body 
In this section I compare Damasio’s (2010 and 2003) works with Harris’s original (1973, 
1995, 2006) arguments that contemporary neuroscience supports a metaphysics of mind 
based on key principles of Spinoza’s system; a thesis Harris maintains follows from the wider 
metaphysics considered heretofore.209 In addition I compare these results with more recent 
enactivist theories. My aim is not to defend a particular interpretation of Spinoza, nor to 
establish soundness of the resulting theory of mind, but rather to demonstrate a common and 
coherent thread that runs through the works considered, i.e. a Spinozian embodiment.  
Harris finds Damasio’s (1994, 1999, and 2003) works particularly illuminating (unlike 
Flanagan and Dennett) because Damasio “makes no attempt to deny or explain away 
consciousness” (2006, p. 63). For Spinoza, Harris explains, there is a distinction between 
attributes as apparent aspects of nature, and Substance, which is the actual monist reality. 
“Body and mind are one thing (res), one entity, not two. They are substantially one and the 
                                                
208 For a summary of Harris’s approach to the problem of mind, see the below appendix § V. 
209 In Spinoza’s system mind and matter emerge as aspects of a singular fundamental Substance that is God. My 
reasons for excluding God from the discussions that follow are (i) I maintain that at its core, insofar as Harris’s 
logic relies upon Spinoza’s reasoning, it can be reduced to a NM without any loss to the force of his resulting 
system; (ii) to my mind much more argument is needed to conclude that the neutral Substance is Godly than 
either Spinoza or Harris provided; and (iii) space prohibits my sufficient consideration of this issue. 
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same; but the essence of the one substance is expressed differently under different attributes, 
and what is, under the Attribute of Extension, a body, under the Attribute of Thought, is an 
idea or mind” (1995, p. 53). In a similar vein, Damasio writes that by “keeping separate levels 
of description” he is not endorsing substance dualism but instead appealing to Spinoza’s 
“aspect dualism” (2010, p. 44). Both Damasio and Harris vehemently refute the homunculus, 
direct realism, and Cartesian dualism. Toward this end they depict the mind in terms of what 
Spinoza calls the ideatum.  
Positing an interpretation of perception and learning in line with embodied cognition, 
Harris claims that “perceptual discrimination of objects is not an immediate revelation but a 
skill which we learn in early infancy by a gradual process […] an activity of organization, of 
selection, of distinction, correlation and synthesis in which objects are constructed out of the 
deliverances of feeling” (1965, p. 336). As noted above, he here claims that feelings and their 
synthesis are fundamental to mind. Following Spinoza, he later argues mind is the idea of the 
body, “not the conception of the body, nor its mental image, not a complex model of its 
physiological functioning constructed by abstract scientific thinking, but the feeling or self-
sentience of the body – sensory-awareness…” (1995, p. 63). Bodily feeling is thus “the basic 
level of consciousness” (2006, p. 111).  
Importantly, in one of his earliest texts on Spinoza, (drawing from the Ethics II, xiii) 
Harris noted that despite our perceptions to the contrary, an implication of the ideatum is that, 
“when one speaks or thinks of oneself as ‘feeling’ other bodies (e.g. tactually), it is only when 
and because one experiences a specific sensation in some part of one's own body” (1973, p. 
81). Harris hereby recognizes that our sense organs are transparent to the subject. Positing 
that the body is primary in awareness means questioning our very conception of bodies 
beyond our own in all cases – not merely those in which we suspect that our body is 
malfunctioning. 
The mind is the idea of the body as a whole, not only of the nervous system; and, no doubt, 
different physiological activities are reflected in it by differences in idea, but the awareness of the 
body that constitutes the mind is not a clear and distinct idea of the body and its internal 
processes, but (at any rate, in the first instance) a confused idea (pp. 82-83). 210 
                                                
210 Indeed this interpretation of Spinoza is corroborated by van Bunge, et al (2011), who explain that for Spinoza 
“All knowledge of the human body (E2p19), the human mind (E3p23) and the external bodies (E2p26) begins 
with affections of the body” (p. 145). What Spinoza called our confused and fragmentary knowledge of the first 
kind (E2 p. 29). 
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If awareness is fundamentally of what is being processed through the body then the idea that 
generates our conception of self and world is mistaken because we do not have awareness of 
its nature in Substance (thus we require some method of clarification). Harris proposes that 
Damasio’s protoself is a neuro-cognitive analogue of the ideatum (2006, p. 64).  
Damasio (2010) agrees that “the body is a foundation of the conscious mind. We know 
that the most stable aspects of body function are represented in the brain, in the form of maps 
[…] located below the level of the cerebral cortex, in […] the upper brain stem” (p. 14). What 
Damasio calls “maps” are “not a mere copy, a passive transfer from outside the brain toward 
the inside” (p. 44). Rather, maps consist of interoceptive, proprioceptive, and exteroceptive 
primordial feelings that together compose the first stage of his model of consciousness, what 
he calls the protoself (pp. 51-52). Damasio claims the operation of upper-brain-stem nuclei 
are responsible for bringing the body to mind, which “is the ultimate expression of the brain’s 
intrinsic aboutness, its intentional attitude regarding the body” (p. 63),  
Importantly, Damasio maintains that over time mappings of the body permanently 
influence the body itself. This he claims, is because “neurons are about life and about 
managing life in other cells of the body, and that that aboutness requires two-way signalling” 
(2010, p. 62). Such feedback systems Damasio believes to be based upon a “biological value” 
ever working toward homeostasis, whether in the case of a cell, an individual or a social 
system. This value, he maintains, has shaped neuronal evolution and is so fundamental as to 
deserve the “status of principle”.211 Although Damasio denies mind to individual cells, in 
addition to value, he grants that intentionality and will are evident in neurons (p. 25). In 
consequence, he recognizes that by granting intentionality to neurons, the “body-brain 
separation” appears “somewhat exaggerated since the neurons that make up the brain are 
body cells…” a point, he recognizes, that has significant “bearing on the body-mind problem” 
                                                
211 “Biological value has influenced the evolution of brain structures, and in any brain it influences almost every 
step of brain operations. It is expressed as simply as in the release of chemical molecules related to reward and 
punishment, or as elaborately as in our social emotions and in sophisticated reasoning. Biological value naturally 
guides and colors, so to speak, almost everything that happens inside our very minded, very conscious brains. 
Biological value has the status of a principle” (Damasio 2010, p. 17). On Harris’s (1965) account, biology 
reveals a “value judgment” under the guise of “survival value”, which has become a criterion of success in 
evolution. This, he claims, has shown that value is “consequent upon auturgic wholeness.” He goes on to argue 
that if we identify the intelligence of “social interaction and theoretical formulation” with the same self-
organizing nisus heretofore considered, we are justified in holding intelligence to be superior in in the scheme of 
evolution (pp. 425-26). Clearly this is all consistent with the findings of chapter 6 above. 
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(p. 203). In this vein, self-maintenance may be a means to bridge the mind-body chasm if, as 
Damasio contends, the process by which cells of the body maintain life is one of self-
sentience, a process that gives rise to our felt conception of self and world. 212  
Both Damasio and Harris follow Spinoza’s (Ethics II) conception of "idea ideae”, or the 
idea of ideas. Damasio considers this to be crucial for “representing relationships and creating 
symbols” and he holds that it “opens a way for creating an idea of self” (2003, p. 215). He 
goes on to claim that the most basic kind of self (in humans) is a “second-order idea” because  
it is based on two first-order ideas—one being the idea of the object that we are perceiving; the 
other, the idea of our body as it is modified by the perception of the object. The second-order idea 
of self is the idea of the relationship between the two other ideas—object perceived and body 
modified by perception. This second-order idea I call self is inserted in the flow of ideas in the 
mind, and it offers the mind a fragment of newly created knowledge: the knowledge that our body 
is engaged in interacting with an object (ibid).  
In neuro-cognitive terms, this may correspond to Damasio’s later discussion of reentrance 
and recursion, which refers to signals that in addition to “going forward along a single chain, 
also returns to the origin, looping back to the ensemble of neurons where each element of the 
chain begins” (2010, p. 60). This is part of what he calls the “massive interconnectivity” of 
“mind-making regions” in which, “a high complexity of cross-signalling is achieved, a 
feature that in the case of the cortex is amplified by cortico thalamic interlocking” (ibid). 
Harris appears sympathetic to this approach, but he is philosophically more fine-grained in 
his discussion. Harris claims the ‘active’ idea of the human body  
is conscious of itself, is self-reflective and so self-transcendent, because being idea it is (ipso 
facto) idea ideae. Thus it can grasp in idea the relation between ideas and the structural principles 
of configurations, which are registered in, but not apprehended by, bodies as such. This 
reflectiveness (as we are told in TdIE) enables the human mind to clarify itself of confusion and to 
make its knowledge adequate (1995, p. 86).  
Consciousness thus obtains iff the self-sentience of the body is capable of becoming about 
itself (i.e. meta-cognition or knowing that one knows). This manifests as a judgement of one’s 
relation to their objects but does not involve an infinite regress of ideas. Such a regress, 
Harris asserts, is not only unnecessary for consciousness but also impossible in practice 
                                                
212 These assertions are particularly interesting considering that Damasio makes no mention of AE in his (2010, 
2003, or 1999) works, and offers only brief agreement with Varela et al’s (1991) The Embodied Mind (2003, p. 
308; and 1994, p. 234). 
	   242	  
(1973, p. 88). Rather (in my words), this judgment involves a cognitive decoupling of object 
from background that is coincident with negation, thus permitting on-going clarification of a 
self-world relation. 
What follows from this recurrent picture of cognition Damasio calls the ‘not even 
unpopular view’ in neuro-psychology that mind begins in the brain-stem (further supported 
by cases of hydranencephaly). The philosophical implication of the proto-self is thus a 
monistic view of consciousness described as a continually regenerated neurobiological state, 
one identified with the homeostatic process that generates feeling-centered maps of the body-
in-relation. The body is thus conceived: “as the rock on which the protoself is built, while the 
protoself is the pivot around which the conscious mind turns” (Damasio, 2010 p. 15). Mind, 
for both Harris and Damsio is achieved when the idea of the body effectively becomes self-
referential, thus achieving a greater level of constraint on the dynamics of the body. In what 
follows I consider how this line of thought conceptualizes emotion in comparison with more 
recent accounts from AE.  
 
7.3.1 Sensorimotor-Enactivism and Affectivity  
On Harris’s (1965) account, cognition is not “all there is to consciousness for every 
cognition is, at the same time and by the same token, emotionally toned and conatively 
propulsive” (p. 367). In clear anticipation of sensorimotor contingencies, “perception” Harris 
maintains, “is conditioned and limited by the organic neuro-muscular conditions of sensibility 
and the spatio-temporal circumstances of the percipient” (p. 429). He avers that muscular 
tensions and bodily movements “do (perhaps always) accompany thinking and that internal 
problem-solving and reasoning are sometimes assisted, though at other times hindered, by 
them” (p. 440). However he recognizes that “some thinking occurs even in the absence of 
specific muscular tensions”, which brings him to conclude that “there is a sense in which we 
think with our whole bodies, but it is because thinking is the organization of total behaviour, 
not the functioning of special organs” (ibid). 
What is meant by ‘organization’? In his later (1988) work, Harris elaborates this point by 
arguing that there is a “close association of cognition with impulse and emotive tone […] 
even in the coldest and driest theoretical speculations of developed consciousness”; and 
consciousness, or perception, cannot “emerge independently of instinctive urges and the 
biological needs” (p. 81). Developing upon his interpretation of the ideatum, Harris holds that 
cognition is dependent upon emotions that are further developments of underlying biological 
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needs. Hence on his view, emotion serves as an organizational constraint that facilitates both 
biological survival and cognitive awareness. 
With regard for Spinoza, Harris elaborates that just as the body is an “active metabolic and 
physiological system” (by maintaining dynamic equilibrium) for Spinoza, the idea is not a 
passive replica of its object, but an “activity of thinking” (1995, pp. 53-54). He goes on to say 
“self-sentience of the body, what for Spinoza is the idea of the body, includes everything of 
which I am sensuously aware; and it is from this, and on this as foundation, that all my ‘ideas’ 
of whatever kind are elaborated” (1995, p. 55). Following Spinoza (Ethics III), the physical 
affects such as joy and desire are primary, with the passions considered secondary and 
constructed out of these ideas. Again, it is because our ideas are fragmentary that our 
practices result in error and suffering (1973, ff. p. 113). That is, “they are only partial and 
leave out significant aspects or factors belonging to the objects they present” (1995, p. 59).213 
To ground his view in neuropsychology, Harris appeals to Damasio’s conceptions of the 
somatic marker, convergence-divergence zones (CDZ), and core-self respectively (2006, pp. 
72-79).  
On Damasio’s account, the body (and structures with which it relates) acts as a distributer 
of cognitive functions, speeding up reaction time by using physiological cues corresponding 
to cognitively constructed “dominions”. Following William James, Damasio claims the mind 
distinguishes such dominions of body, mind, past, and present by attributing emotions and 
feelings to their perception, feelings that serve to separate self from not-self.  
The somatic marker does not need to be a fully formed emotion, overtly experienced as a feeling. 
(That is what a “gut feeling” is.) It can be a covert, emotion-related signal of which the subject is 
not aware, in which case we refer to it as a bias. The notion of somatic markers is applicable not 
just to high levels of cognition but to those earlier stages of evolution. The somatic marker 
hypothesis offers a mechanism for how brains would execute a value-based selection of images 
and how that selection would translate in edited continuities of images. In other words, the 
principle for the selection of images was connected to life management needs (2010, p. 123). 
Similarly, Thompson (2007) has argued these “emotion-based signals” or “affects” serve 
as an “allure” operating prior to conceptual or conscious information processing in order to 
differentiate our field of awareness into a “dynamic gestalt or figure-ground structure” (p. 
                                                
213 Note the connection between what is here considered the inadequacy of ideas and what has above been 
discussed as the MPF. See van Bunge, et al. (pp. 282-83) for a more detailed reading of Spinoza’s conception of 
the passions. 
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374). Following Thompson, Maiese (2014) contends this produces a “caring-contoured 
mapping of one’s surroundings, so that one can immediately focus one’s cognitive attention. 
This serves to directly bias the competition for processing resources in favor of information 
one feels is important” (p. 237). By implication, Maiese concludes in apparent agreement 
with Harris that to the extent AI systems  
fail to exhibit the dynamics of living systems, they are not self-regulating, autonomous agents, and 
their sense-making is not physically grounded in autopoietic and metabolic processes. Thus, there 
is good reason to think that they cannot have emotions like ours and are incapable of making 
sense of their surroundings via affective framing (p. 239). 
Neurologically speaking, Damasio proposes that convergence-divergence zones (CDZs) 
are formed through a subject’s neuronal dispositions to respond to certain stimuli in 
characteristic ways based upon the strengthening or weakening of synaptic connections over 
time. More specifically a “CDZ is an ensemble of neurons within which many feedforward-
feedback loops make contact” (2010, p. 101). CDZs receive “feedforward” connections from 
“earlier” sensory signal-processing networks and also sends reciprocal feedback signals to 
those areas. Additionally, CDZs project “feedforward” signals to regions located in the next 
connectional level of the chain and receives signals from them.  
Damasio holds that the activity at the end of the processing chains occurs within what he 
calls a “dispositional space”, made up of microscopic CDZs and macroscopic convergent 
divergent regions (CDRs) in the association cortices. These regions are supposedly not 
engaged in image-making but provide necessary assistance for this process. Though the 
dispositional space (e.g. in anterior medial temporal cortices) contains what are called 
grandmother neurons “whose activity correlates with the presence of a specific object”, 
Damasio holds that this activity does not in itself create recognizable mental images of 
objects and events without successive retroactivation: “To recognize or remember our 
grandmother, we must reinstate a substantial part of the collection of explicit maps that, in 
their entirety, represent her meaning. Like mirror neurons, so-called grandmother neurons are 
CDZs” (p. 107). Thus, for Harris, AE, and Damasio, experiences such as ‘a grandmother,’ 
cannot be isolated from the affective and neurological contexts within which they arise, nor 
can they be reduced to individual neurological states.  
Establishing the second stage of Damasio’s argument, he proposes the core-self: “a pulse 
of core self is generated when the proto-self is modified by an interaction between the 
organism and an object and when, as a result, the images of the object are also modified […] 
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the modified images of object and organism are momentarily linked in a coherent pattern” (p. 
127). This is to say that a momentary sense of self is possible when a subject’s bodily 
sensations are influenced by an object such that both CDZs and CDRs are altered by the 
subject’s association/identification of the object-in-relation to oneself. Again, this appears as 
a more detailed account of what may be considered a constraint instantiated by attentional 
judgement (§ 7.2, arguments 2 and 4).214 Thus, Harris appears justified in claiming 
“corroboration” of what he considers Spinoza’s position, in that “perception is not simply the 
reception of a ‘datum’ but is an active interpretation of the sensory input requiring at least 
implicit judgement” (2006, p. 74). 
Following Merleau-Ponty, Brender (2013) relates sensorimotor theory to his conception of 
symmetry-breaking in a manner that is further supportive of Harris and Damasio’s 
conceptions of embodiment. Cognition, he argues, is contingent upon the asymmetry of an 
environment, upon which a body may act, and without which, the organism will receive no 
perceptual answer to the questions posed by its motor movements. In this way, bodily 
movement underwrites what he considers “the original ‘transformation’ […] in the body’s 
perceptual field”, one that brings a meaningful world into being:  
The particular asymmetries a body perceives will depend on its particular way of moving, the 
unique motor habits it has developed over the course of its life. As our movements become more 
complex and asymmetrical, so too does the world we perceive. Thus the organism and its world 
grow together dialectically, each driving the other to become more articulated and determinate 
through its own increasing determinacy. This is the growth of sense: the self-articulating field of 
differences that make a difference to the organism (p. 271). 
Connecting Brender’s comments to the above discussion, I suggest that for AE it is 
precisely the primitive feelings of the proto-self, together with their sensorimotor couplings to 
the environment that undergoes symmetry breaking, which gives rise to a core-self 
characterized by particular affective and cognitive capacities. Indeed, a growing body of 
experimental evidence and theoretical works are revealing that conceptual content is often 
                                                
214 I fully appreciate how massive the philosophical terrain concerning the nature of ‘self’ actually is, and thus 
how drastic a leap I am making by moving forward in the discussion. Indeed innumerable texts have been 
devoted to defining the concept and Harris certainly took pains to elucidate what he meant by self (e.g. 1965, pp. 
315-32; 1987, pp. 83, 117, 238, 259; 2000 ff. p. 250; 2006, ff. p. 111). Unfortunately this topic requires too deep 
a divergence into phenomenology and neurophenomenology than I currently have space to consider. Thus what 
little more is offered on this topic in the following section will have to suffice for my present purposes.    
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constituted by sensorimotor and affective systems, rather than disembodied abstract 
symbols.215 As Robbins (2013) argues:  
affect serves what were traditionally believed to be purely cognitive functions. These functions 
include the consolidation of memory, anticipation of the future, evaluation of the other people and 
things in the world, and, especially, through the integration and modulation of the process of the 
transduction of sensation into complex perceptions, the production of a personally meaningful 
world—a world articulated explicitly by phenomenology but which is lived primarily at a 
preverbal, implicit level of awareness (p. 6). 
In this vein, Gallagher (2014) contends that enactivist accounts based upon sensorimotor 
contingencies (e.g. O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004) are far too narrow due to their 
“neglect of the relevance of the affective aspects including proprioceptive and kinaesthetic 
aspects — factors that should be of high interest since they derive from movement and 
contribute to one’s practical grasp of sensorimotor contingencies” (p. 234). Gallagher argues 
that while our affective states are explained by and dependent upon operations of the rest of 
our body, an affective state such as hunger significantly influences cognitive judgments and 
sensorimotor abilities. While the subject’s environment affords various possibilities for 
action, each has an affective price tag: “One thus not only has a practical (sensorimotor) 
understanding of accessibility, but an affective take on that same accessibility […] a 
perceptual sense of the ease or difficulty of making something present” (p. 236).  
As Thompson (2015b) summarizes, the nervous system enacts a self/not-self distinction 
through a relational process established between efferent motor signals for action and the 
reafferent sensory signals arising from action:  
On one side lies a unique sensorimotor perspective that constitutes the subject of perception and 
the agent of action. On the other side lies the environment as the meaningful locale of perception 
and action. In this way, sensorimotor I-making and sensorimotor sense-making arise together and 
are inseparable; they’re dependently co-arisen (p. 334).  
                                                
215 For example, writing in the context of EM theory, Niedenthal, et al. (2014) have found “the body’s 
reproduction of parts of an emotional experience constitute conceptual content for emotion. The words “disgust” 
and “interest” are not mentally grounded by disembodied symbols but are grounded by parts of the bodily state 
that are re-enacted to support perception and thought” (p. 247). See Colombetti (2010 and 2013) for further 
details concerning affectivity, phenomenology, and AE; see Pessoa (2015) and response articles for an 
extensive discussion on the cognitive-emotional brain. For an overview of affective neuroscience see 
Armony & Vuilleumier (2013). 
	   247	  
At this point it is clear that the Spinozian embodiment to which Harris appeals can be more 
technically established by Damasio’s neurological conception of the emergence of core-self, 
which can in turn be further philosophically articulated by AE. On this view, feelings, affect, 
and emotions are not dissociable kinds of process from those capacities commonly considered 
cognitive, such as reasoning. Moreover, higher-level cognitive capacities reliant upon 
recursive thought (idea ideae) may be both dependent upon and constituted by affective 
sensorimotor associations. With these sentiments, Harris’s place within the AE camp is 
increasingly evident. However, positing cognition in these terms requires that Harris and 
others must address to what extent the world is constructed by our participation – an issue to 
which I return in chapter 8. What remains to be clarified in the following section is how 
Harris relates to the embedded thesis. It is through this consideration that his proposed 
relationship between self-maintenance and consciousness may be further elucidated.216  
 
7.4 Conatus: The Self-Preservation of Consciousness  
According to Harris, Spinoza’s conatus in suo esse perseverandi denotes the constant 
effort inherent in all things, to persevere in their own being, an effort to increase their power 
of action, which provides the incentive for self-improvement. “Accordingly, the effort to 
persist in one’s own being is ipso facto the endeavour to act solely from one’s own essence or 
nature” (1995, p. 58). At the human level of organization Harris contends, “conative efficacy” 
occurs as an enfoldment of simpler feelings manifesting as “emotional states” that are 
“consequent upon the disturbance of equilibrium” (1965, p. 324). So for Harris, the very same 
self-preservation identifiable in living systems occurs in and through the self-organization of 
emotions, which (purportedly) permits the complexity of human function. “If this is 
remembered” he finds, “much misleading talk confusing organic and psychological tensions 
with mechanical pushes and pulls may be avoided and many mis-conceptions entertained in 
machine-theorizing may be corrected” (1965, p. 325).  
Anticipating later embodied and embedded conceptions of active meaning-making (such 
as affective allure mentioned above), Harris makes two particularly important points that 
exemplify the conatus of human consciousness: (i) In perception “[l]ong-standing sets may be 
                                                
216  For further research concerning the Foundations of embodied cognition today, see Fischer & Coello (Eds) 
(2016), volume 1 Sensorimotor and emotional embodiment and volume 2 Conceptual and interactive 
embodiment.   
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established which will determine definite perceptual dispositions, as when, for instance, a 
distant dust cloud is seen by a general as the movement of troops, by a herdsman as a 
movement of cattle” (1965, p. 402); (ii) “empathic elements may be contributed by past 
motor responses (e.g. the appearance of a hill as ‘rising’, or a road as ‘winding’). Thus the 
general set or adjustment of the organism determines the way things appear and emphasis is 
placed upon the active integrative and organizing process involved” (p. 403).  
So for Harris there is “no such thing as ‘pure observation’”, and perception is a process by 
which the subject non-consciously projects previously constructed assumptions and generates 
hypothesis that are either confirmed or disconfirmed so as to revise their original assumptions 
(1965, p. 416). As a means of philosophically interpreting this gestalt conception, Harris 
appeals to Spinoza’s contention that causation of any kind between the attributes and their 
respective modes is denied; “Ideas cannot cause motions nor motions ideas” (1973, p. 85). 
However, he argues ideas are “not epiphenomena” since they can become “genuine actions of 
the mind and are identical in substance with bodily acts involving motion conductive to the 
health and preservation of the bodily organism” (ibid). Hence, on this account, the constraint 
of emotions on the basis of self-maintenance leads to the emergence of a conscious self. To 
connect his theory to contemporary neuroscience, Harris appeals to Damasio’s 
“autobiographical-self.” 
The third stage of Damasio’s argument, the autobiographical-self develops as an aggregate 
of the core-self and is necessary for all the most characteristic qualities associated with 
consciousness such as identity and self-awareness through time. Accordingly, this cognitive 
function (responsible for our use of knowledge recorded in innumerable external mediums) is 
generated when identifiable “objects in one’s biography” stimulate the core self to produce a 
“large-scale coherent pattern” (2010, p. 127). He claims that this occurs in two stages. (1) A 
significant set of “biographical memories must be grouped together so that each can be 
readily treated as an individual object” (p. 150). These networks are then capable of 
modifying the protoself and re-producing the core-self. (2) Due to their complexity, the brain 
needs devices capable of coordinating the relevant recall of memories with respect to 
identifiable objects, situations, etc.  
From a neural standpoint the coordinating process is especially complicated by the fact that the 
images that constitute an autobiography are largely implemented in the image workspaces of the 
cerebral cortex, based on recall from dispositional cortices, and yet, in order to be made 
conscious, those same images need to interact with the protoself machinery, which, as we have 
seen, is largely located at brain-stem level (ibid). 
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The autobiographical self, Damasio contends, involves capacities of memory and reflection 
that depend upon networks across numerous neurological and bodily strata. However he 
further notes that biographical memory “depends on the brain’s ability to produce not only 
mental representations that imitate reality slavishly and mimetically but also representations 
that symbolize actions and objects and individuals” (2010, p. 206). 
At this point Harris diverges from Damasio’s conception of the autobiographical self for 
its reliance upon representations but follows Spinoza in what he claims is a nominalist 
position (1973, p. 95). In a later work Harris notes, “it is to the neurophysiologist, who is 
conscious of the neural activity and its consistent relation to something, and to us who 
perceive the image, that the relation is represented. There is no implication that the function 
of the brain is representation” (2006, p. 65). He goes on to point out that even if such 
representations were permitted, we will remain puzzled by “how such codes could be 
decoded to present an image to the conscious subject” (p. 66).217 His concern is that the brain 
cannot be responsible for management of the (autobiographical) self because this involves 
“assessment of circumstances and decision”, neither of which seems explicable in terms of 
representations by neural states (p. 68). In an earlier work he argues the subject must make 
some kind of distinction between the concept as remembered and the object it represents, 
between the present remembering and the past remembered – what is essentially an act of 
judgment: “To do all this, my remembering cannot be confined either to the present event or 
to the past but must transcend both, as well as the relation between them” (1988, p. 88). With 
these contentions, Harris denies that self-awareness is to be either spatially located in 
neurological states or temporally located in phenomenal representations of a particular 
moment.  
Harris’s solution to this problem of locating the idea of the self may be considered in a 
number of steps. First, following Spinoza, Harris maintains “sensations in themselves are 
neither true nor false…” (1973, p. 91). Error, he explains, consists in our omitting something 
without our awareness that is pertinent to the idea that we affirm. “It is in virtue of this 
unrecognized omission that the idea we affirm is confused. Error, for Spinoza, therefore, is 
                                                
217 He later complains that for Damasio, not only is the brain representational but “all thought consists of 
images” and “all thinking and acquired knowledge, for him, is conscious” (2006, p. 66-67), a position that Harris 
is unwilling to accept. For his part however, Damasio does appear to avoid criticisms concerning representation 
and the non-conscious in his later work: “Nuclei are filled with ‘dispositional know-how,’ the sort of knowledge 
that does not require detailed mapped representations” (2010, p. 62). 
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mere privation or abstraction – the omission of essential fact or implication…” (p. 92). 
Consequently, no idea or feeling represents something in the world since “what is felt is not 
just the original activity by itself […] it is in intimate organic relation to the whole environing 
universe” (2000, p. 180). Second, Harris claims perceptions (somatic and kinaesthetic) are 
“interpretations of impressions in the light of their context and past history. This is a 
perpetual process of judging […] measured by its coherence and self-consistency” (2000, p. 
192). I discuss this resulting coherence theory in § 8.3.1, but for now it is only important to 
orient Harris’s rejection of ‘representations.’ 
In consideration of Steiner’s (2014) thorough analysis of enactivist arguments against 
representationalism, Harris presents himself as advocating for the most extreme of positions: 
(i) against the role of representation in cognition and bodily function, i.e. against mind 
independence; (ii) against the formats of representation, meaning functions like language, 
meaning memory retrieval and problem solving are not abstract representations; and (iii) 
against the existence of representations in the world (pp. 44-46). In contrast to classical 
cognitive theory, nothing can represent anything else in dialectical holism because such 
signification depends upon the knowledge of an entire system within which the particular 
relation may be sufficiently individuated. In other words, nothing can be representational, nor 
correspond to anything in and of itself, unless it were constructed to do so at the level of the 
system-as-a-whole (e.g. by observers). In the latter case, claiming something is 
representational is to provide no more than a mere tautology.218 As proponents of AE 
recognize however, taking this position does not conflict with methodological 
representationalism.  
Harris concludes that self-awareness is achieved not only through “brain activity” but is 
also “inseparable from social activity” (2006, p. 69). He goes on to argue that Damasio’s 
conclusion that self-awareness depends upon sociality is not strong enough because it still 
permits us to say that judgment is represented by neural states:  
                                                
218 In the context of memory, Bechtel (2009) contends that “information is often encoded in a very distributed 
fashion in which there is no single locus for the engram” (p. 25). He goes on to explain that one consequence of 
this distributed representation scheme is that the representations or memories are “subject to catastrophic 
interference as the learning of new information alters the connections that maintained the previously learned 
information” (ibid). Hence, even if we admit the term representation in philosophical discussion, it may not 
actually serve much if any explanatory purpose given how dynamic brains and worlds actually are. 
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A moral point of view is possible only for a self-conscious mind, which is aware of the self in its 
social relations and can make judgments of right and wrong that may induce it to oppose its own 
instinctual inclinations. How and where patterns of neural transmissions in the brain bring about 
such self-conscious reflection is puzzling enough […] but that such patterns could themselves 
amount to moral judgments […] hardly makes sense (2006, p. 69).  
Bearing in mind the discussions from §§ 7.2 and 7.3.1, the basis of such judgement must be 
the feeling of self-organization and preservation of the system as a whole. At the level of 
human consciousness, judgements of the whole (being within a social context) fall under the 
heading of morality. Though Harris does not make all of them explicit, three contentions 
follow: (i) sociality can obtain iff subjects establish “a moral point of view”; (ii) if self-
awareness depends upon sociality, a moral point of view is necessary for self-awareness; and 
(iii) if moral judgements are constituted by social relations beyond the brain, self-awareness 
is irreducible to neural states.219 In the next section I consider this line of reasoning in greater 
detail so as to clarify Harris’s conditions for self-awareness. 
 
7.4.1 Embedded Persons and Responsible Minds 
For Harris, elucidating the conatus of humans involves an analysis of responsible action, 
what he calls the activity of reason that becomes possible only for reflective, self-conscious 
beings, or persons:  
Personality and self-consciousness, however, develop only in a social setting and are elicited only 
through communication with other people, recognized equally as rational agents. Responsible 
action is, therefore, social action, and its performance presupposes social relations and social 
structures (1988, p. 107). 
                                                
219 Unfortunately I do not have space to elaborate the fascinating empirical evidence to this end but the following 
summarizes two relevant lines of reasoning. In evolutionary neuroscience, Striedter (2005) has argued that the 
last significant burst of brain growth for Homo sapiens 100,000 years ago was not due to a change of diet or 
genetics alone, but “altercations with fellow humans” that spurred language and culture (ff. p. 318). In 
evolutionary psychology, Corballis (2007) maintains that there is a link between the FOXP2 gene mutation and 
the mirror system (Broca’s area), proposing that this mutation has provided a means to incorporate vocal control 
into (and thus depended upon) our abilities to mirror physical actions. “It provides further evidence that the 
FOXP2 mutation was the final stage in a series of adaptations that allowed speech to become autonomous” (p. 
585). Additionally see Richerson, et al’s., Not by Genes Alone (2005). 
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He goes on to argue “history is the self-knowledge of mind […] on the grounds that to know 
oneself is necessarily to be aware of oneself as a social being, and that requires the a priori 
concept of the historical past” (1988, p. 133). In a Spinozian context, Harris elaborates what 
he sees as an implied coherence theory:  
inadequate ideas, if properly supplemented and set in proper context, approach the truth […] 
There they are fully adequate, completely filled out, and fitted into the web of their actual 
relations to all others. The nearer ideas approach to this completeness (as is equally the case with 
their ideata) the more reality, and the more perfection, they possess (1995, p. 59).  
Taking these points together, proper self-consciousness can obtain (and be maintained) 
only on a moral and historical basis: that is, networks in which a given agent faces pressures 
to establish judgments concerning the actions and dispositions of other agents with 
cognizance of historical context. Achieving adequate ideas further implies the agent is 
capable of re-cognizing their identity (self-relation) with respect to other agents and 
alternative points of view with increasing systematicity. Perhaps another way to understand 
this proposition (§ 7.2 argument 4) is to say consciousness obtains iff the ideatum establishes 
a relation to (becomes about) some socially constructed MSE and cognizes judgments about 
this relation. Here I claim Harris has moved into the domain of situated cognition. 
Providing general support for Harris’s position, Damasio and others have argued that in 
the absence of emotionally charged somatic markers (as in subjects with damage to the 
vmPFC), the subject is incapable of effectively determining moral value of outcomes. This 
emotional impairment leads to moral malfunction, which supports the position that rationality 
is insufficient for moral reasoning (Strejcek, et al. 2014). Concerning morality and cognition, 
after reviewing a range of empirical studies on social isolation after (relatively) normal 
development, Doris and Nichols (2012) have concluded that “[r]ationality is not only socially 
developed, it is socially sustained; in many domains, optimal reasoning occurs when the 
reasoning process occurs as part of a social process” (p. 434).220  
Following Husserl’s phenomenology of culture, Havelange (2010) contends that empathy 
reverses the natural attitude. Comprehension of the “Other” he maintains, comes not from 
apprehension of an objective body. Rather empathy provides a “substrate of immediate 
meaning” that permits the communicative intention of the Other to engender a corresponding 
                                                
220 On the extreme, famous examples abound in social psychology of mal-development resulting from severe 
neglect in children that has been shown to arrest moral and reasoning capacities associated with human 
consciousness (Itard, 1802); (Spitz, et al., 1949); (van der Horst, et al., 2008).  
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intent in the subject. The shared bodily and linguistic expressions he maintains, enables the 
subject “to intuitively understand the experience of the Other by ‘putting myself in his place’ 
and to predict his behaviors” (p. 344). Similarly, Thompson (2015b) argues that social 
cognition, perspective taking, and empathy are closely related to the ability to cognize the 
self/not-self distinction. He finds that “being able to think of oneself as a self seems 
inseparable from being able mentally to grasp an outside view of oneself, that is, from the 
vantage point of the other” (p. 345). In defending this stance he appeals to studies from 
developmental psychology arguing  
these two mental abilities arise together and build on the capacity for shared or joint attention. 
Joint attention emerges around nine months of age and comprises the threefold structure of a 
child, an adult, and something to which they know they are both giving attention. It includes 
activities such as gaze following (reliably following where one or the other person is looking), 
acting together with shared objects (such as toys), and imitative learning (the child’s acting on or 
using things the way adults do) (pp. 345-46).  
He concludes that “self-experience emerges from I-making processes that are fundamentally 
social and intersubjective” (p. 347).221 
In contrast to theory of mind (ToM) approaches that emphasize mind reading, Gallagher 
(2014) argues that the mirror neuron system is activated not merely as imitation of another, 
but anticipation of another agent’s behaviour. He defends what he calls the predictive coding 
model: 
Intersubjective interaction is not about mindreading the mental states of others, but about directly 
perceiving their intentions and emotions in their postures, movements, gestures, facial 
                                                
221 Harvey et al. (2016) have maintained that interactivity reveals a shortcoming to the enactivist conception of 
operational closure: “where enactivism describes agent-environment relations in terms of in-the-moment 
coupling, we assume these relations play out on multiple heterogeneous timescales, such that in many cases – 
perhaps most – agency is fundamentally distributed” (p. 235). Their worry appears to be satiated by considering 
Thompson’s (2007) appeal to generative phenomenology that “concerns the historical, social, and cultural 
becoming of human experience” (p. 33). He goes on to claim “To investigate the life-world as horizon and 
ground of all experience therefore requires investigating none other than generativity – the process of becoming, 
of making and remaking, that occurs over the generations and within which any individual genesis is always 
already situated” (p. 36). Evidently Harris’s conception of historical cognition is in deep agreement with, but 
perhaps not as technically developed as generative phenomenology.  
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expressions, vocal intonations, etc., as well as in their highly contextualized (by physical 
environment, social roles, culture, etc.) actions… (p. 238).222  
These sentiments are in line with AE (and dialectical) evolution as described above, in that 
cognitive capacities do not arise through intrinsic or genetic alterations alone, but in and 
through behaviour, which in the human context is necessarily social, moral, and emotional. 
Concerning the importance of historical cognition, in Bayesian terms, Gallagher (2014) holds 
that neurological dynamics of anticipation are hierarchical, involving synaptic inhibition 
“based on an empirical prior—something that depends on the organism’s previous experience 
and context-sensitive learning” (p. 241). He holds that neural states are to be understood not 
as holding intrinsic content, but rather as being meaningful only in and through the agent’s 
history. 
 Moreover, it is the historical environmental interaction (beyond the brain) that provides 
the means for and determines ongoing processes of “top-down synaptic inhibition”: 
Such inhibitory patterns constitute a prediction which is then matched against ongoing sensory 
input. If there is a mismatch, i.e., if the new stimulus generates a different firing pattern than the 
one anticipated, prediction errors are sent back up the line and the system adjusts dynamically 
back and forth until there is a relatively good fit (p. 241).  
This dovetails with Harris’s view that modification of connections sufficient for anticipating 
future processing relies upon both prior processing and constraints across numerous spatial 
scales. In agreement with both Bohm (1980b) and Silberstein & Chemero’s (2015) ENM (§ 
2.5 above), Gallagher maintains the “explanatory unit” of perception, cognition, or action, 
should not be considered the brain, nor some number of brains in social interaction,  
but a dynamic relation between organisms, which include brains, but also their own structural 
embodied features that enable specific perception-action loops involving social and physical 
environments, which in turn effect statistical regularities that shape the structure and function of 
the nervous system (p. 242).223 
                                                
222 See Clark (2016) for further details concerning prediction theory in embodied cognition.    
223 Interestingly Harris recognizes that the bi-polarity between self and not-self is not black and white because on 
occasion, “the body, or part of it, is excluded from the self; at others the self may come to include what, in 
different circumstances, would be regarded as parts of the not-self” (1965, p. 338). While this and other lines of 
reasoning concerning the noösphere (1991, pp. 139, ff. 149, 173; 1992, pp. 3-4; 1988, pp. 149, 151) and 
collective mind (1995, pp. 90-91) leave open the possibility of further discussion with contemporary arguments 
in extended mind/sociopoiesis, unfortunately space prohibits my addressing this issue in greater depth.   
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How then, does this line of reasoning conceive of self-awareness? Harris claims that the 
capacity of a cognitive system to ‘extricate itself’ so as to grasp an entire structure as a whole 
means that mind is self-transcendent. The problem is that the self remains ephemeral because 
it must be capable of grasping and he maintains, going beyond a differentiated whole of 
experience, and thus cannot be for itself an object: “no such judgements and no awareness of 
relations could occur without a subject who transcends the single terms of the relationship” 
(1991, p. 142). For Spinoza, Harris writes: 
Ideas, so far as they are the awareness of finite extended things, involve the awareness of the 
limits which define their objects, and such awareness ipso facto surpasses those limits; for if it did 
not it could not be an awareness of them. Thus the self-awareness or idea, of the body, by its very 
ideal nature, transcends the limits of that body both spatially and temporally (1995, p. 66). 
Importantly, Harris does not mean to claim that self-awareness is actually ideal in a Platonic 
sense. Rather, the conscious subject cannot be part of its gestalt, nor the sum total of bodily 
parts at any one time because for Harris (and AE), it does not even exist at any one time or 
place! Harris concludes that while the self is dependent upon and partially constituted by 
relations with its world, its transcendence of these relations is required to afford knowledge of 
the world.224 This means that for Harris and AE, the explanatory units of mind are relations 
across both spatial and temporal scales: “Human experience is always continuous, not 
discrete; embedded, not isolated; temporal, not eternal” (Gallager 2015, p. 115). 
Harris’s concluding remarks regarding the conatus reveal important insight into how he 
believed the process of mind could be depicted as continuous with that of evolution: 
The conatus produces reactions to [the passions] in the endeavor to preserve the self, which take 
the form of appetites and desires accompanied by the appropriate emotions. But the conatus is the 
endeavor of the thing (res) – in this case the human being – to maintain itself in its own essence 
[…] The conatus, therefore, is, in its proper and most adequate expression, the endeavor to 
increase the power of action of the human self. Ideas corresponding to action (as opposed to 
passion) are always adequate ideas, and the power of action is the power of reason. Accordingly, 
                                                
224 Indeed Damasio says, “The oddest thing about the upper reaches of a consciousness performance is the 
conspicuous absence of a conductor before the performance begins, although, as the performance unfolds, a 
conductor comes into being” (2010, p. 16). Similarly he finds this implies that  “No single mechanism explains 
consciousness in the brain, no single device, no single region, or feature, or trick, any more than a symphony can 
be played by one musician or even a few” (p. 17). 
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human nature is twofold […]: it is both subject to passion and is capable of action; it is both 
appetitive and rational (1995, p. 102).  
In summary, for Harris the conative effort of self-preservation that characterizes 
consciousness is one of historical sensitivity and social relatedness; it is an effort to increase 
freedom via self-knowledge. Consciousness then involves the effort by an agent to become 
about one’s own aboutness by becoming increasingly sensitive to the (endogenous and 
exogenous) unconscious dynamics that instantiate their gestalt. For AE and Harris, awareness 
of this kind provides a means to regulate otherwise endogenous passions and vicissitudinous 
environments. What Harris attempted to convey, I maintain, is that the self-preservation of 
consciousness is the same process of internalization or broadening of phenomenological 
horizons posited in dialectical evolution, with the only difference being a matter of scale. I 
submit that the arguments from Harris and recent proponents of AE can reach the common 
conclusion that for humans, the conatus is to be identified with the capacity to re-cognize 
one’s momentary ideatum as socially situated. This process results in increased freedom and 




Towards establishing a connection between self-maintenance and consciousness Harris has 
argued that sensations “are differentiations of feeling or sentience, which supervenes on a 
certain high degree of integration of physiological functioning involving specially integrated 
patterns of activity at lower levels” (2000, p. 178). He notes that the “lower levels” consist 
not only of neural discharges “but probably all, or most of, the metabolic and physiological 
functions of the body” (ibid). While he recognizes the importance of the nervous system and 
brain, he claims, “the whole system of the organism is involved” (2000, p. 179). Moreover, as 
discussed above, the process of consciousness is considered inseparable from social networks 
and historical context. Accordingly, self-awareness is identical not with any neural process 
taken in isolation, but with the form of one’s living, historical, and social lifeworld as a 
whole.  
In § 7.3, I have highlighted Harris’s anticipation of Damasio’s neurological model of mind 
and sensorimotor enactivism. With Harris, Damasio has recognized the relevance of many of 
                                                
225 For a summary of this argument for Spinozian Embodiment, see the below appendix, § V-a. 
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Spinoza’s concepts for contemporary neuropsychology (such as ideatum and the centrality of 
emotion). However, I have argued that Damasio’s appeal to representations at the level of the 
biographical-self is incompatible with both Harris and AE. In clear agreement with Harris’s 
conception of the self, enactivists give emotional affect a central role in their theory of 
sensorimotor cognition. This convergence of ideas was further exemplified in § 7.4, 
concerning Harris and AE’s arguments that social, moral, and historical relations are partially 
constitutive of self-awareness.  
With this convergence of ideas having been established I am now in a position to evaluate 
Harris’s revision and naturalization of the crucial problem: “It is not a matter of bridging the 
gap between first-person revelation and third-person description […] What needs to be 
overcome is the chasm between third-person description of brain functioning and third person 
description of conscious awareness” (2006, p. 60). What remains to be seen is the extent to 
which the above descriptive model of mind (neuropsychological-heuristic) can be expanded 
into an ontological explanation. Toward this end, in accordance with his above (§ 7.2) 
conception of (3) the scale of forms, Harris appeals to DST, thus in the following chapter I 
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Chapter 8 
Bridging Philosophies of Consciousness and Cosmology 




In the previous chapter I elucidated Harris’s neurocognitive model for the emergence of 
consciousness. Harris took pains to show that the findings of contemporary sciences were 
most efficiently systematized by appealing to metaphysics of process, dialectical relations, 
and a series of unifying principles. With these conceptual guides he argued that it is possible 
to discuss both “subjective” and “objective” phenomena without being hindered by the 
Cartesian Chasm. Additionally, he argued consciousness can be considered continuous with 
evolution (as discussed in § 6.3.1). What remains to receive a head-on treatment in this final 
chapter is Harris’s argument for a naturalization of mind and knowledge within the holist 
metaphysics considered heretofore.  
In § 8.2, I outline Harris’s appeal to DST in neuroscience and his anticipation of theories 
depicting consciousness as “phase of matter.” Here I consider possible implications this 
proposition has for AE. In § 8.3, I reconsider the TAP in light of Harris’s response to the hard 
problem and highlight some consequences this theory has for a naturalization of knowledge. 
Here, I suggest Rapoport’s (2011) and Rosen’s (2008) conception of Klein Bottle Logic 
serves as a suitable analog of Harris’s reasoning and extension of AE’s appeal to second-
order science. In the final § 8.4, I elucidate Harris’s contention that consciousness is a scale 
and argue that the resulting model reveals a cosmological dimension for the enactivist 
paradigm. 
 
8.2 Consciousness as a Phase of Matter 
In this section I clarify the ontological status of consciousness within a dialectical holist 
framework. In his later work Harris reiterates his above (§ 7.2) contention (3), that if mind 
and neural activity are the same phenomenon, merely described with different languages (as 
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the dual aspect theorist claims), “there must be some similarity or common character in their 
‘logics.’ They must be mutually convertible in some way, as mathematically isomorphic 
calculi are mutually convertible” (2000, p. 171). What is this common language? As 
previously discussed, Harris posits an ontology of self-organizing scales, each dialectically 
related and inseparable from the Concrete Universal that embodies the form of Nature. 
Specifically, the process by which this scale of forms undergoes self-differentiation is 
considered to be the very same process that instantiates consciousness. In this way he 
believed we could establish a common language between phenomenal and material processes.  
Consciousness, Harris argues, occurs through a graded scale, in which earlier grades of 
presumably lesser complexity “can exist without the later, but not vice versa.” Hence, 
“thought and intellect” are unnecessary for earlier phases such as locomotion and appetite, 
but these capacities cannot develop without the “lower vital functions” (2006, p. 98). As 
previously discussed, the lower and higher functions taken together establish Harris’s 
conditions of consciousness (2006, ff. p. 150):  
 
(1) Self-organization (entropy management);  
(2) Embodiment (sensorimotor affectivity and implicit judgment);  
(3) Interrelation with other organisms (normativity/selection);  
(4) Organization of emotions (the explicit judgment of one’s gestalt); and  
(5) Modification of one’s gestalt/world-view (“adaptive thought” of a transcendent ego). 
  
Following from Harris’s original conception of auturgy toward consciousness, 
phenomenal awareness is by this reasoning understood as emerging through a graded scale. 
The complexity of cognizance is considered a range of “self-specification” from greater to 
lesser homogeneity (i.e. symmetry-breaking) of the “psychical field” (1991, p. 109). 
Attention, he claims, is established through the construction of “a figure-and-ground datum”, 
that differentiates the life-world or Gestalt of attention in the same manner as that found in 
the physical world. Each involve “the same organizing activity as that operative throughout 
nature […] It is the same organizing principle that integrates the physical cosmos and unites 
the biosphere, which unifies conscious experience and ensures the integrity of the 
experienced world” (1991, p. 132). He goes on to claim that “all are mutually continuous 
dialectical phases or specific forms in the necessary self-differentiation of the universal 
totality” (ibid). By essentially appealing to nominalism, Harris arrives at his TAP: if 
consciousness is a scale of nature, then it is considered a necessary phenomenon within the 
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history of the Universe. Hence what remains to be established is an argument that depicts the 
function of consciousness (as depicted heretofore) as one such scale. 
Contrary to the brain/hardware, mind/software argument of the 80’s and 90’s that 
attempted to paint a “grandmother neuron” picture of neuronal activity, Harris maintains that 
contemporary science has depicted brain function as holistic. “The sensory cortex was found 
to be hierarchically responsive, successive layers reacting to more detailed and refined 
characters of objects presented” (2006, p. 83). Neurons, he maintains respond dynamically 
under varying condition and are in a continuous flux of death and regeneration. This he 
believed “undermined the pixel interpretation of neural performance” (p. 84). Population 
coding suggests that the average firing strength of neural populations, rather than individual 
neurons, were correlated with consciousness. This implies, “neural reactions were not so 
much digital as global. They were integrated and inseparably conjoined, so that groups acted 
as wholes to produce their output” (ibid). Harris argues that a far more accurate approach to 
the science of mind going forward is DST. 
Harris finds that in order to represent neural activity computationally, due to the incredible 
sensitivity of the brain, adjustments have to be made in the measurements relating input to 
output, which seemed so small as to make no intelligible difference to the outcome of 
calculations. Chaos theory becomes relevant in this context because it has “discovered that 
the minutest difference in initial conditions could, in the course of non-linear processes, result 
in enormous deviations in the eventual outcome” (2006, p. 85). He goes on to say that what 
appeared on the surface to be chaotic was in fact a complex order emerging from the total 
process guided by a strange attractor. “It was impossible to explain the consequent effect by 
analysing the process and reducing it to disparate items. The organizing principle of the 
whole is what determined the detail of the total structure” (ibid). Citing the non-linearity of 
“re-entrant” feedback loops and their subsequent cascade affects, Harris posits that “the 
reaction of the brain to any input is never predictable as is the response of a computer” (p. 
86). Thus, Harris finds that chaos provides viable methodological approach for 
neuropsychology.  
In this vein, Harris appeals to Edelman and Tononi’s (2000) work, which argued the 
synchronicity of neural firing patterns, rather than specific neurons or nuclei, explains for 
example how object recognition may be achieved.226 Harris finds that memory is most 
                                                
226 Harris may have gone too far in positing “that theories of artificial intelligence can throw little or no light on 
how the brain operates, any more than they can on what I have said is the crucial problem” (2006, p. 87). He 
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adequately conceptualized by the dynamic core because it has been found to arise through the 
collective efforts of numerous “scattered nuclei” throughout the whole brain and changes in 
accordance with the subject’s experiences. “It is dynamic, not static; that is, it has not only 
developed over the time of maturation, but is continually changing with varying experiences 
and learning” (2006, p. 88). While the dynamic core is meant to model the contents of 
consciousness, Harris believed it to “occur as one undissectable operation”, in which 
conscious acts both constrain and are dependent upon peripheral non-conscious goals, 
emotional cues (i.e. value systems), learned motor functions, etc. (p. 89).227 
For Harris, the emergence of self-consciousness in and through this dynamic core is 
considered the “actualization of the potentialities of all the earlier stages, each successively 
matter to the next as form” (2006, p. 98). Harris maintains this relationship is “analogous to 
that between a magnetic field and the molecular structure of the body from which it 
emanates” (2006, p. 146; see also 1991, pp. 105-6). As with earlier scales,  
the human mind is the form (or idea - eidos) of the human body, a highly organized complex 
phase of matter, incorporating all prior stages in the scale of forms. Yet as a composite of matter 
and form the living human being is one substance only, not two, as the wax and the impressed 
pattern are one and the same thing (2006, p. 99).  
Again, he holds there is no causal “transition” from neuronal function to consciousness, but 
that awareness is an “enfoldment” of the organism as a whole, “a phase transition occurring 
when a critical threshold is reached of complex integral unification” (p. 161). In line with my 
above analysis, Harris thus proposes that consciousness is a field, phase of matter, or further 
instance of φ, whose mode of formal governance is for the sake of the intellect and adaptive 
thought. In the following sections I evaluate this position with respect to more recent works. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
maintained that without a programmer there is no program, without an informed observer there is no behaviour, 
read out, etc. To judge an algorithm as intelligent or not, meant for Harris, presupposing an intelligent creator. 
Following Penrose’s (1989) appeal to the Gödel theorem, he maintains that we must be able to determine 
whether or not the system is capable of non-computable insight, short of this no test will suffice (1991, p. 118).     
227 Following Greenfield (2000) and McCrone (1999), Harris (2006) claims that imaging technology of 
contemporary neuroscience has provided support for his argument that there is no one-to-one correlation 
between function or phenomenal experience and brain region, nor does any one region represent an experience. 
Rather, experiences must be understood as global processes wherein the brain regions that constitute awareness 
execute their functions through their interplay with one another and the body as a whole.  
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8.2.1 Neurodynamic Field Theory  
In recent years, dynamic systems theory (DST) has become increasingly useful for 
numerous sub-disciplines of psychology. This paradigm provides an overarching framework 
for investigating the dynamical activity associated with consciousness across multiple space-
time scales (Cosmelli, et al. 2007).228 Specifically, dynamical neural fields (DNFs) have been 
useful for studying processes of individual behaviour, development, learning, and 
environmental constraints. In what follows, I review evidence that DNF provide support for 
Harris’s (§ 7.2) contentions (3, 4, 5) and with respect to the previous section, permits 
consciousness to be treated as a phase of matter. 
In accord with Harris’s appeal to the irreducibility of a dynamic core, DNFs are holistic in 
that it is usually not “known exactly where the processes modelled in the DNF take place in 
the brain, and it may even be doubtful whether any single neural population exists that 
behaves exactly as the dynamic field does” (Schneegans, et al. 2008, p. 252). Consequently, 
the “functionally significant states of such complete systems emerge as attractor solutions 
from these dynamics under the appropriate circumstances […] These functions are not fixed 
and they do not ‘sit somewhere’ until activated. They are simply emergent properties of the 
dynamical system” (p. 268). Accordingly, brain connectivity reveals a “hierarchy of scales” 
from local neuronal circuits to functional topological networks, the dynamics of each 
“determined not just by processes at that scale, but by processes at other smaller and larger 
scales as well” (Richardson, et al. 2014, p. 46). DNFs thus arise from multiple distributed 
areas whose net evolution of stable activation patterns reveals an “interaction dominant 
system”, the components of which cannot be treated in modular terms (p. 48).  
DST is therefore complementary with situated cognition, for it depicts the organism as 
obtaining in and through numerous (spatio-temporally) coupled levels including the nervous 
system and environmental task context. The brain is thus conceived as “a very high 
dimensional, complex-dynamical system, built neuronally, but potentially coupled so closely 
to the environment through its own effector and sensor systems that these become part of the 
dynamical system” (Schneegans, et al. 2008, p. 268).229 Because interaction-dominant 
                                                
228 For example, concerning neurodynamics and electrocortical Activity, Minelli (2009), summarizes: “The 
spectrum of EEG activity is usually divided in the following bands: delta, 0 to 4 Hz; theta, 4 to 8 Hz; alpha, 8 to 
12 Hz; Beta, 12 TO 30 Hz; and gamma, 30 to 80 Hz” (p. 76).  
229 The goal for those working in DST is to identify the tasks and elementary behaviours, through which such 
dynamic structures can be identified, “in which projection from the high dimensional state space into much 
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systems are irreducible, some authors have maintained “the cognitive system in question is 
not encapsulated within an individual brain or even an individual body […] When human-tool 
or social cognitive systems are complex dynamical systems with interaction-dominant 
dynamics, they are extended cognitive systems” (Richardson, et al. 2014, p. 48). This idea is 
clearly consistent with many of the above contentions (§§ 2.5, 7.4.1) for extended and 
situated minds.  
In accord with Harris’s above (§ 7.2) contention (5), a growing number of theorists in 
recent years have argued DST provides a method applicable to both physical and 
phenomenological dynamics. In their introduction to Chaos and complexity in psychology 
(2009), Guastello, et al. explain synergetics in a way that recapitulates formal governance (§ 
5.3): “The emergence of a hierarchical structure follows the same mathematical and physical 
dynamics as a phase transition, such as the transition of a solid to a liquid” (pp. 24-25). 
Moreover, supporting a possible extension of ϕ to consciousness, Hollis, et al. later contend 
“the brain and body” may be considered “excitable media” stimulated to create autocatalytic 
“traveling waves or solitons” – “temporarily invariant structures that exist as coherent, 
ordered entities within the space and energy of an excitable medium” (p. 212). They explain 
such waves do not reduce to components of the nervous system, but are “emergent 
phenomena” within a hierarchy of constraints: “Constraints are accrued through idiosyncratic 
experience, and constraints are implicit in the immediate context. Constraints are aspects of 
biology, culture, history, context, or current states that narrow down the possibility for 
cognitive activity, prior to its occurrence…” (p. 214). It is unsurprising then that Renaud, et 
al. (2009) have found agent-environment coupling can be characterized by fractal patterns, in 
which stable forms can be represented by specific attractors and repellors that in turn guide an 
agent’s behaviour (p. 182).  
In a clinical setting, Van Geert (2009) agrees that the levels of childhood development are 
best understood as highly dynamic attractors represented by a fuzzy logic (i.e. a function of 
continuous rather than discrete membership). As attractors, he holds, stages of development 
                                                                                                                                                  
lower dimensional subsystems is possible” (Schneegans, et al. 2008, p. 269). What the mathematics of 
dynamical systems describes is the temporal evolution of state variables “governed by a field of forces, the 
vector field, which specifies for every possible state of the system the direction and rate of change in the 
immediate future” (Schoner, et al. 2009, p. 454). Besides claiming that nervous systems can be modelled by 
differential equations, DST reveals that the functional states resulting from nervous, sensory, and motor system 
couplings are best captured by attractors and thus fall into a special class of dynamical systems, called 
“dissipative” systems (pp. 456-57). 
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are most comparable “to the phases of physical matter (gaseous, liquid, solid)” (p. 262). 
These stages are “defined by the developmental system’s major order parameter”, which is 
captured by brain maturation and habitual skills developed within the subject’s niche. He 
finds the difference between phase transitions of a substance and the emergent self-organized 
criticality of complex systems such as embodied-embedded brains, is that for the latter, the 
phases are possibilities rather than necessities – the stages are thus metastable. As Hollis, et 
al. (2009) explain, whereas self-organization, by itself ends in an attractor state (e.g. fixed 
point, limit cycle, Taurus, or strange), humans by contrast, appear to be drawn to metastable 
states of self-organized criticality, “that dance in the neighbourhood of attractors without 
fully realizing them…” (p. 218). Such states have more recently been identified with what 
Van Orden, et al. (2011) call pink noise, which reveals fractal patterns between random 
(white noise) and over-regular (brown noise). “Pink noise is a fundamentally complex 
phenomenon that reflects an optimal coordination among the components of person and task 
environment” (p. 629). They explain that deviations from this optimum occur when learning a 
new skill, in advanced aging, and disease. 
In this vein, Dixon, et al. (2014) have argued that the classical approach to cognition has 
proven incapable of accounting for the generation of new cognitive processes, including 
novel means of problem solving. Towards a more fruitful approach they suggest that 
“[e]ffects in physical systems, including those within biology, must be understood in terms of 
the flow of energy and matter” (p. 163). They argue that a truly embodied cognition requires 
that interactions are understood as a result of “energy consumption”, and so should the 
quantities we measure, which provides what they call a “common currency across all scales 
of the system and environment, as well as explicit connections to thermodynamic laws” 
(ibid).230 They conclude that the generation of new macroscopic cognitive functions is most 
adequately defined as phase transitions:  
                                                
230 Concerning the relationship between neuroanatomy and cosmology, Cherniak (2009) has found certain 
biological structures have originated “directly from simple physical processes, without need of DNA 
involvement” (p. 371). An example of this is the way in which nature solves the Steiner tree problem. According 
to Chemiak’s research, the brain solves this problem “via a lucky if counterintuitive factoid of computational 
geometry, that embedding dominates over topology; topology can in effect be ignored at comparatively little 
cost […] Neuron arbors solve their minimization problem to within a few present of optimality, about as well as 
nonliving arbors, such as river drainage networks…” (pp. 372-73). Interestingly, this is to say that brains achieve 
volume minimization “via the same basic fluid dynamic processes as do water networks” (ibid). Indeed, this 
should come as no surprise given the findings from §§ 5.2 and 6.2.1. 
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Phase transitions are well understood theoretically, and have been broadly demonstrated 
empirically in a wide variety of systems […] Our work shows that the formation of new cognitive 
structures shows the same signatures as in other embodied, physical systems. That is, an increase 
in fluctuations as the transition point approaches… (p. 168).  
In an effort to live away the problem of mind, neurophenomenology utilizes DST as a 
means of modeling neurological and phenomenological dynamics in terms of trajectories of 
states within correlated but irreducible phase spaces (Robbins & Gordon, 2013). Treated as a 
complex system, the global state (for either phenomenal or neurodynamic domains) is 
captured by a single point in some number (n) of independent variables that together compose 
an n–dimensional state space.  
A sequence of such states followed in time defines a trajectory, also known as the system flow. 
The shape of the flow is determined by the system’s intrinsic dynamics — the forces that push the 
system state in one direction or another, depending on where the current state is located. They can 
be thought of as constituting a kind of landscape over which the behavior of the system moves. An 
“attractor” is a trajectory in phase space to which the system will converge from any set of initial 
conditions (Van Quyen 2010, p. 256).  
By this methodology it can be seen that phase transitions and symmetry breaking are 
applicable to both phenomenological and neurological domains. The result is that these 
domains are conceived as “homologous”, mutually informing state spaces characterized by a 
common evolutionary trajectory or “landscape”.231  
For autonomous dynamical systems, the global shape and evolution of the landscape are 
determined by order parameters (constraints) created by collective interactions among the 
individual parts of the system, which in turn govern the behavior of the individual parts. 
Intentional constraints however must be added to those already present in the environment 
and linked to boundary conditions (like those prescribed in a laboratory). “Once again, in a 
circular causal manner, the intentions modulate the control parameter, which in turn maintain 
(or modify) the intentions” (Renaud, et al. 2009, p. 183). DST entails that intentional 
                                                
231 Concerning its practical application, Van Ouyen concludes that in the case of seizure research, 
neurophenomenology can provide a significant advance in our understanding of the disease. What must be 
remembered however, is that “the efficiency of this approach needs a continuous circulation between the field of 
phenomena revealed by the patient’s experience and the correlated field of phenomena established by the 
neurodynamics […] this circulation can be based on a state space strategy, revealing homeomorphisms linking 
the topologies of phenomenal and neuronal states” (p. 261). The research, he maintains, reveals a “co-
determination” between respective domains.   
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constraints permit perceptual-motor coordination on a time scale larger than that of body 
movements and thereby “modulate the intrinsic dynamics of the order parameters linked both 
to the flow of information and the flow of motor control. By so doing, they define an attractor 
capable of guiding motor behaviour toward the desired pattern” (p. 183).232  
Tschacher, et al. (2009) point out that this circular causal structure (synergetics) bears 
important implications for the nature of intentionality. They argue “emergent mental 
properties do indeed matter”, and cannot be “epiphenomenal” because this conception of 
synergetics “is applicable to both sides of the mind-body gap, and may even put forward 
ways to bridge this gap…” (p. 329). Likewise, Van Orden, et al. (2011) have argued 
(continuous with formal governance) that DST may naturalize intentionality:  
We have proposed that intentions affect behavior as constraints, not causes. Intentions as 
constraints are temporary dynamical structures, soft assembled from interdependent components to 
function in control parameters to create critical states […] Constraints are therefore no less natural 
or no more magical than causes, or the convectional cells of the atmosphere that change the 
weather. Thus the complexity account makes progress toward naturalizing intentionality (p. 657).  
This section has shown how the tools and methods of DST, when applied to the study of 
mind reflects Harris’s (§ 7.2) central ontological claims (3 and 4) and support his contention 
that the mind is an instance of ϕ. For DST, mind is principally characterized by constraints 
arising from the organization of a series of irreducible forms, indicated by phase transitions, 
attractors, and fractal dynamics across numerous spatio-temporal scales (for further details 
see Steyn-Ross, et al., 2010; Di leva, 2016). Concerning Harris’s methodological contention 
(5), neurophenomenology utilizes multi-dimensional phase models as a common language for 
bridging first, second, and third person accounts of consciousness. While the above is merely 
                                                
232 Schoner, et al. (2009) find that DST accounts for the capacities of openness to learning, adaptation, the 
differentiation of skills, patterns of behaviour, and the emergence of novel functions that take place across 
numerous time scales: “DST makes it possible to talk about the continuous temporal evolution of processes, 
their mutual or unidirectional coupling and decoupling, and their coupling to sensory or motor processes” (p. 
453). Importantly, this is possible without appealing to abstract, symbolic and or computational representations 
of goals and actions. The system needs only to couple its neural control system driving its motor behaviours to 
the dynamical neurons that receive sensory inputs about environmental elements of attention. Localized 
activation peaks of DNFs thus replace the units of representation by acting as “the attractor solutions of 
dynamical systems that describe the temporal evolution of activation fields” (p. 462). As opposed to information 
processing or connectivism, learning is not downloading a function but “a process that eases the constraints on 
the environmental and task conditions under which a function may emerge” (Schneegans, et al. 2008, p. 268). 
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a crash course in the application of DST to neuroscience, the strongest argument for mind as a 
phase of matter is in many ways opposed to the enactivist paradigm. In what follows I 
consider this proposition in light of what I consider the dialectical holist response.  
 
8.2.2 The “Φ”, Phase, and Scale of Consciousness 
Following Tononi’s integrated information theory (IIT) as a means of naturalizing 
consciousness, Tegmark (2014a) contends that “consciousness can be understood as a state of 
matter, “perceptronium” with distinctive information processing abilities” (p. 1). According 
to Tononi (2012), IIT can be essentially captured with four axioms: 
1. Information axiom – every experience is specific, each is what it is by differing in a 
particular way from a wider repertoire of alternatives. Additionally, a mechanism in a state 
must “specify either selective causes or selective effects” (e.g. inputs and outputs), so as to 
generate cause-effect information within the system (p. 297). Tononi explains that in 
ontological terms, the information postulate means that “from the intrinsic perspective of a 
system, only differences that make a difference within the system exist” (ibid). 
2. Integration axiom – each experience is unified and is irreducible to independent 
components. As an ontological postulate, this means that only information that cannot be 
partitioned into independent mechanisms or components (irreducible in the past and the 
future) exist in and of themselves: “Integrated information (Φ) can be captured by measuring 
to what extent the information generated by the whole differs from the information generated 
by its components (minimum information partition MIP)” (p. 297).233  
3. Exclusion axiom – every experience is definite by being limited to particular things and 
not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution, i.e. only experience that have 
definite borders, temporal, and spatial grain, exist intrinsically. From this Tononi claims a 
mechanism that specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future effects 
is considered a concept. A complex is a maximally irreducible set of concepts. Its concepts 
signify a maximally integrated conceptual information structure. As an ontological postulate 
this means that only entities that are “maximally” irreducible exist in themselves (p. 297).  
                                                
233 The reader should bear in mind that Tononi’s original symbol for integrated information is a capitalized phi, 
whereas my symbol for Harris’s unifying principle or scale of Nature is the lower case version used heretofore.   
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4. Identity theory – when in a particular information integration state, the complex becomes 
necessary and sufficient for a quale of experience. In this way there is an ‘identity’ posited 
between the phenomenological and causal-informational aspects of a system:  
an experience is a maximally integrated conceptual information structure. Said otherwise, an 
experience is a “shape” or maximally irreducible constellation of concepts in qualia space (a 
quale), where qualia space is a space spanned by all possible past and future states of a complex. In 
this space, concepts are points in the space whose coordinates are the probabilities of past and 
future states corresponding to maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoires specified by various 
subsets of elements (p. 298).  
Although he does not address Tegmark’s work, Thompson (2015b) takes issue with 
Tononi’s IIT because to his mind, it incorrectly renders consciousness “an abstract 
informational property” when consciousness must be understood as “a concrete bioelectrical 
phenomenon” (p. 343). Thompson argues further that  
consciousness can’t be instantiated in an artificial system simply by giving the system the right 
kind of computer program, for consciousness depends fundamentally on specific kinds of 
electrochemical processes, that is, on a specific kind of biological hardware. This view predicts 
that only artificial systems having the right kind of electrochemical constitution would be able to 
be conscious (ibid). 
Given the previous discussions, Harris’s theories of mind are in clear agreement with 
Thompson’s contention. Hence, despite Harris’s appeal to Tononi’s work, current IIT only 
dovetails with Harris’s idea to the extent that it supports an “irreducible” conception of mind. 
Tononi’s claim that qualia are the units of mind is something neither Harris nor AE can 
endorse. Tegmark’s more recent work however does partially satisfy Thompson’s worry by 
emphasizing that consciousness is fundamentally dynamic and requires the right kind of 
substrate.  
Analogous to ‘computronium’ (the most general substance capable of computation), 
Tegmark suggests ‘perceptronium’ as the most general substrate capable of supporting 
perception. He argues that if consciousness is a state of matter, it will be possible to identify, 
quantify, and model its characteristic dynamics despite the likelihood of there being 
numerous types (just as there are different types of liquid). In a functionalist spirit, he claims 
consciousness (just like wave dynamics) can obtain in a range of supportive media. Towards 
this end, Tegmark argues that such a perceptive state of matter must satisfy at least six 
necessary conditions: (i) substantial information storage capacity; (ii) substantial information 
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processing capacity; (iii) substantial independence from its world; (iv) it must be integrated, 
meaning it cannot consist of nearly independent parts; (v) the system is unified such that it 
specifically records information useful for it; and (vi) the system is autonomous such that it 
has substantial dynamics and independence, which means “information can be processed with 
relative freedom from external influence” (p. 2).  
Tegmark claims there is a parallel between conceptions of integration in non-living 
systems with that found in biology. Following Damasio’s (2010) work, Tegmark argues  
to be in homeostasis, a number of physical parameters of our brain need to be kept within a 
narrow range of values […] this is precisely what is required of any condensed matter system to 
be near-critical, exhibiting correlations that are long-range (providing integration) but not so 
strong that the whole system becomes correlated like […] a brain experiencing an epileptic seizure 
(p. 5). 
Tegmark claims that Φ goes to zero bits as the temperature T →∞ on one hand and to one bit 
as T → 0 on the other. However, Φ assumes a maximum (>1) at an intermediate temperature 
that is also near the critical point of phase transition (p. 6). Integration thus requires that 
memory is relatively efficient (in terms of energy consumption) in both reading and writing 
information. So the system/substance must not be too ridged, like the ordered molecules of 
gold, meaning it must be capable of complex dynamics, but it must also be more ordered than 
a liquid or gas. These remarks agree with the findings of § 6.2.1 and so appear to satisfy 
Thompson’s above concern that consciousness depends upon a living substrate.  
While Tegmark’s contention that consciousness occupies a unique region of phase space is 
certainly shared by AE and Harris, another point of disagreement is brought to light with 
respect to the appropriate scale of consciousness. Tegmark argues, “consciousness is related 
to information processing, not mere information storage”, which means Φ “applies to 
classical neural networks rather than general quantum systems” (p. 12). Unlike Harris and 
AE, Tegmark and Tononi believe that the function of neurons obtaining at the classical scale 
should provide a sufficient identification of consciousness. For example, Tononi reasons:  
[I]t should be possible to establish if in the brain consciousness is generated by neurons or groups 
of neurons. In this case the exclusion postulate would also mandate that the spatial scale at which 
ΦMIP is maximal, be it neurons or neuronal groups, excludes finer or coarser groupings: there 
cannot be any superposition of (conscious) entities at different spatio-temporal scales if they share 
informational/ causal interactions (2012, p. 305).  
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“Integration” is thus appreciated by the dialectical holist insofar as it agrees with formal 
governance and third-order emergence, but for Harris (§ 7.2), it is a category mistake to 
identify measured information (“mechanism”) at a particular scale with consciousness.  
For the dialectical holist, it would be possible to use Tononi’s “Φ” for predictive purposes 
only if the integrated information is considered an abstracted signature taken from a 
contextually embedded system-as-a-whole. In this case, the degree of “integration” would be 
indicative of formal governance arising in and through the particular history of an embodied, 
embedded, and living system, i.e. as an organizational constraint across spatio-temporal 
scales, not of a particular scale. It should be noted that this puts an additional demand on the 
‘black box’ conception of functionalism: If mind obtains through a particular organization of 
scales, each can be treated as a black box, but each will also bear dialectical relations to those 
of its neighbours – relations that are considered necessary for the occurrence of 
consciousness. It is the process of this organization that appeared to Harris to be indicative of 
the phase of consciousness. While it is expected that living bodies and brains will be analysed 
as unique phases of matter, the properties of which must not be identified with perception 
because doing so abstracts away from the total dynamical system (the total set of material 
scales) that instantiates consciousness. This is an interpretation that appears congruent with 
AE appeals to DFT as discussed above, because the attractor dynamics of behaviour, 
learning, biological adaptation, and environmental alteration are all considered partially 
constitutive of consciousness.  
In sum, although Tegmark and Tononi disagree with Harris and AE concerning the 
metaphysics of cosmos and mind, all parties can share the common conception of mind as a 
phase of matter. Additionally,	   insofar	  as	  the	  integrated	  information	  (Φ) of consciousness 
counts as a necessitated and irreducible mathematical structure in Tegmark’s MUH, he 
endorses a much stronger anthropic principle than he has been able or willing to recognize (in 
line with my conclusion of § 4.5.2).234 These revelations warrant much further empirical 
collaboration and philosophical discussion between IIT and AE paradigms in future works. 	  
                                                
234 Linking the MUH with his theory of mind, Tegmark provides an approach to the quantum factorization 
problem concerning why we perceive the world as a dynamic hierarchy of objects that are strongly integrated 
and relatively independent (2014a, p. 3). This Tegmark claims is “because a generic Hamiltonian cannot be 
decomposed using tensor products, which would correspond to a decomposition of the cosmos into non-
interacting parts, so there is some optimal factorization of our universe into integrated and relatively independent 
parts” (pp. 26-7). This factorization is what conscious observers are expected to perceive because the observer is 
considered an integrated and relatively autonomous information complex. Thus he suggests, “we need a criterion 
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8.3 Ontological Individuation: Chasing the Slippery Serpent 
In the following sections, I further unpack Harris’s conception of consciousness as a phase 
or scale with respect to his wider epistemic and cosmological theories. In this section I 
consider how Harris (or a subsequent dialectical holist) can justifiably refer to the scale of 
forms as ontological, rather than epistemic, i.e. as merely conventional categories. By 
extension, this means addressing the extent to which Harris’s metaphysical arguments 
provide a means of bridging phenomenal and noumenal domains, thus avoiding Kant’s 
transcendental idealist conclusions. To do so, I first consider two problems resulting from 
correspondence-driven approaches to a ToE.  
Following Rees (1999, pp. 12-13), numerous cosmologists have begun modelling 
complexity within the cosmos in a way that appears to mirror Harris’s scale of forms. Most 
notably, Carr (2007) maintains that “physics has revealed a unity about the Universe which 
makes it clear that everything is connected in a way which would have seemed inconceivable 
a few decades ago. This unity is succinctly encapsulated in the image of the uroborus…” (p. 
11). Carr has elaborated this view as follows: 
The physical evolution of the universe from the big bang (at the top) through the Pyramid of 
Complexity to humans (at the bottom) is just the start of a phase of intellectual evolution, in which 
mind – through scientific progress – works its way up both sides to the top again […] interpreted 
historically as representing how humans have systematically expanded the outermost and 
innermost limits of their awareness… (2006, p. 150).  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
for identifying conscious observers, and then a prescription that determines which factorization each of them 
will perceive” (p. 28). While this establishes a research program for identifying the material conditions of mind, 
it must be recognized that as a mathematical structure, the phase of consciousness is considered inherent within 
and necessitated by the logic or law of the Universe. On this point dialectical holism agrees. 
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Here Carr’s (phase-1) top-down process is akin to Harris’s E, while the bottom-up 
intellectual progress (phase-2) mirrors his conception of cognition as increasingly 
internalizing the environment (§ 6.3.1). Harris’s metaphysical task then, is to establish an 
ontology of consciousness in relation to this two-phase process.235 
Towards a clarification of Harris’s approach to nature and knowledge, it is instructive to 
consider Ellis’s (2015) argument for a “holistic ontology.” Ellis proposes that nature may be 
understood as a hierarchy of possibility spaces, each influenced by both bottom-up and top-
down causes, all of which considered equally real (ff. p. 6). These include: (i) the matter and 
forces of physics (p. 237); (ii) biological phenomena (ff. p. 140); (iii) minds and meaning (ff. 
p. 291); and (iv) computer software (ff. p. 35). Importantly, Ellis contends that all these 
realms exist independently of our minds and each correspond to a super-space of Platonic 
possibility:  
This Platonic world is being progressively discovered by humans, and represented by our 
mathematical theories. That representation is a cultural construct, but the underlying mathematical 
features they represent are not, they are timeless eternal realities whose existence does not in any 
way depend on the existence of human beings (pp. 365-66).  
                                                
235 Interestingly, Rosen (2008) argues that we cannot distinguish between uncertainties of the ‘large scale’ (GTR 
singularities) and ‘small scale’ (QM measurement problem) because they “constitute the very same limitation” 
(pp. 31-32). In both cases he claims, the problem is that this uncertainty “entails the collapse of scale” (p. 33).  
Figure 4 – Uroborus as analogous to Harris’s scale of forms and explicative process. Figure recreated with 
permission from Primack & Abrams’ (2011). For details on the uroborus see the glossary below. 
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Although Harris’s scale of forms is similar to Ellis’s possibility hierarchy, there are a 
number of important discrepancies. Building upon the discussion of § 5.3, φ are to be 
understood as general classes of spatio-temporal dynamics obtaining through self-
organization, phase transition, and symmetry breaking. Much like the identifiable scales 
within a fractal curve however, the regularities (or physical laws) that characterize respective 
φ are abstractions from a continuous whole. The emergent laws that obtain in each are 
possible because of both intra- and inter-relations of instantiated φ. Ellis and Harris’s 
ontologies are fundamentally at odds because the former appeals to Platonic counterfactuals – 
that is, to possible domains that do not materially exists – whereas for the latter, the 
(concrete) evolutionary trajectory of differentiating φ is all that exist. This means for Ellis the 
identifiable domains exist in themselves, but for Harris, they are nothing apart from a concrete 
movement, our knowledge of which is ever incomplete.  
The principle conflict then concerns the individuation of such domains. As anticipated by 
the discussions of previous chapters, Tegmark (2007) admits that unless we maintain a 
Platonic position that mathematical structures are real, “discovered” rather than created, there 
can never be a ToE due to an unavoidable infinite regress: “one is ultimately just explaining 
certain verbal statements by other verbal statements” (p. 114). Despite his Platonic 
sympathies, Ellis has recognized two problems concerning a potential ToE. First, the question 
of whether a given domain (e.g. humanity) is determined will not be solved by a ToE, but 
only “reinforced” because “such a theory would in essence have the image of humanity built 
into it – and why that should be so is far from obvious, indeed it would border on the 
miraculous if a logically unique theory of fundamental physics were also a ‘theory of 
everything’” (2004, p. 634). Second, Ellis (2006a) considers the inability of a ToE to predict 
future theories and experiments results in “the self-referential incompleteness of physics” (p. 
756). Indeed, Ellis’s worries should be concerning for anyone sympathetic for his ontology.  
Ellis has argued that because we cannot reduce or avoid positing domains of various kinds, 
we should conclude that those defined by our present capacities of observation (i.e. those 
“discovered” by respective scientific fields) successfully individuate corresponding Levels of 
Nature. This move not only conflates epistemology and ontology (MPF), but also results in 
our transcendental problematic. Hence, Ellis’s first worry arises because our ability to 
“discover” Platonic domains assumes the very bridge between knowledge and nature (via 
individuation) that is at issue concerning metaphysical arguments about how (if at all) mind 
figures into nature. In other words, it would not be surprising to find humanity built into a 
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ToE because this is inevitable for all metaphysics that purport completeness without 
justifying the means of individuation that generates such a system by some metric beyond the 
system it creates. 
This circularity results in a contradiction however, which remains even if we deny a 
Platonic realm but maintain a correspondence (or representational) theory of truth and reality. 
In this case, it is believed science should “decrease the degree of discrepancy between 
objective and subjective” until we acquire a complete picture of nature (Jordan & Day 2015, 
p. 3). By this reasoning however, “science is metaphysical” in that it “reveals how reality 
really is” (ibid). This means that the methodological examination of nature is somehow 
beyond the physical in order to be capable of representing it, but in so doing, science escapes 
its own net – thereby leading to Ellis’s second worry. Hence, by presupposing the capacities 
of (empirical) individuation we tacitly presuppose what will be taken as natural, which 
separates observer from observed and so undermines our efforts to discover a consistent 
theory of nature-as-a-whole. 
In an attempt to turn reductionism on its head in support of his TAP, Harris contends that 
if physics is successful in reducing the laws of nature to a mathematical formula, we will then 
exemplify Hegel’s articulation of dialectical reason: Nature will have become conscious of 
itself as “pure thought” (2000, p. 37). Although a prospective ToE is not used as a 
justification in Harris’s system, the above remarks should sufficiently highlight the problem 
confronting both contemporary physical theory and metaphysics: attempts to systematize the 
whole of nature appear to result in an awkward circularity such that the form of our 
epistemology (formalism) justifies our methods of individuation, which provides an ontology 
(what we believe exists), and thereby justifies our preconceived relation to the world. 
Consequently, the relationship between Nature (phase-1) and knowledge (phase-2) is tacitly 
assumed in our individuation practices, and so it cannot be justifiably established by these 
practices. As a mere circle, our conception of nature must be recognized as being inherently 
false. Despite his rejection of a Platonic reality and representations, it remains to be seen how 
Harris (and a proponent of dialectical holism) can escape this circularity.  
 
8.3.1 Coherence Theory: Towards a Unity-in-Diversity of Nature 
Here I consider some efforts to establish an epistemology that avoids the above circularity 
and remains consistent with Harris’s system. In contrast to the thoroughgoing commitment to 
a correspondence theory of reality and truth, Jordan & Day have developed an alternative 
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coherence approach, under the guise of wild systems theory (WST), one that I maintain is 
consistent with Harris’s epistemology and largely implied by AE. I suggest this epistemology 
can be combined with Clayton’s proposal for a plurality of “complexity producing 
mechanisms,” so as to exemplify what, on Harris’s account, the relationship is between φ of 
phase-1 and 2. 
According to Jordan & Day (2015), appealing to coherence means refusing to begin a 
discussion concerning reality by assuming “its independence of observers” (p. 1). In accord 
with my conclusion of the previous section, they go on to say, the “correspondence relation is 
validated by placing it within an assumed, larger-scale reality […] the evolved physical 
world” (p. 6). They maintain however that this “assumption” undermines the realist’s thesis. 
Clearly retracing Harris’s reasoning concerning internal relations and reality, they argue that 
if one maintains  
a difference between intrinsic and relational properties, then realism seems the obvious choice; the 
purpose of science is to uncover the intrinsic properties of reality. If, however, one assumes that 
relata are themselves constituted of relational properties […] then there can be no intrinsic 
properties. This is because the constitution of all properties, by definition, would be re-lational. In 
short, reality would constitute a unity in which all things were constituted of all things (pp. 7-8). 
This notion of reality being infinitely relational is at odds with the correspondence theory 
because, they contend, such a reality cannot be subdivided into intrinsic properties “in-and-
of-themselves”. In an infinitely relational reality, all objects and subjects are contextually 
grounded, so what at first appear to be intrinsic properties are eventually re-cognized as 
relational.  
In agreement with Harris, they argue that if we reject the assumptions of subject-object 
independence and objectivity being of paramount value then,  
truth can no longer be measured by assessing the degree of difference between reality and an 
impression, idea, or representation we have of it, or by investigating an assumed relation we share 
with it. There exists nothing ‘as it is’ to which anything else can accurately correspond. The final, 
ontological description of what something is must include reality as a whole (p. 9).236 
                                                
236  Again, this view is perfectly congruent with Bohm’s ontological theory: “It should be clear from the above 
that we do not expect to come to the end of this process of discovery (for example, in a form that is currently 
called the ‘Theory of Everything’). Rather our view is that nature in its total reality is unlimited, not merely 
quantitatively, but also qualitatively in its depth and subtlety of laws and processes […] Our knowledge at any 
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They claim scientific endeavours should be understood as “modes of experience”, or 
“abstraction” from reality, which is an “internally related unity in which we are embedded” 
(p. 11). By “abstraction” they mean science can never be outside of, nor look at reality itself, 
but is partially constitutive of the reality it is meant to describe. Scientific practice then is 
“conceptualized as a recursion on reality—an abstraction about that from which it emerged 
and within which it is entailed” (ibid). Hence for WST there is no effort to capture reality as a 
whole, nor to establish our relation to it from the outside, but only to systematize identifiable 
relations towards increasing clarification. 
Consistent with Harris’s E and neurophenomenology, such clarification in WST focuses 
on “multi-scale, self-sustaining homologies […] that which is common across the internal and 
external contexts of an organism; namely, energy transformation” (p. 13). In this way, an 
organism is conceptualized as “the very energy-transformation hierarchy in which it sustains 
itself; it is an embodiment of the reality (i.e., context) within which it emerged. In short, it is 
reality within reality” (p. 14). The topologic of this conception will be considered in greater 
detail in the following section, but at this point I am only concerned to elucidate how WST 
establishes “truth.” WST applies the coherence criterion to experience and beliefs by 
conceptualizing organisms as embodiments of context (i.e. as necessarily being about their 
environment in a meaningful way), which avoids the correspondence relation. Truth they 
claim, is a matter of coherence “entailed within one’s moment-to-moment embodied context 
(i.e., phenomenology) and across the beliefs one derives from the moment-to-moment flows 
of embodied context” (p. 16). Coherence is in this vein no less than a criterion for sustained 
sensorimotor enaction across ever widening environmental domains.237 WST thus considers 
our phenomenal and larger-scale reality as a single recursive hierarchy of energy 
transformation that is sustained in and through coherent self-reference – a conclusion that is 
itself maintained only by its coherence.  
In his discussions of emergence, Clayton provides an interesting vein of support for WST 
that further clarifies Harris’s epistemology. Clayton contends that the theory of emergence is 
                                                                                                                                                  
stage is an abstraction from this total reality and therefore cannot be expected to hold indefinitely when extended 
into new domains” (1993, p. 321).  
237 In agreement with Harris’s appeal to the ideatum, this implies that mental ‘models’ are not representing a 
reality external to us, but “would have to be stretched to such a point that the organism itself constitutes a model 
of reality” (Jordan & Day 2015, p. 16). In other words, avoiding an epistemic gap created by representations 
means conceptualizing the organism “as a self-sustaining prediction” (p. 17). 
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meta-scientific, necessary for what he calls “integrative ordering” and predicts “that each 
relation between neighbouring disciplines will exhibit certain general features recognizable 
across disciplines” (2004, p. 603). In a later (2013) text, he makes considerable efforts toward 
developing this idea. Here, Clayton is careful to voice criticism of the Unity Approach, which 
holds that complexity may unify all natural sciences. Clayton contends that we should “resist 
the Unity Approach to complexity […] because it obscures a deeper insight that complexity 
theorists offer into the way that cosmic evolution works” (p. 334).  
Clayton argues that we currently do not have a single coherent science of complexity, but a 
variety of complexity-producing mechanisms (CPM) operative at different time scales and 
observed across numerous disciplines, which provide a “meta-level theory of complexity” (p. 
338). Hence, CPM “is meant to produce common ground so that conversations can continue 
even while theorists deeply disagree about fundamental features of complexity” (p. 340). 
Importantly, Clayton notes that the common features of CPM can only be identified via 
comparative studies of their functions in respective empirical fields (i.e. transdisciplinarity):  
non-symmetrical relations between disciplines of study produce the “ladder” of the sciences. This 
ladder is temporally indexed and corresponds to the order of cosmic evolution […] Later fields of 
study in the process contain all the complexities of earlier fields while adding new forms of 
complexity of their own […] To pluralize complexity studies, as the CPM approach does, does not 
block the natural scientific study of the world but enhances it (2013, pp. 342-43). 
Indeed, many of Clayton’s claims concerning the plurality of CPMs have been anticipated 
by Harris’s E. CPM captures Harris’s message that individuating the respective wholes of 
nature requires ongoing interrelation and synthesis between disciplines to resolve conflicts 
and generate increasingly coherent paradigms. Additionally he recognized that our method 
should be focused upon not merely understanding the “underlying mechanisms” of natural 
phenomena, but, more fundamentally for metaphysics, also on establishing principles of the 
“highest” scales of organization depicting “different orders of reality” (1970, p. 369). Bohm 
(1980b) has likewise echoed this strategy when he maintained that comprehension of an 
ultimate law of the whole cannot be the “final goal of scientific research”, but rather our goal 
is to clarify “a movement in which ‘new wholes’ are continually emerging” (p. 137). In a 
similar vein, as a process of ongoing clarification and revelation of wholes, Clayton is apt to 
state, “[s]cience’s most powerful ally […] is emergence” (2004, p. 599). In short, CPM 
provides a way of establishing metaphysical unity-in-diversity across the natural sciences that 
embraces interdisciplinary collaboration, which may itself generate further disciplines. The 
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resulting conception of reality is that of an ongoing becoming of scales (e.g. a fractal), rather 
than a means of carving nature at its joints (as though said joints existed prior to the 
carving!). 
Clayton’s CPM appears consistent with WST because theories of emergence are meta-
scientific in organizing domains of observation, but scientific observation itself does not 
capture any part of reality. For WST, this is because there can be no correspondence test of 
reality, no intrinsic properties, and science cannot be metaphysical: “That is, if reality is an 
internally related unity, then theories are constitutive of that reality and can never ‘point to’ 
reality as if to do so outside of it. They are, by definition, ‘in it’ just as we are. Thus, they are, 
by definition, incomplete” (p. 18). They claim WST provides a way for cognitive scientists in 
particular to frame their theories and models not as metaphysical tests, but as pragmatic tools. 
Hence, the increased coherence that science affords us provides “more influence over our 
context; that is, it affords us the ability to more effectively sustain ourselves” (ibid). This, 
they conclude, avoids “distracting arguments” concerning the problem of how the meaning of 
our concepts, symbols, etc., are to be grounded.238  
WST’s appeal to coherence is clearly congruent with Harris’s own support of this theory. 
For Harris, respective fields and paradigms of science, just as sense modalities of individual 
perspectives, progress by differentiation and synthesis – what Harris considered E of social 
development (1992, ff. p. 1). Harris’s conception of “adaptive” or “reflective thought” as 
ongoing, implies that one’s gestalt is never complete, each “represents a stage in the 
development of knowledge and none can be finally and totally satisfactory short of 
omniscience” (1970, p. 352). Nevertheless, WST’s pragmatic conclusion is prima facie at 
odds with Harris’s much stronger attempt to secure a direct-realism about scales: 
Coherence is order and organization. We perceive and come to know the surrounding world by 
organizing the contents of the sensuous field into an orderly and coherent system. The activity that 
                                                
238 As opposed to the ‘hard naturalism’ that resulted from Dewey’s system, which eschewed metaphysics and the 
reality of the subject, following Nagel (2015), Jordan & Day (2015b) argue meaning is “ubiquitous throughout 
reality” (p. 3) and later, “meaning is constitutive of reality” (p. 4). Additionally however, they contend that we 
need not appeal to the a priori, the transcendental, objective reality, or the absolute (p. 3). It is difficult to 
imagine how the ubiquity of meaning in Nature can be maintained and idealism avoided, while the 
transcendental, a priori, and absolute are rejected. These moves appear inconsistent but are clarified no further. 
Harris’s holism depends upon the transcendental a priori and at least some implications for the absolute. To my 
mind, any dialectical holist would be obliged to maintain Nature is inherently meaningful because we are 
inherent within it, but ‘meaning’ remains an abstraction from the whole.  
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does this is judgment, and the faculty of reason. It is the same dynamic principle of wholeness that 
is active at lower levels in the gamut of natural forms, which, in the course of self-specification, 
has brought itself to consciousness in the human mind, it reveals itself as reason and as 
dialectically continuous with the organizing principle operative in the physical and the biological 
phases of reality (2000, p. 248).  
Like proponents of WST, Harris proposes that the development of nature (phase-1) and 
knowledge (phase-2) can be considered a single continuous process.  
Towards a reconciliation of Harris’s realism and WST’s pragmatism, it may be possible to 
appeal to Brender’s ontology of asymmetry. Brender proposes an endogenous sense to nature 
that implicitly supports the PAP as articulated above:  
The autoproduction of sense in nature takes place through symmetry-breaking, in which natural 
wholes articulate themselves into parts or regions, creating differences out of indifference and 
form out of uniformity. These differences are neither things nor ideas, neither atoms nor artifacts. 
They cannot be known by a disembodied mind, but only perceived by a living body (p. 272).  
Brender goes on to dismiss the prospect of obtaining a view from nowhere, arguing that 
ironically nothing could be more anthropocentric than the efforts of mechanistic science to 
“strip nature of all anthropic predicates in order to arrive at an account of reality as it exists 
‘in itself’” (p. 272). In line with WST, CPMs, and my conclusions of the previous section, 
Brender finds that the mechanistic reductive project has thus failed for deciding a priori “how 
nature is to be divided” (p. 273).  
Here again, symmetry breaking provides further illumination of Harris’s E by serving as a 
neutral base of evolution (phase-1) and knowledge (phase-2), but insofar as it serves as an 
ontic conclusion, it nevertheless remains pragmatic. This is because the goal of science 
Brender holds, is to permit a natural phenomenon to reveal ‘which difference make a 
difference to it’, and this involves continually learning to recognize differences that were 
previously unrecognized while at the same time discounting some that were previously 
considered relevant (ibid). Accordingly, coherence may be understood as yet another instance 
of the same recurrent process of self-differentiation and formal-governance that has been 
fundamental to my exposition of dialectical holism heretofore. In the following three sections 
I consider how this conclusion may be formalized with respect to Harris’s TAP.239 
                                                
239 Petit (2014) has also provided arguments concerning the relationship between autopoiesis, coherence theory 
and neurophenomenology that largely agree with the conclusion of this section. He proposes coherence as a 
“multi-scale concept” that may be “applicable to different levels of organization of the living being” (p. 219). 
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8.3.2 Towards a Topologic of Phenomenology 
Towards an elucidation of the logic by which Harris believed he had overcome the 
problem of consciousness, the recent development of Klein Bottle Logic (KBL) appears 
invaluable. I argue that Harris’s theory of consciousness as an instance of φ anticipates Rosen 
and Rapoport’s independent arguments that KBL provides an onto-epistemology for 
understanding mind, life, and (cosmological) evolution. Additionally, though the metaphysics 
of ENM has yet to be sufficiently specified, I maintain KBL makes significant strides towards 
this end.  
Rosen (2008) contends that what is needed to surmount the present difficulties in 
theoretical physics is a completely new “philosophical base” that provides an altogether 
different “way of intuiting the world” (p. xi). By recognizing, rather than suppressing 
philosophical assumptions he aims to embrace subjectivity and surpass the subject-object 
split. Taking a “dialectical approach”, Rosen claims “neither mind nor body, neither subject 
nor object nor space” is primary to the other, but each arises from a common “inchoate flux”, 
which he calls apeiron (i.e. without measure) (p. 7).240 Following Rosen, Rapoport holds that 
the dominant worldview today, Aristotelian Boolean logic (ABL) is responsible for 
reinforcing rifts of philosophy-science, ontology-epistemology, mind-matter, etc. Moreover, 
Rapoport contends, our reliance upon the dualistic ABL has lead us to speak about the 
manifestations of things and processes as contained in space and time, which has resulted in 
the myth of finality in science (2012, p. 7). In accord with the conclusions of the previous two 
sections, Rapoport claims the central problem is that ABL has “failed to describe its own 
generation and its association with becoming” (p. 14).  
Rapoport and Rosen propose a paradigm shift based on the topology of the Klein bottle 
(K2) as a principle that surmounts the Cartesian cut (CC). Appealing to cybernetics and 
multi-valued logic they challenge the fundamentality of unity/symmetry in physics, which 
Rosen claims, permits a self-transforming function for cosmogony – ‘a unity-in-diversity of 
nature’. Rapoport writes that the resulting model is essentially a “second-order cybernetics” 
                                                                                                                                                  
However, Petit gives up the neurophenomenological project because he finds it an impossible task to ‘identify’ 
neurodyamics with mind since there are too many relevant parameters both within and beyond the brain to be 
considered. I address this issue in the final sections. 
240 On numerous occasions Rosen (2008) recognizes Bohm’s anticipation of this line of reasoning with his 
arguments for the holomovement (pp. 2–3, 26, 29–30, 46, 80, 83, 108, 126, 201, 211).  
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in which, “the steerer has to be included in the system that is steered, and thus self-reference 
is placed as the lifeworld of the system in which the observer cannot be excluded […] subject 
and object become fused into a single being…” (2011, p. 35).241 Both authors agree that the 
analytic assumption of object-in-space-before-subject stands as their primary obstacle. 
Toward this end, Rosen argues that for some relationships between identifiable variables 
to remain invariant, we must posit a container that is also invariant. However, “space is not an 
object to be known but is the means by which the subject does the knowing” (p. 18). 
Consequently, spatiotemporal dimensionality can no longer be considered a changeless 
backdrop: “Dimensionality itself is seemingly thrown into the arena of concrete change, 
thereby mitigating the absolute distinction that had been drawn between the spatial container 
and the dynamic processes it contains” (p. 20). This implies, there are no invariant variables 
to be identified and even the “laws of nature” are “viewed as evolving” (ibid).242 
Phenomenological intuition, Rosen argues, offers an alternative to the duality reinforced by 
the “external relations” of contemporary science. Accordingly, “all relations are internal […] 
in the underlying lifeworld there is no object with boundaries so sharply defined that it is 
closed off completely from other objects” (p. 44). Likewise, Rapoport argues, “if objects are 
related by mutual containance, no separate container is required to mediate their relations, as 
would have been […] the case with externally related objects” (2011, p. 39). Hence, there is a 
“dialectical relation” between object and subject in which “space and time are not mere 
containers but the essential core of this relation” (ibid). What is meant by “core”? 
Appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) conception of “depth”, Rosen insists that “the 
dialectical features of perceptual experience (‘orientation, polarity, [and] envelopment’) are 
not merely secondary to a space that itself is devoid of such features” (p. 47).243 Rosen finds 
Merleau-Ponty’s depth was intended as a ‘first’ or fundamental dimensionality that “contains 
itself”, from which our conventional notion of space and dimensionality are derived. The 
                                                
241 For	  an	  overview	  of	  cybernetics	  see	  the	  attached	  glossary	  below.	  For	  a	  rigorous	  discussion	  concerning	  
the	  present	  status	  and	  viability	  of	  second	  order	  cybernetic,	  see Riegler & Müller (2016).  
242 Rosen apparently supports a version of the PAP by maintaining that this problem expresses “the indivisibility 
of the observer and the observed. It seems that, in QM, the observer no longer can maintain the classical posture 
of detached objectivity; unavoidably, s/he will be an active participant. Evidently this means that quantum 
mechanical action cannot be regarded merely as objective but must be seen as entailing an intimate blending of 
object and subject” (pp. 25-26). 
243 Rosen points out that while the depth dimension gives rise to intentionality, it is not itself intentional in its act 
of generation, but more appropriately “spontaneous” and “impulsive” (p. 125).  
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“depth dimension” thus “blends subject and object concretely, rather than serving as a static 
staging platform for the objectifications of a detached subject” (p. 49). Essentially then, 
Rosen considers the depth dimension to be an instance of Kant’s synthetic a priori, “the 
immutable organizing principle for all experience”, a principle side-tracked by mathematical 
abstraction employed to fill the void of what he calls ‘phenomenological intuition’ (ff. p. 66). 
Rapoport proposes the K2 torsion as a means of surmounting the CC by serving as a logo-
physical field that unites our description of subject with object, thus providing an ‘onto-
epistemological principle of self-reference’ (2012). Rosen finds that the simultaneous open 
and closed nature of the one-sided K2 provides a paradigmatic model of depth, demonstrating 
“a continuous, self-containing movement that flies in the face of the classical trichotomy of 
contained, containing, and uncontained — symbolically, of object, space, and subject” (p. 
72).244 Hence, neither subject, Nature, nor the K2 are contained within space, but are self-
contained, embodying both global inside and outside through self-reference. In this way they 
claim, K2 supplies a bridge between the physical and logical domains that ‘incorporates’ and 




                                                
244 ABL is a two-valued system of T/F (0, 1), which are inter-transformable through negation. In Matrix Logic, 
on the other hand, Rapoport contends T and F are non-dual operators in which the negation operator does not 
transform the values. “True and False are no longer in specular reflexive relation; there is a folding in the 
cognitive plane, which is embodied in the twist of the Mobius Band and the Klein Bottle…” (2012, p. 19). Here 
the torsion defines a cognitive operator, M, given by the difference of True and False, i.e., M = True – False, 
which it not equal to the null operator. In Matrix Logic, ABL is a projection within the superposed topological 
states of true and false, nor true nor false, etc. (2012, p. 20). 
Figure 5 – Klein bottle. Recreated with permission by Diarmuid Crowley of the Manifold Atlas Project: 
http://www.map.mpim-bonn.mpg.de/2-manifolds. For further details concerning dimensionality and the 
K2, see the glossary below. 
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According to Rosen, the point at which the uncontained intersects the contained, a 
discontinuity seems to be created, but the true Klein bottle, 
enacts a dialectic of continuity and discontinuity […] Depicted here is the process by which the 
three-dimensional object of the lifeworld, in the act of containing itself, is transformed into the 
subject. This blueprint for phenomenological interrelatedness gives us a graphic indication of how 
the mutually exclusive categories of classical thought are surpassed by a threefold relation of 
mutual inclusion. It is this relation that is expressed in the primal dimension of depth (p. 72). 
To make this move however, Rosen argues that the standard mathematical conception must 
be wrong because as an abstraction, it presupposes an “extensive continuity” that cannot 
account for the “inherent discontinuity of the Klein bottle created by its self-intersection” (p. 
75).245 Rosen thereby rejects the notion that K2 is a closed object embedded in a 
hyperdimensional continuum. Instead, as a phenomenological structure, he maintains the 
Klein bottle breaks the continuity of space itself. Thus there is no need for ‘extra’ dimensions 
within which the form is embedded, rather the hole or point of intersection (D-0 singularity) 
is considered the ‘dynamic ground’, acting as source and goal of the whole. 
Both authors likewise reject the standard view of cosmogenesis because in place of a 
primal symmetry, KBL implies a dialectic of symmetry and asymmetry (‘synsymmetry’). 
Rosen explains, “[a]ssociating wholeness with symmetry and ‘holeness’ with asymmetry, we 
can also see the intrinsically synsymmetric nature of Kleinian action. In flowing through itself 
as it does, the Klein bottle continually breaks and remakes its own symmetry…” (p. 119). 
Cosmogenesis then is considered a process of dimensional (global) transformation, a “self-
transforming symmetry process” (p. 120). Consequentially, dimensions cannot be considered 
objects of analysis, but as “spatio-subobjective concrete universals” whose evolutionary 
dynamics are accessible to “phenomenological intuition” (p. 167). Here, it can be seen that 
the ‘first’ symmetry break is one of self-reference in and through depth dimension. 
                                                
245 Rapoport elaborates upon the KBL as follows: “M = Time + Spin, the Time and Spin Logophysical 
operators, respectively […] the former computes the difference between logical states, and thus a (logical) 
distinction that generates distinctions, […] and geometrically operates rotating the real numbers axis to the 
imaginary numbers axis. Hence, Time connects the representation for res extensa with that of res cogitans. Spin 
produces a rotation normal to the complex plane, and thus together they form a primeval logophysical vortex 
operator (identically to the torsion of spacetime)…” (2012, pp. 20-21). 
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If linking the evolution of the universe to transformations of consciousness seems odd, it is 
because we have been deeply conditioned to regard cosmological events in purely “objective” 
terms, as physical occurrences “out there in space,” with subjective awareness playing no role. 
But phenomenological intuition guides us to a different sensibility. From this standpoint, 
cosmogony cannot properly be understood as a sequence of happenings devoid of inner life, of 
lived subjectivity. Instead we must regard it as a process of Individuation that involves the self-
transformations of sentient dimensional organisms (p. 207).  
This line of reasoning renders consciousness continuous with cosmology and results in a 
cyclic model of cosmic evolution, each phase of which permitting a “new dimension, 
including new forms of matter and a new force of nature” (Rosen, p. 206).246 Likewise, 
Rapoport holds that applying KBL to cosmology entails an eternal return symbolized by the 
“Ouroboros.” In agreement with Kurakin and Smolin above, Rapoport argues 
“Mathematically, non-linear systems have an increasing entropy until they suffer a transition, 
a ‘blow-up’ […] in which they go through an infinity (the Klein bottle re-entering) after 
which the entropy is lowered, instead of the thermodynamic death that the Big-Bang 
mythology claims for the Universe” (2012, p. 90). Hence, both Rapoport and Rosen claim to 
have linked cosmological evolution with phenomenal dynamics. What results is a means of 





                                                
246 In virtue of its self-containing and self-transforming quality, the Klein bottle eigenstructure εD2/εD3 
develops from what Rosen calls “dialectical action upon itself”, or “Kleinian autopoiesis” (p. 110). Depth 
dimensionally is considered the lemniscate’s support of the Moebius via εD2/εD1 and acts as the lemniscate’s 
primary guiding action. Similarly, he holds that the εD3/εD2 enantiomorph of the Moebius provides support for 
the Kleinian wave. Further, the enantiomorph, εD3/εD1 provides a secondary means of guidance for the three-
dimensional Kleinian vortex. Here the “fusion of εD3/εD1 and εD1/εD3 enantiomorphs leads instead to the 
εD3/εD2 and εD2/εD3 coupling, the higher-dimensional enantiomorphic pair whose subsequent merger does 
bring the Kleinian vortex to fruition” (p. 112). 
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Rosen finds psychical and physical domains become so connected that movement from 
one to the other “is at once a return to the first” (p. 237). This results in what he calls a 
“dialectical cosmogony”, that involves “situating the analysis of cosmogony within 
cosmogony itself” (p. 242). In the act of cognizing the self-transformation of the cosmos, the 
theorist herself surpasses the projective construction of oneself as an independent observer 
and “the analyst figures essentially in the reflexive enactment of this process” (ibid). Echoing 
Harris’s TAP, Rosen claims phenomenology reflects the very same self-referential dynamics 
of Nature because the “self that participates in the concrete universality of cosmic 
transformation must also be universal” (p. 243). In accord with the conclusions of § 2.5, 
emphasizing a sub-objective and psycho-physical quality of dimensional transformation 
results in a self-referential ontology and a reflexive epistemology, i.e. an onto-epistemology.  
In sum, for KBL the ‘transcendental problematic’ is side-stepped by rejecting the 
assumption of object-in-space-before-subject and embracing an inherent reflexivity of Nature 
that is directly observable in and through embodied phenomenology. Brender’s symmetry 
breaking and KBL are mutually supportive because in each case object and subject may be 
Figure 6 – Klein Bottle topology as a triadic phenomenology.  
(01) Outside-Inside – The contained consists of bounded and finite relations, ‘facts’, structures, and 
objects. In this primitive form of individuation, subject/object, past/present, inside/outside remain 
undifferentiated.  
(10) Inside-Outside – The uncontained denotes the individuation of agent in relation to their object via an 
action exclusively from the former to the latter. Here, the Kleinian form flows back upon itself to reveal a 
dialectical lifeworld.  
(11) Inside-Inside – The containing space serves as the means by which reflection occurs. This represents 
a climactic return of the lifeworld to itself via ‘proprioceptive circulation’, wherein the identities of 
subject and object become fused. The synthesis of this stage itself becomes the object upon a return to 
(01) (Rosen, p. 77, p. 127; Rapoport 2012, p. 72). 
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reconsidered as a single (dimensionally) differentiated field. In agreement with Clayton’s 
CPM, KBL posits a unity in diversity of nature that also links Jordan & Day’s WST account 
of science as a “recurrence on reality” with the findings of §§ 5.2 & 5.3, i.e. further 
illuminating an enactivist cosmology. As will be discussed in the following section, I contend 
this reasoning accommodates the synthetic act of observation in the very same manner as 
Harris’s E.247  
 
8.4 Dialectical Holism 
Harris (1965) argues that the world revealed by contemporary science is “undoubtedly 
monistic…” (p. 452). On the following page he makes it evident that what he has in mind is 
neutral-monism based upon process ontology: “Physics, if it does not actually reveal, 
nevertheless gives ample reason to presume a primordial matrix of the world, which though 
mater, is not materia, because it is prior to all matter. The matrix is in no way static but is 
some form of perpetual activity, in essence process” (p. 453). What is this process? Harris 
later concludes: “The process of evolution thus transpires as one of progressively brining to 
explicit self-consciousness the principle of organization inherent in the organism from the 
start, that which galvanizes its auturgy and is itself the immanent principle ordering the 
cosmos as a whole” (1991, p. 91). As self-specification, the Concrete Universal is thus 
identified with processes of both mind and evolution. I will examine his reasoning in three 
steps. 
(1) Epistemological Coherence – Invoking coherence theory Harris says, “the diverse 
components must be mutually adjusted so that they fit together without conflict or friction, 
and this means that they are organized in accordance with a principle of order that determines 
how they are reciprocally adapted” (2006, p. 152). Harris argues that if the world is the result 
of a dialectical evolutionary process, the “‘external world’ is not extruded from the mind so 
as to be inaccessible to it, nor is the proffered theory of knowledge such that, if it were true, it 
would be impossible to ascertain” (p. 163). Being realist about the scale of forms does not 
                                                
247 To my mind KBL and symmetry breaking are really two sides of the same coin. This is because the very 
completion of self-reference by a Klein bottle introduces a fundamental kind of limitation, an exclusion of what 
is not included in the referential process, i.e. what is beyond the system. It is this inclusion/exclusion that (on the 
dialectical holist account) necessitates an open-ended process for nature and mind. In the following section I 
shed some further light upon this process.     
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result in circularity he claims, because as long as chaos is parasitic on order, modus tollens 
shows that “unless the world had the sort of dialectical structure revealed in knowledge, we 
could not have the sort of knowledge that we enjoy” (1970, p. 383).  
(2) Ontological Coherence – In order for the Universe to “fulfil its own holistic character” 
Harris maintains, it must complexify its physical constituents so as to “elaborate its intrinsic 
differences as a noetic world, in which the physical and the organic are sublated and re-
presented in a theoretical system of unified science” (1991, p. 155). Explication of the world 
is for Harris achieved in and through explication of the subject: “What is organized and 
integrated is a relational complex and relations are made explicit only when they are 
cognized…” (2006, p. 147). The synthetic act of consciousness is thus considered the 
“universal function of relations” (p. 152). The principle of coherence is here considered the 
same φ identified in previous forms, now manifested as the awareness of one’s body-in-
relation: “The ‘transcendental subject’, therefore, turns out to be the ultimate dynamic 
principle of organization itself…” (2006, pp. 154-55).248  
(3) Anticipating KBL – Harris argues the problem of the transcendental ego has not been 
resolved or avoided by appeal to Husserlian or Heideggarian phenomenology because in 
either case,  
relationships are being posited, awareness of which, even though only incipient, requires synthesis 
of a manifold in the Kantian sense, spontaneous and a priori, which can only be attributed to an 
apperceptive subject logically and ontologically prior to any of the related terms (one of which is 
Dasein) (1988, p. 95). 
Harris contends the result of this recurrent situation is as follows: “On the one hand, Dasein is 
in the world, but at the same time, on the other, there is an important sense in which the world 
is in Dasein” (p. 96). His solution is that the content of consciousness is “the entire scale of 
forms, dialectically related each to the next, as which the universal principle of organization 
has specified itself – the very process through which the mind has been generated. What 
becomes object is itself the autogenesis of the subject” (2006, p. 163). This is to say the 
object of the mind is the world in becoming and “the subject is no less than the world come to 
                                                
248 In other words, individuation of any phenomenon is achieved via the differentiation of a phenomenological 
space, i.e. the individuation of an object is identical with the projection of some dialectical whole of the subject, 
each of which incomplete with respect for its actual relation to the whole of Nature.  
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consciousness of itself” (1991, p. 115).249 By implication, if the material world and 
phenomenology are best conceived as a self-specifying and self-transcending scale of forms, 
then it is justifiable to maintain that consciousness is itself a re-entrant scale of nature, thus 
vindicating Harris’s TAP. 
 
8.4.1 On the Topology of Transcendence  
Towards a development of dialectical holism it may be noted that many of the above 
mentioned authors who appear sympathetic to the system have made a common case that 
consciousness must be included within any sufficient cosmology. On numerous occasions, 
Harris and his would-be proponents have articulated this as some kind of ‘emergent 
hierarchy.’ I propose that such a conception would render the resulting metaphysics 
incoherent and therefore requires an alternative structure.  
As Rapoport has maintained, due to its cyclic dynamics, appealing to the Klein bottle 
entails a heterarchical paradigm captured by hyper Klein bottle logic (HKBL): “For the 
HKBL the ‘outmost’ system in the heterarchy, re-enters in all systems which also exteriorize 
as the outermost Outside-Outside state as well as in a myriad of intercommunicating systems” 
(2012, p. 86). Rapoport claims that the archetypical form of all systems in the world is the 
HKB, all of which are “interrelated in heterarchies with re-entrances of all elements on 
themselves and other selves and the whole re-entering in the elements as well” (p. 97). In 
other worlds, the self-recurrent structure of Being entails an ongoing process of ontopoiesis 
that involves constraints across all scales – as Bohm has maintained, none of which being at 
the bottom or top. Rapoport argues that if conscious observation requires such a 
contextualization (i.e. if it must be embedded in culture), then consciousness must be 
described with HKBL, meaning “reality is a joint construction of the dialectical relation of 
object with subject…” (p. 24). For Rapoport, HKBL implies “that the world indicates itSelf 
                                                
249 Harris hereby identifies the very concept maintained by consciousness with the same self-specifying 
Concrete Universal considered heretofore (E) (1987, p. 200). He anticipates the idea that understanding the 
dynamics of respective kinds of complexity or scales, ought to require disparate cognitive abilities of 
corresponding predictive capacities. Harris finds our epistemic need to appeal to scales in scientific observation 
is mirrored in our sensory modalities and cognitive functions (1970, ff. p. 352; 1991, ff. p. 121; ff. p. 135). 
Additionally, the closest Harris comes to an analogous and succinct HKBL (as I depict in what follows) can be 
found in his (1987) discussion of objectivity (ff. p. 227).  
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through ourselves, which by doing this we indicate our-selves (and the Socius) and the Self of 




Interestingly, this heterarchical conception is in line with Thompson’s ontology: 
In the process view, “up” and “down” are contextual-relative terms used to describe phenomena 
of various scales and complexity. There is no base level of elementary entities to serve as the 
ultimate “emergence base” on which to ground everything. Phenomena at all scales are not 
entities or substances but relatively stable processes, and since processes achieve stability at 
different levels of complexity, while still interacting with processes at other levels, all are equally 
real and none has absolute ontological primacy (2007, p. 441). 
KBL is further reflected in Thompson’s (2015) blog post, in which he builds on his earlier 
notion of “groundlessness” (1991) by maintaining “Nature, by way of the brain, beholds itself 
[...] You might think that you contain your mind, but it’s actually the other way round: your 
mind contains you—your sense of self—and your mind is too vast for you to comprehend.” 
Dialectical holism goes further. The argument (from figure 6) is that any attempt to explain 
phenomena (01), by investigating empirical matter – that which is apparently beyond self 
(10), or appealing to a priori first principles (11), results in a return and reliance upon the 
opposite. This is because the self-reference of Being distinguishes 01, 10, and 11, but also 
couples each to the rest in a continuous self-differentiating movement. Moreover, the 
Figure 7 – Nested glass Klein bottle as a topological depiction of self-transcendence in and through 
cultural development. Created by Alen Bennett, shown at the London Science Museum. 
http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/images/i046/10314758.aspx. Image reproduced with permission from 
Science and Society image executive Sophia Brothers. 
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trajectory (or bias) of this movement remains transparent (i.e. unconscious) to the subject at 
each stage. Consequently, the subject is engaged in an ongoing self-transcendence in and 
through their embodied engagement with their Other (i.e. self-projection). 
An examination of cultural development serves to exemplify the above points. Harris and 
AE share the common appeal to coherence that requires reflexive attendance to a finite set of 
relations deemed relevant within a given context. For Harris, by going beyond this structure 
we fulfill the final cause of Nature in our philosophical and scientific practices. Gunn (2011) 
appears to reveal insight into Harris’s original teleological proposal: the “goal” of Nature, he 
claims, “cannot involve the attainment or bringing into existence of some specific physical 
state […] but only the continuous unfolding or objectification of the activity itself” (p. 416). 
What is meant by ‘objectification’? Gunn proposes that human activity is a “special instance” 
of physical or “pneumatical force”, whose goal is the progressive and “never-ending 
development of culture” (ibid).250 This implies a simultaneously circular and linear 
development of Nature:  
objectification of anthropic force at a given time alters the environment in which this force will 
subsequently objectify itself, and this in turn alters the subsequent objectification itself […] 
Therefore, the correct geometrical image for cultural development and the history of thought is 
neither the circle nor the line but the spiral… (ibid).  
More specifically, for dialectical holism it appears that re-cognizing our selection effect(s) 
within a given paradigm results in a HKB ascension. While Harris maintained an ontological 
realism about a culmination of this process (i.e. objective idealism), as above, I contend 
contemporary dialectical holism can only remain consistent (with an appeal to coherence) if 
its ontology is endorsed on pragmatic grounds.  
For Thompson, classical emergentism is inadequate for maintaining “that physical nature, 
in itself, is fundamentally non-mental, yet when it’s organized in the right way, consciousness 
emerges” (2015c). He goes on to say that as long as we maintain this kind of conceptual 
dichotomy the emergentist view won’t work. He claims this means developing a theory of 
                                                
250 Rosen claims his conception of ‘proprioception’ is similar to Fox-Keller’s “empathy”, in her scheme of 
dynamic objectivism. In line with sensorimotor enactivism, Rosen emphasises feeling, embodied empathy, and 
love that constitutes the lifeworld: “It is a world in which the dialectic of difference and identity is enacted 
proprioceptively, through an intimate knowledge of other that requires and is inseparable from the knowledge of 
self (a ‘consciousness of self’)” (p. 241). Though not discussed by Gunn, empathy is a key aspect of AE and 
Harris’s conception of cultural development – the latter view will be summarized in § 8.4.1.  
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“neutral monism—which says that the ‘physical’ and the ‘mental’ are concepts that capture 
different aspects of something that’s more fundamental and neutral between them, being 
neither ‘physical’ nor ‘mental’…” (ibid). Following Merleau-Ponty, Brender has proposed 
that our “new ontology”, or “milieu” common to philosophy and the natural sciences that 
serves to unite “the phenomena of form and morphogenesis”, thereby closing the Cartesian 
chasm is “asymmetry and symmetry-breaking” (p. 272). Providing a primal process of 
transformation, symmetry breaking is epitomized by E: I propose that the common 
conclusion for Harris, Bohmian ontology, and AE is that the subjective and material domains 
are considered co-arising and mutually constraining scales; each of which incomplete 
abstraction from a higher dimensional Concrete Universal that achieves self-reference via 
self-differentiation (i.e. symmetry breaking). On this pragmatic view, consciousness is to be 
treated as a 5D transformation of Nature, one that is constituted by the dynamics of neuronal, 











                                                
251 For a summary of the revised ENM that results, see the attached appendix § VI. 




Figure 8 – Relating neurophenomenology and the implicate order. Top: a “homeomorphic” relationship 
between (a) phenomenological and (b) neuronal dynamics used in neurophenomenological seizure 
prediction (Van Quyen 2010, p. 259). Recreated with permission from MIT press. Bottom: the correlations 
of phenomenal and neurodynamics are for Bohm analogous to respective 2D recordings of a single 3D 
object (1980, p. 237). Bohm holds that the reality behind respective ‘aspects’ will be of a “higher 
dimensionality than are the separate images on the screens” (p. 238). Recreated with permission from 
Routledge press. Here, Bohm originally mirrored Harris’s scale of forms maintaining that “there is a 
universal flux that cannot be defined explicitly but which can be known only implicitly, as indicated by the 
explicitly definable forms and shapes, some stable and some unstable, that can be abstracted from the 
universal flux. In this flow, mind and matter are not separate substances. Rather, they are different aspects of 
one whole and unbroken movement” (1980, p. 14). Juxtaposing these diagrams is philosophically 
illuminating of the neurophenomenologal methodology because in both cases mind is not to be identified 
with the data from either of the abstracted phase spaces, but  rather, it is identical with a ‘higher 
dimensional whole,’ to which we have incomplete access regardless of what methodology is employed.   
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The dialectical holist response to the hard problem of consciousness is thus to back away 
from discussions presupposing ABL in analyzing phenomena of the world. The dialectical 
holist refuses to take properties, T/F atomic facts, and the object-in-space-before-subject as 
given. Appealing to HKBL, consciousness may be framed as a natural function of the 
Universe that is ultimately neither mind nor matter. This topologic provides a sympathetic 
response to Harris’s TAP, a revision of emergentism, and a common ground for mind and 
matter. Taking the lessons from KBL and WST together, Nature’s self-referentiality is 
posited on pragmatic grounds with the expectation of theoretical unity in diversity in and 
through agential participation. This participation is believed to facilitate an ongoing 
clarification of our individuation practices directly correlated with an ongoing differentiation 
of scientific disciplines and philosophical domains (e.g. Clayton’s CPM). As formal 
governance is considered the torsion of system, so phenomenology is considered a recurrence 
of E. To my mind a model of this kind fulfills Varela’s conception of ‘walking the razor’s 
edge’ between scientific realism and subjective idealism. Thus, the resulting onto-
epistemology encapsulating ‘self-reference’, and ‘symmetry breaking’ of the ‘Concrete 
Universal’, appears to metaphysically ground the neurophenomenological program and 
elucidate a cosmological dimension of the enactivist paradigm. 
 
8.4.2 Ethical Implications: The Responsibility of Being a “Philosopher”  
I believe that a particularly apt testament to Harris’s character is eloquently exemplified in 
the preface of one of the last books he published, The Restitution of Metaphysics (2000). Even 
at the age of 90, still hoping to inspire new minds to the tremendous value of philosophy,	  he 
explains that a metaphysic and moral philosophy premised on the conception of wholeness is 
our best chance of counteracting the environmental and social challenges that have resulted 
from our modern technological capacities and empirical outlook. He explains that this work  
presents a world view that I think I can claim is genuinely post modern […] If there is little sign at 
the present time of widespread adoption of a fresh philosophical outlook, I can but hope that what 
I have written may catch the attention of some of the younger generation, in whose hands the 
direction of the future lies (2000, p. xiv). 
While Harris’s works on ethics, value, and politics are too extensive for even the briefest of 
summary here, I intend to bring attention to a characteristic feature of Harris’s approach that 
fuses the practices of knowing with an analysis of normativity.  
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Harris argues that viewing the development of knowledge in the terms outlined in this 
thesis produced a number of ethical implications in general and provided criteria for the 
practice of philosophy in particular:  
For the Ancients, philosophy meant what it said: the love of wisdom. Wisdom was held to be the 
fruit of intelligence and thoughtful reflection upon as wide a range of experience as possible. It 
was held to bring insight into every aspect of human life and to give enlightenment in the face of 
every problem, both theoretical and practical […] Philosophy, as the love and practice of wisdom 
– for to love it must be to use it and not just to affirm its theoretical teachings – was not merely an 
intellectual pursuit but a way of life… (p. 69).  
To this end, while a review of the past and analysis of scientific claims are necessary, the aim 
of philosophy for Harris, is to reveal connections between scientific disciplines thus unifying 
our understanding of nature to solve contemporary problems. As Harris states above, the 
problems we face are not just theoretical, but involve the interrelations of actual people. 
Ultimately Harris’s metaphysics implies a deep concern for the evolutionary trajectory of 
humanity as a whole, an imminent responsibility to avert global disaster and aspiration 
toward “enlightenment.” What is meant by enlightenment? 
Harris laments that logic “is simply a matter of convention” in that the logician is free to 
adopt whatever logic validates their chosen theory (p. 74). As a result, “the philosophy of 
analysis, in its eagerness to clear away rubbish, has been so zealous that it has removed 
everything of any positive value and left a vacuum, into which the forces of extremism may 
move without effective resistance” (p. 76). Interestingly, Harris found that over-emphasizing 
analysis was to blame for many ecological and socio-political problems. He claims that when 
applied on its own, such intellectual dissection could not provide morals, cannot facilitate 
human development, nor account for one’s fellow beings as ends in themselves. For Harris, 
the solution is to recognize “the organizing and integrating activity of the mind in all its 
functioning”, believing that the “proper activities of reason”, consists in a process both 
“analytic and synthetic in mutually complementary phases. Thus it is the principle of insight 
and rational enlightenment” (p. 77). Only the professional philosopher, he claimed, with an 
appreciation of holism, is equipped to assess the clash of ideologies and their resultant social 
conflicts in the real world (p. 80).  
Harris argues that we cannot but adopt some philosophical theories about the world and 
that these theories unavoidably become value judgments. These judgements he claims, cannot 
but affect our conduct: “Philosophy always changes the world, and only if this is clearly 
	   295	  
recognized and acknowledged by philosophers will they understand, and can they fulfil their 
proper function in society conscientiously and responsibly” (p. 81). As discussed above, he 
argues that for both common sense and scientific practice, observation is “embedded in and 
inseparable from interpretation” (p. 88). Any thought or observation requires the projection of 
a paradigm, which means any “metaphysical explanation is the same in character as, and is 
continuous with, scientific explanation” (p. 92). He goes on to remind us that, “[t]he aim of 
metaphysics is a comprehensive conceptual scheme in the light of which the whole of 
experience can be organized and become intelligible” (ibid). It is the philosopher’s 
responsibility, therefore, to not only critically assess the form of a paradigm, but to also 
synthesize such worldviews with ever increasing coherence. 
In applying this dialectical logic, Harris (2005; 1993) advocates for a Global Federation, a 
unification of humanity and dissolution of sovereign states. Each nation, he maintains shares 
the earth and must recognize their interdependence with those of their neighbours. As a 
species, Harris claims, our very survival depends upon our ability to facilitate the emergence 
of a “noösphere” of “communal minds and wills” (1988, p. 161). To do so he argues, human 
efforts across disciplines and nations must be unified in and through our differences, and 
there is only one way by which this can be achieved: 
the pervading and consolidating sentiment that alone can bind together the members of any 
society […] is love – not a sensuous or sentimental love, but a genuine felt concern for the true 
welfare of its object. In any community whatsoever that can maintain itself as a society, there 
must be some degree of mutual reliance and trust (p. 162). 
Harris argued that the only way any sort of social contract or intellectually constructed social 
organization can remain a non-contradictory and self-preserving whole is through love. Upon 
“self-reflection” he claims, love of one’s neighbour and of God become coincident: “It is 
genuine concern for the welfare of each and every individual, it is the universal respect for 
persons, that treats each as an end and none merely as a means” (p. 163).  
In relation to the whole of Nature, mankind is understood as a single community, the 
concern of which is the maintenance of oneself, world, and society: “That maintenance is a 
responsibility upon man, so that his relation to nature is ethical, rather than simply biological 
or technical” (1987, p. 262). To act upon this moral concern is considered a “responsibility to 
the ultimate totality”, one fulfilled only “in a spirit of unreserved self-giving”, towards what 
he calls a “a spiritual Heimat” (p. 263). As with previous unifying principles, the individual 
“is not solely constituted by his or her subjective character, but by the social functions and 
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capacities exercised and the consequent web of relations woven by interaction with other 
people” (1992, p. 15). Evil is thus considered “whatever denies or contradicts the universal 
principle of order, or obstructs or counteracts its dynamic urge towards wholeness” (p. 42). 
Considering Harris’s ethics with respect to the above discussions concerning dialectical 
holism in general reveals a number of interesting conclusions. All conscious beings 
(especially philosophers) have the responsibility of pursuing enlightenment. This involves 
relating a given theory, concept, etc., to an ever more inclusive system in order to establish 
not only a clearer understanding of the object, but also of oneself as the subject(s) reponsible 
for bringing the whole into being. Truth thus requires an embrace, rather than a suppression 
of our subjective disposition, only then can we account for the world we enact and transcend 
our momentary means of individuation. Accordingly, Reality is not only revealed to us, but 
comes into being as the observer and community can enact a greater range of relations. 
Whereas evil is instantiated by an individual assuming dominance over, and thus 
contradicting the whole to which they belong, love is considered the only way by which a 
(social) system can achieve coherent unity in and through difference: Coherence of love and 
the coherence of truth are thus one and the same; both enacted through the ongoing empathic 
awareness and synthesis of alternative perspectives beyond one’s own.  
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Despite his entire career being focused upon a study of consciousness, when Harris finally 
finished his one and only text devoted to the subject, he merely remarked, “I have been able 
to get hold of several useful books on this subject and have managed to complete a short book 
of my own, ‘Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness’” (unpublished, pp. 259-60). Ever 
so humble, this is all we are told regarding the culmination, the conclusion of his lifelong 
intrigue. However, in the preface of this work we gain a somewhat deeper insight that rings 
with well-warranted condescension: 
From whatever angle one approaches philosophy one cannot avoid this problem […] The problem 
has been central to my own thinking throughout my philosophical career and has figured in almost 
everything I have written. The solution I have reached is not new and I claim for it no originality; 
it is derived from Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel and Collingwood […] I know of none that is better 
founded. But I can claim that it has been sorely neglected and universally overlooked by 
contemporary writers whether from ignorance or from deliberate oversight; and I have felt the 
necessity repeatedly to remind them of it (2006, p. ix).  
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I think that at this point Harris’s humility had clouded his judgment. I hope it is clear from the 
contents of this thesis that the extensive efforts he made to derive his conclusion from earlier 
philosophers and restate these results while retaining consistency with contemporary sciences 
assures the originality of his solution.  
For my own part, I have shown that Harris’s conception of the dialectical whole in his 
theories of cosmos, life, and mind, anticipates a number of philosophical and scientific works 
of recent years. I maintain that despite Harris’s silence on this point, the metaphysics of 
dialectical holism is broadly a phenomenological response to both the problem of mind and 
AR. By way of making the value of this contribution clear, it will be useful to mention a 
number of avenues for future research within the resulting paradigm. 
 1. Identifying the unifying principle with solitonic or formal governance provides a 
metaphysical framework for understanding natural phenomena from the formation of 
galaxies, to autopoietic systems of varying sizes and complexity. In line with CPM, 
dialectical holism would be supported to the extent that principles from disparate disciplines 
are mutually informative yet remain irreducible to each other. Ongoing collaboration should 
provide illumination of such principles and thereby lead to the development of further 
scientific disciplines. Specifically, as discussed in chapter 5, to the extent that phase 
transitions and symmetry breaking provide support for E, the resulting theories of evolving 
laws, second- and third-order emergent systems will demand further scientific and 
philosophical development. Toward this end, it is hypothesized that phases of matter should 
be innumerable upon further investigation. 
2. Depicting the whole of nature as a self-governing, self-differentiating Concrete 
Universal has provided a viable teleological response to the anthropic principle. In support for 
this conclusion, Harris’s theory of ‘environmental internalization’ that was originally 
conceived as a biological telos is now logically extended to the evolution of the cosmos. If 
dialectical holism is to be maintained, proponents should critically develop and apply the 
HKBL that supports this approach as broadly as possible, e.g. to phenomenology, ethics, 
anthropology, and cognitive neuroscience.  
3. For Harris, the telos of nature in general but of humanity in particular, is the re-
cognition of the universe as a whole. Broadening enactivist sensorimotor-affectivity and 
ENM, Harris has maintained that at the level of human (i.e. social) cognition, the same 
universal process of auto-genesis and self-reference appears as empathy and self-
transcendence. Continued neurophenomenological research should in this vein be combined 
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with projects in anthropology, complexity, and cosmology so as to further clarify the 
purported scale of consciousness. Specifically, the philosophical interpretations of physics 
that underpin neurophenomnology must be further developed. Towards this end, the above 
discussions have indicated that utilizing Bohmian QT and research into dimensionality should 
be invaluable for this program.252 
Harris died on June 21st, 2009 at the age of 101, leaving behind four children and over 25 
books that he had authored or co-authored throughout his 70-plus year career. In this thesis I 
have shown that Harris’s metaphysics is alive and well, though until now, maintained within 
disparate camps and research programs, their proponents each unaware of one another. In this 
thesis I have set out what I believe to be the strengths of the dialectical holist naturalization of 
mind and the challenges it ought to face in future research. The principle value of this work 
has been to pose a challenge to philosophers of mind to recognize the wider cosmological and 
underlying metaphysical implications of their position. Specifically, I hope this work stirs 
those sympathetic for AE to respond with either detailed refutation or support of the 
respective camps I argued they implicitly endorse. It warrants further mention that Harris 
system was extensive, developing tributaries into issues of phenomenology, free will, 
religion, political philosophy, and ethics, none of which have I been able to adequately 
address in this thesis. To fully grasp the import of the system born from Harris’s efforts, the 










                                                
252 For a summary of the overarching reasoning of this thesis and what I consider a resulting onto-epistemic 
dialectical phenomenology, see appendix, § VI-a. 
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Appendix: 
The Principles of Dialectical Holism 
 
I. Dialectical Individuation 
(1) If all physical properties depend upon a dynamic context to obtain – if the fundamental 
observable unit is the relation – then we are obliged to appeal to a principle of coherence that 
both specifies how such relations fit together and constrains the possibility space of these 
relations over time, i.e. what Harris called the unifying principle.  
(2) In this scheme, positing ontology requires explaining precisely how a given phenomenon 
or entity relates to the system within which it obtains, i.e. how it relates to the history of the 
Universe as a whole.  
(3) Since in practice such knowledge is currently beyond our reach, it is considered necessary 
a priori to posit respective unifying principles – though the ontological status of the particular 
principles so proposed remains uncertain.  
(4) As a result, the organizational constraints upon natural phenomena are enacted, or brought 
forth in part by our acts of levation or diffractive practices as culturally construed. More 
specifically, propositions of ontology are acceptable on the basis of their coherence within a 
given paradigm – what can be called an onto-epistemic coherence theory of knowledge.  
(5) In consequence, no level of analysis is any more fundamental than any other and 
reduction must be reconsidered. This results in a continuous transdisciplinary movement 
across domains of analysis that increase in coherence to the extent that more perspectives, 
paradigms, and relations can be organized. 
 
 
II. Metaphysical Pillars 
(1) Nominalism – This system is anti-realist about abstract structures including: (i) 
propositions; (ii) properties; (iii) universals; and (iv) worlds. In the case of (i), (ii), and (iii), 
the dialectical holist relies upon a coherence theory of knowledge (see below) that considers 
these terms conceptual tools that do not directly correspond to anything independent in the 
world. Concerning (iv), the ‘possibilities’, or counterfactual ‘worlds’ are converted into 
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hypotheses. In all cases, a great deal of effort is exerted to distinguish between these linguistic 
structures and the empirical phenomena to which they refer, or from which they are derived.   
(2) Process Ontology/Dialectical Relations – What exist in nature are relatively stable, modes 
of organization instantiated through dialectical processes. This is to say that nothing exists 
intrinsically, but only as interdependent dynamical relations (i.e. mutually contingent or 
interdependent). While universal patterns (i.e. forms, unifying principles, or implicate orders) 
of respective spatiotemporal scales may be identified, they are granted no independent 
ontological status, but are believed to exist in and through intra-relational processes of the 
whole within which they obtain.   
(3) Neutral Monism – Natural evolution, just as the advance of scientific and philosophical 
theories, are both recapitulated as the self-differentiation of a single whole or Concrete 
Universal. Mind and matter are considered two modes of a single whole that is not to be 
identified with either the qualities of matter as empirically observed, or with phenomenality. 
Importantly, while respective forms are understood to be emergent with respect to one 
another – matter exists as a plurality of unifying principles or organizations – each of which is 
not an addition to, but abstractions from the neutral whole, i.e. a scale of forms or 
holomovement. The resulting “dialectical whole” is considered a synthetic a priori 
presupposition of science, philosophy, and phenomenology, i.e. this structure-process is 
fundamental to our knowledge (paradigms) and in Nature (ontology). 
 
 
III. Epistemic Interdependence of U and C 
(P1) Self-individuation (C) is a legitimate a priori first principle. 
(P2) Positing C requires some background context of system (U) to which it relates (i.e. ¬C) 
within which C obtains and by which C can be known.  
(P3) As the whole of U is beyond empirical analysis, propositions about it remain synthetic 
and a priori. 
__________ 
(C1) The existential relationship between U and C (∃R) is an a priori synthetic proposition. 
(P4) Parameters necessary and sufficient for defining U and C respectively are covariant such 
that alteration to one side entails some corresponding alteration(s) to the other.  
(P5) Entities are epistemically interdependent iff changing the defining nature of one 
necessarily constrains the defining statements that can be made of the other.   
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__________ 
(C2) Analyses of U and C are epistemically interdependent in virtue of ∃R. 
(C3) Any complete account of either U or C must include a complete account of the other, i.e. 
as an epistemic system, the dialectical whole has a bipolar structure.  
 
 
III – a. A Priori Argument for the WAP  
(P1) It is a priori there is a self-referential thinking being (C).  
(P2) It is knowable a priori that if the universe (U) contains a C, then U satisfies the local 
(necessary and sufficient) conditions for C. 
(P3) On the assumption that the universe is congruent with the existence of C, then it is 
knowable a priori that one can learn about U by studying the local conditions of C. 
(P4) The WAP says it is possible to learn about U by studying the local conditions of C.  
__________ 
(C) The WAP is true.  
 
 
III – b. Selection Effects 
(1) Epistemological Selection Effect (ESE) – Denotes the limitations of a posteriori 
knowledge resulting from the method of investigation employed. A common metaphor is the 
mesh of a net used for fishing, which permits fish smaller than the mesh size to escape and 
therefore avoid being observed. This is to say that what we observe is constrained by the 
experiments we devise and capacities of our sensory system. Hence, the occurrence of our 
sensory system (as a material phenomenon) must cohere with what we know about the 
material world within which it occurs.  
(2) Physical Selection Effect (PSE) – Involves any force acting on material entities such that 
certain observations are restricted while others are made possible. The above metaphor is here 
taken literally as the physical constraint that some entity (e.g. a net) has upon a system (e.g. a 
population of fish). The PSE necessarily contributes to the ESE, but does not exhaust it. 
(3) Metaphysical Selection Effect (MSE) – Considers the impact that a priori presuppositions 
have on the form of the observer’s physical theories, e.g. rules of logic, the questions we ask, 
the rules for mapping abstract terms onto objects of the real world (individuation), and choice 
of methodology. Here the constraint arises from our paradigm, which creates a limitation to 
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how accurately physical entities can be individuated. For example, a theory concerning the 
relationship between the constants of nature and the necessary and sufficient conditions of life 
is constrained by our limited ability to define the relevant terms (life and constants) within the 
relevant domain (Universe). Hence, any extrapolation based upon such self-consistent or 
‘possible’ transformations must be carefully qualified with respect to these limitations. The 
MSEs are a sub-group of the ESE. 
 
 
III – c. Evidence of Fine-Tuning 
(1) If the weak force were much weaker, hydrogen would not exist and so supernovas would 
not have developed. If it were much stronger, supernovae would fail to seed interstellar space 
with heavy elements, upon which life as we know it depends. 
(2) The nuclear binding energy as a fraction of rest mass energy or strong force (E ≈ 0.007) is 
considered fine-tuned for if it were 5% greater, all of the hydrogen in the early universe 
would have been converted into helium. Likewise, the dimensionless ratio of electrical and 
gravitational forces between protons N ≈ 1036 is considered fine-tuned because if protons 
were 0.2% heavier, they would decay into neutrons, destabilizing atoms.  
(3) The luminosity of a star is determined by its mass and life on earth has required that our 
sun has a mass between 1.6 x 1032 kg and 2.4 x 1030 kg. If the electromagnetic force were to 
be greater by 4% relative to the other fundamental forces, the production of carbon and 
oxygen would have stopped in the early universe and planets would be unable to form. On the 
other hand, if it were 4% weaker, all stars would be much hotter, which would result in their 
having much shorter time-spans as stable stars, helium would not have formed, and the result 
would be a hydrogen-filled universe.  
(4) Carbon is created in the helium-burning phase of red giant stars via the triple-alpha 
reaction, in which two alpha particles combine to form beryllium, which combines with a 
third alpha particle to form carbon. If this conversion occurs too rapidly the result will be 
oxygen. The process takes about 1010 y, at which point stars explode as supernovae, scattering 
the elements necessary for complex chemistry throughout space.  
(5) The amount of matter in the universe (Ω ≈ 0.3) in units of critical density; the amplitude 
of density fluctuations for cosmic structures (Q ≈ 10-5); and the cosmological constant ∧≈ 
0.7 (expansion rate) in units of critical density provide the strongest grounds for AR. For 
example, if ∧ were slightly larger or smaller, our universe would have blown itself apart or 
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collapsed before complex systems could form. There remains uncertainty as to which of these 
are determined by (presumably random) processes during the early universe and which are 
prescribed “freely” as part of the initial conditions.  
(6) Having D<4 spatiotemporal dimensions results in an absence of gravity (so says GTR) 
and in D<3 there is insufficient complexity for the emergence of observers. In D>4 bodies 
would fall much faster, i.e. inhibiting planetary systems for all but D4. Likewise in D>3 there 
would be no stable atoms and thus no life.  
 
 
III – d. A Priori Argument for the Dialectic PAP 
(P1) To posit anything relies upon the individuation of a dialectical whole. 
(P2) The totality of all that exists (the Universe) is the only physical, complete, and self-
contained whole.  
(P3) The Universe is an object of metaphysical synthesis whose form is ultimately grounded 
upon embodied (meaningful) relations with immediate experience. 
(P4) According to the dialectical PAP, short of accounting for the selection effect(s) inherent 
in our embodiment, it is impossible to coherently conceive of the Universe independent of ∃R. 
__________ 
 (C1) Positing a universe in which the relation between the embodied agent and their 
environment is void undermines the coherence of (AE) epistemology, i.e. such a universe is 
meaningless. 
 (C2) It is impossible to coherently conceive of any complete, self-contained whole that does 
not include the participation of the subject  (∃R). 
 
 
III – e. Dialectical Argument for the TAP 
(P1) Teleology (in dialectical holist terms) obtains iff particular entities X bear a dialectical 
relation to their wider system Y such that the physical nature of Y depends upon the physical 
nature of X and the nature of X depends upon the dynamical constraints of Y.   
(P2) Some material phenomena (X) bear a dialectical relation to their superordinate system 
(Y). 
(P3) X instantiates irreducible relations (laws) that are necessitated by the constraints of Y.   
__________ 
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(C1) If ∃R instantiates irreducible dynamics (laws), then this phenomenon can be considered 
the result of a teleological process (E) instantiated by U. 
 
 
IV. The Universe as a Complex System 
(1) Process/structural ontology – Process ontology in combination with OSR is a viable (if 
not preferable) foundation for understanding complex systems. Accordingly, relational 
processes constitute entieis at all scales though the two are ontologically equal and 
interdependent.  
(2) Emergent constraints – Forms arise through self-organization that both restrict and enable 
future states, dynamics, structures, and relations.  
(3) Deterministic function – The components of a complex system are interrelated/coupled 
such that if one of the constituents is absent the function (or evolutionary trajectory) is 
incomplete.  
(4) Historicity – Complex systems are path-dependenent meaning small events can become 
locked-in to constrain future dynamics and emergent structures.  
(5) Hierarchical levels – Nested structures obtain within complex systems, each requiring 
different (irreducible) descriptions. 
(6) Situated dynamics – The constituent states/structures depend upon the environment within 
which they are embedded. 
(7) Intricate and cycling behaviour – Complex systems obtain between simple order and total 
chaos, which instantiates periodic behavior that does not exactly repeat.  
__________ 
If the Universe is a complex system, its function is identified with a space of determinant 
forms/states that obtain throughout its evolution (E). 
 
 
IV – a. Argument from Absolute Chaos 
(P1) In a condition of absolute disorder no principles, patterns or laws can obtain.  
(P2) To posit a state of nature is to distinguish an instance of order. 
(P3) A state of perfect symmetry is one that lacks all contrasts, patterns, and regularity, i.e. 
order.  
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 (P4) To posit a state of nature devoid of order is tantamount to saying there is a state of 
matter that is no-thing, i.e. abstract homogeneity. 
__________ 
(C1) Therefore, nature can never be in, nor arise from a state of absolute disorder or perfect 
symmetry.   
(C2) Any disorder of the Universe as a whole presupposes self-differentiated order. 
 
 
IV – b. Revised Criteria for Scales (ϕ) 
(1) Identification of ϕs should involve at least three parameters, whose combined values are 
unique to the respective scale: (i) structure – a-temporal relations within an identifiable 
boundary; (ii) kinetics – capacity to do work via energy transference (ET chain of a particular 
form); and (iii) periodicity (relatively stable self-organized spatiotemporal dynamics).  
(2) While some relations will be multiply realized across scales, i-iii results in a function that 
arises at a global level for each ϕ that is indicative of emergent laws, formal governance, or a 
PSE). Importantly, the emergence of such laws should be explicable in terms of symmetry 
breaking.  
(3) The formal governance of a given scale ϕa, will permit certain (thermo-) dynamic 
relations and phase transitions both within and beyond its bounds (e.g. order parameter and 
some self-organized boundary conditions), that permit the (at least second-order) emergence 
of scales ϕa1, ϕa2, ϕa3… ϕan, dependent upon ϕa.  
(4) As a result of their irreducibility, it should be impossible to conduct a priori investigations 
from a given ϕ to its neighbors. While common principles will be discovered that unite 
identifiable ϕ with increasing systematization, their discovery and relationships will require 
ongoing a posteriori observation.  
(5) Just like the investigation of states within an infinite dimensional phase space or structures 
within a fractal curve, it is hypothesized that the discovery of scales (i.e. phases) will be 
ongoing.   
 
 
IV – c. Dialectical Evolution 
(P1) Variation of auturgic (self-organized) form is a precondition of natural selection.  
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(P2) As the genome only functions as a whole, its information obtains only at the level of a 
living organism within an environment, e.g. traits obtain in living organisms actively engaged 
within an environment (traits consist of form and function), not in independent DNA. 
(P3) The self-organization of information at the level of the adaptive organism provides a 
positive/physical selection effect (PSE) tending towards viable states.  
__________ 
(C1) The unit of selection is the self-maintaining system as a whole (i.e. the systems that have 
sufficiently coordinated form and function within an environment). 
(C2) Fittedness is determined by how an organism’s adaptive behavior (macro-functionality) 
both accommodates and feeds back to influence inherited genetics (micro-form) so as to 
remain viable within an environment (Neo-Lamarckism). 
(P5) Increasing coordination of form and function in response to perturbation is equivalent to 
increasing complexity. 
(P6) Selection pressures result from the self-organization of an ecological system as a whole 
upon the autonomous agent. 
(P7) The self-organization of the ecological system is facilitated by individual systems 
adaptively coordinating form and function in accord with their ecological constraints. 
(P8) Any open thermodynamic system that adaptively constrains the forms and functions of 
its constituents is auturgic.  
__________ 
(C3) The biosphere as a whole exerts constraints upon its members that drives an increase in 
complexity, thus qualifying as auturgic (i.e. ecopoiesis or Gaia). 
 
 
V. Approaching the Crucial Problem of Consciousness  
(1) The Crucial Problem – Harris proposes the problem of consciousness is the discrepancy 
between identifiable behavior and mental phenomena such that behavior will never be 
sufficient to derive conscious experiences.   
(2) Judgment – If all bodily behavior can be recreated via mechanical means, it must be 
insufficient to account for mental phenomena. Harris proposes that judgment is arises from 
numerous unconscious dynamics that provides a necessary and pre-lingistic 
contextualization/synthesis that renders conscious some sensation, impression, or conception.  
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(3) Scale of Forms – Rather than positing a relationship between conscious awareness and 
material behavior, Harris aims to investigate consciousness within a scale of non-conscious 
mental processes on the one hand and the scale of material evolution on the other. Harris 
argues that a result of framing mind in this way is that there is an isomorphic configuration 
and identity of organization that appears as respective fields, not corpuscles.  
(4) Dynamical Constraint – Through the sublation of relatively independent phases of 
organization/ function Harris claims the system is ‘informed’ in the sense that it is guided by 
the feelings it creates. “Conscious behavior” is a dynamic constraint upon or organization of 
phases that instantiate a higher order phase (characterized by a judgment of feeling). This 
kind of organization does not however occur at the level of the brain and/or body, but across 
numerous levels of the system as a whole through time. 
(5) Neurophenomenology – Anticipating later works in the philosophy of neuroscience, 
Harris holds that both phenomenological and cognitive neurological investigations are 
required and neither is sufficient on its own to study the phenomenon of consciousness.  
 
 
V – a. Spinozian Embodiment 
(P1) Self-maintenance of a human being is achieved in and through self-sentience of the 
system (ideatum or biological value principle). 
(P2) Self-sentience of the system as a whole depends upon self-reference: systematization of 
judgments concerning past and future actions involving (initially confused) affective cues. 
(P3) A conscious system must be capable of cognizing beyond one’s (non-representational) 
felt model of self-in-relation-to-world by anticipating alternative models (i.e. self-
transcendence via empathy). 
(P4) Self-transcendence is possible only for a system that is embedded in a sociological 
network and has access to external perspectives of oneself and their objects of intention. 
__________ 
 (C) Consciousness is an embodied, embedded, and enacted process of self-reference whose 





	   308	  
VI. Enactivist Neutral Monism 
(1) Coherence and Reflexivity – Intentionality, life, and mind are considered interrelated and 
co-instantiating. As a result, AE in conjunction with sensorimotor theory requires that 
conscious experience is not in or about an external world, but is intentional and reflexive, 
meaning agents produce a meaningful world and this world produces us. This entails a WST, 
or coherence theory of truth, in which affordances are about a synthetic world-as-
experienced, which gives rise to the objects and properties we identify. However, there is a 
continuous movement beyond any given system so constructed, towards increasing clarity.  
(2) Dynamic Systems Theory – DST rejects intrinsic properties of atoms, neurons, brains, or 
people. As a result, in the context of consciousness, qualia are rejected while experience is 
attributed to embodied, embedded, and extended organisms. Representationalism and 
computationalism are rejected on the basis that brain-body-world forms a strongly coupled 
non-linear dynamical system. This behavior of this system can be treated as an attractor in 
phase space and its functions can be modeled as phase transitions, consistent with those non-
living system with which subjects can be coupled.  
(3) Ontic Structural Realism – The natures of space, time, and matter are incompatible with 
standard metaphysics that rely upon concepts like individuals and intrinsic properties. An 
OSR supportive of ENM grants ontological priority to relational processes and structure – 
structures that turn out to be relations upon further inspection. Accordingly, the world is not 
made of any basic parts, nor does it have a foundational level; but is conceived as relations all 
the way up and all the way down. Here structures and relational processes are ontologically 
equal and inseparable.  
(4) Neurophenomenology – On the one hand, the NCC are considered necessary but 
insufficient conditions of consciousness. On the other hand, conscious experience necessarily 
involves temporal flow, the feeling of presentness via ongoing synthesis that permits 
protention of the future and retention of the past. This implies that subjective reports are 
fundamentally incomplete and constrained by the above coherence theory. Consequently the 
evolution of a subject’s gestalt and neurodynamics are treated as correlated but irreducible 
processes, each modeled in phase spaces characterized by respective symmetry breaks and 
self-organization. In accord with Bohm’s conception of correlated lower dimensional 
structures that are unified in a higher dimensional reality, phenomenology and 
neurodynamics can be mutually informing and increasingly illuminating of a common neutral 
base. 
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(5) The Neutral Base – Mental and material domains are partial realities, abstractions from a 
neutral base that is neither a substance, nor fundamental kind of constituent. This base is 
considered a higher dimensional and self-specifying whole that manifests as a range of co-
arising domains, i.e. a scale of forms. Consciousness is not a property, thing, entity, or 
substance that arises from a substrate in the strong emergentist sense, nor is it essentially 
different, separable from, or merely correlated with matter. The dichotomies of outside/inside, 
knowledge/nature, and mental/material are rejected (or rephrased as conventional). Subject 
and object/world are considered co-existent, co-constraining, and self-consistently 





VI – a. Onto-Epistemic Dialectic Phenomenology  
(1) Dialectical Whole as Structure – Characterized by a-temporal abstraction, at this level 
there exists only a framework for knowledge resulting in rough empirical levation/diffraction 
via noematic givenness (ESE/thesis). Outside-inside (01) in KBL, this level denotes the 
experience of 2-3D form – that is, efficient causation and ideal sensation of contained body. 
(2) Dialectical Whole as Kinetics – Identification of dynamics permits increasingly accurate, 
spatiotemporal levation. Here structures are individuated in virtue of their generating, or 
being generated by some temporal process, thereby distinguishing the formal governance that 
constrains efficient causation (PSE/antithesis). Inside-outside (10) in KBL, this denotes the 
2+1 or 3+1D identification of form against a relative background – that is, the differentiation 
of bodily self from bodily Other. The addition of time permits the specification of possible 
alterations to the identified phenomena, thus anticipation and judgment are enacted.  
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(3) Dialectical Whole as Periodicity – Spatiotemporal iterations leading to the identification 
of empirical emergence, respective levels of nature characterized by self-organization, and 
formal governance (MSE/synthesis). Inside-inside (11) in KBL, this signifies the return to 
depth-dimension. Here the subject establishes identity with their object via self-reference and 
self-transcendence of this identity via conception of the object’s origin and developmental 
trajectory. Relations among objects are systematized through (the now possible) social 
conventions that permit the object to be identified with the whole of reality, thus establishing 
a priori synthesis, cosmology, and metaphysics. Such systems may again be objectified (via 






















                                                
253 Notice also that these three phases mirror the above conception of Spinozan embodiment (including 
Damasio’s arguments) for the emergence of self, i.e. ideatum/proto-self, core-self, biographical/situated social 
self. 
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Glossary  
 
Autopoiesis – (self-producing) refers to the self-creating, self-organization of chemical, 
neuronal, and cognitive systems, in which there is a continuous regeneration and reproduction 
of the system by its own processes. This theory was originally proposed by Varela and 
Maturana (1972) as a model of life in its simplest form, i.e. the individual cell. The resulting 
conception of biochemical feedback loops between the living system and its environment 
(sensation), coupled with those between its membrane and components (self-generation) have 
been considered necessary and sufficient for adaptive self-preservation (minimal 
intentionality and cognition). In later developments, this theory has been extended to 
analysises of ecological and social systems more broadly.  
Cybernetics – Derived from the Greek kubernētēs ‘steersman’, from kubernan ‘to steer.’ 
The paradigm shift ushered in by cybernetics replaced the linear Newtonian worldview by 
showing that information (or detectable differences) permits order in and through feedback 
relations of a system. Hence, cybernetics is the science of communications and automatic 
control systems in both living and non-living systems. With cybernetics there is particular 
emphasis upon self-organization, recursively, and form. Second-order cybernetics (or second-
order science) attempts to account for the feedback influences of an engineer or observer 
upon an original target system.   
Diachronic – denotes historical changes in a system over time that lead to the emergence 
of some properties, relations, functions, etc., that are purportedly irreducible to their lower 
level constituents. For example, the occurrence of life in an environment that previously did 
not contain life, or the alteration of a language to include rules previously absent fits this 
category. In this thesis it is argued if certain phenomena cannot, by their very nature be 
spatio-temporally localized, they are diachronically (at least second-order) emergent. 
Dialectic – as a method, the dialectic began with Socrates’ (469 – 399 BCE) approach to 
discourse. Towards the establishment of truth concerning two or more different points of 
view about a subject, the dialectic can progress by reductio by assuming the truth of a 
particular view and then showing that it leads to contradiction. As proposed by G.W. Hegel 
(1770-1831), the dialectic was presented as a triadic structure that exemplifies three stages of 
development through abstract → negative → concrete sublation. Later elaborated by J.G. 
Fichte (1762-1814), the dialectic took the following iconic form: (i) a thesis that takes the 
form of a positive proposition, structure, or effect; (ii) an antithesis, which contradicts or 
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negates the thesis; and (iii) a synthesis that resolves the tension between the two and generates 
a successive thesis. In this thesis “dialectic” denotes both a kind of relation and an 
evolutionary process. The term “dialectical relation” (synonymous with “internal relation”), 
applies to instances in which the nature of an entity and the system within which it obtains are 
mutually dependent and dynamical. For a summary of “dialectical evolution”, see the below 
entry on “explicative process”.   
Diffraction	  –	  If a wave meets a barrier in which there is a circular opening whose diameter 
is much smaller than the wavelength, the waves emerging from the other side of the opening 
spread out in all directions. This deviation from the previous straight-line path results in the 
wave impacting the opposite face of the barrier, which creates an interference pattern. 
According to agential realism, diffraction permits a more accurate means of conceptualizing 
the relation between nature and culture than a representationalist analogy of reflection from 
geometrical optics. This relation is considered that of “exteriority within”, an “enactment” of 
boundaries. 
Dimensionality – In physics and mathematics the dimension of a space or physical object 
is typically defined as the minimum number of (orthogonal) coordinates needed to specify 
any point within it. For example: 0D is the point, an infinitely small placeholder that exists 
not in space, but only in time. Although no time passes within it, the zero dimension marks 
the moment between past and future. A line has 1D because only one coordinate is needed to 
specify a point in such a space. A surface such as a plane or the surface of an object is 2D 
because two coordinates (latitude and longitude) are needed to specify a point in this space. 
The inside of a cube, a cylinder, or a sphere for example is 3D because three (x, y, and z) 
coordinates are needed to locate a point within this space.  
Ecosystem – A system, or a group of interconnected elements, formed by the interaction of 
a community of organisms with their environment. Specifically, I take the term ecosystem to 
mean two or more organisms whose self-organizing processes have become coupled or 
interdependent with one another and to a mutual non-living context. Systems of this kind are 
unique for their capacity to collectively manipulate their non-living environment and thereby 
instantiate the selection effect of evolution. This is possible to the extent that the organisms, 
combined with their environmental create a feedback loop to constrain the form and function 
of the organisms themselves. 
Effective Field Theories – (EFTs) includes the appropriate degrees of freedom to describe 
certain physical phenomena occurring at a relevant length or energy scale, while ignoring 
substructure and degrees of freedom at shorter distances and higher energies. EFTs provide 
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what some call a ‘tower of theories’ ordered hierarchically according to energy scale, where 
high-energy (short-distance) theories are at the ‘top’ and lower-energy (larger-distance) 
theories compose the lower ‘levels’ in the tower. Each of the levels are considered (quasi-) 
autonomous in that each can be studied independently of the one above it, but the entities of a 
particular level are also somehow constituted by those of the level above it. Roughly 
speaking, the respective energy levels correspond to the phenomena studied by respective 
disciplines, e.g. quantum gravity, particle physics, condensed matter, chemistry, biology, and 
psychology. According to the reductionist program the dynamics of microlevel entities should 
determine processes on the macrolevel (the low-energy processes). In practice however, 
theories from different levels are not as closely connected because a law that is applicable on 
the macrolevel can be mostly independent of microlevel details, e.g. hydrodynamics. Each 
level is thereby linked to its neighbors via emergence relations.  
Embodiment – A theory of cognition that maintains particular bodily forms and functions 
are a necessary precondition for the experience of emotion, use of language, thought, and 
social interaction. Kinesthetic awareness of the body is thus a vehicle through which 
sensorimotor, perceptual, and nonconceptual lived world is experienced. Antithetical to 
representational and computational theories of mind as emotionless symbolic manipulations, 
this theory posits a proprioceptive, nonconceptual awareness that is sub-conscious, pre-
reflective, and necessarily intersubjective.  
Enactive – First used by Bruner (1966) in his theory of child learning that consisted of 
three successive modes of representation: enactive (action-based), iconic (image-based), and 
symbolic (language-based). The phrase, “enactive approach to cognition,” was later used by 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) in the context of embodied cognition. Accordingly, all 
life involves autonomous agency that actively generate and maintain their identities, enact 
(bring forth) their own cognitive domain. For example, the nervous system generates and 
maintains its own coherent and meaningful patterns of activity according to organizationally 
closed reentrant sensorimotor network of interacting neurons. According to this theory, the 
nervous system does not process information in the computationalist sense but creates 
meaning. This implies that the cognitive being’s world is not a pre-statable, external realm, 
represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain that is brought forth by that being’s 
mode of coupling. The environment then, is from the first, partially constituted by a network 
of agents. Human knowing and purposeful acting is best understood as a complex 
interrelationship between brain, body, and environment.  
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Explicative Process (E) – Harris’s theory of evolution intended to be applicable to 
cosmology, biology, and the sociological development of knowledge. Harris’s theory of 
evolution concerns the self-differentiation of Nature as a whole (i.e. the Concrete Universal). 
For Harris, this evolutionary process results in a series of “unifying principles” (ϕ) becoming 
specified over time, the relations between which are considered fractal and thereby 
interdependent (i.e. dialectically related). In the present thesis I have argued that E is most 
adequately conceptualized as a process of symmetry breaking, largely analogous to Bohm’s 
articulation of the “holomovement” and Gunn’s conception of “pneumatical force.” As Harris 
recognizes however, since each phase is believed to sublate and transform those of its 
predecessors towards increasing completion (contra Gunn) this process is essentially 
dialectical in the Hegelian sense.  
Fractal – To obtain a fractal dimension we begin with a Euclidean 2D space and reduce its 
linear size by 1/r in each spatial direction (length, area, or volume). The measure thus 
increases by N=rD times the original. Taking the log of both sides of the resulting N=rD, 
produces log(N) = D log(r). Solving for D = log(N)/log(r), which means D is not an integer, 
as it is in Euclidean geometry, but a fraction between 1 and 2 dimensions. As a fraction 
dimension, each scale has the same statistical character as the whole over potentially infinite 
iterations. Fractal modeling can be useful for predicting structures in which similar patterns 
recur across a range of scales (such as snowflakes), and in describing chaotic and dynamic 
systems such as crystal growth or galaxy formation. Although such natural phenomena 
demonstrate scale-free patterns, they are considered quasi-fractals because they are finite.  
Idealism – A range of metaphysical theses maintaining that reality as a whole (ontological 
variants), and/or reality as we can know it (epistemic variants), is fundamentally mental, 
spiritual, or otherwise immaterial. Whereas George Berkeley’s “immaterialism” advocates for 
the exclusive ontological reality of ideas, Imanual Kant provides an example of a critical or 
“epistemic” varient typified by his division of “phenomenal” and “noumenal” domains. 
Idealism has been further differentiated into “subjective” and “objective” varients. In his 
subjective idealism, Fichte argued that only subjective content of the I is absolute and denied 
its identity with not-I or nature. Contrarily, Schelling attempted to establish the identity of the 
subject, object, and concept by positing the objectivity of subject (I), as well as the 
subjectivity of the object (not-I). Objective idealism identifies subject and object as the 
“absolute,” unconditioned first principle of philosophy (hence, it is a “philosophy of 
identity”). Harris, following Hegel, proposed that self and not-self (mind and matter) were co-
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arrising phases through which the Absolute must pass (like a symphony), but that formal 
(dialectical) constraints are common to both and ultimately render these (conventional) 
distinctions continusous. On my account, dialectical holism can recognize the ultimate 
continuity of “subject” and “object,” but cannot identify any particular subtect-object relation 
with the Absolute since its status remains beyond our ken.  
Klein Bottle –The Mobius strip, named after the astronomer and mathematician August 
Ferdinand Möbius (1790-1868), was first proposed in 1858: start with a rectilinear strip of 
anything, say paper, twist it 1800 and then join the ends. The most interesting feature of this 
object is that it is considered non-orientable – meaning it has only one surface. In 1882, Felix 
Klein (1849-1925) considered what would happen if two Möbius loops were connected 
together to create a single sided bottle with no boundary. Here the structure’s “inside” is its 
“outside”. While the Möbius strip obtains only if it is embedded in three-dimensional 
Euclidean space, the Klein bottle typically requires being embedded in 4D. A physical Klein 
Bottle is a 3D immersion of a 4D structure, analogous to a two-dimensional photograph of a 
three dimensional object. As a 2D manifold (i.e. there is only one surface) a Klein Bottle 
requires 4D because the surface has to pass through itself without a hole, which is to say it 
must be closed and non-orientable. In this way we must imagine the 4th dimension that 
permits its structure. In this vein, a hyper-Klein Bottle obtains in still higher dimensions.  
Neutral Monism – An ontological thesis in the philosophy of mind maintaining that the 
mental and the physical are two ways of organizing or describing nature as a whole, which is 
itself something neutral between the two. Importantly, NM is noneliminativist about the 
reduction of mental and physical aspects to their common base. The questions these 
proponents must answer are: (i) What is the nature of the neutral base that forms ultimate 
reality, e.g. plural (the usual account), or singular? (ii) What is the relationship of this neutral 
base with matter and mind? In this thesis it is argued the neutral ground is best captured by 
appeal to a particular ontic structural realism.  
Ontic Structural Realism – Scientific realism, is the belief in the existence of 
unobservable entities posited by the most successful scientific theories. One of the most 
powerful arguments against this view is from the history of paradigm changes in science. 
First proposed by John Worrall (1989), structural realism (SR) provided a way of having the 
best of both worlds. In its epistemic form (ESR) can be understood as a relational 
constructivism, in which we know only the causal-relational structure of the world, not its 
intrinsic nature. According to OSR, the natures of space, time, and matter are incompatible 
with standard metaphysics that rely upon concepts like individuals and intrinsic properties. 
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Broadly construed, OSR supports any metaphysical thesis that grants ontological priority to 
structure and relations – structures that on many accounts turn out to be relations upon further 
inspection. The version of OSR attributed to dialectical holism in this thesis maintains that 
fundamentality in the philosophy of physics is not granted to structures (abstract symmetry 
relations) nor to their relata (kinds of physical entity), but rather to the dynamic process by 
which both become realized.  
Ouroboros – (jʊəәrəәˈbɒrəәs, ˌjʊəәroʊ; Ancient Greek: οὐροβόρος [ὄφις] < οὐρά (tail) + 
βόρος (devouring) "tail-devouring snake") is a symbol originating in Ancient Egyptian 
iconography depicting a serpent or dragon eating its own tail. The ouroboros entered Western 
thought via Greek magical tradition and was adopted as a symbol in Gnosticism, 
Hermeticism, and alchemy. As in this thesis, it is typically intended to represent a process of 
eternal return. Counter contemporary appeals to this symbol as characterizing scientific 
progress however, I argue that the implication of finality, as in a ToE is mistaken. 
Phase of Matter – Matter is defined as that which has mass and occupies space. States of 
matter are the physical forms that matter takes under some condition of temperature and 
pressure such as solids, liquids, gases, plasma, Bose–Einstein condensates, condensed, 
magnetic, time crystal, and electric. To specify the state of matter is to provide the compound 
of a physical system (e.g. a jar of oil and water is in a liquid state) whereas phase specifies the 
set of states within such a system (in this case two phases due to their relative insolubility). 
Phases of matter are determined with respect for the region of space in which there are 
uniform physical parameters (temperature, pressure, etc.) or phenomenology (the types of 
molecular movements observed at different temperatures). During a phase transition, a 
system passes beyond a critical state at which point the order parameter goes from zero to 
non-zero. Critical states appear as repellers by acting as boundaries between basins of 
attraction, but they can also act as attractors since the smallest relevant perturbations can 
collapse the system beyond the threshold. Passing this boundary, phase transitions describe 
how relations among molecules can suddenly undergo qualitative changes to more efficiently 
dissipate energy. Immediately before a phase transition, disorder increases within the system, 
which coincides with a disintegration of existing structures prior to reorganization. After a 
phase transition, disorder drops to a lower level than it was previously. The difference 
between the entropy before the start of the phase transition and the entropy immediately after 
is called negentropy, which coincides with the emergence of new thermodynamically 
advantaged structure due to an increase in how quickly the system can manage/export 
entropy.  
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Phenomenology – A philosophical tradition originating in the early nineteenth century 
European sources interested in the study of phenomena, the structure appearance, experience, 
or consciousness. Kant used the term to distinguish between the study of objects and events 
as they appear in experience (phenomena) and as they are in themselves (noumena). Hegel 
(1770-1831) used the term to denote a science he hoped to develop, by which mind may 
become known to us as it is in itself. Franz Brentano (1838–1917) introduced the concept of 
intentionality (from intender, meaning directed aboutness). For William James (1842-1910), 
phenomenology was radical empiricism, lived experience in the immediate moment before 
the differentiation of subject and object. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and his followers 
focused upon lived experience of the immediate moment. Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology used a method characterized by the epoché (from the Greek ἐποχή epokhē, 
"suspension") or bracketing of our naïve or natural attitude that what is observed exists ‘out 
there’ beyond the observer. This became a method of self-discovery and ego transcendence, a 
discipline endeavoring to describe how our lifeworld is constituted and experienced by 
reducing or distorting influences of various cognitive operations of one’s object. For Martin 
Heidegger (1889-1976), phenomenology was ontology, the study of dazein, or modes of 
being in the world. For Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), phenomenology was the study of 
essences, the nature or meaning of perception. Developed by Francisco Varela (1946-2001), 
contemporary neurophenomenology, draws upon these traditions in combination with Eastern 
meditative practices and neuroscience to elucidate common principles of neurologic and 
experiential dynamics. 
Pneumatology – On the very first page of Gunn’s (2011) work he notes “pneumatology” is 
taken from the Greek word for breath. By pneumatic he intended an antonym for mechanical 
action by which one entity acts on another. An entity acts pneumatically when it determines 
or endeavors to determine its own state. Gunn’s project has been to argue that physics reveals 
sufficient evidence to posit pneumatical action as not only possible but essential to Nature. 
That is, nature is fundamentally self-determining and self-moving, thereby excluding any 
need to invoke God or any other external force. Hence in line with Bohm and Harris, Gunn’s 
thesis aims to antiquate a mechanistic view of nature and undercut idealism in favor of a 
process ontology based in contemporary physics.  
Pragmatism – An American philosophical movement initiated by C. S. Peirce (1839-
1914) and William James (1842–1910), who were unable to agree on a single definition of 
the term, thus resulting in two pragmatisms. Pragmatism rejects the idea that the function of 
thought is to describe, represent, or mirror reality. Instead, pragmatists consider thought an 
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instrument or tool for prediction, problem solving and action. Pragmatists contend that most 
philosophical topics – such as the nature of knowledge, language, concepts, meaning, belief, 
and science – are best viewed in terms of their practical uses and successes. Pragmatists can 
appeal to a coherentist theory that rejects the claim that all knowledge and justified belief rest 
ultimately on a foundation of non-inferential knowledge or justified belief. Justification can 
then be established via the relationship between beliefs, none of which are privileged as in the 
case of foundationalist theories. Pragmatists thereby hold a considerably deflationary account 
of truth. Accordingly, assertions that predicate truth of a statement do not attribute a property 
called truth to such a statement, but such assertions are rather useful-to-believe. This is also 
consistent with an instrumentalist and anti-realist philosophy of science that a scientific 
concept or theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains and predicts phenomena, 
as opposed to making claims about objective reality. This leads to a pluralist view of 
metaphysics that there is more than one sound way to conceptualize the world and its content. 
Dialectical holism endorses this view but maintains (or hypothesizes) a particular kind of 
open-ended convergence, i.e. an ongoing unity-in-diversity of ontologic and epistemic 
theories.   
Supervenience – A relationship holding between some higher- and lower-level properties. 
Some intrinsic qualitative properties of an object O supervene upon intrinsic qualitative 
properties and relations of its parts just in case there is no change in the properties and 
relations of O without a change in the properties and relations of its parts. Hence, higher-level 
properties supervene upon the lower level when knowledge of the underlying constituents 
overdetermines the knowledge of the higher level.  
Symbiogenesis – Also referred to as endosymbiosis, this theory began as an evolutionary 
theory of the origin of eukaryotic cells from prokaryotic organisms, first articulated in 1910 
by Russian botanist Konstantin Mereschkowski. The theory was later elaborated and 
substantiated with microbiological evidence by Lynn Margulis in 1967. Accordingly, 
eukaryotic cells evolved from the organization of numerous prokaryotes (e.g. mitochondria) 
into a single system. This theory has provided significant support for conceptualizations of 
multi-level selection and macro evolution endorsed by both Harris and contemporary 
enactivism.  
Symmetry – Derived from the Greek words sun (‘with’ or ‘together’) and metron 
(‘measure’), which forms summetria. This term originally implied a relation of 
commensurability or relation between theories using a shared terminology that allows direct 
comparison to determine which is more valid or useful. In the late 1800s Pierre Curie 
	   319	  
established criteria for symmetry breaking. Asymmetry was understood as a particular 
absence of symmetry that is considered to be precisely what permits anything to happen 
within a system. While the symmetry elements of a cause must be found in its effects, the 
reverse is not the case, which means an effect can be more symmetric than its cause(s) (called 
Curie’s principle). Symmetries can be exact (unconditionally valid), approximate (valid 
under certain conditions), or broken (context dependent). Symmetry breaking is understood to 
create certain phenomena that have lower symmetry than the previous states or systems 
involved. In other words, the initial symmetry group is broken into one of its subgroups. A 
symmetry principle is one in which a law or physical phenomenon remains invariant under 
transformation(s) (e.g. rotation, reflection, translation). In symmetry principles, symmetries 
take an explanatory role within a hierarchical structure of a physical theory. Here, symmetries 
are properties of laws that explain their form and occurrence/non-occurrence via physical 
events. Given the methodological power of symmetries, a great deal of ink has been spilt in 
arguments as to whether specific symmetries are ontological or epistemic. Symmetry may, at 
least pragmatically, indicate “objectivity” via invariance under transformation of reference 
frames.  
Synchronic – The study of the elements and their relations at a given moment. In the 
context of emergence this concept refers to instances in which a phenomenon is considered as 
though it were a static photograph so that its purportedly “higher”- and “lower-level” 
properties can be analyzed without dynamical interference.   
Synthetic A Priori – A type of proposition in logic that meets the following two criteria: 
(i) the truth of such a proposition is knowable independently of experience (a priori); (ii) the 
predicate of the proposition is not analytically contained within the subject, but requires 
emperical observation (synthetic). In the present thesis it is attributed to Harris that the 
structure of a dialectical whole identifiable in phenomenology satisfies (i), i.e. it is a priori 
knowble that identity is dependent upon difference via internal relations. Additionally, the 
process of self-differentiation into a scale of forms satisfied (ii), i.e. the content or constraints 
of each scale is only known through empirical investigation, but its coherent evolution 
remains a priori.  
Unifying Principle – (ϕ) Central to Harris’s theories of nature and knowledge, this term 
refers to particular kinds of systems or dialectical wholes. Harris claims an understanding of 
nature and knowledge can be acquired by focusing upon instances in which the form of a 
system imposes an organizational constraint (coherence or unity) upon its constituents. 
Though the whole is considered prior to tis parts, this governance is expected to arise not 
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solely through top-down constraint, but equally through bottom-up self-organizing dynamics, 
i.e. a causal feedback loop. The particular details of this feedback dynamic are believed to be 
characteristic of a particular spatiotemporal domain. Consequentally, the system is 
(dialectically) coupled to its environment just as its components are coupled to one another. It 
is therefore proposed that Nature can be understood as a series of theoretical principles that 
provide accurate predictions within a particular domain or scale. Likewise, theories just as 
their organizing paradigms are considered to be dialectical wholes of this very kind. It must 
be remembered however, that no matter their level of sophistication, the principles that are 
constructed in our systems of knowledge do not refer to actual levels of nature, but are 
general patterns akin to distinguishable levels of a fractal that lead to the discovery of 
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